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This is a general theory of objects and object-relations.1 There are five 
object-types in the world: discursive objects, material objects, relational 
objects, structural-institutional-systemic objects (this type includes 
discursive and material configurations) and people, including the self, 
which is always experienced differently from the way other people are 
experienced. Each of them has different characteristics and, because 
objects have a dynamic structure, in rare circumstances they may change 
their status as objects; indeed, what constitutes an object-type is also 
dynamic. In an object-ontology, objects, including human beings, have 
acquired dispositions. It is also possible to identify different types of 
concepts if we understand a concept-type in relation to how it can be used 
in a way of life. Some of these are: generalisations, abstractions, symbols 
in the mind, acquired dispositions (this is the use that I will be focusing 
on in this book), object categorisations, valued configurations, algorithmic 
formations and semantic conditionals. The reason for doing this is to 
configure and reconfigure the idea of a concept and, in the process, 
configure and reconfigure the concept of learning.
I had originally intended the writing of this book to be devoid of 
references to other philosophers and thinkers. This proved to be too 
ambitious and I have fully referenced, in both a borrowing and 
oppositional sense, some key figures in the history of thought: Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Aristotle, Martin Heidegger, Robert Brandom, Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, Charles Taylor, Roy Bhaskar, Michel Foucault and others. There 
are two reasons for this: first, an inability on my part to develop the full 
range of ideas required to fill out a general theory of ontological objects 
and object-relations; and second, an acknowledgement that the theory 
itself includes a commitment to the way particular ideas, concepts and 
1 In contrast to Maynard Keynes’ General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (Keynes, 1936), 
this general theory does not have a representationalist epistemology and clear Humean (Hume, 
2000) distinctions between facts and values.
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descriptors are embedded in networks of ideas, concepts and descriptors, 
and have a history.
At the time of writing, the world is infected with the coronavirus, 
and much of what I have written here seems to pale into insignificance in 
relation to this threat. However, this general theory is meant to apply to 
pandemic-ridden as well as pandemic-free societies and worlds, which is 
another way of saying that it is a general theory. This book, which is a 
culmination of everything else that I have written (in book, article or 
report form), is dedicated to my family: Moira, Sarah, Ben, Gail, Lucas, 
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the general theory 1
Part one
The general theory
The first part of this work fleshes out a general theory of objects and 
object-relations through an exploration of the important concept of 
learning. It is important because all human activities supervene on 
learning practices of one type or another. However, we should be careful 
not to conflate the concept and the practice, although these are related in 
both causal and associational ways. Knowledge and learning are 
homologous concepts, as they both operate in the same way and they 
share properties and meanings. Knowledge, then, is fundamental to the 
three types of learning that can be identified: cognitive (relating to 
propositions), skill-based (relating to processes) and embodied (relating 
to bodily accomplishments). Prior to each of these three types of 
knowledge is a set of dispositions, without which cognitive, skill-based 
and embodied learning would be unsustainable.
However, in order to understand both the concept and the practice 
of learning, we always and necessarily have to enframe the concept of 
learning. This notion of ‘always and necessarily’ has the Wittgensteinian 
sense of a grammatical notion of inevitability that comes from it being 
part of a network of other concepts and of a system of convention-
governed behaviour. This enframing comprises a semantic understanding 
of the possibilities of the concept, and these possibilities have political, 
social, epistemological, functional, ethical and relational meanings. This 
is the task that I have set myself in the first part of the work, which is an 
account of the general theory. In the second part, I explore in greater 
detail the implications of this theory for the concept and practice of 
learning. I also do what I say needs to be done in the first part of the book: 
to provide historical, archaeological and genealogical accounts of the 
concept and practice of learning.
The general theory then has to take account of discursive 
and material configurations (chapter 1), transcendental knowledge 
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(chapter 2), judgements and criteria (chapter 3), objects and object-
relations (chapter 4), ontic and epistemic values (chapter 5), difference 
(chapter 6), knowledge dualities (chapter 7), institutional and systemic 
power relations (chapter 8) and identity and consciousness (chapter 9). 
In order to do this, it borrows ideas, insights and arguments from two 
seminal books by Ludwig Wittgenstein: the Philosophical Investigations 
(1953) and On Certainty (1969). This enigmatic and tormented 
philosopher provides the inspiration for the general theory that I set out 
in the first part of the work. His influence continues through the second 
part. Although the Investigations is now over 60 years old, what he had to 
offer in the way of ideas still seems to me to be of immense significance.
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1
Introduction – learning as a concept 
and as a practice
In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1961), Ludwig Wittgenstein 
suggested that the world is the totality of facts. A fact, under this 
conception, is simpliciter a truth bearer. Bertrand Russell (with A. N. 
Whitehead, 1925–7)2 had previously developed an argument that there 
are atomic facts on the one hand and expressions of those atomic facts on 
the other. Both Russell and Wittgenstein in the end repudiated these 
atomic unitary philosophies, resulting, in Wittgenstein’s case (see his 
Philosophical Investigations, 1953), in the development of a use theory of 
meaning. Words cannot be understood in relation to the objects they 
designate, nor can they be understood in terms of the representations 
of these objects in the mind. Rather, they can be understood by how they 
are used.
In light of this we need to understand what his use theory might 
mean, and in particular to relate this to what he actually said in the 
Philosophical Investigations (1953).3 This may be the wrong place to start, 
since my purpose in writing this book is to investigate the meaning of 
concepts and other objects as they are used in everyday life. However, in 
this case it can serve as a beginning and a methodology; so long as this 
is understood as a ground-clearing activity and so long as this allows 
2 Russell (with A. N. Whitehead, 1925–7) and Frege (1892) before him adopted an essentially 
Platonic view of logic. For Russell, mathematics is a branch of logic and derives its meaning and 
credibility from it. In this Platonic sense, he believed in a realm of truth that is separate from 
everyday life and which is immutable and eternal. The only way that one could gain access to this 
realm was through reason.
3 Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (1953) is written in a highly elliptical and idiosyncratic 
style; that is, as a series of units exploring a particular topic or idea in what has been called a 
hypertextual mode. This form of writing or textuality is deliberate and has implications for the 
theory of truth he is espousing.
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me to elucidate the key concept that I am concerned about in this book: 
the idea of learning.
Reading a text can be construed in a number of ways, principally 
either as an action in the world or as a conceptual activity in the mind. 
In this opening chapter I am more concerned with the latter than the 
former. A number of approaches to reading texts have been developed. 
The first of these is monosemic,4 which means that a definitive reading 
can be made of a text. However, this type of reading still requires a 
correct approach to be adopted, which comprises: a bracketing out of 
values and value-positions (the reader is able to put to one side their 
preconceptions and prejudgements during the reading);5 the making of a 
series of semantic inferences from the text (the reader uses the one 
correct way of deriving meaning from the assemblage of words and 
other extra- and para-linguistic forms); and being comprehensive 
(the reader is not selective in any way). This correct reading is not 
equivalent to the intentions of the author, as she may not have fully 
appreciated the meaning of the words that she set down on paper (or 
on the internet). Furthermore, she may have changed her mind about 
what her text actually means. However, there is within the text being 
examined an unequivocal statement of meaning, which can be grasped 
only through the use of a transcendental method.
A second approach is also monosemic, but here the primary focus is 
the intentions of the author. The text allows an unequivocal reading because 
that reading is consistent with these intentions. Again, this type of reading 
comprises the use of a transcendental method. A number of implications 
follow from this. It would be wrong to talk about a text being read in a 
number of different ways, because the author intended it to be read in one 
particular way. Since the purpose of reading a text is to reconstruct what 
was in the mind of the author and not to make sense of collections and 
arrangements of words, the text itself acts only as a piece of evidence, albeit 
an important piece, from which the intentions of the author can be 
reconstructed. (It is perhaps appropriate here to point to the real question 
that should come to mind when we are dealing with a notion of evidence, 
which is ‘what is evidence?’ rather than the frequently asked question 
‘what is the evidence for this or that proposition?’6 – see chapter 4.) 
4 In this case there is a double hermeneutic at work, since a concept of learning will also have to deal 
(at least in part) with the learning of concepts and the relations between them.
5 The phenomenological reduction then is this attempt to suspend self and other viewpoints and 
preconceived perspectives on the world.
6 The use of a reductionist and detheorised notion of evidence is common in the field of education 
currently.
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There are a number of problems with the idea that, when reading a text, 
readers should always focus their attention on what the author of the text 
intended. First, the author may not know her own authorial intention 
with the required degree of certainty. Second, the author may have 
deliberately crafted a text that allows a number of different readings. The 
meaning does not reside in the text, but in the way in which it is read. 
Furthermore, the form the text takes or the way in which the thought 
processes of the author are translated into textual form – its textuality – is 
time-oriented, which complicates the process of inferring authorial 
intention from the text.
A third approach focuses on reading the text and its enframings. 
This is a word used by Martin Heidegger (1962), translated from the 
original German word, Gestell, to denote those social, geo-historical, 
temporal, epistemological, political and discursive frames within which 
our utterances are ineluctably embedded. The text and the way in which 
it is read are enframed. Heidegger (1962: 191) pointed to the ‘fore-
structure’ of interpretation; he meant by this that an interpretation is 
never ‘a presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to us’, 
but always involves a ‘fore-having’, ‘fore-sight’ and ‘fore-conception’. 
Historical texts are therefore read in terms of their pre-texts: each social 
and discursive formation has its own way of organising language, 
discourses and writing, and thus any historical text has a form that is 
unfamiliar to the reader. Furthermore, each text has a subtext, which 
operates beneath the text, but which gives it its meaning: those 
epistemologies and traditions of knowledge that are historical, and which 
allow a particular reading. Heidegger suggested that if we are to 
understand the world, what is in the world and how it is constituted, then 
this understanding has to be seen as a process of Dasein’s7 (being-in-the-
world) ability to interpret the world. This ties together interpretation and 
understanding; and it demonstrates that our interactions with the world 
are not preconditionless, but involve processes of fore-having, fore-sight 
and fore-conception.
There are a number of solutions to the problems created by the 
assertion that textual reading is immersed in history and society. The first 
of these is to accept that any interpretation made is perspectival, and that 
is as far as anyone can go. The second possibility is that we can in some 
way transcend the historicity of our own interpretative stance. 
7 Dasein is a German word, central to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, which means ‘being there’ 
or ‘presence’. (In German, da is ‘there’ and sein is ‘being’. It is sometimes translated into English as 
‘existence’.)
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Hans-Georg Gadamer (1989) suggested this, although it is not a complete 
solution. Instead of proposing that an unequivocal reading of a text is 
possible, he suggested that if we can understand the different contexts 
and pre-texts of a text, then this in itself constitutes a better way of 
reading it. For Gadamer, wrestling as he did with the respective claims 
of authority and tradition, reading a text can be a reasonable activity, 
provided we understand that this is not an objective endorsement of 
authority. Heidegger’s insistence on the place of the fore-structure in any 
interpretation we might want to make is in large measure a reassertion of 
this position.
In making a claim that a conceptual activity such as reading a text 
may have more than one set of meanings attached to it, I am performing 
certain actions and these actions are enframed in various ways. Part of 
this enframing is methodological. I am employing a method that allows 
me to make a claim – it cannot at the same time provide a justification for 
the contents of that claim – about the properties of a particular word or 
word-set. And when I say that an object in the world, in this case a word 
or word-set, has properties, I am saying that the word-object is 
characterised by how it is structured or what attributes it has. I am also 
suggesting that it cannot have an infinite number of properties or 
attributes – there are limits – and what follows from this is that in the 
ceaseless repositioning and restructuring of these objects and their 
properties, those properties, however fleetingly held, constitute the 
object’s potential behaviours and uses in the world. And thus, as 
Wittgenstein reminded us, there is a particular way of understanding 
these behaviours: ‘(w)e feel as if we had to see right into phenomena: yet 
our investigation is directed not towards phenomena, but rather as one 
might say, towards the ‘possibilities’ of phenomena. What this means is 
that we call to mind the kinds of statement that we make about phenomena’ 
(Wittgenstein, 1953: §90, his italics). Any methodological statements 
that I make, and I will be making many of these in the pages of this book, 
will point in the first instance to the possibilities and, as importantly, 
limitations, of a word, word-set or linguistically structured concept with 
the purpose of determining the meaning. The aim, as it was for 
Wittgenstein, first and foremost, is a semantic one. If the task is semantic 
then we are necessarily concerned with determining the truth or 
otherwise of the statements we make about the world, including the one 
that begins this sentence.
For example, if I assert that true knowledge is language-based, I am 
suggesting that the truth criterion for this assertion is situated in a 
language and its structures. I am, as Wittgenstein argued, using criteria, 
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and in using these criteria I am choosing one set of criteria over and 
against another. The problem with locating truth in language structures 
is two-fold. First, an assumption has to be made that this language 
structure has developed as the optimal way of describing and functioning 
in the world and that the semantic enablements and constraints built into 
these linguistic structures are not historical corruptions but are responses 
to changing ontological structures. The second assumption that has to be 
made is that the development of these language structures does not 
influence or have an effect on what is there in the world. Making either or 
both of these assumptions is fraught with difficulty. However, what we 
can take from this discussion of the semantic implications of reading a 
text or interpreting a discursive object in the world is that any reading or 
interpretation is epistemically enframed in some way or another. And this 
means that ineluctably we have to confront the issue of knowledge 
creation and its justification.
True knowledge
We are concerned then with the idea of true knowledge. I can think of a 
number of possibilities as to what this might be, using a Wittgensteinian 
approach to understanding concepts. For example, true knowledge might 
refer to hypotheses that work. Here, the burden of proof for whether a 
statement satisfies a set of criteria is that when this hypothesis, referring 
to a proposed relationship in the world, is deployed in a practical sense, it 
works, or at least it leads to effects that the hypothesis predicted. A second 
example might be that true knowledge is inter-subjectively agreed 
knowledge. Here the burden of proof is that the truth criterion for this 
statement about knowledge resides in whether or not the claim being 
made is agreed with a community of knowers who have an interest in it. 
A third example might be that true knowledge can be justified empirically; 
and here the burden of proof for any statement that I might want to make 
rests with some form of true relationship between what is in the world 
and my knowledge of it. The most common form that this can take is 
correspondence or mirroring (cf. Richard Rorty’s, 1979, arguments 
against this position). A fourth possibility is that true knowledge is 
logically coherent and that it is possible to identify, in a universal sense, 
certain correct relations and consequently certain incorrect relations 
between words, word-sets, concepts and forms of knowledge. Another 
credible position that can be taken asserts that true knowledge is such 
because we trust it. In effect, we have tried-and-trusted methods, deeply 
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embedded in the social arrangements we have made, for judging whether 
evidence is reliable, including, as Wittgenstein would have been inclined 
to say, criteria for making these judgements.
There are five conceptions of truth (there may be more, but they 
have not yet been invented or codified): truth as correspondence, truth as 
coherence, truth as what works, truth as consensus and truth as warranted 
belief.8 These different theories of truth are framed so that they point to 
a relationship between a statement and a referent; and thus we can say, if 
we want to adopt a correspondence theory of truth, that a statement is 
true if it corresponds to something in the world. Again we can say, if we 
want to adopt a conception of truth as coherence, that a proposition is 
true if it is consistent with a further set of propositions, and so on, until 
we exhaust the possibilities that inhere in this concept.
It is also possible for us to assert, if we ignore those siren voices 
pushing us towards taking a sceptical position about knowledge, that the 
referent in each particular case is of a different order. So, for example, a 
correspondence version of truth refers to a state of affairs, whereas truth 
as warranted belief refers to whether it satisfies an epistemological test 
to determine its value. Furthermore, some of these conceptions of truth 
allow for the possibility of a social element whereas others do not. So, 
truth as correspondence would suggest that a belief in epistemic 
relativism is unsound, whereas truth as consensus is predicated on a 
belief that a universal ahistorical warrant cannot legitimately be 
developed. These different theories are framed so that belief in one 
precludes belief in another.
From this list of possibilities, we can perhaps focus on those that 
could be placed under a pragmatist (in a formal philosophical sense) 
heading; and this is what Wittgenstein seems to have done. There are a 
number of knowledge frameworks that can broadly be thought of as 
pragmatic. C. S. Peirce’s (1982) pragmatic maxim was that any theory of 
meaning assumes that the content of a proposition is the experienced 
difference between it being true or false. Or, as he put it: ‘consider what 
effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the 
object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is 
the whole of our conception of the object’ (Peirce, 1982: 402). There has 
been some debate about what he meant by this, even to the extent that 
Peirce disowned William James’ version of it, leading him to rename his 
philosophy as pragmaticism. However, these different interpretations lead 
8 For a fuller explication of these theories of truth, cf. Bridges (1999).
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us towards a theory of truth in which truth is understood in terms of 
the practical effects of what is believed and, particularly, what its use-
value is. The concept of use-value is and can be deployed in a number 
of different ways: making a set of propositions more coherent or 
consistent; alleviating some need in the world; fulfilling a personal 
desire; moving from one state of being to another; or, as we have already 
seen, determining whether a hypothesis actually works in the world.
A further version of pragmatism is that something is true if it enables 
that person to say that this mechanism or sequence of activities will 
happen or can be sustained in other situations than those in which it is 
being applied. It therefore has an externalising dimension. This points 
to the idea that something is true if it works; and this immediately 
creates a problem because a further justification needs to be made as to 
whether what works is ethical – the normative ontological dimension. 
More importantly, there is a problem with regards to how it works – what 
is it about its workings that allows us to say that it works? Furthermore, 
any theory that incorporates an externalising element is realist in 
principle, although this argument does not specify what type of realism is 
being advocated.
Another pragmatic justification is that a judgement can be made 
between two different items of knowledge on the grounds that one is 
more likely to be useful than the other. It should be noted here that an 
epistemic judgement (in the traditional sense, and where this refers to a 
true or false proposition) is being replaced by a pragmatic judgement 
about efficacy, although in this case a different type of truth theory is 
being invoked. As a result, it is possible to argue that a theory about an 
object, a relation between objects or a configuration of two (or more) 
objects should be preferred to another theory because it is more practically 
adequate – human practices within which it is subsumed work in a better 
way as a result of its use. The issue still remains as to what might constitute 
successful work, or, to put it in a Wittgensteinian way, what criteria could 
be used to judge whether the practical adequacy of one practice is superior 
to another. This can be resolved only by arguing that one of these theories 
contributes to a better way of life than the other, and that this better way 
of life is determined by the preferences of people in society and manifested 
through particular networks of power. The problem with this is that those 
sets of indicators – in a Wittgensteinian sense, these are criteria – that 
determine whether a theory is practically adequate may not be acceptable 
to those who hold a different and rival theory. This therefore cannot form 
a basis for distinguishing between different theories except insofar as this 
is decided through and as a result of asymmetrical power arrangements 
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within society. Even here it is not possible to say with any certainty that 
one is more practically adequate than the other as a result of current 
arrangements in society, because what those arrangements signify might 
be disputed, and, in addition, they are likely to change over time.
For Roy Bhaskar (2011), judgemental rationality is the key idea and 
not the natural necessity of objects in the world or the adoption of a use 
theory of language, although the way that objects become the objects 
they are, and the relations between these objects as they are and as they 
will be, still needs to be explained. This requires a unitary theory of 
knowledge and is a corrective to the many disciplinary or domain-specific 
forms of knowledge in existence. And what this suggests is that at the 
extra-disciplinary level, knowledge is capable of being produced that 
allows us to make a judgement between different theories about the 
world; in other words, to allow us to say that this knowledge of objects in 
the world is superior to that knowledge of the same objects. Judgemental 
rationality consists of four elements or processes. The first of these is 
epistemic, where one theory is better than another theory because the 
relationship between knowledge of the world and how the world is 
structured is better aligned. Bhaskar (2011) identified four possible 
reasons for the two elements being misaligned: there are social objects in 
the world and these exist regardless of whether they are known or not; 
knowledge is fallible because any epistemic claim can be refuted; there 
are trans-phenomenalist truths that refer to the empirical world and 
discount deeper levels of social reality – that is, the work of social 
mechanisms; and more importantly, there are counter-phenomenalist 
truths in which those deep structures may actually be in conflict with 
their appearances. The second element or process is where a theory or 
description of the world is superior to another because within it there are 
fewer contradictions and logical anomalies. A third approach focuses on 
the capacity of the theory or model to be more rational than its rivals; and 
a fourth approach suggests that a theory is to be preferred to another 
because it is more practically adequate or has stronger links to existing 
frameworks of meaning (coherentism). These four processes, once they 
have been reconciled, allow us to make judgements about theories, 
models and descriptions of the world. In addition, this configurational 
process can act as criteria of judgement about the object of the 
investigation – the concept of learning.
There are three problems with this conceptualisation of true 
knowledge. The first is that since we are dealing here with four processes, 
we have to address the issue of how they can be subsumed into one set of 
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criteria,9 which would allow us to determine that this statement or claim 
is superior to another statement or claim. The second is that these four 
possible criteria are of a different logical order and this creates difficulties 
if we want to use them in this way. And, third, each of the processes is 
valued ontologically, with these valuations being differently arranged in 
social, geo-historical and discursive environments. What valuations 
should be given to each of them in the process of reconciliation?
However, for Bhaskar (2011), the power of this explanation (for 
determining that one account of something in the world is better than 
another) resides in the disciplines or domains of knowledge, operating as 
they do as transitory manifestations of temporal and spatial knowledge-
development processes. And this implies the use of an immanent 
critique;10 that is, critiquing a perspective in its own terms and usually 
from a specific disciplinary perspective, to establish the possibility of 
judging that one particular theory is superior to another, which means 
that this process belongs to a tradition, disciplinary form of knowledge or 
particular framework. This seems to rule out the possibility of any form 
of universal or foundational knowledge. However, denying the possibility 
of universals seems to be a contradiction in itself, since the denial acts 
in this and other cases as a universal. If this argument is correct, then we 
are beginning the process of establishing the existence of what P. F. 
Strawson (1959) called universals of coherent thought,11 and even some 
universals relating to ontological relationships such as a mind–world 
distinction and consequently a connection between them. This is also a 
denial of true knowledge as being located in the disciplines or domains 
alone and a reassertion that there are some trans-epistemic elements 
(understood in a transcendental sense) to knowledge development.
I take up the issue of universals and their possibilities in the next 
chapter. However, some brief remarks about this important idea are in 
order at this stage of the argument. Universals can be distinguished from 
and contrasted with particulars or individual objects. Under this 
conception, similarity and identity are explained by appealing to general 
concepts existing only in the mind, although they clearly have some 
 9 Susan Haack (1993) attempted a reconciliation between these different criteria of judgement, 
although in her case the criteria were foundationalism and coherentism. She understood 
foundationalist criteria as being inclusive of experiential, rational and logical elements. She called 
her reconciliation foundherentism.
10 For a fuller explication and defence of the notion of immanent critique, cf. Isaksen (2017).
11 This was an attempt by Strawson to reinstate metaphysical entities, although these were somewhat 
different from traditional metaphysical properties of the world. It was not entirely successful.
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connection or relation with particular objects that are mind-independent 
– both of our minds and other people’s. This would suggest that concepts 
such as learning are not real in themselves; that is, they cannot be located 
in space and time. In broad terms, universals can be divided into two 
types. The first comprises meta-statements about matters to do with the 
relationship between mind and world; for example, our conceptual 
frameworks, perspectives on the world and descriptive languages 
interpenetrate what is being called reality to such an extent that it is 
impossible to conceive of a pre-schematised world (Putnam, 1990). The 
second type comprises statements about worldly issues; for example, 
whether smaller class sizes in educational institutions are conducive to 
improved learning by participants.
My concern in the first instance is to try to defend a meta-notion of 
universals, the first of our conceptions, and the one that socio-materialists, 
semiotic-materialists, semioticians and the like12 embed in their theories, 
or at least make assumptions about in their theories, without offering 
any formal justification for doing so. The other important issue that we 
need to think about at this early stage of the argument is the distinction 
between these universals and – their antithesis – particulars. Particulars 
fill regions of space and are located in moments of time. Universals are 
metaphysical, such as in God or ideal speech situations, or at least outside 
space and time, as in numbers. The important contrast here is between 
what is repeatable (universals) and what is not repeatable (particulars). 
There are difficulties of a philosophical nature with universals, it hardly 
needs saying, and accounts of these difficulties will feature in the next 
chapter.
Using criteria, or acknowledging that there are always criteria being 
used in judgements that are made, points to the purpose or function of 
these criteria – the use of any criteria signifies a set of enablements and 
constraints as to how we can use a word or concept. This is a point made 
repeatedly by Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations (1953). 
What constrains or enables us? Now, this question can be answered in a 
psychological or socio-material way. If the person answers it in a 
psychological way, then that person is identifying constraints that relate 
to the person and not to the object or the conditions for the existence of 
the object. For example, if the person makes reference or at least points 
to characteristics that denote personal qualities such as laziness, 
incompetence, ignorance and so forth, she is implying that it is possible 
12 For example, Kress and Bezemer (2015).
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for a human being not to be constrained in this way, and in addition 
she is saying that this particular human being is so constituted at a 
certain point of time that she is unable or unwilling to perform the 
activity. If the person answers it in a socio-material way, then she is 
in effect acknowledging that there are objects, such as linguistic 
structures, metaphysical framings, conceptual arrangements and more, 
that are external to human beings and prevent them from doing certain 
things or allow them to do these things; and these are not just experiences 
of constraints or of course enablements. We do not have to experience 
them as constraints or enablements in order for them to effectively 
constrain or enable us. An example of this process is the formation and 
reformation of a discursive configuration.
Discursive configurations
There are five types of object in the world, each of which has different 
characteristics: discursive objects, material objects, relational objects, 
structural-institutional-systemic objects – this type includes both 
discursive configurations such as Michel Foucault’s (1978b) dispositif, 
and material configurations such as an educational system – and people, 
including the self, which is always experienced differently from the way 
other people are experienced. Each of them has different characteristics 
and, because objects have a dynamic structure, in rare circumstances may 
change their status as objects; indeed, what constitutes an object-type is 
also dynamic. In an object-ontology – this is the framework within which 
I am positioning the concept of learning – objects, including human 
beings, have acquired dispositions (see chapters 14 and 15). Objects may 
change their form over time. An example of this change process where the 
object is initially discursive is the invention (insofar as the set of concepts 
and relations between them is new) of the notion of probability in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (cf. Hacking, 1990), which 
changed the way in which other social objects could be conceived and 
ultimately arranged. The dilemma is that the social world, in contrast 
perhaps to the physical world, is always in a state of transition, so it is 
hard to argue that there are invariant laws by which this world works, at 
all times and in all places, except in a basic logical and rational sense. At 
the discursive level, then, as this example shows, objects (in general and 
in particular) change their form over time and act to constrain and enable 
future configurations. This formulation, which ties together the positive 
force of an enablement with the negative force of a constraint, is not 
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entirely satisfactory. However, my intention here is to point to the dual 
role of an object with causal properties and the possibility that it may 
operate in either way.
If we take one of these object-types, a discursive object-
configuration, we can see how discourses are constituted at set moments 
in time. A discourse is a set of propositions about the world joined together 
by a series of connectives and relations that offers an account of an object 
or objects in the world, and it may even act to create objects in the world. 
It can have a material form – it can be written, orally presented or stored 
electronically as text – and is usually mediated through a language or 
languages. Implicit within every discursive formation are: an account of 
a person, including her dynamic capacities and affordances, and the 
environments within which she is situated; an account of the relationship 
between a person and her environments; knowledge about understanding, 
learning and change, with regards to the person and the environments in 
which she is located; inferences from these accounts, and conclusions 
about appropriate representations, media for representations and 
learning environments. We can say in this context that they are enframed 
by something or other. Furthermore, what needs to be said time and time 
again is that a discursive configuration can never be a simple determinant 
of identity, behaviour or action. Discourses are structured in a variety of 
ways, and both this meta-structuring and the forms it takes are relative 
to time and place (see chapters 21 and 22). These meta-forms refer to 
constructs such as identification, balance of performativity and 
denotation, relative value, hierarchical binary opposition, truth-value 
and reference.
The first of these refers to the setting of boundaries between objects 
in the world – how an object is realised. It is also about the relations 
between singulars and generalities; and it refers to those items that, when 
considered together, constitute a general description of a set of objects, 
such as male/female in a gendered discourse, abled/dis-abled in a 
disablist discourse, black/white in a racial discourse or heterosexual/
homosexual/bisexual/polysexual/transsexual in a sexualised discourse.
A second meta-form concerns the balance in educational and social 
statements between denotation and performativity,13 or between offering 
an account of something with no intention of changing the world and 
offering an account that is intended to change an object or create a new 
13 This distinction is derived from the work of the philosopher J. L. Austin (1962) on denotation and 
performativity. It has subsequently been taken up by many sociologists, who use the two terms, and 
the relations between them, in slightly different ways.
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one. The person is not intending to merely describe what she thinks is in 
the world, but in making the statement, she intends to bring something 
into being. There is of course no guarantee that performative statements 
will achieve their purpose. Denotative statements have a different 
function, in that they seek to describe what currently exists, what might 
exist in the future and what has happened in the past. The intention of 
the utterer is not to bring anything into being in the world. This distinction 
between performativity and denotation makes sense only in relation to 
the intentions of the maker of the utterance and to the perceived 
relationship between statement and act – it implies that such a relationship 
exists even if it does not specify what that relationship is. Propositions 
about learning can be characterised in terms of the balance of 
performativity and denotation within them.
A third meta-epistemic form concerns the relative value given to an 
object in comparison with another object. For example, within a race 
discourse, one of the pair of words is given a greater value than the other, 
with a fairly obvious example being that white is privileged over black. In 
a gendered discourse, male is given a more important valuation than 
female. Dis-ability is understood as being inferior to ability in a disablist 
discourse and so on.
A fourth meta-structuring device refers to the bipolarity of objects, 
descriptions and dispositions; that is, an object, description or disposition 
is defined in terms of another object, description or disposition of which 
it is the mirror opposite. If the male/female binary is used as an example, 
it is possible to see that the positioning of the two terms as oppositional 
in meaning, and the subsequent valuing of one (male) and the devaluing 
of the other (female) because of their oppositionality, has significant 
implications for the way the debate about relations between the two 
concepts can be conducted. Thus, certain words, phrases, descriptors and 
concepts are understood in bipolar terms, which determines how they can 
be used as a resource for understanding the world.
A fifth meta-principle refers to the truth-value of a statement. 
Making an educational or social statement about learning means that 
a particular type of truth-value is being invoked. So, for example, a 
correspondence theory represents the truth of whether the statement 
mirrors the reality that it seeks to describe. As we have already seen, a 
number of such theories are in existence, some fairly primitive such as 
naive appeals to facts, others more sophisticated so that they avoid mirror 
imagery and at least take account of sceptical arguments. On the other 
hand, coherentist theories are constructed in such a way that they 
comprise a belief that the truth-value of a statement does not lie in its 
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reference to an external world but rather in whether it fits coherently 
in a web of knowledge. An educational statement about a category is 
therefore implicitly or explicitly underpinned by a theory of reference 
embedded within a theory of truth, and this marks it out as a discursive 
knowledge form.
A sixth meta-principle refers to the way in which particular ideas, 
concepts, phrases and descriptors are embedded in networks of ideas, 
concepts, phrases and descriptors, and have a history. So, for example, 
learning as a concept is positioned in a complicated network of other 
concepts, such as innateness (see chapter 15), difference (see chapter 6), 
valuing (see chapter 5), power (see chapter 8), assessment (see chapter 
18), curriculum (see chapter 18), genetics (see chapter 9), pedagogy (see 
chapter 17), time (see chapter 21), space (see chapter 21), technology 
(see chapter 13), biology (see chapter 9), intelligence (see chapter 13), 
progression (see chapter 16), reflection (see chapter 17), evolutionary 
theory (see chapter 9), identity (see chapter 9), consciousness (see 
chapter 9), genealogy (see chapter 19) and many more.14 A web or 
entanglement is a suitable description here of this set of relations.
I have been focusing on the relations in the discourse between 
different ideas and notions, and how these can vary depending on the 
discourse – these meta-relations are those of identification, balance of 
performativity and denotation, relative value, hierarchical binary 
opposition, truth-value and reference (cf. Scott and Scott, 2018). These 
in turn can vary in relation to any of the others. Societies are different 
because different valuations are given to each of them. (In chapter 5, 
I will say more about the important role values have in meta-theorising 
and I will argue that values are both ontologically and epistemologically 
present all of the time, which means that the judgements we make and 
the actions we own are subject in every case to a process of normative 
evaluation. Although this is not an entirely original thought, it is still an 
important part of the argument I am making in this book.) These are 
some of the characteristics of discursive objects, although it is important 
to accept that in the flow of time a discursive object may change its status 
and consequently its characteristics. It becomes a different object or even 
in certain circumstances a different type of object. Other types of object, 
such as material entities, object-relations, structural formations and 
human beings, have particular characteristics at particular points in time. 
14 The emphasis in this sentence should be on the words ‘many more’, as this is indeed the crux of 
the matter. In this book I am able to deal with only a small number of all the eligible concepts.
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A discursive object then is a form of knowledge and has to be understood 
as such.
Foundations
However, to use a Heideggerian idea, our being-in-the-world (Dasein) is 
not primarily a question of knowledge. When we talk about being in the 
world, we are referring in the first instance to entities and relations 
between entities. When we talk about knowledge, we are referring to 
ideas, facts, theories and the like. This does not mean that knowledge 
does not and cannot have a material form or that ideas cannot in principle 
generate other ideas or influence material objects, object-configurations 
or relations between objects, because they clearly do. However, knowledge 
and its contents are not the same as those entities and the relations 
between them that make up the material world. The mind always focuses 
on objects that are external to it, although clearly some of these objects 
have become implanted in the mind and therefore can be reexamined in 
their mindful form. This is the key to understanding the social world; and 
consequently, the question needs to be asked: how do we conceptualise 
and make sense of objects and our knowledge of them? These relations 
can be understood in a number of different ways, ranging from a clear 
demarcation between the two sets of objects to a weak or integrated one, 
with each of these conceptualisations referring to how they change 
internally and in relation to each other, and how they can be justified.
Advocates for classical conceptions of foundationalism (and this 
is an example of such a relation or connection) argue that any justification 
for the truth of a proposition rests on identifying those sets of basic 
principles that underpin the way we describe and use them, and the 
relevant inferences that allow the researcher to move from premise to 
conclusion. These basic principles or beliefs must be true propositions, 
and not in need of any further justification, if they are to qualify as 
foundational principles.
This strong foundationalist view therefore comprises a process of 
identifying self-evident truths, which only those human beings with a 
defective perceptual apparatus cannot recognise. It is worth noting here 
that these fundamental and self-evident truths are not subject to any 
forms of argument or development, except insofar as those advocating 
them might choose to exclude those they consider to have a defective 
sensibility; they literally present themselves to the normal person – this 
is, of course, a contested and normative concept – and provide the means 
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by which a foundational structure can be built. And thus, if a foundational 
belief is to be thought of as credible, it requires no further justification 
and no further evidence to support it. In effect, it plays the end role in any 
chain of justification, and there is nowhere else to go if such a justification 
is sought. This is an epistemic chain of reasoning to a foundational or 
transcendental notion. In chapter 2, I address the issue of transcendental 
knowledge in greater detail. A belief in transcendentalism has implications 
for how we can construe the relationship between knowledge and the 
world, and this has implications for whether we can and should accept a 
representational view of the relationship between mind and world.
Representation
Wittgenstein in his early work argued for something that on the surface 
looks like a representational view of the relationship between mind and 
world. An influential interpretation of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 
(Wittgenstein, 1961) is that he was advocating a picture theory of 
meaning, which includes within it the idea of representation. The 
relationship between what we say and what is in the world under this 
conception then becomes one of identity or reflecting back the original 
object. Furthermore, what seems to follow from this is that any proposition 
that we might want to make about the world is meaningful only insofar 
as it pictures states of affairs or matters of fact. And again, what this 
means is that other types of propositions to which we might want to 
give expression, such as ethical, aesthetic or metaphysical ideas about 
the world, are literally nonsensical. In the Introduction to the Tractatus, 
Wittgenstein argued that: ‘(t)he whole sense of the book might be 
summed up in the following words: what can be said clearly, and what we 
cannot talk about we must pass over in silence’. This immediately creates 
a problem, which needs a solution, or at least a tentative solution, before 
I can continue with my argument. This is because I am searching for the 
meaning of the concept of learning, and this concept is not designed to 
picture the world as it is. Picture theories are presupposed by a notion of 
a state of affairs in the world and this theory of language would seem to 
deny meaning to the types of statements that I want to make in this book 
and indeed that Wittgenstein made in the Philosophical Investigations.15 
15 Crude representation theories or picture theories underpin most of the array of tools used by 
statistical empiricists: basic hypotheses tests such as t-tests, ANOVA, contingency tables and chi-
square tests; classic regression modelling including logistic and probit regressions; multilevel 
regression modelling; and data envelopment analysis, propensity score analysis, stochastic frontier 
analysis and simulation.
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This is all very familiar and in a sense in the Investigations Wittgenstein 
attempted to correct this misunderstanding. However, here we have 
another of these troubling concepts: the possibility of correction.
In the Philosophical Investigations, which in some ways can be 
interpreted as a reaction against and repudiation of the Tractatus, 
Wittgenstein focused on the truth-value of linguistic propositions and in 
particular sought to develop an argument or series of arguments against 
words naming objects, the reduction of language to representation and 
the adoption of an atomistic unitary philosophy. This is the use theory of 
language referred to above: ‘for a large class of cases of the employment 
of the word “meaning” – though not for all – this word can be explained 
in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language’ (Wittgenstein, 
1953: §43). Thus, Wittgenstein placed the emphasis on singulars not 
generalisations and concrete processes not abstractions.
This leads ineluctably to a notion of a language-game, which is one 
of the central elements of the Philosophical Investigations (1953). What 
this means is that for certain words and concepts we cannot give a 
definitive account of meaning and this applies equally to words such as 
‘language’ and ‘game’, and complex word forms such as ‘language-game’. 
This does not mean that we cannot use these words and many others on 
the grounds that they are imprecise in definitional terms, but only that 
the case for establishing the meaning of a word, set of words or word-
concept does not lie in the way it is defined. However, what a language-
game does is point to the conventional (not necessarily rule-bound) 
nature of meaning derivation. Wittgenstein’s suggestion that ‘the meaning 
is the use’ is interpreted by Stanley Cavell (1979: 206–7) as calling 
‘attention to the fact that what an expression means is a function of what 
it is used to mean or to say on specific occasions by human beings’. 
This suggests that the meaning of a word, sentence or proposition resides 
in and can only be fully understood within the contexts of its utterance 
(and these in turn need to be explained). This Wittgensteinian assertion, 
if this interpretation is correct, is a refutation of the notion that meaning 
is given by the fixed and essential grammar of the word, sentence or 
proposition, typically addressed by reference to a dictionary or a work 
of reference.
I also want to suggest that words and word-sets may contain more 
than one meaning. For example, a notion such as objectivity, a key term 
in post-truth discursive politics, contains multiple rather than singular 
meanings, as it is used in the world. It is possible to give six different 
meanings to the word (Wittgenstein’s phenomenal possibilities), namely: 
that something can exist objectively without it being perceived by human 
beings; that if something meets a set of truth conditions it is objective; 
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that something is objective when the relevant knowers’ traces such as 
values and interests are bracketed out; that something is objective if it 
can be directly accessed through observation; that something is objective 
if its mode of application to the world is correct; and that something 
is objective when more than one knower can agree on its truthfulness 
(cf. Scott and Scott, 2018).
For Wittgenstein, grammar is a semantic idea; in trying to 
understand the grammar of a collection of words, we are always looking 
at what is meant by the words and their arrangement. Grammar is not 
understood in terms of its linguistic reference, but rather in terms of how 
it can show meaning – what concerned Wittgenstein was the semantic 
possibilities of the grammar of a word or collection of words. This then 
is the point of the Philosophical Investigations (1953). This viewpoint 
also provides a reason or reasons for whether we should or should not 
accept a dispositional view of concepts and a dispositional realist view 
of the world.
Concepts
A number of concepts are used in the field of education, such as: literacy, 
numeracy, meta-cognition, emotional intelligence, self-regulation, growth, 
progression, curriculum, assessment, learning, race, gender, dis-ability, 
intelligence, behaviourism, constructivism and many more.16 It is also 
possible to identify different types of concepts if we understand a concept-
type in relation to how it can be used in a way of life. Some of these are: 
generalisations, abstractions, symbols in the mind, acquired dispositions 
(this is the use that I will be focusing on in this book), object cate- 
gorisations, valued configurations, algorithmic formations and semantic 
conditionals. This class of objects can be understood, as Wittgenstein 
did, as having family resemblances and not just logical or rationally 
formed relations or connections. (I discuss this important Wittgensteinian 
idea in greater detail below.)
I have been focusing on words or complex word-forms in the first 
instance; however, the same applies to concepts and especially to the 
concept of learning. How then can we understand the notion of a concept? 
We can look for the necessary and sufficient conditions by which objects 
can be said to be parts or exemplars of larger groupings. Or we can reject 
16 These are a small sample of all of the available concepts.
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what Wittgenstein described as a ‘craving for generality’ and substitute for 
it a notion of family resemblance:
I can think of no better expression to characterise these similarities 
than ‘family resemblances’; for the various resemblances between 
members of a family – build, features, colour of eyes, gait, 
temperament, and so on and so forth – overlap and criss-cross in the 
same way. – and I shall say: ‘games’ form a family. (Wittgenstein, 
1953: §67)
What this means is that the meaning of a word cannot be definitionally, 
essentially or categorically derived but depends on ‘a complicated 
network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: similarities in the 
large and in the small’ (Wittgenstein, 1953: §66). And what follows from 
this is that how we use a word depends not on a definitional or essential 
meaning but on how it is used in the way of life that we choose to belong 
to and this way of life has a history, within which this network is formed 
and reformed. These overlapping and criss-crossing similarities are events 
that have happened and are happening – an event precedes another 
event. In passing, it is worth noting a desire in much political and 
academic rhetoric to conceal the genealogical element of the meaning of 
a concept. Even if we decide not to go down this genealogical path, we 
still have to acknowledge that in any investigation of an idea or an event, 
there has to be a historical element.
If we assigned a new word to every new manifestation, then we 
could not and would not have concepts. Rule-following is an example of 
such a concept, and Wittgenstein addressed this issue in the Philosophical 
Investigations (1953). For Wittgenstein, rule-following is not a question of 
whether a rule has a definitive abstract form; rather, it is that knowing the 
rule involves grasping that abstract entity. Therefore, the question 
Wittgenstein posed is: how do we know that we are following a rule? The 
claim he made is that there are a number of ways of following the rule and 
the only way for us to have some faith in it being the correct way to follow 
a rule is to observe how it is used:
… no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every 
course of action can be brought into accord with the rule. The 
answer was: if every course of action could be brought into accord 
with the rule, then it can also be brought into conflict with it. And 
so, there would be neither accord nor conflict here. (Wittgenstein, 
1953: §201)
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Wittgenstein wanted to reject the common assumption that a rule is so 
constructed that we are obliged to follow its correct application. This put 
him at odds with Platonism, where the contents of the rule are understood 
as integral and abstract (in other words as non-spatial entities), and 
mentalism, where the contents of the rule are considered to be in the 
mind. The example he gave of a rule is +2, so a pupil who has developed 
the rule correctly up to 1,000 continues it after reaching that number in 
an idiosyncratic way:
Then we get the pupil to continue one series (say ‘+2’) beyond 
1,000 – and he writes 1,000, 1,004, 1,008, 1,012. We say to him, 
‘Look what you’re doing!’ – He doesn’t understand. We say, ‘You 
should have added two: look how you began the series!’ – He 
answers, ‘Yes, isn’t it right? I thought that was how I had to do it.’ 
(Wittgenstein, 1953: §185)
This would seem to suggest that in terms of rule-following anything goes, 
that there is no absolute or integral meaning that can be given to a rule.
However, Wittgenstein was also concerned to repudiate this 
scepticism about meaning. In the end he claimed that there is a way 
of grasping the rule that is not an interpretation – so that it has an 
unequivocal and unambiguous meaning – and this is to treat each 
grasping as a case of application and a case in its own right. Here we have 
an example of Wittgenstein’s anti-theoretical stance, although he 
expressed it – as in a sense he was compelled to do so – in a theoretical or 
abstract manner. He went on to suggest that rule-following is a practice; 
that is, how we follow a particular rule is not a universal, ahistorical or 
atemporal activity – the means for determining how we should follow 
that rule are embedded in our way of life. And this means exactly and 
unequivocally what is feared by a great many academics and scholars: 
that the knowledge process, including the means for determining true 
knowledge, is located in or relative to the activities of geo-historical social 
and discursive communities, or so Wittgenstein claimed. He wanted to 
liberate us from the position of having any metaphysical or foundational 
authority for rule-following beyond the application of the rule.
Related to this is the notion of Wittgenstein’s arguments against the 
idea of a private language – this is one of his units of meaning. Language 
both as a means of social expression and as the arena in which semantic 
games are played out is irredeemably public. Wittgenstein suggested that 
for a statement to be meaningful (that is, for it to make sense and thus be 
useable), it must in principle, and in reality, be subjected to public criteria 
of justification to allow a judgement to be made about its truth-value. 
IntroDuCtIon – learnIng aS a ConCePt anD aS a PraCtICe 23
Thus, for Wittgenstein the signs in language can work only where there 
is the possibility of public (comprising other people in specific time 
and place locales) affirmation or disaffirmation. Two further notions 
of some relevance are referred to in the Philosophical Investigations 
(1953): grammar and form of life. Contrary to the position he took about 
grammar in the Tractatus (1961), Wittgenstein chose to develop a 
semantic notion of grammar. Previously he had understood grammar in 
a technical sense, as the rules in language for correct usage, rather than 
the norms for making a meaningful statement. In this new work, the 
Investigations, he wanted to suggest that the norms of grammar describe 
how we use words to justify our utterances. In doing this, Wittgenstein 
argued against truth-bearing grammarians: grammatical rules cannot be 
idealised as an external system of signs. Grammar is not abstract and thus 
universal (as Noam Chomsky’s original work would have it, see chapter 
15), but is part of a language-game. It is to here that the principal 
controversy about Wittgenstein’s later work can be traced. He states 
explicitly in an early part of the Investigations (1953: §24) that: ‘(t)he 
word “language game”[the word-part in the original German, Sprachspiel, 
is also italicised] is used here to emphasise the fact that the speaking of 
language is part of an activity, or of a form of life’. In the Investigations, the 
words ‘form of life’ are used only five times; however, even this cursory 
use of the term has provoked a number of contrary interpretations. 
Two of the most prominent ones are: to understand a form of life in 
relativistic terms17 – a state of affairs is determined by culture, context and 
history – and the second is to see a form of life as a universal notion 
common to all human beings.
The key determination of this book, to understand what learning 
is, also has to come to an understanding of what a concept is. Indeed, 
there is a need to determine whether learning is a concept at all. The 
Wittgensteinian approach, as I have suggested above, is to embrace a use 
theory of meaning and a semantic rendition of the notion of grammar. 
This is a methodology first and foremost. What this means is that, 
17 This can be contrasted with a passage taken from On Certainty: ‘I believe what people transmit to 
me in a certain manner. In this way I believe geographical, chemical, historical facts etc. That is how 
I learn the sciences. Of course learning is based on believing. If you have learnt that Mont Blanc is 
4,000 metres high, if you have looked it up on the map, you say you know it. And can it now be said: 
we accord credence in this way because it has proved to pay? Again, the argument would seem to 
be that I cannot prove that Mont Blanc is 4,000 metres high, but believing it, on the authority of a 
map, has “proved to pay”. In other words, the social procedures we have for establishing certain 
types of fact cannot be justified, but they are successful, they pay, and this is why we employ them’ 
(Wittgenstein, 1969: §170).
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if I focus in the first instance on what a concept is, I might come to some 
conclusions about its possibilities and limitations. So, for example, I can 
say that concepts are representations in the mind, and consequently that 
learning as a concept in the mind and doing its actual work represents in 
a mind-dependent form what is exterior to it, or what is or has been 
happening in the world. I could of course be wrong, and this in itself 
constitutes an important part of the general argument that I am making 
– the possibility of error (see chapter 21).
Advocates for a representational theory of mind believe that these 
representations are internally structured; that is, a representational 
theory of mind understands the internal composition of these repre- 
sentations as comprising a system of language-like connections and 
identity semantics. Or we can say, with Gottlob Frege (1980), that 
concepts cannot be images in the mind, which represent what is in the 
world, but should be understood as abstract objects. For Frege, concepts 
mediate between thought and language and more importantly between 
thought and the referents of that thought; in short, between mind and 
world. This means that thoughts are understood as propositions (in the 
traditional sense). For those who relate these representations in the mind 
exclusively to the senses (and thus reinstate empiricism as the dominant 
view of mind), this would seem to raise more problems than it solves. For 
example, where are there abstract objects in nature to which this form of 
representational theory refers? Another way of framing this argument is 
to contrast abstract knowledge with concrete knowledge (knowledge 
of particulars), an abstraction being understood as a psychological 
construct in which new ideas are formed if a number of these ideas are 
analysed together. The object itself is initially conceptualised in its 
concrete form.
What this also suggests is that a concept – including the concept of 
corrigibility – can be polysemic and used in a number of different ways. 
And further to this, concepts in general and concepts in particular such as 
learning are enframed in a form of life. It is therefore incumbent on us to 
try to answer a series of questions about concepts in general and then 
some more questions about the particular concept being investigated – 
in this case, learning. Some of these general questions are: how do 
they relate to other concepts?; how do they relate to the world?; how 
coherent are they?; how relevant are they?; how rational are they?; could 
one function without concepts?; what functions do they have?; and how 
are they valued ontologically? In the rest of this book I attempt to find 
answers to some of these questions, particularly as they relate to the idea 
of learning.
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A theory of learning
In this book I want to focus on learning mechanisms in particular 
environments and this calls for an engagement with learning theories. 
Five philosophies of learning are examined in chapter 11: behaviourism, 
phenomenology, cognitivism, constructivism and materialism.18 Each of 
these has particular implications for pedagogic approaches and optimum 
learning environments, and they are different in their enframings of the 
concept, and perhaps more importantly in their correctness or corrigibility. 
Throughout I will be engaging in a modelling exercise. Models are 
expressions of the real world, without the extraneous detail, and can be 
understood only as indicative. They are not the real world and it would be 
a mistake to think that they are. They are designed to help us better 
understand how the world works (although they might also be understood 
as activities in the world). However, their use raises a number of questions: 
for example, what expressive and representational purposes do they 
have?; what kinds of entity are they?; and what is their learning function? 
In addition, any model that can be conceived has normative elements; 
that is, theorists are explicitly suggesting that this model or framework is 
better than other models or frameworks that have been and could have 
been devised. This applies, above all, to the activity of learning.
Here is one possible characterisation of the concept of learning. 
Learning as a process has a set of pedagogic relations – it incorporates a 
relationship between a learner and a learning object, which could be a 
person, a text, an object in nature, a particular array of resources, an 
artefact, an allocation of a role or function to a person, or a sensory object. 
A change process is required for this, and it is either internal to the learner 
or external to the community of which this learner is a member. Learning, 
then, is conditioned by an arrangement of resources, including spatial 
and temporal elements. Each learning episode has socio-historical roots. 
What is learnt in the first place is formed in society and outside the 
individual. It is shaped by the life that the person is leading. It is therefore 
both externally and internally mediated. Under this conception, learning 
has an internalisation element where what is formally external to the 
learner is interiorised by the learner, and a performative element where 
what is formally internal to the learner is exteriorised by the learner in 
the world. Within this framework, behaviourists, complexity theorists, 
18 There are many more and these five philosophies are only a small sample. They are, however, the 
most commonly used.
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cognitivists, cultural-historical activity theorists, social constructivists, 
symbol-processing theorists, sociocultural theorists of learning, actor-
network theorists and critical realists conceptualise the various elements 
of learning and the relations between them in different ways.
A theory of learning pivots on the idea that there is an entity called, 
for the sake of convenience, a human being and this entity has a 
relationship (both inward and outward) with an environment (for some, 
this entails a post-humanising and materialising process).19 As a concept, 
learning is fundamentally related to knowledge, and therefore if we are 
thinking about learning and the practices of learning, we also need to 
make reference to what is to be, and how it is, learnt. Typically what 
we are aiming at in such considerations is some form of knowledge. 
Philosophers usually divide knowledge into two categories: knowing-that 
and knowing-how. (They sometimes add a third category, knowing by 
acquaintance, but this is not central to the argument that I am making.20) 
These forms of knowledge are understood in modern societies as 
fundamentally different; in other words, there are strong and impermeable 
boundaries between them. I want to suggest using a formulation from 
Robert Brandom (2000) that this is misleading, and that consequently 
some of the problems that these strong insulations have created can be 
resolved. In society, these different forms of knowledge are given different 
statuses or have different levels of importance attached to them, so, for 
example, vocational knowledge (broadly thought of as being about 
processes) is considered to be less important than academic knowledge 
(broadly understood as being about propositions) (see chapter 7). 
However, these ascriptions of importance do not lie in the intrinsic nature 
of each knowledge form, but rather in the way in which these knowledge 
forms are realised in particular societies.21
Knowledge, then, is fundamental to the three types of learning that 
can be identified: cognitive (relating to propositions), skill-based (relating 
to processes) and embodied (relating to bodily accomplishments).22 
19 cf. Edwards (2015).
20 Some philosophers distinguish between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description 
by suggesting that knowledge by acquaintance is where the subject has direct, unmediated and 
non-inferential access to what is known, whereas knowledge by description is a type of knowledge 
that is indirect, mediated and inferential.
21 In an influential conceptualisation of the curriculum that I discuss later on in this book, strong 
distinctions between vocational and academic knowledge and between scientific and everyday 
knowledge are drawn. My position on this matter is that these relations are too strongly framed.
22 Very little will be said in this book about the notion of embodied knowledge, although this should 
not indicate its lack of significance. I am using the term in contrast to some philosophers who argue 
that all knowledge is embodied is some form or another.
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Knowledge and learning are homologous concepts; by this I mean that 
both operate in the same way and that they share properties and 
meanings. Prior to each of these three types of knowledge is a set of 
dispositions, without which cognitive, skill-based and embodied learning 
would be unsustainable. Cognition comprises the manipulation of those 
symbolic resources (words, numbers, pictures, and so on), which points 
to (though not necessarily in a mirroring or isomorphic sense) something 
outside itself. However, the referent might also be construed as internally 
related or, more specifically, as a part of an already established network 
of concepts (for example, Brandom, 2000) or as expressive (for example, 
Taylor, 1985). Skill-based knowledge is different from cognition because 
it is procedural and not propositional. Examples of embodied conceptual 
knowledge are sexuality or sexual preference, physicality and motility. 
Distinguishing between knowledge of how to do something (or process 
forms of knowledge), knowledge of something (or, in Brandom’s, 2000, 
terms, judging that claim in terms of its relations within and to a network 
of concepts, and making the subsequent commitments that this entails) 
and embodied forms of knowledge (assimilating an action and being 
able to perform in the spaces associated with that action) is important. 
They are, however, in essence all knowledge-making activities, and 
furthermore, as we will see, can be formulated generically as acts 
of learning.
Robert Brandom (2000) suggested that acting in the world requires 
the use of, and is underpinned by, conceptual frameworks of one type or 
another. For him, propositional knowledge, or making a claim that this 
or that is the case, is, in common with the other two forms of knowledge, 
a process of doing and thus of knowing how to do something or other. 
And this results in all of these types of knowledge having the same general 
form, which allows them, in this form, to be understood as learning 
actions or acts of learning. As a result, propositional knowledge-
development activities are construed as individual processes that involve, 
for example, assertings, claimings, judgings and believings – activity 
processes.
This means that propositional knowledge cannot be thought of as 
fundamentally different from procedural and embodied forms of 
knowledge since assertings, claimings, judgings and believings are of the 
same order as thinking(s) (about a problem, for example), drawing(s) (a 
picture, for example), teaching(s) (a class, for example) or analysing(s) 
(a set of empirical data, for example). Note the way in which these four 
activities are typically thought of as knowing-how processes, whereas the 
first four activities are usually thought of as knowing-that processes. 
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However, what I am suggesting is that in order to make a claim of 
knowing, we are not, as is commonly thought, providing a description 
of an experience (that is, constructing propositional knowledge) but 
making a claim about it in what Sellars (1997) has described as ‘a space 
of reasons’ (much more needs to be and will be said about this well-used 
phrase in the pages of this book). What follows from this is that we 
can and should understand and use concepts specifically in relation to 
current and future-oriented networks of meanings. Brandom (1994: 48) 
has described this as ‘playing a role in the inferential game of making 
claims and giving and asking for reasons’, with the notion of giving a 
reason being understood as the making of an inference, so that if one 
makes a knowledge claim, the contents of that claim consist of inferential 
commitments made in applying it in the world and, further to this, these 
commitments refer to both the circumstances surrounding its content and 
its consequences.23 This strong version of inferentialism can be criticised 
on three counts: the translation of representational contents into 
inferential contents in every case cannot be satisfactorily made (Fodor 
and Lepore, 2007); there is an overemphasis on concept development and 
use and as a consequence an underemphasis on other forms of knowledge 
development (Standish, 2016); and there is an implied conflation of 
inferences drawn from knowledge claims and inferences that are a central 
part of these claims or judgements.
And further to this, the issue of representationalism needs to be 
addressed. Both Brandom (2000) and Taylor (1985) have rejected crude 
versions of representationalism that have dominated previous and 
current theories of learning, such as behaviourism and cognitivism (see 
chapter 11), and in the process also rejected the idea of non-conceptual 
sensory representations. Representationalist theories of mind identify an 
23 Brandom’s (1994; 2000; 2004) support for a notion of inferential semantics is designed to identify 
the semantic contents of the concepts we use. In rejecting a representationalist viewpoint, where 
the contents of the concepts that we use are determined by states of affairs in the world, he wants 
to substitute a notion of inference from concept to concept, from discursive object to discursive 
object, from concept to what is in the world, and from discursive object to material object. This 
viewpoint then focuses on the relations between different types of objects. This neo-pragmatist 
philosophy rests on the superiority (for describing what is in the world) of inferentialism over 
representationalism in every case. However, this position threatens the idea that some concepts, 
some discursive objects and some relations between objects have some epistemic content. Further 
to this, inferentialism cannot describe in a full sense the types of relations that endure between the 
different elements of language and the world. It does, however, point to the need to enframe our 
understanding of concepts and discursive objects/configurations in the world (with the implications 
that this has for pedagogy and learning). The problem still remains that if one rejects in its entirety 
representationalism, then it is difficult to work out what the semantic contents of concepts such as 
learning might be (cf. Haack, 1993).
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inner realm of representations and an outer realm of objects in the 
world, which are placed in some form of identity relation. If we reject 
this approach, the focus of our investigation should be, not so much the 
existence of these two realms and the possibility of their identification, 
but the relationship between the two. The question then becomes: how 
do we understand the relationship between mind and world? Charles 
Taylor (1985) argued that this relationship is one of action rather 
than representation (whether this is understood as correspondence, 
reflection, sameness or manifestation) and this formed the central 
concern of his expressivist philosophy. Brandom (2004: 2) also sought to 
heal ‘the dualistic wound inflicted by the heedless use of an over-sharp 
distinction between mind and world’. Both Taylor and Brandom in 
arguing for an expressivist view of the mind–world relation do so by 
prioritising expression before representation in the semantic process, 
that is, in the determination of meaning. (There are some important 
differences in their solutions to the problem, but they at least agree about 
the nature of the problem.) Expressing a feeling in action, for example, 
makes a difference to what that feeling is like. An activity of the mind is 
not a representation of an action in the world, but, as Taylor (2011: 23) 
suggested, ‘an expression makes something manifest in an embodiment’. 
Moral judgements bring about something. They do not simply act as 
reflectors of some preformulated reality. Expression is a form of human 
activity. If meanings do not come before expression, then it is the 
expression itself that constitutes the meaning, although there are of 
course normative constraints on language use, and it is this that allows 
judgements to be made.24 This will serve as a brief account of one 
interpretation of the concept of learning, with the understanding that the 
concept is potentially polysemic, and can be understood only in relation 
to how it is used in the world.
Conspectus
A book deserves an introduction. However, there are at least four sets 
of meanings that can be given to the idea of an introduction. The first is 
where the reader is presented with a synopsis of the general argument 
being made in the book without a full account of its elaborations and 
24 The central task then of the philosophy that I am advocating in this book is that of determining 
the relevance, probative force and semantic contents of one reason over another with regards to a 
claim about something in the world.
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justifications. An example is Robert Brandom’s text, Articulating Reasons: 
An introduction to inferentialism (2000), which serves as an introduction 
to his book, Making It Explicit: Reasoning, representing, and discursive 
commitment (1994). This is a separate book; however, it could have been 
a part of the overall work. It is an overview of the general argument being 
made, and it is not and cannot be a complete account of the contents of 
the book. A second type of introduction is where the framing or indeed 
enframing of the general argument is articulated. The third credible use-
function that can be given to the idea of an introduction is that it is 
reflexive, and this involves a prior reflexive and thus critical account of 
the argument being made in the text. It is also an account of the book’s 
textuality. I have left, in the main, the discussion of this use-function to 
the last chapter. A fourth type of introduction is an account of what the 
reader can expect if they continue with their reading of the book, and this 
involves a series of signpostings to its various parts and arguments. This 
chapter, which serves as the introduction to the book, has elements of all 
four of these.
The framing function, a setting out of the background to the 
methodology being used in the construction of knowledge in the book, 
comprises an account of, or reasoned argument to support, a claim about 
some aspect of the world, whether meta-epistemic or empirical. Such 
knowledge in this case (see above) refers to the following propositions: i) 
any claim to knowledge made by a person is enframed; ii) there is a 
need to articulate and give expression to this enframing as it relates to 
ontological, epistemological and methodological concerns, and thus 
any knowledge claim is enframed by a theory of knowledge, what it is 
and how it can be justified; iii) a relationship exists between a claim to 
knowledge and its truth-value, and this allows us to talk about ‘true-
knowledge’ as a useful compound word; iv) any divisions or categories 
that we care to use are in history and could be other than they are, and 
this includes ontological and epistemological divisions or, more 
importantly for our purposes here, divisions between our five object-
types; v) this requires a theory of mind and thus a theory of the 
relationship between mind or minds and the world; vi) knowledge and 
learning are homologous concepts; vii) concepts – including the concept 
of corrigibility – can be polysemic and used in a number of different ways 
and are enframed in a form of life; viii) it is possible to determine that any 
claim to knowledge we might want to make is credible, that there are four 
ways of establishing the truth or otherwise of any propositional claim we 
might want to make about knowledge – epistemic, coherentist, rational 
and logical – and that some form of combination of these is possible and 
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necessary; and ix) this ontology is a form of dispositional realism. All of 
this and more needs to be established before the central argument of this 
or any other book can be attended to. I have, I hope, provided in the body 
of the text convincing arguments in support of these nine propositions. 
This first chapter has been an attempt at providing a set of convincing 
reasons for the framing assumptions that I make.
The first part of this book, then, is an account of a general theory 
of objects and object-relations. There are five object-types in the 
world: discursive objects, material objects, relational objects, structural-
institutional-systemic objects and people. Each of them has different 
characteristics and, because objects have a dynamic structure, in rare 
circumstances may change their status as objects; indeed, what constitutes 
an object-type is also dynamic. In an object-ontology, objects, including 
human beings, have acquired dispositions.
Two arguments (reason-giving propositions) that are relevant to a 
notion of transcendental knowledge can be inferred from these brief 
remarks. The first is that it is possible to identify a type of meta-knowledge, 
the truth of which does not lie in specific instances of knowledge 
construction, but in a set of preconditions for the operation of knowledge 
disciplines and practices. The second is that no sense can be given to a 
general notion of rationality unless there is also an acknowledgement 
that all of its generating instances are situated in some form or another. 
The argument then becomes that our utterances always and necessarily 
presuppose a set of conditions that are in effect universal. These include 
context-transcending notions of truth and morality and the rejection of 
domain-specific notions of correctness. Acts of referring therefore cannot 
take place without a background of an operating referential system; acts 
of lying cannot take place outside a system of truth-telling. This argument 
is set out in chapter 2.
In chapter 3, I suggest that concepts, and this after all is the focal 
point of my investigation, cannot be fully determined with regards to 
their meaning in definitional and essentialising ways, but only in terms of 
how they are used in a way of life. I then suggest that a distinction can be 
made between knowledge of the world and meta-knowledge, which 
directly refers to knowledge of this world and not to the world itself. And 
further to this, all knowledge, including knowledge of learning, uses or 
is enframed in criteria, whether these criteria are implicit or explicit. 
I suggest that in addition to the use of criteria, any investigation into the 
meaning of a concept has a judgemental element: does the object that is 
being primed for investigation conform to the criteria that are appropriate 
to the making of a judgement of this type? An answer to this question then 
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needs to incorporate some understanding about reasons (for making 
these sorts of judgements) and about whether reasons can qualify as 
evidence for a knowledge claim.
What I am suggesting is that in order to make an ontological claim, 
we are not, as is commonly thought, providing a description of an 
experience but making a claim about it in what Wilfred Sellars (1997) 
described as ‘a space of reasons’, and that what follows from this is 
that we can and should understand and use concepts specifically in 
relation to current and future-oriented networks of meanings. Reasoning 
within this space involves giving and asking for reasons, where this 
activity is understood as making a commitment in the world, with that 
commitment referring to the circumstances surrounding its content 
and its consequences.
In chapter 4, I focus on the third of the object-types within an object-
ontology – an object-relation. If we are able to distinguish between 
different objects and we want to build into our conception of the world 
ideas of change, inter- and intra-relationships and continuities (over 
time), then we need to understand what these are and how they occur. 
This is predicated on the idea that object-relations inhere in those objects 
as characteristics of these objects. They are thus interactive, powerful, 
dynamic and object-specific. This means that in the first case, an object, 
with a particular set of characteristics, enters into a relation with another 
(or other) object(s). In the second case, objects in interaction with other 
objects have the power to change themselves and other objects, object-
relations and arrangements of objects. A third characteristic is their 
dynamism, both in terms of their substance and in relation to how they 
can be classified as object-relations. And a fourth characteristic of an 
object-relation is that it is specific to a particular object – its potential 
power to influence and change other objects in the world in an interactive 
process is determined by the nature of the characteristics that inhere in 
that object, and this means that the essential nature of an object is time- 
and space-bound.
In chapter 5, I make the case (that is, provide sufficient reasons for 
making a claim of knowledge) for values as being centrally implicated in 
both our descriptions of the world and in our life choices. There are two 
dimensions to this claim. The first is ontological, and this amounts to a 
claim that objects in the world and human beings are valued in relation 
to each other and to other object-types. A second dimension is that values 
are epistemological. If we accept that value-free knowledge is an 
impossibility, that we inevitably make prejudgements about the world in 
our investigations, then being in the world is understood as a practice, 
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primed for investigation, but resistant to the algorithmic and value- 
free methods for describing it used in the natural sciences.
In chapter 6, I examine the issue of divisions and boundaries 
between objects. I make the argument that processes of classifying and 
reclassifying change the nature of objects, object-relations and object-
configurations. All references to the world involve the identification, 
manipulation, transformation and reconstruction of the categories, and 
we cannot avoid this. The scientific method – with its claims for the 
possibility of positional objectivity, that concepts can be reduced to 
measurable constructs, and that we should adopt a representational 
ontology – is negligent of these.
In chapter 7, I examine two important binary categories (scientific/
practical and educative/training) – they are important because they 
act as cultural conditioning agencies for many of the institutions and 
systems that exist in the field of education and learning. The strength of the 
boundary between two contrasting manifestations of a concept influences 
how learning institutions (buildings, pedagogies, curricula, environments 
and the like) are constructed; for example, if a strong boundary between 
vocational and academic education is in place, this can mean that children 
are assigned to different types of schools, are taught in different ways, 
follow different curricula and learn in different environments.
In the first part of the book, I focus on some important ideas in 
the history of thought: what concepts are, the relationship between 
knowledge and learning, the possibility of universal knowledge, 
excellence in a practice, what evidence is, the distinction between 
epistemology and ontology, the role and place of values in our descriptions 
of the world and in the world itself, the notion of difference, different 
epistemic categories and powerful practices (see chapter 8). I also 
relate these to a notion of human identity in chapter 9, referring as it 
does to our fifth object-type: human beings and human consciousness. 
The problem with a physicalist notion of consciousness is that not 
everything can be explained by this view of the mind–body relationship 
– every action of the mind cannot be explained fully by an identical 
movement in the brain. It is this missing knowledge that constitutes the 
core of consciousness. Consciousness under this conceptualisation is 
more than what we already know about the mind and the brain, and more 
than we can literally ever know. Consciousness is thus too complicated 
to explain through the methods of physicalism or neurophysiology. In 
chapter 10, I discuss the concept and disposition of theorising.
In the second part of the book I focus exclusively on learning in its 
two guises: as a concept and as a practice. They need to be analysed 
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separately because they are different types of object, and what this also 
requires, then, is an explanation of how they are or how they can be 
connected at both ontological and epistemological levels. This key 
relation in the lifeworld is between the world itself and our knowledge 
of it. I start off by examining five important philosophies of learning: 
behaviourism, phenomenology, cognitivism, socioculturalism and socio-
materialism (chapter 11). Theoretical and contextual considerations 
impact on how elements of teaching and learning are realised. 
Acknowledging this allows the construction of a number of learning 
models: observation, coaching, goal-clarification, peer-learning, trial and 
error, hypothesis-testing, reflection, meta-cognition and repetition. And 
each of these in turn is underpinned by a particular theory of learning. 
What this means is that any model of learning used in the world is 
constructed in relation to a particular view of how we can know the world 
and what it is. These models or learning sets give different emphases to 
the various elements of a learning process (chapter 12). In chapters 13 
and 14, I examine four important concepts that relate to learning – 
technology, artificial intelligence, literacy and numeracy – treating each 
in socially semiotic ways in terms of their meanings and their possibilities.
This relates to an important element of the claim or series of claims 
that I am making about learning in this book, which is that any coherent 
theory of learning needs to embrace a dispositional essentialism, and 
consequently an object – whether discursive, material, relational, 
configurational or person-oriented – has causal properties and thus 
dispositional powers. In accepting this, I am committing myself to an 
approach that suggests objects have real powers by virtue of what they 
are, although those powers are not always realised. Conceptual learning 
or, as I have transposed it, dispositional learning, then, has a place in the 
language of learning. What this means is that concepts are understood as 
the properties of a person, as elements of knowledge and as having 
dispositional powers. Knowledge is transformed at the pedagogic site, 
through processes such as: simulation, representation, amplification, 
pedagogic control, progression, textual construction, temporality and 
feedback. This means that in the learning process, the learning object 
takes a new form as a result of changes to its properties.
In chapters 15 and 16, I show how arguments for nativism or 
innateness can be refuted and suggest that learning has to incorporate a 
notion of progression; that is, movement from one state of being to 
another, with the latter being understood as better in some form or 
another. This introduces an ethical dimension to the concept of 
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progression, and thus ineluctably an epistemological dimension. We can 
rise to or reach higher kinds of knowledge only through a supersession 
of what we perceive to be a lower kind. As I argue in chapter 17, a 
concept, such as pedagogy, is both a material and discursive object and 
consequently has all of the characteristics that we have come to associate 
with these types of object. In the real world, boundaries are drawn 
between objects. As a discursive object, the concept of pedagogy has 
certain properties, such as being polysemic, semantically contested, 
networked, interactive, powerful and dynamic. In addition, as an object 
it has causal powers, both as a conceptual object and also because it is in 
the world, or at least in a world.
In chapters 18 and 19, I focus on learning as curriculum knowledge 
and its historical, archaeological and genealogical connections and 
relations. With regards to the second of these, I consider how these 
three types of event-methodologies, which refer to events in the past and 
in the present-past, can be distinguished from each other. Historical, 
archaeological and genealogical methodologies are framed by time, 
although this core category is construed differently in each of them. 
A further shared element is that they produce configurations of discursive 
objects, such as learning discourses relating to, for example, disengaged 
reasoning, curricularisation, scientism, atomisation, innatism, 
bureaucratisation, naturalism and representationalism. These discursive 
object-configurations are understood in different ways historically, 
archaeologically and genealogically. The key, then, to understanding 
what they are lies with the types of relations that exist between objects in 
their formation and reformation.
An important dimension of learning is time and temporal relations 
(chapter 20). This works through activities such as: progressions and 
trajectories of the learner; knowledge formations; progression and 
emergence of learning objects and relations between them; logical 
prerequisites of learning objects and relations; institutional temporal 
relations such as timetables, lesson durations, school days or learning 
holidays; examination and test progressions; age-related competences 
and more. Indeed, it could be said that time and temporal flows are 
essential to understanding the concept, process, institutionalising and 
practice of learning. In chapter 21, I discuss its companionate concept, 
that of space. In the last chapter (22), I return to two important episte- 
mological issues: what knowledge is and how we can know anything at 
all. In this concluding chapter I focus on the reflexive importance of 
understanding the textuality of the work that I have written. I have used 
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a variety of textual devices in this book and I point to some of them here: 
referentiality, linearity, fragility, corrigibility, enframing and coherentism. 
A key determination of the meaning of the concept of learning is whether 
and in what way it relates to a meta-theory, which invokes a relationship 
between mind and world, and which has transcendental elements. In the 




In this chapter I examine interrogatively three dimensions of the 
knowledge-construction process. The first is the possibility of some 
universal or transcendental elements. The second refers to those epistemic 
properties that result in forms of knowledge in a community, such as: 
the means for determining what is true knowledge; the arbitration of 
good practice; the semantic formulation being used; the types of values 
that are attached to concepts; and the types of power mechanisms that 
are in place. And the third refers to the development of a credible account 
of epistemology and ontology and the relationship between them. 
The first of these is an examination of whether and in what way there 
are transcendental elements at work in the development of knowledge.
Here are a number of statements that can be thought of as universal 
or transcendental: i) a distinction can be drawn between the way the 
world works and how these workings can be expressed; ii) social 
reality has ontological depth; iii) the social dimension of reality can 
be understood as an open system; iv) our conceptual frameworks, 
perspectives on the world and descriptive languages interpenetrate what 
we are calling reality to such an extent that it is impossible to conceive of 
a pre-schematised world (Putnam, 1990); v) there are such entities 
as universals of coherent thought, and even some universals relating 
to ontological relationships such as a mind–world distinction and 
consequently a connection between them; vi) disciplinary and inter- 
disciplinary forms of knowledge supervene on universal or transcendental 
types of knowledge; vii) curriculum knowledge is derived from our 
understandings about knowledge in general; viii) true knowledge refers 
to hypotheses that work; ix) any form of knowledge, and its justification 
and grounds for legitimacy, has constructed elements, and this means 
that knowledge is relative to particular human environments, structured 
differently in place and time; and x) statements about the world and 
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about knowledge of the world are potentially and ineluctably corrigible. 
These are all meta-knowledge statements; that is, they refer to a material 
world, can be construed as discursive objects in the world and are 
expressed as true statements about this and other worlds. They do not 
seem to be relative to particular manifestations of human existence but 
are universal in intent and scope. They are deemed to be rational, or at 
least they are seen as parts of a system of thought, where the criteria for 
determining whether something is rational or not includes some notion 
of what could constitute intelligibility.
A minimum set of conditions for a belief to be thought of as 
intelligible is as follows (this set is not necessarily correct): there are 
reasons that can potentially be made available for supporting a belief and 
these reasons can be construed in evidential form; these reasons are 
relevant to this belief insofar as they are necessary and sufficient for 
holding it and using it in the world; there are no contrary reasons publicly 
available or imagined for not holding that belief; this set of reasons is 
internally coherent, which means that the four conditions for intelligibility 
are met (the rule of non-contradiction, the rule of conformity to a truth 
criterion, the need for logical connectives, and the need for conditionals/
inferential methods); and there are a series of logical connectives, 
conditionals and inferential methods available for use, so that there is 
a reliable method that can be used for connecting evidence, reasons 
and beliefs (adapted from O’Grady, 2002: 145). Each of these five 
requirements or conditions is designed to be universal or transcendental 
in substance.25 But even then, we need to understand what a universal 
might be.
Transcendence
Basarab Nicolescu (2002), in his Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity, 
suggested that transdisciplinarity is holistic, stratified, semantically 
and practically unified, multi-referential and multidimensional, non-
metaphysical and progressive. It should be noted here that although 
Nicolescu presented this menu of specifications as not aspiring to be 
a new metaphysic, it certainly seems to be just that. And the fact that 
this is a manifesto would take it out of the realm of a philosophy or 
25 Intelligibility is of course another of these contested concepts. It could be understood as a 
precondition of saying anything at all that is not nonsense, gibberish or false.
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philosophical argument and place it within the bounds of a political 
treatise. Nicolescu (2002) explicitly characterised transdisciplinarity as 
complementing those approaches that have been called disciplinary or 
domain-specific (see Young, 2005, for an example in the field of education 
and see chapter 18 for a critical evaluation of this approach). Since 
complexity is, for Nicolescu (2014), an important feature of reality, and 
reality is stratified (and contains the logic of the included middle),26 then 
consequently there is a need, as he saw it, to rethink and reconceptualise 
the traditional relationship between subject and object.
The etymological root of transdisciplinarity is that the object under 
consideration is transcendent (from the Latin word transcendentem, 
meaning surmounting or rising above – see Online Etymology Dictionary), 
rather than the corruption that has taken place, which positions it within 
those forms of knowledge, which we might want to call, generically, 
interdisciplinary. The word-forming element, ‘trans-’, embraces a number 
of disparate meanings: across, beyond, through, on the other side of, 
going beyond. This can be traced back to the Latin word, trans, which in 
turn has been translated as across, over or beyond, and perhaps to its verb 
form, trare, meaning to cross. This in turn may have its roots in the Proto-
Indo-European suffix tra-, or a variant, tere, both of which mean to cross 
over, to pass through or to overcome. Since we are talking here about a 
corruption and an evolution, and indeed about a word with multiple 
meanings, we can perhaps distinguish three meanings from its likely 
etymology. The first of these is a going beyond with the implication that 
it is more basic (foundational) and operates at a higher level of reality. An 
example of this is Mylonakou-Keke’s (2015) notion of an ongoing 
dialectical synergy between different methodologies, different disciplines 
and different types of researchers at different levels of reality, which 
generates a ‘syn-epistemic wholeness’. It is this wholeness that qualifies it 
as being beyond disciplinarity and the various forms of interdisciplinarity 
on offer. The second of these is that transdisciplinarity is understood as 
the equivalence of interdisciplinarity, with the emphasis now on a 
bricolage or synthesis across the disciplines. The third notion is that of 
movement between the two, so that transdisciplinarity consists of a 
process of passing through or crossing over, with the implication that the 
knowledge developer needs to go through a process of inter- 
disciplinarity before reaching a state of transdisciplinarity.
26 Another negative obstacle for Nicolescu is the ‘either/or’ law, or ‘law of the excluded middle’ 
(tertium non datur), which states that if a state A and a state not-A exist, a state T that is 
simultaneously A and not-A cannot exist.
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The first of these notions then is that transdisciplinarity signifies 
a unity of knowledge beyond the disciplines. This unity might be 
expressed in the form of Platonic universals (Plato, 1997),27 a Christian 
Godhead28 (cf. Van der Meer et al., 1961), the European Enlightenment 
notion of reason29 (cf. Israel, 2001), a Hegelian notion of teleology30 
(cf. Taylor, 1985), Martin Heidegger’s (1962) phenomenological 
perspective,31 Umberto Eco’s (1997) conception of a perfect language,32 
Jurgen Habermas’ (1981) idea of an ideal speech situation or E. O. 
Wilson’s (1998) theory of consilience.33 This unity implies movement 
from segmentation of knowledge to boundary crossing, from frag- 
mentation to wholeness, from working alone to collaboration and 
cooperation, from simplicity to complexity and from detheorisation to full 
theorisation. In a Wittgensteinian sense we have to be careful not to 
essentialise the meaning of these terms and consequently we should 
understand them as being both corrigible and semantically oriented to 
how they are used in the way of life we choose to belong to or to some 
or other way of life in another possible world.
We can take one of these, Jurgen Habermas’ (1981) ideal speech 
situation, and examine its transcendental qualities. For Habermas, 
communication is a basic social need. He argued that all human 
communication implicitly involves the making of validity claims. A 
communicative transaction involves four such claims: that what is said 
and done is intelligible, truthful, justified and sincere. Given this, 
Habermas suggested that undistorted communication allows all four 
27 Plato’s solution to the problem of universals is to say that they do exist, but not in an ordinary 
common-sense understanding of this term. They are outside space and time, and human beings 
cannot have direct sensory contact with them. Nevertheless, they have an existence and can be 
conceived of.
28 Christianity has been the dominant cultural tradition in certain parts of the world for 2,000 years. 
Its central belief is a transcendent creator.
29 This is the European Enlightenment notion of reason, in French siècle des Lumières (century of the 
Enlightened) and in German Aufklärung, in which God, reason, nature and humanity were 
redefined.
30 A Hegelian notion of teleology is where there is a finality or complete explanation for something, 
human history perhaps, in terms of its endpoint, purpose or goal. It comes from two Greek words: 
telos (end) and logos (reason).
31 Martin Heidegger’s phenomenological perspective is extensively referred to in the pages of this 
book. This perspective was a reaction to and disputation of Husserl’s original phenomenological 
perspective, and in particular his notion of epoché (bracketing out the natural world around us).
32 Umberto Eco’s search for the perfect language was conducted through a belief in an Ur- 
language, a universal medium of unambiguous expression. As with Habermas’ notion of an 
ideal speech situation, it does not and cannot solve the many philosophical problems with 
universals.
33 E. O. Wilson’s theory of consilience describes the ultimate synthesis of all knowledge types, and 
especially those from specialised fields of the life course.
tranSCenDental knowleDge 41
validity claims to be met – a situation that he referred to as the ideal 
speech situation.
Habermas saw the ideal speech situation as involving rational 
agreement reached through critical discussion, an agreement or 
consensus that can be distinguished from one arising from custom, faith 
or coercion – a critical dialogue conducted through known public criteria. 
Here, justifications become explicit as people talk about their reasons for 
what they do and do not do just in terms of their desires. In an ideal 
speech situation, all participants have an understanding of the technical 
issues involved, in addition to having a procedural understanding of how 
to act appropriately and a competence to participate fully and equally. 
An ideal speech situation, with its absence of external and internal 
constraints, is characterised by openness and a commitment to deep 
explanation, where each participant has an equal chance of participating 
and therefore where all of its validity claims can be successfully redeemed. 
In this way, any consensus achieved through dialogue will be based on the 
force of the better argument rather than the force of ideology, where this 
contentious idea is understood as being against an idea of a true (and 
thus rational) account of the world.
Indeed, the very notion of a language makes no sense without some 
idea of an ideal speech situation. To engage in dialogue while repudiating 
it is to contradict oneself. It follows, therefore, that the values and criteria 
of the ideal speech situation are universal; they are present in any 
language and any dialogue and are in effect context-free. However, this 
is not the end of the matter, for the ideal speech situation can function as 
a norm or regulative ideal, an idealisation of rational practice, even 
though most actual conditions of social interaction and communication 
are nothing like this. In this sense, it provides a critical measure of the 
inadequacies of existing forms of interaction. Thus, actual situations can 
be examined (an important task for researching and ultimately knowing 
the world – see chapter 4) to ascertain the degree to which they deviate 
from an ideal speech situation and appropriate action can be taken to 
bring them closer to the ideal. But more significantly, an ideal speech 
situation seems to provide the ideology-free position from which ideology 
can itself be rationally critiqued: it is universal and transcendent; it 
provides public and shareable criteria for justifying and choosing; and 
it cannot be denied without falling into substantive contradiction.
However, the fact that an ideal speech situation is rarely if ever 
present poses other difficulties. Should we endeavour to bring it about? If 
research, or even our daily interactions with and in the world, is not to be 
either an instrument for the further dominance of technical-rationality 
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(see chapter 4) or for the furtherance of human understanding and 
communication, then something else is needed. The ideal speech situation 
is the condition of possibility of language as a communicative tool. But 
this now suggests a further question, which is to do with what makes the 
ideal speech situation possible. The most plausible answer is undistorted 
language, because if language is distorted then the rationality that 
constitutes the ideal speech situation becomes distorted and in effect it 
becomes yet another ideology.
What is required for language to be undistorted? Such a language 
would have to be pure and transparent – a language free of the distorting 
effects of particular practices, readings and interpretations. What is being 
asked for here is a totally decontextualised language that can fulfil its 
referential function without vagueness, variation or ambiguity. It is not 
difficult to realise that such a view of language is highly problematic. 
Apart from the impossibility of finding such a language, it cannot even be 
posited as a norm or regulative ideal, since even if it were achievable, 
it would actually end all communication rather than undistort it. It is 
precisely because language is distorted that we can communicate through 
it, so any realisation of an ideal speech situation, far from making for 
undistorted communication, would actually stop all communication in its 
tracks. And thus it can be said that the ideal speech situation as a 
transcendental concept is flawed. In addition, this does not and cannot 
solve some of the problems I have alluded to already, and will do so below, 
with transcendentalism or a monistic epistemology.
Monism
The initial task, then, is to understand what monism or transdisciplinarity 
might be. Transdisciplinarity, monodisciplinarity, interdisciplinarity 
and disciplinarity constitute different forms of knowledge. A form of 
knowledge is constituted by its fidelity to certain types of norms, practices 
and protocols. Examples of these include the accepted means for 
determining what is true knowledge in a community; the arbitration of 
good practice within the community, over, for example, what constitutes 
excellence (see chapter 3); the semantic formulation currently in use; the 
type of values that are attached to concepts within the community; 
and the types of power mechanisms that are in place to regulate these 
practices and protocols. Transdisciplinarity is sometimes treated 
as equivalent to interdisciplinarity and this is a mistake, because 
transdisciplinarity, or its equivalence, monodisciplinarity, is monistic in a 
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fundamental sense: knowledge of everything can be justified only in 
one fundamental transcendental way. Medieval conceptions of the 
transcendentals by scholars such as Thomas Aquinas34 (cf. Fester, 2009), 
Henry of Ghent35 (cf. Porro, 1990) and John Duns Scotus36 (cf. Spade, 
1994) in the end are monistic,37 leading to a notion of God.
Immanuel Kant (2007) developed a different type of transcendental 
argument, which he described as transcendentally idealistic. There are 
conditions for how human beings can know objects in the world, such 
as space, time and human intuition,38 and these conditions in part 
contribute to the formation of the object. We cannot know these objects 
in themselves, but only as they appear to us: they have been filtered 
through the mind’s functions and categories. These epistemically 
inaccessible real objects are transcendentally real and fundamentally 
mind-independent. In Kant’s terms, these are noumena.39 Phenomena, on 
the other hand, are objects as they appear to us: empirically real, and in 
part dependent on the means of knowing them.40 Science can study only 
the empirically real and not objects in themselves. Roy Bhaskar (2008a) 
argued that the objects of science are not just objects as they are for us, or 
objects that are meaningful to us in relation to how we can access them; 
they are mechanisms or objects regardless of how we access them. He 
suggested that the existence of these objects as independent of human 
judgement is a transcendental precondition of doing any form of science.
Two arguments (reason-giving propositions) that are relevant to a 
notion of transcendentalism can be inferred from these brief remarks. 
The first is that there is a type of meta-knowledge, the truth of which does 
not lie in specific instances of knowledge construction, but in a set of 
preconditions for the operation of knowledge disciplines and practices. 
The second is that no sense can be given to a general notion of rationality 
unless there is also an acknowledgement that all of its generating 
instances are situated in some form or another. The argument then 
34 Thomas Aquinas argued that in addition to it having ontological properties, a first known is 
credible propositionally.
35 For Henry of Ghent, although the idea of God is still thought of as the first known, being is 
redefined as that which is known first. In contrast to Aquinas, Henry’s interpretation of key concepts 
such as being and thing was essentialist.
36 Duns Scotus began his theology with the idea that all things naturally knowable of God have to 
be a transcendental, and this includes a notion of the divine. Scotus argued that there is nothing 
above it except being and that a transcendental is not common.
37 Monism is characterised as being operative of one single principle, being or force, and can be 
applied to knowledge as such.
38 Anschauung in the original German.
39 Dinge an Sich in the original German.
40 Erscheinungen in the original German.
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becomes that our utterances always and necessarily presuppose a set 
of conditions that are in effect universal. These include context-
transcending notions of truth and morality and the rejection of domain-
specific notions of correctness. Acts of referring therefore cannot take 
place without a background of an operating referential system; acts of 
lying cannot occur outside a system of truth-telling. An example of a 
monist philosophy is critical realism.
Critical realism – a unitary philosophy
Roy Bhaskar (2011), a philosopher whose primary concern was 
to reinstate ontology as the singular most important dimension of 
humankind (this is a unitary or transcendental philosophy), made three 
claims about the world: there are important differences between 
knowledge of the world and the world itself, that is, between the transitive 
realm of knowing and the intransitive realm of being; reality has 
ontological depth; and the social world is an open system. The first 
of these establishes a clear distinction or demarcation between the 
ontological and the epistemological spheres of influence, although this 
does not and cannot rule out a dynamic relationship between the two. 
Thus, in certain circumstances but not in every circumstance, knowledge 
of an object, a network of other objects and the relations between them 
can act to change those objects, networks and relations. In a similar 
fashion, objects, networks and relations in the world are the referents for 
knowledge. These networks, confluences and conjunctions are constantly 
changing; with the consequence that the point of reference for the 
knowledge gatherer is always the dynamic object, the dynamic network 
and the dynamic system of relations within and between objects.
The second of Bhaskar’s requirements for a unitary theory is that 
social reality has ontological depth. This means that these objects, 
networks and relations are structured and because of this they possess 
powers. He described these objects as mechanisms to indicate that they 
are dynamic. The powers held by these mechanisms have three forms: 
they can be possessed, exercised or actualised. Powers that are possessed 
belong to objects regardless of whether they have been triggered by 
circumstances or by contact and interaction with other objects. Powers 
that have been exercised are now operating within an open system and 
interacting with the powers of other objects in different types of ways. 
However, these powers may not result in any new phenomena (objects, 
networks and relations) because other powers may be acting as constraints 
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on their actualisation. A third manifestation of these powers is that 
they are generating effects in the open system of which they are a 
part. These effects have not been suppressed or counteracted by other 
objects, networks or relations. What this means is that embodied, 
institutional, systemic or discursive powers can be possessed by an object 
but are not actualised, or they can be actualised but not have any real 
effects in the open system they are operating in, or they can be influencing 
present and future arrangements of objects, networks and relations 
dynamically. As a result, causation cannot be understood in terms of 
processes of spatiotemporal contiguity, succession and constant 
conjunction (as David Hume [2000] would have wanted us to believe), 
but rather generatively.
The third of Bhaskar’s requirements is that reality and especially the 
social dimension of reality should be understood as an open system. In 
closed systems there are always two conditioning factors: objects, 
networks and relations operate consistently and do not deviate from their 
essence or essential nature. In open systems neither of these conditions is 
present. It is characteristic of the social world that objects, networks and 
relations between objects within networks operate in these open systems, 
and one implication of this is that it then becomes difficult to make 
predictions and develop law-like propositions about the social world. For 
Bhaskar, these three dimensions of reality are central to what the world 
is like and to how we can conceptualise it, and these fundamentals have 
transcendental qualities.
Interdisciplinarity
The issue then of what knowledge is, its justification, constitution and 
rationale, is a concern. If knowledge is understood as disciplinary-based 
or domain-specific, then the mode of production and justification is 
located within a discipline or domain of knowledge. If knowledge is 
understood as interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary, then its mode of 
production and justifying rationale is located in the spaces between 
different academic disciplines or knowledge domains or outside of those 
different academic disciplines or domains altogether. What this also 
means is that disciplinary knowledge, discipline-derived rationales for 
knowledge and discipline-based epistemic practices are in some important 
ways insufficient and inadequate.
The real question we need to answer (and this is one that is 
frequently ignored by philosophers, sociologists and knowledge 
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developers alike) is: what is there in and about the world that makes 
interdisciplinarity and consequently transdisciplinarity possible? 
Answering this question requires the identification of limits to inter- 
disciplinarity as a feature of the knowledge theory, as well as the 
development of transdisciplinary constructs as features of it. And this in 
turn is to understand knowledge, its development, and its derivative 
capacity as having ontological and objectifying dimensions, and as being 
more than what is produced by and in the disciplines. Disciplinary 
knowledge then is always a pale reflection of deeper-lying knowledge 
constructs. Any form of knowledge, and its justification and grounds for 
legitimacy, has constructed elements; and this means that knowledge 
is relative to particular human environments, structured differently 
in place and time. For example, logical positivists such as A. J. Ayer 
(1936) understood the limits of true knowledge – what constitutes 
true knowledge and what cannot be considered as true knowledge – in 
a different way from Aristotle (2018a; 2018b; writing as he did in the 
fourth century bce in Athens). However, underlying this and much more 
besides is some universal notion of what knowledge is, what constitutes 
true knowledge and what relations there are between the development of 
knowledge and what it refers to. Consequently, it is possible to suggest 
that almost all knowledge development requires interdisciplinary and 
transdisciplinary processes of one type or another. The conditions for this 
depend on complexity and object-dynamism, and since dynamism is an 
important feature of human life, all knowledge development that is 
concerned with human beings and their activities in the world is both 
interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary.
Interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity overlie and encompass 
disciplinary knowledge because they comprise a truthfulness and 
comprehensiveness that is denied to the various forms of disciplinary 
knowledge. If truth can be conceived in unitary terms (through the 
development of a unitary philosophy), then there can be only one version 
of truth; and thus, there cannot be multiple truths generated from 
different disciplines.41 A solution to this problem might be to posit a 
hierarchy of truths, so that there are partial and whole versions of the 
truth. Disciplinary knowledge is frequently understood as partial, but 
41 For example, the title of a book, written by the philosopher of education Chris Winch, The 
Philosophy of Human Learning (2002), seems to imply that philosophers, sociologists, historians, 
psychologists and other groups of people have produced accounts of human learning that are of 
equal standing. The position I take in this book is that philosophy is not just another way of looking 
at a concept, but as a concept it has transcultural and transcendental attributes. This puts me at odds 
with Winch’s view of the world, which is still essentially disciplinary or at best interdisciplinary.
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partiality implies wholeness: it is not possible to make any sense of 
partiality unless it is also understood as partial to something else that is 
not in itself partial. What this also shows is that there is a relationship 
between disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity, as there must be between 
interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity.
These relationships are important. As a result of the interaction of 
these three knowledge forms, variously described and formulated, a 
tradition of knowledge is developed, and it is either morphogenetic or 
(usually) morphostatic. In the field of education, a number of disciplinary, 
interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary traditions of knowledge have been 
developed. In most of these cases, as we shall see, the trajectory of the 
tradition is static, resulting in undeveloped or immature configurations. 
(Young and Muller, 2010, and the Research Excellence Framework [REF], 
2014, are examples.) The reason for this immaturity is that in each 
case transdisciplinary elements are neglected in its formation and 
reformation, with these referring in the main to four processes of 
validation: whether the framing of the object is empirically or practically 
adequate, coherent, rational and referenced to networks of meaning. 
The first task is to identify these traditions of knowledge in the field 
of education, and to remind ourselves that our quest is for an in-depth 
understanding of the notion of learning.
Traditions of knowledge
Traditions of knowledge in the education discipline can be broadly 
divided into three types: academic knowledge traditions, practical 
knowledge traditions and integrated knowledge traditions (cf. Whitty 
and Furlong, 2017). However, their designations as particular traditions 
of knowledge cannot guarantee that they are empirically or practically 
adequate, coherent, rational or referenced to/part of actual frameworks 
of meaning. Academic knowledge traditions position themselves as in 
some way detached from the object being studied and can be distinguished 
from everyday forms of knowledge (see chapter 8, for an unpicking of this 
sharp Durkheimian distinction between sacred and profane knowledge 
forms; Durkheim, 1995). Basil Bernstein (2002) characterised this 
distinction as being between vertical and horizontal discourses. Vertical 
discourses are specialised symbolic structures, which attempt to be 
context-independent, conserved by enclosed social institutions, such as 
disciplines, though not exclusively so, taught in specialised institutions 
that seek to develop nomothetic, abstract and generalised knowledge of 
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objects in the world, and most importantly take the knower beyond his 
everyday and immediate experience. Horizontal discourses are context-
dependent, used in everyday life, involve commonsense knowledge and 
are exchanged through unsystematic processes and procedures.
In addition, Bernstein (2002) distinguished between singulars 
and regions of knowledge. Singulars are bodies of specialised knowledge 
that exist within their own intellectual field, have distinctive practices 
and established boundaries between themselves and other practices, and 
rules of procedure within them. There are two types of singulars: those 
with a strong grammar, hierarchical arrangement, unitary means for 
testing knowledge, and a strong community of practice with a common 
language of expression by participants; and, in contrast, those with weak 
grammars, more eclectic knowledge structures, and that are composed of 
subgroups within the overall specialised knowledge tradition, members 
of which speak a plethora of languages and adopt different methodo- 
logical and epistemological frameworks.
Regions of knowledge, on the other hand, are traditions of 
knowledge that borrow from a number of singulars, do not claim to be 
underpinned by distinctive logical and discursive framings and operate 
both in the field of practice and the intellectual field. However, the 
distinction that Bernstein made between singulars and regions of 
knowledge neglects epistemological issues and subsumes in its generality 
a number of important distinctions as they play out in possible conceptions 
of relations between theory and practice.
A particular regional tradition of knowledge that was influential 
in Anglophone education systems comprised an amalgam of singular 
forms of knowledge, that is, sociology, psychology, philosophy and history 
of education, although it became increasingly obvious that this hybrid 
tradition was beset with some significant difficulties in relation to notions 
of objectivity, relations between theory and practice, the designation of 
scientific knowledge, the means for determining quality in the practice 
and so forth. As with many of these hybrid forms of knowledge, this 
regional form of knowledge became increasingly unstable, while at the 
same time evolving into something approaching a singular. In France, it 
became known as the Sciences de l’éducation. The German tradition 
of educational knowledge (Erziehung) at a more foundational level is a 
singular form of knowledge in Bernstein’s terms, although it should 
perhaps be suggested at this point that Bernstein’s categories of horizontal 
and vertical knowledge are insufficient for a complete understanding of 
the complex relations between scientific knowledge and everyday 
knowledge (see chapter 7).
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Another form that an academic knowledge tradition can take 
is applied educational research and scholarship, which manifests itself 
in the study of particular educational domains. In reality, these 
are ideological epistemic constructions that offer particular views 
on particular aspects of education. Examples are leadership and 
management, comparative and international education, and higher 
education (a subdiscipline that at the moment is dominated by statistical 
empiricists). They achieve their influence by providing the means of an 
intellectual identity for their members. In Bernstein’s terms they are not 
singulars in their own right because they lack a sense of epistemological 
coherence.
A manifestation of a practical knowledge tradition is what Bernstein 
called a generic modality. These are forms of knowledge produced outside 
of and thus external to the disciplines. An example is the Research 
Excellence Framework (REF) in the UK, involving as it does educational 
judgements, sorting processes and extra-disciplinary epistemic 
judgemental frameworks. The problem with categorising practical 
knowledge traditions as generic is that it ignores the genuine argument 
that in the social sciences, disciplinary knowledge – whether of a singular 
or regional type – is by virtue of what it is insufficient or incomplete. 
Another example of a practical knowledge tradition is the use of generic 
standards in course design in universities and colleges of further 
education in the United Kingdom.
Whitty and Furlong (2017) identified a third tradition, which 
they called integrated (although hybrid would be a more appropriate 
term), insofar as there are some traditions that are neither academic 
(usually though not exclusively disciplinary) nor practical: they are a 
mixture of the two. The problem with designating Latvian Pedagogija, 
practitioner enquiry and clinical practice, as Whitty and Furlong (2017) 
do, as particular forms of knowledge and knowledge development is that 
practice enters into the discourse in different ways and at different points 
in the sequences of activities that constitute them. So, for example, 
although this may be disputed, practitioner enquiry using action research 
approaches draws on existing literature (specifically, literature that 
describes research completed outside the specifics of the practice being 
primed for investigation) to design interventions, which are a direct 
response to practical problems in situ. The Latvian Pedagogija tradition 
describes itself as a multidisciplinary science that takes a particular 
approach to teaching and learning. However, it engages directly with 
practice as the source of its theorising and as the experimental setting for 
re-forming that practice.
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The problem with adopting a Bernsteinian framework for 
knowledge production is that epistemological concerns are consequently 
neglected.42 What this means is that classifications about and relations 
between different knowledge types are undeveloped because they are 
not able to adequately describe mind–world relations. I therefore need 
to address the issue of epistemology here, since learning as a concept 
is epistemologically enframed, or so I am claiming.
Epistemology
Epistemology has traditionally been concerned with what distinguishes 
different knowledge claims, specifically between legitimate knowledge 
and opinion and belief. When in the nineteenth century the social sciences 
were beginning to be developed, they did so under the shadow of the 
physical sciences. Therefore, as immature sciences they sought to mirror 
the procedures and approaches adopted by the natural sciences (or 
at least by an etiolated version of scientific methodology that rarely 
equated with how scientists actually behaved).43
Such approaches can be characterised in the following way. There 
is a real world out there and a correct way of describing it. This allows us 
to think that theorising is simply a matter of following the right methods 
or procedures. What follows from this is that the knowledge produced 
from this algorithmic process is always considered to be superior to 
common sense understandings of the world, because it is systematic and 
rigorous. Science works by accumulating knowledge – that is, it builds 
incrementally on previous knowledge. Even given this, it is hard to argue 
that the social sciences have developed a body of knowledge that presents 
unequivocal truths about its subject matter. (There are many reasons 
for this, not least that objects, relations and object-configurations are 
dynamic.) Furthermore, twentieth- and twenty-first-century philosophy 
has generally accepted that any observations that we make about the 
world, including those that are integral to the research process and can 
be construed as ‘facts’, are always conditioned by prior understandings 
we have of the world. There are no theory-free facts,44 and this puts 
42 This is the view of Maton (2014), although his solution is not satisfactory.
43 cf. Comte, 2009.
44 cf. Quine (1951) – in this article he suggested that the distinction between synthetic and analytical 
truths is unsustainable. Sellars’ (1997) rejection of the sensorily given if we are to have any 
perceptual knowledge at all gives support to Quine in his attack on the foundations of 
representationalist and empiricist traditions. 
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at risk the distinction made by logical positivists such as A. J. Ayer 
(1936) between observation and theory. Fact-based semantic theories, 
including Wittgenstein’s early representationalist theory of the 
Tractatus (1961) and Searle’s (1995) status object theory,45 are equally 
guilty of not addressing this foundational and fundamental problem, 
which is that they ignore or misconstrue the real relations in social life – 
those between knowledge of the world or knowledge construction and 
the world itself.
The positivist/empiricist method (cf. Durkheim, 1995) incorporates 
an idealised view of scientific activity and is characterised as a set of 
general methodological rules. A clear distinction is made between 
knowers and objects in the world. Facts can be identified, free of the 
values and personal concerns of the observer. Any assertions or statements 
made about this world refer to observable measurable phenomena, 
and this implies that two theorists if they apply the correct method 
would come to the same conclusions. It is the correct application of the 
method that guarantees certainty and trust in the theories that are 
produced. Although all of these assumptions are significant in their own 
right, they give the impression that positivism and empiricism are 
simply highly idealised abstruse doctrines; however, such theories 
have important social consequences and speak as authorities in the 
world about social and physical matters.
This conception of theory development is and has been disputed by 
interpretivists, critical theorists and postmodernists, who, in their turn, 
have been criticised for not providing a way of developing their theories 
that fulfils the Enlightenment desire for universal knowledge – knowledge 
that is shorn of superstition, personal preference and special pleading. 
Interpretivists, critical theorists and postmodernists therefore sought 
to provide an alternative to a view of theory building that prioritised 
reduction to a set of variables, a separation between the knower and what 
they sought to know, a means of predicting and controlling the future, 
and a set of perfectly integrated descriptions of the world with a view of 
the social actor as mechanistic and determined. Interpretivists provide 
one possible alternative. They generally focus on the meanings that social 
actors construct about their lives and in relation to the world and argue 
45 In Making the Social World, John Searle (2011) writes as follows: ‘Humans have the capacity to 
impose functions on objects and people where the objects and the people cannot perform the 
functions solely in virtue of their physical structure. [For instance, a five-dollar bill can’t be physically 
transformed into a grande latte.] The performance of the function requires that there be a 
collectively recognized status that the person or object has, and it is only in virtue of that status that 
the person or object can perform the function in question.’ (Kindle location 194)
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that human beings negotiate these meanings in their social practices. 
Human action, then, cannot be separated from meaning-making, with 
our experiences organised through preformulated interpretive frames. 
Interpretivists believe that we belong to traditions of thought, and the 
task of the theorist is to make sense of these interpretations, even though 
such interpretive activity is mediated through the theorist’s own frame of 
reference. This is a practical matter for each individual, although of 
course they cannot develop meanings on their own, since all meaning-
making is located within cultural, linguistic and historical communities 
of practice (see Wittgenstein’s, 1953, arguments against the idea of a 
private language and thus against private meaning-making practices). 
The field of study is therefore the meaningful actions of social actors and 
social institutions; and one of the consequences is that the social sciences 
are now thought of as distinct from the natural sciences. Being in the 
world is therefore understood as a practice, primed for investigation, but 
resistant to the algorithmic and mechanistic methods for describing it 
used in the natural sciences.
All of these frameworks cannot be equally correct (an assumption is 
being made here that all knowledge is essentially and potentially 
amendable), and this explains why theorists produce conflicting and 
contradictory accounts of important educational matters, such as the 
concept of learning. However, the situation is more serious than this, as, 
even though two theorists may subscribe to the same epistemology, they 
may still disagree with one another, even if they are focusing on the 
same set of social problems. The dispute might be about the correct and 
incorrect uses of the method, different views and interpretations of the 
epistemological tradition to which they claim to belong, or the use of 
different interpretive frameworks. This has precipitated what has been 
called a crisis of representation; however, the resolution is already given 
in the way the problem is conceptualised. There is no crisis of representation 
because representation is not an intelligible way of understanding or 
conceptualising the relationship between knowledge and the world. There 
are better ways of doing this (see Brandom, 2000;46 and Taylor, 1985).
46 Brandom’s anti-representationalist inferential philosophy amounts to a claim that meaning 
cannot reside simpliciter in a relationship between a unit of language and something that it 
represents in the world. In contrast, and not in addition, an inferential relationship logically implies 
other relationships with other linguistic units (from word to word-complex, for example), with 
other semantic units (from discursive object to discursive configuration, for instance), and with 
relations between objects in the mind and material objects. The problem with this is two-fold: saying 
that the meaning of a discursive unit resides in a network of other semantic units cannot show how 
in any absolute sense the relationship between the particular and the general can be configured; and 
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Theorising is too important to simply ignore the supposed problems 
of representation alluded to above. Indeed, we need to understand 
how our theories are constructed and how power is ever present in their 
construction (see chapter 8). This is because theory development is 
conducted with and through other people (some of them more powerful 
than others), and the theorist is always in the business of collecting, 
collating and synthesising accounts by social actors of their lifeworlds 
and activities in the world. One of the key concepts implicated in these 
epistemological debates is criticality and I now want to address the issue 
of its use (and thus for Wittgenstein, 1953, its semantic possibilities) 
in discursive and methodological frameworks.
Criticality
Adopting a critical approach ineluctably implies that a state of affairs is 
flawed or incomplete and therefore needs to be replaced by an alternative 
that is not flawed or incomplete in the same way. Here I want to focus 
in the first instance on the argument used by Bhaskar (2008b) in his 
Dialectic: The pulse of freedom. That is, from the premise that people have 
needs and that these needs are unfulfilled, we are logically enjoined to 
meet those needs. Thus, we have moved from two factual statements 
without recourse to the addition of a value statement or even a practically 
prescriptive statement to a value conclusion. Identifying a need implies 
that it must be met. We can conclude only that inherent in an explanatory 
critique there is a statement of value and a means for deciding between 
correct and incorrect actions; in other words, the argument is practically 
adequate. Social researchers make truth claims about objects in the 
world. However, in the social world the objects of knowledge include the 
ideas that people have about those objects and, further to this, those ideas 
do not just operate as descriptions or explanations but may causally 
effect and thus transform the original objects. Many of these ideas seek 
to explain the characteristics of that same society. If social scientists 
seek to explain society, and their explanations differ from those held by 
people in society, then both cannot be right. All this shows is the possibility 
it does not take account of how the meaning of particularities and generalities relates to changing 
discursive and material objects. Brandom wanted to make the link between meaning and reference 
explicit, so that language or linguistic expression is located in the rules that pertain to ‘the game of 
giving and asking for reasons’, and thus meaning resides in the role an expression might acquire 
vis-à-vis inferential rules. 
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of critique. This is different from the natural sciences because physical 
objects have no conception of themselves and no means of providing 
an explanation for what they do; in short, they cannot be reflexive 
(see chapter 17).
Social researchers can go further than identifying inaccuracies in 
the accounts that people in society hold about their lives – they may also 
want to explain why these false beliefs are held. What is the false belief-
causing mechanism? Once this is identified, logically and ineluctably, the 
next step is a negative evaluation of it. If we say that some institution or 
structure causes us to misdescribe objects in the world, then necessarily 
we are criticising it and seeking to ameliorate its harmful effects, and thus 
change it. Furthermore, even just reporting the results of an evaluation 
not only subverts the false belief-causing mechanism, but in addition has 
the potential to undermine its false meaning-making powers. Explanation 
thus has the three-fold purpose of describing, explaining and subverting.47
Criticality, however, is a polysemic concept. Indeed, this is part of 
the problem, for the term itself has a complex range of connotations and 
applications. This means that there is disagreement as to what actually 
constitutes a critical approach. It tends to be the case that when critical 
theory is used in its capitalised form (Critical Theory), the reference is to 
the Frankfurt School of social theory founded in the 1930s.48 Indeed, it 
could be argued that all critical theory contains elements of Critical 
Theory. This is hardly surprising, given the powerful model of the critical 
forged by the Frankfurt School and its successors, and the continuing 
relevance of the attempt to both critique and redefine modernity. 
However, this is not to say that all critical theory is simply a gloss on 
Critical Theory, or that all critical approaches simply comprise the 
modelling and enactment of the tenets of Critical Theory. The critical 
can therefore be said to be marked by a disengagement from the scientific 
as conventionally conceived, with an accompanying critique of its 
47 Hammersley (2002) criticised Bhaskar’s emancipatory realism with regards to research and in 
particular to this argument.
48 Some of the most prominent scholars of the first generation of critical theorists were: Max 
Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse (see chapter 13), Walter Benjamin, Friedrich 
Pollock, Leo Lowenthal and Erich Fromm. The concern of the social theorists associated with this 
school was to rethink the meaning of the European Enlightenment at a time when the ravages of 
totalitarianism seemed to be making a mockery of Enlightenment ideals. The spiritual successor of 
the Frankfurt School was Jurgen Habermas, whose work foregrounded the need to reformulate the 
project of modernity. A third generation of critical theorists included Andrew Feenberg, Albrecht 
Wellmer and Claus Offe. All of them owed much to the pioneering work of Habermas, and all of 
them took as the central theme of their writings the inescapable relation between knowledge and 
criticality.
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distinguishing features such as objectivity, value neutrality and the strict 
separation between knowing subjects and objects to be known, or, to put 
it another way, the self and the world.
In interpretivism, research takes everyday experience and ordinary 
life as its subject matter and asks how meaning is constructed and social 
interaction negotiated in social practices. Human action is inseparable 
from meaning, and experiences are classified and ordered through 
interpretive frames; that is, through pre-understandings mediated by 
tradition. The task of research then becomes to work with, and make 
sense of, the world, through the frames and pre-understandings of the 
researched rather than the categories of the social sciences. The process 
of meaning-making and negotiation over meaning is always a practical 
matter for individuals in the sense that it is located in their social practices. 
Situations are interpreted and, while these interpretations may be faulty 
or misleading, they reveal for researchers, and indeed everyone in the 
world, the shared and constructed nature of social reality; and this would 
have been missed had they been objective in a positivist sense. Positivism, 
or positive science as Auguste Comte (2009) called it, can therefore be 
critiqued on the grounds that its proponents fail to understand the 
complexity of the lifeworld of individuals. This lifeworld is instead 
reduced to an oppressive uniformity through the imposition of scientific 
categories and through the reductive processes that are integral to the 
common scientific method. Given, then, that the field of study is the 
meaningful actions of individuals and the social construction of reality, 
the social sciences must be distinct from the natural sciences, with 
different methods, different ways of explaining things and different 
criteria about what constitutes valid knowledge. This means that 
explaining the social world involves understanding or making sense of it, 
and it involves understanding the meanings that both construct and are 
constructed by interactive human behaviour. The goal of research 
becomes that of providing interpretations of human actions and 
social practices within the context of meaningful, culturally specific, 
arrangements.49
49 Some elements of knowledge, which we may want to describe as transcendental, could be an 
exception to this. Richard Rorty (1998: 57) wanted to deny even this and settle for a version of 
knowledge that employs a strategy ‘for escaping the self-referential difficulties into which “the 
relativist” keeps getting himself [and this] is to move everything over from epistemology and 
metaphysics into cultural politics, from claims to knowledge and appeals to self-evidence to 
suggestions about what we should try’. This move does not allow a real escape from relativism or 
from the possibility of some form of transcendental knowledge; indeed, it is a thoroughgoing 
sceptical argument.
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If all sense-seeking and sense-making is through culturally and 
historically located interpretive frames, then knowledge of objects is 
perspective-bound and partial – it is relative to these frameworks. 
Gadamer (1989) argued that it is impossible to separate oneself as a 
researcher or person from the historical and cultural context that defines 
one’s interpretive frame since both the subject and the object of research 
are located in pre-understood worlds. Frames (or pre-understandings) 
constitute ‘the initial directedness of our whole ability to experience ... 
the conditions whereby we experience something – whereby what we 
encounter says something to us’ (Gadamer, 1989: 173). Underlying 
Gadamer’s argument is the notion of a universal hermeneutics where 
understanding always involves interpretation and where this 
interpretation is universal. Interpretation is not, however, arbitrary, but, 
as we have just noted, takes place through interpretive frames, which are 
themselves located within the background of all of our beliefs and 
practices. Even apparently simple actions, such as arm-raising, can be 
understood only in terms of an immersion in and inseparability from a 
background and are therefore never fully specifiable. They are enframed.
At the same time, this background should not be seen as a reified 
object, since it can be manifested only through partial interpretations. For 
example, the meaning of this book is manifested through each of its 
chapters (the parts), yet each chapter’s meaning depends on the meaning 
of the whole book.50 At the same time, there is also a background that 
comes into play: of practices, of reading, of culture and history, for 
example, about what constitutes a book. This background is meaningfully 
present, but also absent from the awareness of the reader. This deter- 
mination of meaning in the interaction of part and whole against an 
unconscious background is the hermeneutic circle. But it is important 
to note that the circular and perspectival qualities of interpretation, 
which make it always partial and incomplete, are not extraneous, but they 
make interpretation possible; in other words, they act as conditions 
of possibility.
As a social practice, research is itself a meaningful human action 
constructed through interpretive frames. Researchers are also in the 
sense-making business, so unlike the situation in the natural sciences, in 
social research both the researchers and those being researched are 
sense-makers and knowers. Research into learning therefore involves 
50 An example of a knowledge mechanism in which this is ignored is the Research Excellence 
Framework, in which a book is given an assessment evaluation rather than a proper reading because 
the latter is considered to be time-consuming and too expensive.
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interpreting the actions of those who are themselves interpreters. It is 
an interpretation of interpretations. Any inquiry, including the one that 
I am conducting here – and we should remind ourselves that this is a 
conceptual inquiry and an inquiry about what concepts are – has as its 
starting point the pre-understandings that researchers have of what they 
are researching simply through sharing a world with them. Thus, the 
purpose that motivates and animates inquiry, the carving out of a field 
of study and the emergence of criteria and standards by which that study 
can be evaluated, are all dependent on the historical situatedness of 
scientific activity and therefore on the pre-understandings of researchers. 
But this immediately brings us back to the problem of objectivity touched 
on in chapter 1. How can researchers, as interpreters or meaning 
producers, be objective about the meanings produced by those they are 
researching? Furthermore, how can they themselves be objective in the 
sense of not falling into an arbitrary subjectivism? One answer to this 
problem has been that, although researchers must recognise their 
situatedness, they must also bracket out, that is, temporarily suspend, 
their subjectivity and explanatory frames (see chapter 11).
Yet this position is not altogether satisfactory, and an alternative 
suggested by Gadamer (1989) shows why. He argued that it is impossible 
to escape from our pre-understandings even temporarily. But at the same 
time, it is precisely through the interplay between our interpretive frames 
or pre-understandings and the elements of the actions we are trying 
to understand that knowledge is developed. In other words, our pre-
understandings, far from being closed prejudices or biases, actually make 
us more open-minded because in the process of interpretation and 
understanding they are put at risk, tested and modified through the 
encounter with what they are trying to understand, and this includes 
the dispositional exercise of doubting, as Wittgenstein (1969; and chapter 
22) was so keen to affirm. So rather than bracketing out or suspending 
them, we should use them as the essential starting point for acquiring 
knowledge. In order to know, we must be aware of our pre-understandings 
even though we cannot transcend them. At the same time, however, 
while they are an essential starting point, they need to be left open to 
modification in the lifeworld.
Since knowledge always involves interpretation within historical 
and cultural contexts, it is grasped not by eliminating subjectivity 
but through the inter-subjective relationship between the knowing 
subject and the object to be known. Knowledge is not a matter of subject 
and object becoming identical, but of them entering into a necessary 
dialectical relationship. What is involved, then, is a dialogue, or what 
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Gadamer (1989) called a ‘fusion of horizons’, where knowledge is 
an unpredictable emergent rather than a controlled outcome. Here, an 
analogy between literary texts and social phenomena becomes useful, 
since both are complex systems of meaningful elements that are in need 
of interpretation. Interpretivism is the view that human life is essentially 
historical, and that human societies and behaviours need to be read like 
a complex text. Thus, what is involved in understanding is translation, 
empathy, dialogue, participant observation and thick description. As 
a hermeneutic inquiry, the task for research becomes one of working out 
as many meanings as possible of a complex social life (and in relation 
to concepts of trying to understand their possibilities in a Wittgensteinian 
sense). So, if social phenomena can be read as and like texts, Gadamer 
argued that understanding a text is only partly a function of the historical 
situation of the interpreter, as there is also the subject matter itself that 
must be given due weight. In the fusion of horizons, the term ‘horizon’ 
refers to our standpoint or situatedness (in time, place, culture, gender, 
ethnicity, and so on) and the standpoint or situatedness of that which we 
are trying to understand. The fusion results from an understanding that 
is grounded in both standpoints, neither of which can be bracketed out. 
We could say that a fusion of horizons occurs when authors and readers, 
both of whom are historically situated, create shared meanings. Because 
it is situated, every horizon is inevitably limited, but it is also open to 
connecting with other horizons (perspectives or standpoints). The 
resulting fusion is an enlargement or broadening of our own horizon 
through a process of learning that leaves open the possibility for continual 
reinterpretation and different meanings as horizons move and change. 
It is the outcome of inter-subjective agreement where different and 
conflicting interpretations are played out and possibly harmonised. 
Through the comparing and contrasting of various interpretations, 
a consensus can be achieved despite differences – indeed, because 
of differences.
The fact that both researchers and researched (or people acting in, 
and on, the world) engage in interpretive practices means that the social 
sciences and social research cannot help but be engaged in a dialogue 
with their subject matter. In other words, they cannot help but be 
reflexive, although this is not to say that it is always seen in this way. 
Theoretical knowledge is floated off into a context-free vacuum, the 
matter of research is detached from its locating background, and 
researchers are cast as ideal knowing machines who can know the 
world only by being outside it, even though they still seek to grasp it. 
Interpretivism is a popular approach to research, because in emphasising 
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the social it offers a more fruitful and human-centric way of doing 
research. Through the foregrounding of interaction, meaning and social 
construction, it avoids both the scientism and objectivism of traditional 
positivist approaches and the remote theoretism of critical theory’s more 
structural emphasis.
What I have not yet succeeded in doing is providing some certainty, 
in a Wittgensteinian sense, about the meta-knowledge that I have 
discussed in this chapter. This discussion of criticality and meta-
knowledge ends up with an implicit nod in the direction of scepticism, 
pointing to the need for more work to counteract this. This will be one 
of my tasks in the rest of the book. Before that, I need to address the issue 
of quality or excellence in research and, in particular, to take us back 
to Wittgenstein’s notion of criteria for making judgements about 
knowledge.51 The fundamental question, then, in relation to any 
propositions that we might want to make about learning is not what 
evidence there is for this or that proposition, but what would constitute 
evidence for making a proposition about learning in the first place. All too 
frequently, it is the former rather than the latter that is used as a criterion 
for the truth or otherwise of the knowledge statements we might want to 
make about learning in particular and concepts in general.
51 Wittgenstein’s notion of criteria is complicated. In, for example, The Blue and Brown Books (1958: 
24), he suggested the following: ‘When we learnt the use of the phrase “so-and-so has toothache” 
we were pointed out certain kinds of behaviours of those who were said to have toothache. As an 
instance of these kinds of behaviour let us take holding your cheek. Suppose that by observation I 
found that in certain cases whenever these first criteria told me a person had toothache, a red patch 
appeared on a person’s cheek.’ He went on to say that the way he knew that red patches meant 
someone had toothache was because of the coincidence between the appearance of the red patch 
and the person holding her cheek. He further suggested that ultimately such knowledge is 
conventional. The argument was then taken by Wittgenstein into the realm of defining what a 
criterion for making a judgement might be and he distinguished between criteria and symptoms. 
Criteria for him were those signs that allow a judgement about a state of affairs to be made; 
symptoms were those observational states that allow us to conclude that the feature is actually 
present. Finally, he suggested that in actual cases of language use we cannot distinguish between 




It is at this point in the argument that I need to retrace the steps I have 
taken so far. In line with Wittgenstein, I have suggested that concepts, 
and this after all is the focal point of my investigation, cannot be fully 
determined as to their meaning in definitional and essentialising ways, 
but only in terms of how they are used in a way of life. I then suggested 
that a distinction could be made between knowledge of the world 
and meta-knowledge, which directly refers to knowledge of this world 
and not to the world itself. And further to this, that all knowledge, 
including knowledge of learning, uses or is enframed in criteria, whether 
these criteria are implicit or explicit. I want to suggest that in addition 
to the use of criteria, any investigation into the meaning of a concept 
has a judgemental element: does this object that is being primed for 
investigation conform to the criteria that are appropriate to the making 
of a judgement of this type? An answer to this question then needs to 
incorporate some understanding about the reasons (for making these 
sorts of judgements) and about whether those reasons can qualify as 
evidence for this or that. From this very brief summary of where I have 
got to so far, it is obvious that I have made only a small amount of progress 
and indeed that I have barely touched on learning as such. However, the 
issue of evidence/reasons is an important next step. If we are to include 
reasons in evidential justifications, then we also have to value or evaluate 
those reasons when we make a claim about knowledge.
Within the community of practice that I belong to, I make 
judgements all the time: judgements about the quality of a piece of work, 
about what excellence in the practice might be, about the reasonableness 
of accepting an application for promotion, about the effectiveness of a 
teaching programme and so forth. All of these are inferential judgements 
about evidence and the conclusions that can be drawn from this process. 
In making a judgement about a learning event, evidence and its use are 
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central. There are two types of evidence: primary evidence, which is not 
and cannot be atheoretical, and comes in the form of testimony or direct 
observations of worldly events or happenings; and a codified chain of 
reasoning that comprises the collection and analysis of primary evidence 
and its positioning in an inferential sequence to allow a judgement to be 
made on whether and to what extent a proposition about learning is 
reliable and valid – with the proviso that these two terms also need to be 
interrogated. Evidence can be more or less authentic, reliable and 
accurate, and, more importantly, more or less salient, where this is 
understood as a chain of reasoning involving evidence and inference 
leading to a conclusion about a set of activities and involving judgements 
at every level. So, a piece of evidence may have a weak indirect 
relationship to the chain of reasoning, or a strong direct relationship 
to the chain of reasoning because it refers to the chain itself and not to 
evidential elements of it.
Furthermore, salience as a criterion for determining the suitability 
of a piece of evidence for supporting a judgement is practice-specific.52 
This refers to the kinds of information that serve as supporting facts in 
making a claim, and these, I am suggesting, are practice-dependent: what 
is a relevant fact is determined within a practice. Therefore, evidence may 
not be salient because it does not fit with the evidence base within which 
the claim is embedded, and which gives it some measure of credibility. 
And further to this, each and every evidence set also has within it 
a threshold for determining the required probative force of any claim 
that is made.
Evidence in relation to a judgement about the quality of learning 
may therefore be invalid for a number of reasons: domain incom- 
mensurability; non-conformity to the implicit and explicit rules of the 
domain; a lack of probative force to achieve credibility within the 
domain; a lack of fit with the way the domain is formed; the degree 
and type of fallibility accepted in the domain;53 and the degree to which 
52 The notion of a practice is contested. MacIntyre (1981) argues that practices are cooperative, 
integral and have boundaries between them and other practices. They also have internal standards 
of excellence that make them what they are.
53 There are a number of different types of fallibilism: i) the individual believes that because she is 
positioned in relation to the external world, then her perspective is limited and thus the knowledge 
she produces is compromised and incorrigible; ii) it is possible to make mistakes that in theory could 
be corrected; iii) the individual holds that no true knowledge is possible because there are no 
convincing arguments to refute the possibility of being radically deceived; and iv) knowledge is 
produced through processes of conjecture and refutation, but this can never attain to a perfect form 
of knowledge, since the changing and emergent nature of reality means that knowledge always lags 
behind its referent.
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the evidence set provides a complete account of the activities 
being investigated. The content of that evidence and the form it takes 
differs between domains. And this in turn means that domain-specific 
judgements are illegitimate if and when they are applied in other domains 
and in particular to domain-specific sets of evidence and inference, 
and this refers above all else to any claims that are intended to be generic 
or universal.
There are a number of ways in which such judgements can be made. 
The first is deontological, where the judgement is made in terms of a set 
of absolutely right actions or a set of universal precepts. A second way 
is consequentialism. This suggests that a normative judgement can 
be made in relation to the consequences of the actions of people, and not 
to intentions, circumstances or processes. A third way in which such 
judgements can be made is by examining intentions, and then comparing 
what has actually happened with what was intended to happen. There are 
a number of problems with this. Intentions are always future-directed 
and, fundamentally, they reflect what people think can be achieved in 
relation to what currently exists and how what currently exists may 
change in the future; that is, they are predictive. Furthermore, they may 
be wrong, misguided, poorly formulated or incorrectly predictive.
The discussion so far has focused on how we can and do make 
judgements about learning. I have already suggested here that these 
judgements and the way in which they are made are underpinned by 
particular epistemological and ontological positions. The issue of whether 
it is possible, within the limits of language,54 to develop lists of evaluative 
criteria or even whether it is possible to judge between different views of 
knowledge is therefore of immediate concern.
A wide range of criteria and criterial systems are in use. And when 
I say in use, I am referring to systems such as the Research Excellence 
Framework (REF),55 or systems for promotion in universities, or review 
processes undertaken by editors of journals in the field. For example, 
Furlong and Oancea (2005) suggest that in relation to applied research 
about learning, where the focus is on texts of various types, there are four 
interrelated and interdependent dimensions of quality: epistemic, 
technological, capacity development and economic. Within each of these 
54 This phrase, ‘limits of language’, is derived from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (1961: §5.6): ‘The limits 
of my language mean the limits of my world.’ It is intended to show that words, word-sets and 
language in general can never give us a full and perfect account of the world. There is always a gap 
between knowledge of the world and the world itself; and to believe otherwise is to adopt a mistaken 
view of what language is and can do.
55 For a fuller discussion of this regressive mechanism, see chapter 16.
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dimensions, they suggest a number of subdimensions. So the epistemic 
dimension comprises trustworthiness, capacity for making a contribution 
to knowledge, explicitness, propriety and paradigm dependence. The 
technological dimension comprises purposivity, salience or timeliness, 
specificity and accessibility, a concern for enabling impact, and flexibility 
and operationalisability. The capacity development dimension requires 
the piece of work being judged to be plausible, collaborative, reflexive 
or deliberative, receptive and/or transformational. And the economic 
dimension comprises marketability, cost-effectiveness, auditability, 
feasibility and originality. The implication of their argument is that for a 
piece of work which describes a learning activity to be judged to have 
reached a threshold of excellence, it should meet the requirements of 
these dimensions and subdimensions, or at least that when a judgement 
is being made, these criteria should be central to the way the judgement 
is made. There are three types of criteria.
Internal, external and parasitic criteria
A fundamental distinction can be drawn between all of the different 
criteria that have been suggested, and this relates to their internality 
or externality. Internality refers to the quality of the piece, with the focus 
on validity, sufficiency of evidence, sufficiency of process of evidence-
gathering or systematicity, which in turn is validated by inter-subjective 
judgements within a particular discourse community, or by judgements 
made by individuals who subscribe to the values of a discourse community. 
However, whether subjectively or inter-subjectively validated, the focus is 
not on the impact it makes on that community or any other community, 
but on the quality of the piece – internal criteria are epistemically focused. 
External criteria, on the other hand, refer to the impact of the piece, so 
the piece is judged to be sound if it can be shown to have had an effect on 
an agent or agency in the world. A single external criterion may be 
deemed to be necessary, though not sufficient, for making a judgement 
about the quality of the piece, especially if a multi-criterial approach is 
adopted. The reason for distinguishing between these two types of criteria 
is that a piece of work can be internally sound but have made no impact; 
and conversely, a piece of work can be internally flawed but may still have 
made an impact, either positively or negatively, on a discourse community.
A piece of work can be internally sound, that is, it represents the 
world adequately; however, it still may not be adequate at the level of 
external satisfaction. For example, it may not be useful, it may not have 
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had any impact and it may not have contributed to the development of the 
research community or to any capacity within it. It is internally sound in 
the sense that it is epistemically valid. The assessor, in using external 
criteria in judgement, is switching her attention from the original account 
and focusing on a different problem – that of the impact of that account 
on different discourse communities – and this requires a different range 
and type of evidence to be collected to determine whether or not it is 
adequate. As I have suggested above, this still requires the use of epistemic 
criteria, although these are now being invoked to determine the adequacy 
of a different activity.
There are a number of criteria that cannot be treated as criteria in 
their own right, but which are parasitic; that is, their value relates to the 
values given to first-order criteria, such as epistemic validity or the impact 
on a discourse community or communities. For example, a piece of work 
can be valued only for its transparency if what is being made transparent 
is epistemically valid. If this is not epistemically valid, then the attribute 
of transparency has no value.
An example of a second-order criterion is intentionality. It has been 
suggested that the stated intention of the author or authors should be a 
necessary, but not sufficient, element in any judgement about worth that 
is made. A piece of work should in part be judged on whether it conforms 
to its stated purposes. In this case, no overall judgement should be made 
as to its impact or its internal validity, or even the soundness or otherwise 
of those intentions, without at least some reference to the stated 
intentions of the author or authors, if they can be safely understood. 
Thus, if the intention of the author is that it should have no impact, it may 
still meet the requirements for soundness in relation to this intentional 
criterion because there is an intention behind the piece, which acts as a 
satisfier for quality.
However, if we have good grounds for believing that the stated or 
implicit intention of the researcher is flawed, or even that, in all of the 
possible cases that have come to our attention and all of the possible cases 
that could come to our attention, there is the possibility that a researcher 
could have a misguided intention, then the inclusion of intentionality as 
one of our criteria is suspect. A criterion such as intentionality can be used 
in this way only if it has a close relationship with other epistemic criteria, 
such as truthfulness, validity or reliability. It is therefore a second-order 
concept. The assessor is being asked to make her judgement not in relation 
to whether the researcher has an intention but in relation to whether the 
intention or purpose of the piece being assessed is sound. Furthermore, 
this means that no value can be given to intentionality in a criterial set 
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unless a further judgement is made that this intention is sound or 
reasonable, and this involves a further judgement about the background 
to the research being made. It also requires a judgement to be made about 
whether the implicit recommendations of a piece of research are binding 
on participants in the setting under consideration or not.
Probative force
Another issue then that needs to be addressed is the probative force of the 
conclusions made in a piece of research.56 If a researcher makes a 
theoretical claim about learning, she is also claiming that this theory is a 
better theory for explaining all of the available evidence than every other 
possible theory, and the truth claim embedded here would compel the 
practitioner to modify her practice if it was relevant to that practice. To 
do otherwise would be to base her practice on custom and experience 
rather than on the prescriptive force of research findings. However, much 
research does not make the claim that it has an absolute view of truth, but 
rather hedges its findings as helpful guidance or lacking in contextual 
detail or as tentative, and therefore deliberately does not make the claim 
that it should be accepted as the complete truth about the matter in hand. 
In this case, an acknowledgement is being made that the exercise of 
practical wisdom comprises a selection from all of the available evidence. 
This does not mean that the practitioner ignores the evidence and does 
what she feels was right all along, but it does mean that evidence and 
hypothesising are treated here as being strictly non-determinative.
A criterial judgement is considered to be sound if it satisfies the 
requirements for that judgement to be made.57 For a piece to be judged to 
have met the requirements of being significant, for example, it must have 
conformed to a model of what significance means to the person making 
the judgement, and this comprises two processes: first, that the criterion 
56 Most research currently has attached to it an inadequate notion of truth, whether the author 
explicitly states this or not. This amounts to an assertion that because that author has collected, 
collated and analysed data (of whatever type) and drawn the appropriate conclusions, then what 
she is presenting to the reader must be truthful. It is a mistaken assertion.
57 Wittgenstein (1953: §354) distinguished between criteria and symptoms, while at the same time 
making it clear that all knowledge claims were determined by criteria: ‘The fluctuation in grammar 
between criteria and symptoms makes it look as if there were nothing but symptoms. We say, for 
example, “Experience teaches that there is rain when the barometer falls, but it also teaches that 
there is rain when we have certain feelings of wet and cold, or such-and-such visual impressions.” 
As an argument in support of this, one says that these sense impressions can deceive us. But here 
one overlooks the fact that their deceiving us precisely about rain rests on a definition.’
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is adequately defined; and second, that this general definition is applied 
to the particularity of the piece in a satisfactory way, so that this piece in 
part or in its entirety is an adequate example of the criterion. A criterion, 
then, is a statement about the quality of a piece or any future piece, and 
implicit within it is a model of what constitutes sufficient evidence for 
a judgement to be made that it conforms to the criterion, and evidence 
in the particular example being considered here (its significance) refers 
to the structure of the piece, whether it shows to the reader that the 
argument made is significant and so forth. The reader, who is making 
the judgement that it is significant, needs to have found good reasons or 
evidence as to why it meets those requirements. The reader may also have 
looked for evidence that the piece has not met the criterial requirements; 
in other words, she is looking for evidence or examples of places within 
the text that would indicate that the satisfiers for the criterion have not 
been met. If she finds a sufficient number of examples in which the author 
has not adopted a significant approach, then she is likely to judge that it 
has failed to meet these satisfiers. Thus, moments of positive affirmation 
and negative disconfirmation are implicit within the process.
Furthermore, two conditions have to be met. First, the relationships 
between these criteria have to be clarified. Are they for instance in a 
hierarchical relationship with each other? Do they have different values 
attached to them? If they do, are these implicit or explicit? And second, 
the application of criteria still requires an interpretive process to be 
undertaken by an assessor or assessors, and this involves the surfacing of 
background knowledge and the reaching of agreement between those 
assessors. This reaching of agreement is fraught with difficulties, 
especially if the discourse community is fractured or consists, to use 
Bernstein’s (2000: 67) phrase, of ‘a variety of specialised languages’.
However, it is not a question of abandoning one set (such as internal 
criteria) at the expense of another (such as external criteria), but of 
deciding on the relative value of each. This is inherently problematic; 
first, because different types of research may have different purposes and 
thus to give a low value to a piece, which is designed to have no practical 
or instrumental purpose, would be to discriminate against it. The second 
reason is that a further justification, which is an addition to the individual 
justification for each criterion, has to be provided, and this refers to why 
one criterion should be given a higher or lower value than another, and 
this applies even if all of the designated criteria are given equal values. In 
the process of identifying these criteria, an implicit value is given to each, 
and this value is relative to values that could be given to other criteria 
within the set, and in turn, these relative valuations need to be justified. 
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Those making these judgements then need a meta-theory that provides a 
rationale for the values given to the different criteria.
Assessors make judgements about quality, although the background 
to their judgements may be implicit. What is the origin of their judgement? 
They may have had experience of performing the same action before, and 
although their understanding of what is involved has changed over time, 
it has been influenced by previous encounters with the same type of 
problem. They may in the past have had their view moderated by 
examples of other people performing similar actions to their own, and 
they have assimilated these experiences into their repertoire of beliefs, 
leading to certain well-rehearsed practices/actions. Knowledge in 
judgement is still tacit, even if at various points in time that tacit 
knowledge is surfaced for reflection and contemplation and amended 
accordingly. They have a model of what good research looks like when 
they make a judgement and, in part, they match up the piece under 
scrutiny with this model. There may, however, be a further process at 
work, which is that because they are aware of a number of different and 
conflicting ways to make a judgement about a piece of research, they 
suspend their own set of beliefs and judge the work to be sound if it 
conforms to the collective judgement of the discourse community in 
which they work, as they understand it. However, what we can say is that 
evidence-providing or reason-giving activity has a judgemental element.
Evidence in judgement
All judgements about educational matters are inferential; that is, evidence 
is collected, and a conclusion is drawn from that piece of evidence 
or evidential set. In making a judgement about a piece of research 
in relation to a set of criteria, evidence is investigated. However, the 
relationship between evidence and judgement is complicated. The 
evidence or evidential set has either a strong or a weak warrant and is 
domain specific – the kind of information that will serve as supporting 
facts in making a claim is dependent on the practice within which it 
is embedded. Claims that are made in the world, then, are domain 
specific, so one set of practices or a domain requires a different type of 
evidence base from another.
In making a judgement about a piece of research using a set of 
criteria, the issue of fallibilism is salient, both as it relates to the judgement 
made by the assessor and as it relates to the use of evidence by the 
researchers to support their hypotheses. This is because in making a 
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judgement, true knowledge (that x is better than y, where x and y refer to 
different pieces of work) may consist of an acceptance that a weak form 
of evidence to support the hypothesis that is being made and/or a weak 
relationship between evidence and hypothesis is all that is required. In 
this case, knowledge is fallible; however, it may still be acceptable either 
to the reader or user of research or to the discourse community in which 
she works. Thus, when a judgement is made that a piece of research is 
relevant, plausible, transparent or whatever, no assumption is being 
made that it is perfectly plausible, transparent or relevant. It is accepted 
that it meets some but not all the requirements of these criteria.
There is a further dimension that needs to be considered, and this is 
the nature of the evidence itself and, in particular, the way in which it has 
been gathered; in other words, its implicit (usually) warrant. If evidence 
is contaminated by vested interests, then it may be considered to be 
unsound. However, at a foundational level, there may be disagreement 
about the possibility or otherwise of any evidence being produced that is 
not imbued with interest values of one type or another. If, for example, a 
Gadamerian perspective is adopted (see chapter 2), then the soundness 
of the evidence is judged by whether a sufficient acknowledgement of the 
background to the collection and presentation of the data is made 
(Gadamer, 1989), and this is underpinned by the idea that no value-free 
evidence can be collected. This, however, is treated not as sufficient for 
designating a piece of evidence as sound or unsound, but only as a 
necessary element of such a process.
A piece of evidence on its own may not be enough to confirm or 
falsify a belief that is held, since it may be that a collection of evidence 
is required to confirm or falsify a belief. Thus, the problem arises with 
regards to the relationships between these different items of evidence. 
Again, more evidence of the same type merely gives the researcher 
greater confidence that she is correct in holding this belief. However, 
the belief that she has may not require more of the same type of evidence, 
because even if she collects many instances of the same type, this 
can never prove conclusively that she is correct to hold that belief. It 
may be that different types of evidence are required to confirm or 
disconfirm that belief. Furthermore, the strength of the evidence, which 
leads the researcher to hold a belief, is always undermined – it becomes 
weaker – if alternative hypotheses generated from those data can be 
identified.
Perhaps the most fundamental sense in which we can understand 
the social processes involved in knowledge formation, even more than 
with the making of judgements about texts, is the activity of learning 
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itself. Before that we need to address the issues of reasons and causes, 
whether reasons are causes, and whether human beings and material 
or discursive objects can be distinguished by their capacity or otherwise 
to operate in the realm of reasons.
Reasons and causes
In chapter 1, I suggested that there are five generic types of objects: 
discursive objects, material entities, object-relations, structural 
formations and human beings. What is missing then is a set of reasons for 
or a justification of an object-ontology.58 This will have to wait. For the 
time being I want to address one element of this argument: the reason-
giving disposition of human beings. Objects, such as material entities, 
structural formations and human beings, have particular characteristics 
at particular points in time. Here I want to concentrate on the most 
important of these object-types, human beings, and suggest that the 
principal characteristic of human beings is their capacity to work with 
and through reasons.
What I suggest is that in order to make an ontological claim – that 
is, a claim about being – we are not, as is commonly thought, providing 
a description of an experience but making a claim about it in what 
Wilfred Sellars (1997) described as ‘a space of reasons’, and that 
what follows from this is that we can and should understand and use 
concepts specifically in relation to current and future-oriented networks 
of meanings. In his Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Sellars 
suggested that ‘in characterising an episode or a state as that of knowing, 
we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are 
placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to 
justify what one says’ (Sellars, 1997: §36). This is a spatial metaphor and 
a marker that can distinguish human beings from other types of objects, 
insofar as trees, rocks and buildings do not seem to reason, employ 
reasoning strategies or attempt to provide a justification for a course of 
action. Reasoning within this space involves giving and asking for reasons, 
where this activity is understood as making a commitment in the world, 
58 By calling it an object-ontology I am affirming that anything I say here has a realist element to it, 
and that it is possible to differentiate between things in the world. What I am also suggesting is that 
the type of realism I am espousing is far from the type of realism argued for by positivists/empiricists 
or the type of realism that postmodernists set themselves against. Realism does not necessarily 
entail representationalism.
ON LEARNING70
with that commitment referring to the circumstances surrounding its 
content and its consequences.
Such an argument makes sense only within a particular enframing 
of the object-world; for example, if one adopts a physicalist view of the 
world, with no distinction being made between mind and matter, then 
reasons and separately rationalisations for those reasons are literally 
irrelevant to true explanations of these phenomena. They can play no 
part in the causal sequence that we might want to explain, which includes 
learning activities. This would suggest that if a non-physicalist approach 
to volition and constraint is adopted, then a notion of giving and asking 
for reasons as the essential characteristic of the human being is needed. 
Although this is an argument that on the surface seems to suggest that 
human beings can will certain things, this would be to claim too much. 
There are two obstacles to us believing this. The first is that I have to 
provide an argument or set of arguments for the giving of reasons in the 
first place, and any subsequent rationalisations of those reasons (all of 
this may be below the level of consciousness) and this reason-giving 
activity have to be different from the way in which a physicalist causal 
sequence might operate. Otherwise reasons are simply epiphenomenal 
and are irrelevant to how we explain this or that – especially when we are 
dealing with learning as a concept or even an episode of learning. And 
second, I still have to provide an argument within a space of reasons for a 
non-physicalist approach. (I do this in chapter 9.)
There may be a way out of this dilemma: to construe a reason and 
the giving and asking for a reason in physicalist terms. This would involve 
stripping away all of the elements of the process of giving and asking for 
reasons – the activity of giving, the activity of asking, the notion of a 
reason and more – and understand them purely as physical unwilled 
objects that conform to certain laws of nature, as a neuropsychologist 
would argue. (See chapter 9 for a fuller explication of this argument.) 
This would, I think, render them as meaningless and the space of reasons 
would become an empty concept.
I have suggested here that a temporal distinction needs to be made 
between reasons and rationalisations of those reasons, and this would be 
in accord with the view that human beings have intentions and that these 
intentions are not irrelevant to any explanation we might want to make 
of an event or causal sequence. So, in the first instance, the rationalisation 
of the action might not be a part of the explanation of the original causal 
sequence at the first time point. However, this rationalisation might in 
turn be an important part of a new and different causal sequence, with a 
different object as its endpoint. A rationalisation of an explanation is 
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a post-hoc explanatory mechanism and may have nothing to do with 
the original reason-causing activity, except insofar as it may constitute 
evidence for the identification of the original reason for the action.
The key is answering the question as to whether reasons can be 
causes. This is of some importance because it impacts directly on the 
choice of methods for collecting evidence to confirm or disconfirm the 
theories we might have about human activities. Is it possible to determine 
ex post facto that the reasoning activity of an individual can provide an 
adequate explanation for a particular event in which this individual 
played a prominent part? Texts produced through interactive processes 
such as interviewing and involving interpretative activity can provide 
truthful accounts of them. This argument hinges on the idea that the 
reasoning process undertaken by an individual can lead directly to 
actions; in other words, intentionality is a genuine idea. This does not 
mean that rationalisations of the reasons for their actions by individuals 
do not take place and, indeed, interviews as a methodological tool 
generally focus on these post-hoc rationalisations. However, the post-hoc 
rationalisation is emergent from the actual reason for the activity and 
thus retains elements of it, although it is not reducible to it.
The difficulty then becomes that these reasons (which by necessity 
have a directive quality about them) are embedded in networks of reasons 
for doing things, which exist independently from the consciousness of the 
individual, although clearly the individual has the capacity to access 
them. A person can have a reason for her action, be convinced that the 
reason she gives is the actual reason for why the action took place, and 
believe that the action would not have taken place without the reason 
being developed prior to the action. And yet, the reason given is not the 
real reason for that action. Furthermore, the rationalisation of the original 
reason is not necessarily a distortion of that original reason; it may 
comprise a re-forming of that reason, which now entails the placing of the 
action in wider social, political, economic and discursive contexts (some 
of which are developed during the research process by the researcher, 
trusted-other or teacher). The purpose is to grasp the reasoning action in 
its setting of rules, practices, conventions and, fundamentally, people’s 
expectations. What this implies is that there is always an intentional 
relationship in any particular action or event. And this in turn implies 
that in most circumstances the person is a skilled knower, especially 
with regards to her own reasons for her actions, even if the original 
and motivating reason is subsequently rationalised over time.
In pursuing a causal explanation of learning via a constant 
conjunction model, with its stress on that which can be observed and 
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controlled, researchers, and human beings in the lifeworld, have tended 
to overlook the liabilities, powers and potentialities of the programmes 
and people whose behaviours they are trying to explain. If this is correct, 
then the data-collection methods and the research design are going to 
be different. The reason for this is that researchers are now committed 
to understanding mechanisms that may not actually operate in practice 
(that is, produce effects) because the external conditions for the release 
of the generative mechanism may not be present. Researchers therefore 
have to adopt a two-fold strategy: identifying the appropriate generative 
mechanism and examining the actual conditions that have produced 
the effects they have observed. Since the reality, which they wish to 
describe, is social in nature and comprises social actors interacting with 
each other, they cannot simply assume that those actors are compelled 
to behave in particular and specific ways by causal mechanisms that 
they cannot observe and which they do not understand. These types of 
causal relations need to be understood as configurations of social actors 
making decisions, whether appropriate or not, within certain determinate 
conditions and, further, that the making of those decisions and the 
subsequent retroductions that are made change both the contexts in 
which future decisions are made and the identity of those social actors. 
I have focused here on the reason-giving capacity of human beings and 
the implications of this for how we can research into and consequently 
understand learning, both our own and that of other people. In the next 
chapter, I address these issues in more detail and, in particular, the third 
of our object-types, object-relations.
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Object-relations – research  
into learning
The third of the object-types within an object-ontology is an object-
relation. If we are able to distinguish between different objects (and 
the justification for doing this is complicated, but nevertheless essential 
to the argument being made in this book – see chapter 13 for a fuller 
explication) and we want to build into our conception of the world ideas 
of change, inter- and intra-relationships and continuities (over time), 
then we need to understand what these are and how they occur. This 
revolves around the idea that object-relations inhere in those objects as 
characteristics of these objects. They are thus interactive, powerful, 
dynamic and object-specific. This means that in the first case an object, 
with a particular set of characteristics, enters into a relation with another 
(or other) object(s). A person opens a door and walks through it, closing 
the door behind him. In the second case, objects in interaction with other 
objects have the power to change themselves and other objects, object-
relations and arrangements of objects. A third characteristic is their 
dynamism both in terms of their substance and in relation to how they 
can be classified as object-relations. And a fourth characteristic of an 
object-relation is that it is specific to a particular object – its potential 
power to influence and change other objects in the world in an interactive 
process is determined by the nature of the characteristics that inhere in 
that object, which means that the essential nature of an object is time- 
and space-bound. These object-relations act as hinges in the interaction 
between objects, object-configurations and people.
I have already suggested that one requirement for a coherent theory 
of knowledge and being is that social reality has ontological depth. 
This notion of ontological depth has two elements: that the world is 
stratified or can be characterised as having different levels of being; and 
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that it is possible to identify (but not necessarily through the senses 
or experientially) concrete manifestations of phenomena operating 
at these different levels. One such stratificational hierarchy is Roy 
Bhaskar’s (2011) three levels of reality:59 the empirical level (the level 
of experiences), the actual level (the level of events and states of affairs) 
and the real level (the level of underlying structures and generative 
mechanisms). For Bhaskar, the real level constitutes a more fundamental 
level of explanation – this has implications for how we can know reality, 
since the real level is not immediately available to consciousness. In order 
to access this level of reality, we have to operate in a backwards or 
retroductive fashion to determine what the real relations in any causal 
sequence that has already taken place might be; and in turn this means 
that we cannot safely predict at any time point what is going to happen in 
the future. Objects, relations, networks and people are dynamic and do 
not change in relation to some predetermined pattern or plan. In addition, 
objects, networks, relations and people possess powers. The powers held 
by these objects have three forms: they can be possessed, exercised 
or actualised. What this means is that material, relational, personal, 
institutional-systemic or discursive powers can be possessed by an object 
but are not actualised, or they can be actualised but not have any real 
effects in the open system they are operating within, or they can be 
influencing present and future arrangements of objects, networks and 
relations dynamically.
59 Bhaskar (Scott with Bhaskar, 2015: 35) in one of his last writing projects suggested that: ‘There 
are two basic features of the new ontology that was established by the same sorts of arguments that 
established the necessity of ontology itself. There were two ontological characteristics of the 
greatest importance. Well, let’s say two concepts. The first concept is that of an open system, and 
this is an index of the differentiation of the world, and the second concept is that of ontological 
stratification, or a distinction between, what I call, the real and actual, bearing in mind that the 
actual is also real, the real level then signifies the non-actual real, and of course this was part of a 
triple distinction between the real, the actual and empirical. And so, the key feature of this is 
stratification, and if I could just go into stratification a little bit. There are two senses that can be 
given to stratification, which I think it is important to differentiate, all of which are in critical 
realism. So, the first is the idea of the distinction between structure or mechanisms and the events 
they generate, or the distinction between the real and the actual, or the distinction between powers 
and their exercise or between powers and their realisation in actuality. And the second is the idea 
of the multi-tiered stratification of reality, and this is opposed to the idea that there is just one level 
or stratum, where there isn’t even one level of difference. The distinction between structures and 
events is in principle infinitely repeatable in reality. So, for example, here we have a table, and the 
table is constituted by molecules in motion, and the molecules in motion are constituted by atoms, 
which in turn are constituted by electrons, which are to be explained in turn by quantum fields of 
singularity. In the history of modern physics, we have identified these five levels of structure, and 
critical realism has a very nice schema to show how science gets from one level to another. This I call 
the D-R-E-I-C schema and it basically tells you what happens in any round of scientific discovery and 
development.’ 
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Examples of these object-relations expressed dualistically are: 
one-to-one or one-to-many relations (where the relation between objects 
is manifested as an object-to-object relation or as an object-to-objects 
relation); strong or weak relations (where this refers to the probative 
force of the object-relation); vertical or horizontal relations (where this 
refers to whether hierarchies or flat structures of objects are being 
created); corrosive or developmental relations (where this refers to the 
consequences of the activation of the powers of an object on another 
object or objects – what type of change results); endogenous or exogenous 
relations (where this refers to the direction of change in the original 
object – internal or external); enabling or constraining functionality 
(where the direction and impulsion of the object-relation is towards one 
or the other); feed-back or feed-forward relations (where this refers 
to the temporality of the change process); convergence or divergence 
(where the end point is towards a monistic or pluralistic categorisation 
of knowledge); framing or reframing relations (where this refers to the 
epistemology of the change process); categorising or recategorising 
relations (where the concern here is with the essence or non-essence of 
objects in the world); and subsumptive or contiguous relations (where 
this refers to the impact of the interaction on both objects, whether 
the impact is integral or peripheral). Each of these examples of 
object-relations is expressed in terms of its potentiality to influence 
object-arrangements at a particular point in time.60 So, for example, 
some objects can be characterised as having one-to-one, feed-back, weak 
and contiguous powers, and it is these powers or orientations that 
in conjunction with many other powers and orientations enable us to 
distinguish between objects. As a result, causation can only be understood 
as being generative, productive and retrospectively understood. These 
three knowledge claims need in the first instance to be distinguished from 
claims about causation that are false or insufficient.
Causation
Aristotle’s causal explanatory framework comprises the following: i) 
material causation – an object such as a statue is generated from 
something else, such as a basic metal; ii) formal causation – an object 
60 This is the crucial point. It is not just that objects have tendencies to influence other objects, it is 
that they have tendencies to influence them in particular and specific ways. These tendencies are 
relational. 
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such as a statue represents something else and thus this something else 
can be said to have caused the object; iii) efficient causation – an object 
can be said to have been intended, so we can say that it has been caused 
by the intention of the person and the work of that person in fulfilling his 
or her intention as in a sculptor making a statue; and then there are iv) 
final causes where we are dealing with ends or purposes – the statue has 
some purpose such as satisfying an aesthetic need or honouring 
an important public figure (cf. Aristotle, 2018a: Book II, chapter 3).61 
In order to provide a satisfactory account of causality, the philosopher 
must also develop a satisfactory account of epistemology – the former 
supervenes on the latter.
Those subscribing to empiricist and positivist philosophies claim 
that it is possible to predict events, and this is founded on the idea that 
both the original account (at the first time point – T1) and the predicted 
account (at the second time point – T2) are sufficient in all essential 
respects. On the other hand, as I have argued above, it may not be possible 
to make law-like predictions about social and educational matters. What 
this means is that laws should not be thought of as constant conjunctions, 
or even as determinate causal sequences, but as tendencies of powerful 
objects, and these tendencies are understood as the properties of those 
objects, and not as predictive behaviours that have not yet been 
performed.
Scientific realists and statistical positivists generally subscribe to a 
Humean theory of causality as spatiotemporal contiguity, succession and 
constant conjunction, and this is founded on the idea that although it is 
not possible to observe a relation between cause and effect, it is possible 
to identify a persistent association between two or more events, and then 
infer a causal relation.62 A repudiation of this view of causality is an 
essential building block for a notion of dispositional realism, or at least a 
view that objects have causal properties and thus dispositions of one type 
or another – an argument that I will take up in chapter 15.
Objections to Hume’s theory of causality have frequently been 
made. It cannot account for spurious associations or order cause and 
61 In this exposition, Aristotle was giving an account of the different ways in which causation can be 
understood semantically. He was not in this particular passage showing how causation actually 
works in the world.
62 This is one interpretation of David Hume’s notion or idea of causality and the most common one, 
and he makes this point repeatedly in his writings. Here is one instance of it (Hume, 2000: 161): ‘All 
ideas are deriv’d from, and represent impressions. We never have any impression, that contains any 
power or efficacy. We never therefore have any idea of power.’ There are many other instances in his 
A Treatise of Human Nature.
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effect, and there is no guarantee that all of the possible interacting 
variables have been identified. Furthermore, it is reductive because it 
treats these variables as real, and therefore elides epistemology with 
ontology. The meaning of a concept is always embedded in a framework 
of other concept-meanings, and in pointing to the detheorisation of much 
contemporary research I am suggesting that traditional and reductionist 
forms of research separate out the concept from the framework, in order 
for it to have the properties of a variable. Having detheorised the concept, 
relations are then identified between these different variables, even if the 
variable itself does not have a meaningful relationship with the world. 
(Such relational exercises include descriptive statistics; basic hypotheses 
tests such as t-tests, ANOVA, contingency tables and chi-square tests; 
classic regression models, including logistic and probit regressions; 
multilevel regression models; factorial analysis and structural equation 
models; and data envelopment analysis, propensity score analysis, 
stochastic frontier analysis and simulation.63) Most research in the field 
of learning is predicated on a detheorisation and a semantic reduction of 
the concept(s) being examined. The frequently cited injunction that in 
order to make a comparison between institutions or systems of learning, 
the first move one has to make is to reduce the various elements of the 
setting being examined to sets of numbers is to adopt a restricted view of 
the concept and how it is used in the world – with the consequence that 
this detheorisation process means that the researcher understands 
objects, relations between objects, arrangements of objects, people and 
causality in a particular way, which cannot relate to how these objects 
actually behave and have their being in the world. It is the enumeration 
of the object that acts to delimit the way the object (material or discursive), 
the object-relation, the object-configuration or the person can be 
understood, and what follows from this is that it can produce a distorted 
view of what is being investigated.64 Some objects (both conceptual and 
material) are already framed enumeratively, for example, money65 or 
63 The use of some of these techniques has been described by a leading quantitative researcher in 
the field of education as getting us closer to the real world. He was wrong then and is still wrong 
now.
64 There are three possible alternatives for how we can understand the use of mathematics to 
illuminate concepts: i) mathematics as a useful formal linguistic system; ii) mathematics as a system 
to enable us to discover causally inert and non-normative objects in the world; iii) foregoing a 
representationalist meta-semantics and a causal theory of knowledge implicit in i) and ii) and 
adopting a use theory of meaning and accepting that mathematical statements have normative as 
well as descriptive elements, as Wittgenstein argued.
65 It should be said here that if we are dealing with monetary relations, such as exchange, 
distribution, storage and the like, then enumerative distortions are likely to detheorise these objects.
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runs in the game of cricket, and thus are not detheorised or semantically 
distorted if the mode of investigation or appreciation is broadly 
quantitative; however, most objects, especially those that operate in the 
space of learning, are not framed enumeratively or at least not framed 
exclusively in enumerated ways.
Another view of causality is that people cannot observe these causal 
relations, and in addition, those relations do not exist in nature since 
events are not caused. There are only apparent regularities, and therefore 
what is understood as a causal relationship – that is, a first event has led 
to a second event on every occasion in which they have interacted – is a 
product of chance. There is nothing in nature that causes anything to 
happen. This is an extreme version of causality, effectively a denial of 
causality as real. An alternative view is to suggest that there are different 
types of causes, which are different in kind because they operate in 
different ways; a person having a reason for doing something that also 
causes him to do it, such as keeping an appointment, is different from that 
person not being able to leave a room because the door is locked. If asked 
what caused him to do it, he might provide a different reason for his 
action from the one that motivated him in the first place or conditioned 
his action. This however, is not a refutation of the belief that reasons can 
in certain circumstances be causes, but only an observation that a person 
may be misled about the actual reasons that caused another person’s 
actions, or even that the person himself may have been confused about 
what actually caused him to do something.
Let us now imagine that the world is not random, and thus it does 
have causal elements. Again, there are a number of possible models. The 
first of these is that everything is caused: the universe is a closed system 
of objects, including individual human beings; these objects have causal 
powers that may or may not be activated; and if they are activated, they 
behave mechanically. And what this means is that if an object comes into 
contact with another object, then a new object is formed, which is what 
constitutes a causal sequence. All events are caused whether observers 
are fully able to understand them or not. Incomplete or deficient 
understandings occur because a person does not know enough about the 
world, or because he does not know how he could investigate the event in 
a reliable way, or even because he could never be in a position to conduct 
a reliable investigation. Indeed, he might think that he knows the cause 
of something, especially if the cause–effect–cause sequence involves an 
intentional act; however, he could be mistaken even if he is the intentional 
being. This process takes place regardless of whether it can be or is 
described or theorised about; thus, notions of probability do not come 
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into the equation at this level of explanation. The important point to note 
about this model is that intentionality is treated in the same way as any 
other material or ideational causal substance. Thus, one substance in 
conjunction with another substance necessarily causes a new substance 
to be formed. This ineluctably implies determinism and necessity.
A second model is different and is predicated on the idea that 
reasons can be and are causes. However, this needs to be qualified by the 
adoption of a further premise, which is that reasons are not causes in 
the same way that events have antecedent conditions which necessarily 
have to be present for that event to take place. We need to distinguish 
here between actual reasons for an action and rationalisations of those 
reasons after the event or activity. However, even if we distinguish 
between the two, we are not identifying a new justification, because we 
are not ruling out the possibility that a reason has caused something to 
happen, even if, subsequently, that causal mechanism of which the action 
is the central component has been incorrectly described.
A reason has to relate to the action it seeks to explain; it has to, in 
other words, be relevant. It takes the form of a justification for an action 
yet to be performed, and this therefore implies that there are competing 
actions between which a human being has to choose. (This would include 
all of the possible ways of behaving that are relevant to the proposed 
course of action.) This reason is valued in relation to other possible 
reasons for action, and these values are embedded in those structures of 
agency that act as conditions for the agent. What this means is that certain 
actions, and therefore the reasons for those actions, are privileged over 
other actions and their reasons, and this forms the backdrop to the 
choosing of a reason for an action and ultimately to the performance of 
the action itself.
There is a further model, which in essence is epistemological. This 
is that any causal model we might want to adopt is probabilistic rather 
than deterministic in essence. We may be unable to determine whether 
this model is a viable one because the world is essentially determined or 
because the world is too complicated to allow us to give a full account of 
it. However, it works (the model allows us to successfully predict within 
certain parameters of error), but we do not know why it works. Does it 
work because it is an accurate reflection of the way the world works or 
because in predicting the future, researchers are activating mechanisms 
that will bring it about? In addition, probabilistic reasoning does not 
account for every case being considered, but only a majority of cases; 
outliers are confined to the realm of either the unknowable (error at the 
case level) or theoretical inadequacy (the theory that is being used and 
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that allows prediction is not sophisticated enough to account for every 
single case, but, though flawed, is the best there is). Thus, the empirical 
indicators (Wittgenstein’s criteria) used to construct the causal narrative 
are inadequate for the task, and consequently the post-hoc theory that is 
developed is at fault.
A final model is that events are caused but can only be known 
retrospectively. Events that have taken place are caused, that is, by an 
intention of a human being or by the collective intentions of a group of 
human beings or by the conjunction of two or more mechanisms; but 
to say that this causal sequence can be known only after the event has 
taken place tells us nothing about whether events are caused or not. 
It tells us only whether and at what point we can identify a particular 
causal sequence. However, we can take this model one stage further and 
suggest a generative/productive view of causation. We can hypothesise 
a relationship and then try to work out what the mechanism might be. 
By mechanism I mean literally that an object has causal powers to induce 
change in another object, that these powers may or may not be exercised, 
and, even if they are, that there is no guarantee that change will occur in 
the targeted object, which means that we cannot safely predict how the 
dynamic object in the future will behave.66 This has implications for how 
we construe theory–practice relationships.
Theory–practice relationships
An example of an object-relation operating at the discursive level over 
time can be seen in the relationship between a theory or set of propositions 
about objects, relations and arrangements of objects – how they might 
work in the world – and a set of future arrangements of objects and 
relations in the practice setting (from description to practice). For those 
concerned to provide accounts of learning, conceptualising the 
relationship between the theory that they produce and the practice that 
they are describing, and subsequently transferring to that practice setting, 
66 Prediction is the key to the successful use of some of these quantitative methodologies, and this 
is prediction in the sense that we can know at a first time point what will happen at a second time 
point. However, there are two principal reasons as to why it is difficult to make sound predictions: i) 
we may not have confidence in how we have described what has happened at the first time point, 
and consequently how this description can play out at the second time point; ii) our descriptions at 
the first time point may have influenced what subsequently happens at the second time point, thus 
rendering the comparison null and void. An example of this is opinion polls and the way they work. 
It would be unwise to trust them. This is also an example of the commodification of knowledge.
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is central to their activities. In short, how this relationship is understood 
is important both because it affects the type of account produced 
and because it impacts upon the workings of practices per se. In a 
Wittgensteinian fashion, there are five possible positions that can be 
taken, with proponents of each adopting different stances as to how 
theories about learning practices are constructed and how they relate to 
those self-same learning practices.
The first of these treats science as the final arbiter of truthful 
accounts. There is a correct method for collecting data about learning 
activities. This method, if properly adhered to, leads to the creation of 
objective, value-free and authoritative knowledge about how teachers 
should behave. Teachers or practitioners but not theorists therefore 
need to bracket out their own values, experiences and preconceptions 
because these are partial, incomplete and subjective and follow the 
precepts of researchers whose sole purpose is to develop knowledge 
that transcends the local and the contextual.
Scientific theory is designated as theory because relations between 
educational phenomena are being expressed at a general level: they apply 
to a variety of situations both in the present and in the future. It therefore 
allows prediction, not, it should be noted, because the expression of that 
theory influences what will happen but because the knowledge itself 
is propositional, generalisable, non-particularistic and operates outside 
the realm of actual practice. The criteria that determine good practice in 
scientific research comprise in part a particular relationship to practitioner 
knowledge: that the former (scientific research) is superior to the latter 
(practitioner knowledge), and that appropriate behaviours on the part 
of the practitioner consist of correcting and amending errors to their own 
knowledge domain in the light of what is being asserted as a result of the 
correct scientific procedures being followed. Practice is conceptualised 
as the following of rules that have been systematically researched 
and formalised as theory. This has been described as the technical-
rationality model of the theory–practice relationship in which practice 
is understood as the practical application of a body of theoretical 
knowledge. Worthwhile knowledge is understood as being located in the 
field of generalised propositions; practice is not conceived of as knowledge 
at all but as the application of theory in practical situations.
Proponents of this view make a number of assumptions: first 
and foremost, that theoretical knowledge can give us insights into reality; 
that is, it can provide adequate and meaningful descriptions of how the 
world works. As a result, it de-emphasises actors’ perceptions of how 
the world works because these are partial, inaccurate, ideologically 
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motivated or falsely conceived. Second, practice itself or practical 
knowledge is not in itself sufficiently robust to qualify as knowledge; 
that is, the criteria we apply for something to qualify as knowledge (for 
example, consistency, coherence, validity, reliability or generalisability) 
cannot be applied to practical deliberation. This privileging of theoretical 
knowledge over practical knowledge is not, and cannot be, conceptualised 
as an a priori theoretical truth.
The second viewpoint has some similarities to the first viewpoint 
but understands the creation of objectified knowledge in a different way. 
Proponents of this viewpoint would want to adopt a realist perspective 
but would understand that realist perspective in a different way; they 
might want to adopt a generative rather than successionist theory of 
causal relations or they might want to reconceptualise the researcher–
researched relationship so that the value perspectives of the researcher 
are centrally implicated in the act of doing research. However, the 
educational text that is produced is still treated in the same way as 
with the first perspective, and the relationship between theory and 
practice is understood as being consistent with the technical-rationality 
mode.67 This involves the solving of technical problems through rational 
decision-making based on knowledge that allows us to predict the future. 
It is the means to achieve ends where the assumption is that the ends to 
which practice is directed can always be predefined and are always 
knowable. The condition of practice is the learning of a body of theoretical 
knowledge, and practice therefore becomes the application of this body 
of knowledge in repeated and predictable ways to achieve predefined 
ends. Both of these first two perspectives, therefore – different though 
they are – are concerned with determining a measure of technical 
efficiency that will inevitably lead to the achievement of ends that are 
separate from the determination of means regarded as necessary to their 
realisation.
The third type of theory–practice relationship is multi-perspectival 
and multi-methodological. If there is no correct method, but only a set of 
methods that produce texts of various kinds, and these can be read in 
different ways, then the practitioner has to make a series of decisions 
about whether a text is appropriate or not. Theory and practice are 
here being uncoupled. Whether or not the practitioner works to the 
prescriptive framework of the theorist will depend on a number of factors, 
such as the fit between the values of the theorist and the practitioner, 
67 This was extensively criticised by Schon (2005), among others.
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whether they share a common epistemological framework and, 
fundamentally, whether solutions are being provided by the theorist to 
practical problems encountered during the practitioner’s everyday 
activity. The practitioner is here being treated as a self-sufficient producer 
and user of knowledge. However, there is still a sense with this perspective 
that the outside theorist can produce broadly accurate prescriptive 
knowledge, which because of the contingencies of life in educational 
institutions then needs to be adapted to the settings in which the 
practitioner works. The theorist produces general knowledge, the 
practitioner supplies the fine-grained detail, but in all essential respects 
still follows precepts developed by theorists who operate away from 
the practice setting.
A fourth position that can be taken is an extension of the position 
expressed above. This is an interpretation of the theory–practice relation 
in which deliberated thoughtful practice is not just the target but is the 
major source (perhaps the specifying source) of educational theory. 
What should be noted here is the rejection of a role in practice for the 
theorist, because the theorist operates outside of the practice. Various 
forms of action research fit this perspective, which understands practice 
as deliberative action concerned with the making of appropriate decisions 
about practical problems in classrooms. This cannot mean that there is 
no theoretical activity involved in the making of these decisions. What it 
does suggest is that theoretical activity does not apply only to technical 
decisions about how to implement theory developed by outsiders. 
In addition to practitioners needing to deliberate about the most efficient 
means of achieving certain predefined ends, they also need to deliberate 
about the ends themselves. Practice situations are not only particularistic, 
they may also be understood as complex and uncertain, and therefore 
actively resist routinisation. Understandings of them need to be continually 
formulated and reformulated by practitioners working in situ. In short, 
such knowledge is not propositional, which means that it always involves 
action and deliberation. However, operating in a non-technicist way 
demands that practitioners do not behave as objective theorists say 
they should. But this reconceptualising of the relationship between 
theory and practice is itself theoretical and moreover theoretical in 
a normative sense.
This leads to a fifth position, which is that the theorist and 
the practitioner are actually engaged in different activities. This more 
closely fits the view that the nature of theorising practice demands 
the identification of four different discourses, each of which has implicit 
within it a distinctive way of understanding a practical field such 
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as teaching and learning, and each of which is a legitimate activity: 
deliberation, evaluation, science and utopianism. The deliberative 
discourse is understood as prescriptive and particularistic; the evaluative 
as particularistic and descriptive; the scientific as general and descriptive; 
and the utopian as prescriptive and general. The consequence of this is 
that the theorist and the practitioner are operating in different ways and 
with different criteria as to what constitutes knowledge.68
These five discursive formations offer alternative perspectives on an 
important aspect of social life. What has become a commonplace in the 
development of public policy over the past 20 years is the sense in which 
there has to be a binding relationship between theory and practice (so 
much rhetorical energy is given up to this); but in reality, practice in the 
educational and social spheres is the outcome of political deliberations 
and unforeseen events and occurrences. An example of this binding 
relationship is evidence-based practice.69
Evidence-based practice
Evidence-based practice, or prescriptive activity models for practi- 
tioners or teachers that are supported by evidence about how they should 
behave, is frequently commended and advocated within the education 
community. The central problem with this idea is that policymakers, 
researchers and practitioners disagree about what evidence is and how 
it can be collected. Evidence and evidence collection have a number of 
forms. For example, randomised control trials are used to determine 
whether an intervention works.70 The rationale behind randomised 
control trials is straightforward: the effects of a group of students engaged 
in learning something or other are measured over the period of the 
intervention and then compared with a control group that, although 
equivalent in every other respect to the experimental group, has not been 
subject to the intervention but has continued as it normally would have. 
This allows the researcher to determine the actual effect size of a group’s 
68 It hardly needs saying that these different discursive configurations can be designated as distinct 
objects because of how objects are arranged within them and because of the boundaries that have 
been established between their different objects.
69 Whose evidence is it? and What does it signify? 
70 For a thorough critique of randomised control trials and their place in evidence-gathering 
practices, see Wrigley (2018). The Education Endowment Foundation is an example of a research 
organisation that has bought in to the idea that randomised control trials are truth-bearing 
methodologies.
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exposure to the intervention and consequently whether or not the 
intervention is successful or not.
A number of variations have been developed. The first, a single-
group experimental design, is where a single group of participants is 
tested before and after a programme of interventions to determine 
whether that programme has been successful or not. A variation on this 
is where a control group is added, so that a comparison can be made 
between it and the experimental group. A third approach is where the 
researcher accepts that more than one factor may be influential, arguing 
that a particular factor affects behaviour in one context, but not in 
another. In order to take account of this, the researcher studies a number 
of groups, each of which has different characteristics, and each of which 
is subjected to different types of interventions. Experimental researchers 
use methods that are essentially deductive and involve the testing of 
hypotheses. Furthermore, such methods allow replication, and ultimately 
the establishment of law-like propositions about social activities. 
Experimental researchers argue that as a result, uncontested and secure 
propositions about the way in which society works can be established.
A number of factors may have had an impact on how the old and 
new methods are received. For the comparison between the scores 
obtained by the two groups to be valid, those other factors that may affect 
the amount and quality of learning have to be isolated. The process of 
random sampling affords a partial solution to this problem. If two groups 
can be picked randomly (the one to act as the experimental group and the 
other to act as a control group), then it is possible to be fairly certain that 
the internal characteristics of the two groups are similar. The effect 
of randomly choosing experimental and control groups is that members 
of each group have an equal chance of being influenced by factors other 
than the intervention.
However, there is a significant problem, which is that randomisation 
is difficult to achieve in certain social settings; for example, when the 
researcher wishes to compare groups in schools that may have been 
chosen so that they are deliberately not equal. In other words, the 
researcher comes to a setting that is already determined beforehand and 
his intervention therefore relates to the teaching of those predetermined 
groups. There is a similar problem with matching pairs or groups, which 
has been described as an alternative to randomisation. In order to assign 
matched pairs to different groups and then to intervene at the group level, 
the researcher would have to be in a position to create new groups. In 
much social and educational research, this is simply not possible. There 
is a further problem with assigning students to matched pairs and this is 
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that researchers have to be aware of, and confident in, their ability to 
measure those factors in order to identify appropriate subjects. In other 
words, they have to know before they do their research what those factors 
are to allow them to match one child with another.
A further iteration of this design is where the experimentalist 
foregoes the pre-testing process and is confident that, because he 
has picked randomised groups, they will be equally matched. This 
is known as the post-test-only randomised control group design. 
Measuring the abilities and aptitudes of subjects beforehand is irrelevant 
to the identification of isomorphic groups since the experimentalist is 
concerned above all with the comparative effects of interventions. 
In addition, there are good reasons as to why it is not possible to pre-test 
the various groups; for example, it is inconvenient or not practically 
possible. The principal advantage is that it eliminates the possibility 
of reactivity or pre-test sensitisation to the experiment, thus enhancing 
its internal validity. Randomisation allows the experimenter a measure 
of control over the setting, which is denied to those designs that are 
known as quasi-experimental.
One of the principal problems with conducting experiments is that 
the effects of an intervention may not show up, or the full implications of 
the intervention may be only partially revealed, at the moment of testing. 
An example is in the field of health education, where the experimenter is 
interested in testing for the effects of a smoking prevention programme, 
with the intervention comprising a teaching programme with a group 
of 15-year-old schoolchildren. The intervention consists of lectures, 
seminars, workshops and written exercises. The aim is to reduce both the 
number of children who start smoking after the age of 15 and the number 
who have already started. Because smoking take-up is heavily influenced 
by peer group pressure, the effectiveness of any health promotion 
intervention is likely to be compromised. However, in later life, when 
the influence of the peer group has considerably declined, learning that 
took place at an early age, but which had no immediate effect in terms of 
smoking cessation, influences later decisions to stop smoking. In other 
words, the experimenter has to choose the most likely moment to post-
test the children, even though he is fully aware that the observed effects 
may be partial, incomplete and possibly misleading. Experimentalists 
have therefore devised a series of designs to compensate for this, although 
that compensation can be only partially achieved. One such design is the 
equivalent time-samples design, in which a series (random or regular 
alternation) of interventions are consecutively contrasted (over time) 
with a series of non-interventions. Another is a counterbalanced design, 
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where four different experimental treatments are compared using four 
different groups over four different time periods. Critics of randomised 
control groups have focused on the reductive process of determining 
whether a learner has learnt something or other, the difficulties of 
identifying equivalent groups, the propensity of the method to ignore 
context and effect, the difficulties of controlling all of the variables over 
time, the tendency of the operation to generate simple and consequently 
distorting universal laws of cause and effect, and the fact that they are 
inherently descriptive rather than contributing to theory building. More 
generally, experimentalists find it difficult to give due regard to the 
dynamic nature of discursive, material, relational, configurational and 
human objects in their theories.
Essentially, this is the comparative method that John Stuart 
Mill wrote about at length. In A System of Logic he identified five 
comparative methods. The first is the direct method of agreement: ‘if 
two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have 
only one circumstance in common, the circumstances in which alone all 
the instances agree is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon’ 
(Mill, 1963–91, 7: 390). The second is the method of difference, where:
if an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, 
and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance 
save one in common, that one occurring only in the former; the 
circumstances in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, 
or cause, or a necessary part of the cause, of the phenomena. (Mill, 
1963–91, 7: 391)
A third approach he described as the joint method of agreement and 
disagreement:
if two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only 
one circumstance in common, while two or more instances in which 
it does not occur have nothing in common save the absence of that 
circumstance; the circumstance in which alone the two sets of 
instances differ, is the effect, or cause, or a necessary part of the 
cause, of the phenomenon. (Mill, 1963–91, 7: 396)
Although this is known as the joint method, the principle underpinning 
it represents the application of both of the methods identified above; 
that is, the methods of agreement and difference. Then there is the 
method of residue: ‘Subduct from any phenomenon such part as is known 
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by previous inductions to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the 
residue of the phenomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedents.’ 
(Mill, 1963–91, 7: 398). The last of Mill’s methods is the method of 
concomitant variations: ‘Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner 
whenever another phenomenon varies in some particular manner, is 
either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is connected with 
it through some fact of causation.’ (Mill, 1963–91, 7: 401).
There are philosophical problems with this set of approaches. The 
first of these difficulties is conceptual. A concept is always embedded in a 
framework or network of other concepts (and therefore gets its meaning 
from that set of relationships and from how it is used in a way of life), and 
when we talk about the detheorisation of research, what we mean here is 
that traditional and reductionist forms of research separate out the 
concept from the framework in order for it to have the properties of a 
variable. Having detheorised the concept, relations are then identified 
between these different variables, even if the variable itself does not enter 
into a meaningful relationship with the world. A second problem (and 
I have referred to this above) is that the enumeration of meaning implicit 
in many of these conceptions of research is reductive and compels us 
to understand causation, object-relations, human capacity, free will 
and constraint in particular ways. What I am suggesting here is that a 
particular expressive mode has certain characteristics that prevent us 
from making true claims about knowledge of the world.71 It is insufficient 
and therefore not up to the task. If we examine another example of a 
methodology that is in common use (the comparative survey method), 
we can see how its use contributes to a particular rendition of some key 
and necessary elements of the knowledge-construction exercise we are 
engaged in, such as causal relations, human behaviour and the use of 
particular types of object-relations.
The comparative survey method
Andreas Schleicher (2015), with regards to the Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA), uses a methodology that 
involves ranking a variety of countries in relation to their performance on 
a series of tests, and then identifying those systemic elements that are 
71 I have also argued throughout this book that the two expressive modes that are in common use, 
language and pictures, are also structured in particular ways, and thus enable and constrain the 
determination of meaning in particular ways.
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present in high-performing countries and not present in low-performing 
countries. From this he concludes that it is possible to identify the 
optimum conditions for a system’s effectiveness – a system of objects is 
one of our designated object-types. He is therefore able to suggest the 
following: children from similar social backgrounds can show very 
different performance levels, depending on the school they go to or the 
country they live in; there is no relationship between the share of students 
with an immigrant background in a country and the overall performance 
of students in that country; there is no relation between class size and 
learning outcomes within or across countries (the conceptual framework 
he works to here makes the unjustified assumption that all of the different 
types of learning activities are optimally performed with the same class 
size); there is no incompatibility between the quality of learning and 
equity since the highest-performing education systems combine both; all 
students are capable of achieving high standards; and more generally, the 
top-performing education systems tend to be more rigorous, with fewer 
curriculum items and with these being taught in greater depth.
This approach has a number of flaws in its conceptualisation and 
application, such as making false assumptions that tests can be culture-
free, or that tests such as these can act as direct representational devices, 
or that they can avoid the problem of being able to test only atomistic 
forms of knowledge. In addition, test-makers need to acknowledge 
the bidirectionality of the PISA assessment process, in which washback 
effects on the curriculum can and do take place as a result of the testing 
process, and further accept that test-makers frequently use the same 
methods for testing dispositions, knowledge, skills and embodiments, 
with subsequent errors of ascription. In addition, an individual may 
have to reframe his knowledge set to fit the test, and therefore the 
assessment of his mastery of the construct is not a determination of his 
capacity in relation to the original construct, but a determination of 
whether he has successfully understood how to rework his capacity to fit 
the demands of the testing technology. These create serious problems 
for the legitimacy of such tests. Despite this, PISA is extremely influential, 
and an example of how simple messages can be produced by research, 
which lack a sense of truthfulness.72
72 PISA has an inadequate methodology. I have written about this elsewhere (cf. Scott and Scott, 
2018). For example, a false belief held is that a test can be constructed which is culture-free or free 
of those issues that disadvantage some types of learners at the expense of others. The extent of 
cultural bias in the PISA tests is unrealised and certainly under-reported. In addition, a particular 
technical problem with PISA relates to its sampling procedures. If different types of sampling in the 
different countries are used, then some of these countries will be disadvantaged compared with 
ON LEARNING90
There are a number of ways of identifying good practice. The first is 
identifying outputs from the system (these can be test scores, dispositional 
elements, acquired skills, ethical and moral qualities); that is, outputs 
that have resulted from the individual’s participation in the system itself. 
The argument is then made that one system is better than another because 
it has better outputs and, further to this, that the characteristics of these 
national systems should be transferred to those countries or jurisdictions 
that are considered to be unsuccessful or ineffective in these terms. 
However, such types of modelling – these model types are being used to 
provide descriptions of the influence of Covid-19 in the world currently 
– depend for their truthfulness on which variables are used and how these 
variables are constituted.
A different way of determining quality in a system is by identifying 
a norm in order to allow a comparison to be made. For example, a system 
of learning – whether international, national or local – can be compared 
with, and marked against, a model of best practice, where this model 
is constructed to include all of the possible elements that could and 
should form a learning system (such as its structures, institutions, 
curricula, pedagogic arrangements and evaluative procedures), their 
arrangement in the most logical way (for example, that curricular 
intentions should precede pedagogical approaches and indeed derive 
their meaning from these curricular intentions) and the identification 
and enactment of logically formed relational arrangements between 
these elements (for instance that evaluative washback mechanisms 
should not be allowed to distort the curriculum as it was originally 
conceived). The norm that is used comparatively is constructed through 
sound logical and rational principles. In addition, the meaning of concepts 
is treated as an empirical matter, in terms of how they are used in 
communities or in a way of life. A reliance on outputs in the comparative 
process is unsafe and more importantly likely to be invalid. If we turn 
others. Sampling issues are present in any test, whether this refers to selecting children from a 
number of grade levels and not specifying proportions from each grade, to selecting parts of 
countries for reporting purposes and ignoring the rest. Cultural differences take a number of 
different forms, such as ascribing different values, and different strengths of values to cultural items, 
or determining the nature, quality, probative force, relevance-value and extent of evidence, or 
focusing on practices that may be more familiar to people in some countries than in others. However, 
more importantly, cultural differences with regards to the selection of test items refer to the 
expression of the problem to be solved. If, for example, different national idioms, different national 
ways of thinking embedded in language forms and different normic values woven into the fabric of 
national discourses are ignored, then the presentation of the actual test items, as well as the range 
of possible answers that can be given, may favour students from one nation at the expense of 
students from another.
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away from this, the methodological approach then becomes a search for 
mechanisms, relations and structures that are potentially causally 
efficacious and can be contextualised (historically, culturally and 
socioeconomically), but can also contribute to human wellbeing. This can 
be legitimately construed as a qualitative methodology.
A qualitative methodology
A qualitative methodology73 comprises a focus on, and attention being 
paid to, the changing qualities or characteristics of the object or objects 
under investigation. If, as I have already suggested, objects, object-
relations, object-types, object-configurations and persons are dynamic, 
then the researcher consequently has to examine the characteristics of, 
or qualities that inhere in, these objects. This entails a suspension of 
belief in the much-used notion of a dualism between quantitative and 
qualitative research, because strong claims can be made that these are not 
comparable objects and, further, that in all types of research there is 
necessarily a qualitative dimension. What this means is that any research 
or investigatory study has to address the categorising and recategorising 
or formulating and reformulating process that is a feature of social life.
A qualitative methodology can be understood at the levels of 
strategy and method as a series of steps or action-sets. The first step 
entails a process of reasoning that points to causal relationships 
as expressions of the tendencies of natural and social objects. The second 
is resolving a concrete event occurring in a context into its components. 
The third, and the most important, is redescribing these components in 
a theoretically significant form, where significance is understood in 
epistemic, rational, configurational and coherentist ways. The fourth is 
a retroductive move – or moving from describing the components of 
an event to proposing explanations about what produces or are the 
conditions for the event. The fifth is eliminating alternative possible 
explanations. The sixth is identifying a series of coherent and rational 
explanations and coming to some conclusions about these explanations. 
And finally, there is a need to explain the parameters of these explanations 
and how they relate to the ontology and epistemology of the world 
(adapted from Bhaskar, 2011).
73 I am referring to the concept of quality here to indicate that all types of research should, but rarely 
do, refer to the categories being used in the world and in the piece of research, and to their use, 
reuse and reconstitution in everyday life.
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In the first instance, then, researchers, who focus on learning 
episodes, need to examine a range of phenomena. The first of these – 
structural properties at each time point – may or may not have been 
activated in the particular circumstances, but they provide access to 
understanding the essential contexts of action. In doing this, researchers 
need to try to understand a second phenomenon – interpretations of 
those relations by relevant social actors. Information needs to be collected 
about these interpretations because they provide access to those 
interpretations and their effects. Instead of assuming that a structural 
property (in both non-discursive and discursive forms) always operates 
to facilitate human actions and interactions at every time point, it is 
important to understand when, where and how these different structures 
are influential; and furthermore, what the precise relationship is between 
them at specific moments and places during these interactions.
Researchers therefore need to gather information on those 
relations between different structures at each time point, and those 
perceived relations between different structures at each time point by 
the relevant human being – our fifth and most important object-type.74 
This is a necessary part of the research process for two reasons. First, 
it provides access for the researcher to those real relations referred to 
above. Second, social actors’ perceptions of those relations constitute 
a part of them. By examining their intentions, it is possible to make 
a judgement about how much they know and how this influences the 
decisions they make.
Social researchers also need to consider the unintended 
consequences of actions. Some activities may be designed, and thus have 
a degree of intention behind them, others less so. But more importantly, 
all actions have unintended consequences. After each interaction, 
however limited, its effects on those structures that provide the contexts 
for future exchanges and interactions need to be assessed. This last 
requirement for research therefore refers to the subsequent effects of 
those intended and unintended actions on structural properties. Finally, 
there is the focal point of any investigation: the degree of structural 
influence and the degree of agential freedom for each human interaction. 
This is the crux of the matter because it allows the researcher to 
understand the complex relationship between agency (the willed actions 
of players in the game) and structure (those conditioning factors that 
work on agency in the world) at each time point.
74 I will in subsequent pages of this book say much more about human beings.
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What I have suggested here applies to learning as much as it does to 
other social phenomena primed for investigation. Steering a path between 
voluntarism and structuralism (the two dominant sociological 
perspectives that have been developed) in and about learning is always 
problematic; but if it is to be successfully achieved, then, first, a coherent 
meta-theory needs to be articulated and foregrounded and, second, 
reifying and dehistorisising structural forms needs to be avoided, as this 
leads to a distortion and misunderstanding of social life and educational 
matters. Evidence for learning, then, is a much more complicated 
construct than is generally acknowledged. In the next chapter I examine 
the important issue of values, operating as they do at both epistemological 
and ontological levels. Values at both of these levels are an essential part 
of the world and how we can know this world – in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries there are very few philosophers who subscribe to a 
clear fact–value distinction, although politicians, policymakers and many 
applied knowledge thinkers still acquiesce to this notion.
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5
Values and learning theories
We are puzzled about what the world is like and how we can know what 
it is – a very Wittgensteinian attitude to doing philosophy. A possible 
solution to our puzzlement is to accept that values are central to 
understanding how we live and how we should live, and this valuing 
goes all the way down – into our descriptions of the world, into those 
attempts we make at creating better futures and into our relations 
with other people. We therefore need to work at how we do and can 
understand the world as it is and as we would want it to be. There are two 
dimensions to this claim. The first is ontological, which amounts to an 
assertion that objects in the world and human beings are valued in 
relation to each other and to other object-types.75 Objects are arranged 
in the world and there could be other arrangements of these objects 
in other possible worlds. Indeed, objects (material and discursive), object-
relations, object-formations and human beings could be differently 
formed. Difference therefore is understood as both dissimilarity and as 
the construction of boundaries between objects in the world.
A second dimension to the claim I am making that values go all 
the way down is epistemological, and this invariably elicits a complaint 
from those who assert that we can develop value-free knowledge of the 
world. (This is in effect a rhetorical device for claiming that one version 
of research or knowledge, their own, is superior to another – it is 
semantically empty.) If we accept that value-free knowledge is an 
impossibility, that we inevitably make pre-judgements about the world in 
our investigations, then being in the world is understood as a practice, 
75 In some cases, these valuations inhere in the words themselves. So, we can compare a word such 
as ‘execution’ with a word such as ‘murder’, and we are persuaded to understand the former as being 
legitimate and right because it is state-sanctioned, whereas the latter has no such legitimation. Both 
are in fact killings. And further to this, these valuations change over time.
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primed for investigation, but resistant to the algorithmic and value-free 
methods of describing it used in the natural sciences. Again, if we accept 
that values are ontologically and epistemologically present in the world 
and in our endeavours to understand the world in its many iterations and 
in its many possible iterations, then we have to consider what these values 
might be and what their provenance is.76 Again, in conformity to the 
approach I adopt throughout this book, we need to explore what these 
values are and what they are not – or at least what other people have 
construed them as being.
Virtue ethics is one of the three approaches to ethics that have 
a normative dimension.77 It foregrounds the virtues or moral character of 
the individual and can be contrasted with approaches that focus on duties 
or rules, as in deontological ethics, or on the consequences of actions, as 
in consequentialism. Virtue ethics are different from deontological and 
consequentialist ethical forms in a number of ways. They are related to 
dispositions; what this means is that the ethical act comprises an inner 
state, which is already there (in some form or another), having been 
learnt, seeking to express itself in the world in relation to a problem in 
the world that requires some action. Dispositions, as inner states, precede, 
condition and have some influence over actions. A disposition is a 
character type, a habituation, a state of preparation or readiness and a 
tendency to act in a specified way. Dispositions, then, have this persistent 
quality, although they can in time be modified.78 They have a strong 
affinity with a person’s chosen identity.
The virtues also operate at the cultural or discursive level. In this 
form, they are dependent on membership of a practice, and this includes 
how they are instantiated in that practice. They are practice-based insofar 
76 Charles Taylor (1998: 27) writes about the impossibility of operating in the world in a non-
normative sense: ‘(D)oing without frameworks is utterly impossible for us; … the horizons within 
which we live our lives and which make sense of them have to include these strong qualitative 
discriminations. Moreover, this is not meant just as a contingently true psychological fact about 
human beings, which could perhaps turn out one day not to hold for some exceptional individual or 
new type, some superman of disengaged objectification. Rather the claim is that living within such 
strongly qualified horizons is constitutive of human agency, that stepping outside these limits would 
be tantamount to stepping outside what we would recognise as integral, that is, undamaged human 
personhood.’ 
77 There are many ethical theories in existence, such as: axiological theories, collectivism, 
Confucianism, consequentialism, deontological ethics, egalitarianism, hedonism, humanism, 
individualism, moral realism, natural law, nihilism, normative ethics, objectivism, relativism, 
utilitarianism and virtue ethics. I have concentrated on the last of these and, in particular, a well-
known variant of it.
78 The argument that I am making in this book is that concepts are essentially acquired dispositions. 
In defence of this proposition, I have already suggested that even the most propositional of 
statements can be expressed as doing something in the world.
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as being excellent in the practice requires a judgement to be made on 
what is considered to have value in the practice. This therefore implies a 
relation (a type of progression) between a novice and an expert within 
the practice.79 The crucial issue is that any designation of an ethical virtue 
is always, and can only be, understood in terms of some conception of 
how the society is organised or even perhaps about excellence within the 
practice. Ethical judgements always supervene on epistemological 
judgements.80
The identification of the virtues is the hardest part of the argument 
to sustain because it opens up a series of unresolved issues, expressed 
perhaps as a series of questions: what is the virtues’ provenance?; why is 
one set of virtues to be preferred over another?; why should one prefer a 
teleological account (of society, and it has to be extra-individual or 
broadly social, such as rationality) to a social/political value-impregnated 
utopian view? Aristotle in his extensive writings developed a theory of 
virtue ethics.
Aristotelian virtue ethics
Aristotle’s view of the virtues is encapsulated in the doctrine of the mean. 
In any sphere of action or domain of feeling, for example, strength and 
health, there is both an excess and a deficiency:
First, then, let us consider this, that it is the nature of things to be 
destroyed by defect and excess as we see in the case of strength and 
of health (for to gain light on things imperceptible we must use the 
evidence of sensible things); both excessive and defective exercise 
destroys the strength, and similarly drink or food which is above or 
below a certain amount destroys the health, while that which is 
proportionate both produces and increases and preserves it. 
(Aristotle, 2018b: loc. 33689)
79 Alastair MacIntyre’s (1981) notion of a practice in which virtue resides in the pursuit of excellence 
within that practice would also embrace witchcraft, iniquity, autocracy and the like, and thus there 
needs to be some notion of deontology or consequentialism attached to the particular goods that 
are being sought in the practice and which the practice is about.
80 One of the consequences of arguing that ethics supervenes on knowledge is that one has to look 
in the first instance for the knowledge element in any ethical judgement one might want to make. 
And this epistemological and ontological object-relation is traditionally expressed as a relation 
between knowing the world and the world itself.
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Another example concerns the sphere of action or feeling associated with 
fear and confidence. In relation to this there is a mean virtue of courage. 
For Aristotle, an excess of courage is rashness and a deficiency of courage 
is cowardice:
So too is it, then, in the case of temperance and courage and the 
other virtues. For the man who flies from and fears everything 
and does not stand his ground against anything becomes a 
coward, and the man who fears nothing at all but goes to meet every 
danger becomes rash; and similarly the man who indulges in 
every pleasure and abstains from none becomes self-indulgent, 
while the man who shuns every pleasure, as boors do, becomes in a 
way insensible; temperance and courage, then, are destroyed by 
excess and defect, and preserved by the mean. (Aristotle, 2018b: 
loc. 33689)
Other spheres of action or feeling discussed by Aristotle in the 
Nicomachean Ethics are: pleasure and pain; getting and spending in a 
minor way; getting and spending in a major way; anger; self-expression; 
conversation; social conduct; shame; and indignation. A number of 
questions need to be asked about this inventory, the most important of 
which is whether this list of virtues is universal (that is, whether it applies 
equally to people across time and place) or relates specifically to a 
particular social formation, for example, ancient Greek society.
Aristotle’s notion of a mean or middle point between two extremes 
has the effect of restricting the possible range of virtues. It also acts 
to create a hierarchy among the virtues, with some of what might be 
considered virtues now understood as extremes of some principal virtues. 
So, for example, prodigality and illiberality are understood as extreme 
versions of liberality and are thus deficient in some sense or another, and 
relative to a virtue that is considered sufficient. So, they are understood 
both in a negative sense and as inferior to some other ethical position. 
What the notion of a mean does is identify a list of virtues, with some 
being considered to be more important than others (this of course can 
be achieved by inclusions and omissions) and some being parasitic on 
others. Further to this, it constructs sets of relations between the primary 
virtues and particular strengths attached to those virtues. Aristotle’s 
primary virtues are choices made from a list of all of the possible virtues 
that could be envisaged. (This list might include past, but now archaic, 
virtues, currently fashionable virtues or virtues that reflect the current 
arrangements in society and even virtues yet to be instantiated, though 
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imagined.) Furthermore, this choice depends on the semantic content 
of the virtue.
An objection to Aristotle’s notion of the virtues is that although this 
is considered to be a rule-based ethical schema, it does not always 
conform in this way. Aristotle is clear in the Nicomachean Ethics that ‘the 
mean is not of the thing itself, but relative to us’ (Aristotle, 2018b: loc. 
33692). He qualifies this with regards to some of the virtues or vices, or 
he suggests that at least some emotions or acts are wrong per se regardless 
of circumstance. He gives a number of examples: malice, shamelessness 
and envy (these are emotions) and adultery, theft and murder (these are 
acts). In other words, there cannot be praiseworthy exercises of malice, 
shamelessness, envy, adultery, theft or murder. However, this in itself can 
be challenged, especially from a consequentialist ethical viewpoint; for 
example, if Claus von Stauffenberg had succeeded in murdering 
Adolf Hitler in 1944, this might have saved many lives and foreshortened 
the war.
However, to sustain the argument of the virtuous mean, Aristotle 
needed to develop a notion of difference between human beings, because, 
as he made clear, in determining the right action for an individual human 
being, it is not just the case that this person should follow the implicit 
rules of the already identified and learnt virtuous mean. In addition, this 
person must also judge the right action in relation to the details of the 
case, which includes above all else the actual set of dispositions she has 
acquired at a particular point in time. These character traits comprise 
tendencies towards excesses and deficiencies, and towards committing 
certain types of error – logical, epistemological, biases of viewpoint 
and the like. Thus, the virtuous act requires a prior disposition of self-
regulation or self-observation that is able to identify these character flaws 
and allow for some type of correction. What this means is that both the 
identification of the mean and the identification of its excesses and 
deficiencies require a judgement to be made about whether those 
dispositions qualify as virtues and furthermore about whether there are 
excesses and deficiencies that fit with the virtue and with the overall and 
desired ethic of living. In short, the question needs to be asked: why these 
and not others? The doctrine of the mean cannot provide a satisfactory 
answer to this question.
The doctrine of the mean does not amount to the idea that emotions 
should always be of moderate intensity, or that strong emotions are in 
some sense pathologies, or that in acting the human being should always 
express her emotions moderately, or that human beings should seek 
everything in moderation, or that every virtue has faults and vices, or 
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even that the relations between the virtues and their corresponding 
excesses and deficiencies are rule-based. Rather, excellence is observed 
by following the mean as far as this is possible.81 Aristotle’s theory of 
ethics was also teleological.
the telos
The telos or end point of a virtuous action was important for Aristotle. 
Goals are purposive and they are future orientated; the goal is by 
definition something that seeks fulfilment in a state of affairs (a future 
arrangement of material and discursive objects) that has not yet 
happened. Furthermore, goals require intentional activity – a sentient 
human being to have an intention to do some thing or other. Thus a 
virtue-directed activity, such as being courageous, requires both the 
envisaging of an end point – a better arrangement of material and 
discursive objects in the world – and an intention – some notion of a self-
directing person and of that person having a desire or intention to do 
something in the world.
Virtue ethics are different from deontological and consequentialist 
ethics. They are related to dispositions, and what this means is that 
the ethical act comprises an inner state, which is already there (in some 
form or another), seeking to express itself in the world in relation to a 
problem in the world that requires some action. In the previous chapter 
(4) I developed a notion of non-determinacy, which is directly related 
to virtue ethics. The reason why this notion is important is that, first, 
the identification of the virtues requires a theory of knowledge 
(epistemology) and of being (ontology) and the identification of 
a relationship between the two, including a notion of causation; and 
second, any ethical theory (deontological, consequentialist or virtue-
based) requires a theory of intention. In the next chapter, I develop 
a notion of difference, because in an object-epistemology, my concerns 
are two-fold: with knowledge – this hardly needs saying – and with 
the categories or boundaries between objects.
81 A number of well-known objections have been made to Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean, not least 
Bernard Williams’ (1985: 36) well-known characterisation of it as unhelpful and depressing: 
‘Aristotle’s views on [virtue] are bound up with one of the most celebrated and least useful parts of 
his system, the doctrine of the mean, according to which every virtue of character lies between two 
correlative faults or vices … which consist respectively of the excess and the deficiency of something 
of which the virtue represents the right amount. The theory oscillates between an unhelpful 
analytical model (which Aristotle himself does not consistently follow) and a substantively 




Philosophers often understand the categories as referring to the means 
by which we can access the world. For example, Immanuel Kant (2007) 
described the categories as pure concepts of understanding. They are, for 
Kant, prior to experiences that we might have and are thus implicated 
in how we experience the world. They are the conditions of possibility 
for objects and not just, as some have suggested, classificatory divisions. 
I want to suggest here that the categories, contra Kant, set boundaries 
that structure our thinking and ability to access the material world, which, 
consequently, can be thought of as natural or constructed. Disagreement 
typically centres on which categories are intrinsic bearers of these qualities, 
and how they relate to the physical world. These arguments are significant 
because they are central to a proper understanding of the nature 
of consciousness (see chapter 9) and to the mind–world relationship.
An example of a social category, which is central to the idea of 
learning, is dis-ability. The underpinning philosophy of dis-abled learning 
has in the past drawn on three important enframings, namely the medical, 
socioeconomic and cultural. While the medical model suggests that 
problems and differences lie with the individual, the socioeconomic model 
places the emphasis on matters such as poor nutrition or contaminated 
water, whereas cultural factors refer to the ideological construction of the 
notion of dis-ability or difference. For example, the language used in a 
specific culture for dis-ability or disadvantage points to what is considered 
to be normal or abnormal in that culture – from a cultural point of view, 
the emphasis is on the need to transform the attitudes adopted in relation 
to, and the language used about, dis-ability and difference. This is because 
it impacts on how well people with dis-abilities or differences can be 
successfully assimilated and represented in society.
The dominant models of dis-ability (medical, socioeconomic, 
cultural) accentuate or prioritise one element at the expense of a 
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multiplicity of other mechanisms, factors or influences that are involved 
in its formation and reproduction. For example, the social model omits 
the dis-abled body from the discourse by shifting the emphasis from the 
biological to the environmental. The medical model, in turn, neglects 
environmental factors by foregrounding the idea of the dis-abled body. 
Recent thinking about dis-ability encourages a more holistic approach 
and emphasises all the different levels of reality; indeed, this holistic 
approach has been described as a bio-psycho-social model of dis-ability.
A subcategory of dis-abled learning is the notion of dyslexia. 
Two strands of thinking can be identified: the first refers to a general 
incapacity and the second focuses on particular and specific processing 
functions, especially as they relate to the activity of reading. These might 
include coordination difficulties; hyperlexia (low comprehension but 
good decoding skills); language and communication difficulties; auditory 
processing difficulties; working-memory difficulties; information-
processing difficulties; non-verbal difficulties; literacy difficulties; 
phonological processing difficulties; visual difficulties; and social 
awareness difficulties. The existence of one specific learning difficulty 
does not preclude the existence of another; for example, a learner can be 
diagnosed with phonological processing difficulties and hyperlexia.
Definitions of these terms have proved controversial. There appears 
to be no agreed basis for differentiating between someone who has been 
diagnosed as dyslexic, someone who has been diagnosed as a poor reader 
(this may of course refer to someone who is disinclined to learn) and a 
general reader. Dyslexia itself can be understood as a general term to refer 
to almost any form of reading, decoding and spelling difficulty. This all-
embracing term, in its broad inclusivity, then becomes so general that it 
is not particularly useful for developing remedial programmes. However, 
it may satisfy a need to know which condition is afflicting someone, even 
if this does not in any way lead to an amelioration of the problem, with 
the problem being understood in normative terms so that a comparison 
can be made with a notional idea of how that learner should be behaving. 
The important question we need to ask at this stage of the argument is: 
are these differences between manifestations of a particular condition 
natural kinds or are they social and historical constructions?
Natural kinds
I identified six meta-characteristics of a discourse in chapter 1. The 
first of these, generality, is the designation of objects, such as dis-ability, 
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as separate from other objects in the world. A second meta-form relating 
to a notion of dis-ability concerns the balance in educational and social 
statements between denotation and performativity, or between offering 
an account of something with no intention of changing the world and 
offering an account that is intended to change an object or create a new 
one. A third meta-epistemic form concerns the relative value given to an 
object in comparison with another object. For example, within a dis-abled 
discourse, one of the pair of words is given a greater value than the other, 
with a fairly obvious example being that abled is privileged over dis-
abled. A fourth meta-structuring device refers to the bipolarity of objects, 
descriptions and dispositions, or hierarchical binary oppositions; that is, 
an object, description or disposition is defined in terms of another object, 
description or disposition of which it is the mirror opposite. If the abled/
dis-abled binary is used as an example, it is possible to see that the 
positioning of the two terms as oppositional in meaning, and the 
subsequent valuing of one (abled) and the devaluing of the other (dis-
abled) because of their oppositionality, has significant implications for 
the way in which the debate about relations between the two concepts 
can be conducted. Thus, certain words, phrases, descriptors and concepts 
are understood in bipolar terms, which determine how they can be used 
as a resource for understanding the world.
A fifth meta-principle refers to the referential value of a statement. 
Making an educational or social statement implies that a particular type 
of truth-value is being invoked. An educational statement about a 
category such as dis-ability is therefore implicitly or explicitly underpinned 
by a theory of reference embedded within a theory of truth, and this 
marks it out as a knowledge form. A sixth meta-principle refers to the 
way in which the particular ideas, concepts, phrases and descriptors 
are embedded in networks of ideas, concepts, phrases and descriptors, 
and have a history. So, for example, dis-ability as a concept is always 
positioned in a bewilderingly complicated network of other terms, such 
as: innateness;82 trait theory;83 genetics;84 biology;85 historical origin;86 
82 Once again, we are forced to confront the polysemic nature of a concept, as it is used in the world. 
It has been understood as that which exists naturally or because of heredity, rather than being learnt 
through experience; and it has been understood as having essentialist characteristics.
83 Trait theorists are interested in the measurement of human characteristics, which can be 
understood as habitual behaviours, thoughts or emotions.
84 Genetic theories are deficient because the emphasis is placed on determination and not volition.
85 Biologists understand the categories as natural and certainly as essentialist – some biologists are 
also hard-line geneticists. They are also domain- or discipline-centric.
86 A belief in historical origin demands a particular type of ontology, epistemology and causal theory.
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evolutionary theory;87 cognitive, developmental, intellectual, physical 
and sensory impairment,88 and many more. I have been referring here to 
the relations in the discourse between different ideas and notions, and 
how these can vary depending on the discourse.
Strong constructivists deny that there are any natural divisions 
or differences between objects, social or otherwise. They argue that 
the similarities and differences between objects can be attributed only 
to the social functioning of the relevant concepts and not to any 
natural processes. The problem is that the social functioning of concepts 
and the social functioning of practices in the world that have been 
influenced by these concepts are what constitutes the world and therefore 
are real. If the natural is understood as a pre-conceptualised (before 
human beings have activated the world) state of being, then the issue 
arises of how far one should go back in history before one identifies 
a cut-off point between the natural and the non-natural. A conceptual 
division is established by the concrete actions of human beings; 
a boundary point is set at the conceptual level, which is neither natural 
nor non-natural, but real.89 The principal argument made by con- 
structivists is that any activity in and about the world is dependent on 
a human being or a number of human beings acting in the world, 
and this applies as much to concept development as it does to other 
worldly practices.
Processes of classifying and reclassifying change the nature of 
objects, object-relations and object-configurations. All references to 
the world involve the identification, manipulation, transformation and 
reconstruction of the categories, and we cannot avoid this. The scientific 
method, with its claims for the possibility of positional objectivity,90 that 
concepts can be reduced to measurable constructs,91 and that we should 
adopt a representational ontology,92 is negligent of these. Another 
87 Evolutionary theorists are divided over how the relationship between mind and world should be 
conceptualised. Once again, we are forced back to some prior resolution of the argument about free 
will or volition in human beings.
88 Impairment as a concept is ideological and thus has normative elements.
89 The real is being used in this context to indicate that the object, relation, configuration or human 
being is underpinned by a realist ontology. This, however, is not a naive realist ontology.
90 Positional objectivity is one of the many uses of the notion of objectivity (cf. Scott and Scott, 
2018), and is used with the purpose of establishing the truth of particular assertions about the 
world. However, I have argued throughout that we are always positioned in some way or another.
91 The thrust of the argument that I have made in this book is that most concepts cannot be reduced 
to measurable constructs, and that to do so risks the possibility of a reduction or distortion of 
meaning.
92 I have situated epistemology in an ontological frame, because epistemological activity has being. 
This is in line with Roy Bhaskar’s (2011) use of the term.
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example of a discursive configuration that conforms to this way of 
thinking is the male/female binary.
Gender
An important binary that has had real effects in the space of learning – 
the area of life that is fully focused on learning – is the male/ 
female binary, an oppositional coupling of two words or phrases, and 
this implies a relationship between these two descriptive terms, both 
of which can be problematised. In addition, the strength, type and 
probative force of this relationship is central to the discourse that is in 
operation. I therefore need to examine in the first instance the principal 
characteristics of this male/female dyad. Initially I will focus on the 
critique that radical feminists make of traditional conceptions of what 
constitutes true or valid knowledge about the world. Although women 
have been actively involved throughout the centuries in making societies, 
they have been marginalised when it comes to the production of 
knowledge about societies and social activity. Feminists therefore ask 
how epistemological categories are implicated in defining masculinity 
and femininity, how they function to define the nature of people, how 
they work to attach different valuations to their skills and capacities, 
and how gender difference is a category of analysis around which every 
society is structured.
These questions about how knowledge is produced and who is 
involved in that production underpin all discussions about particular sets 
of categories. They lead to a questioning of the analytic categories that are 
taken for granted and, in particular, how these structure outlooks and 
dispositions and provide the criteria for evaluating social experience. 
Feminist theory is not a unified or homogeneous set of ideas but rather 
encompasses a variety of different perspectives and approaches.
Liberal feminism is widely represented in the contemporary Euro-
American world. Since the 1960s, the relationship between liberalism 
and feminism has underpinned the equal opportunities paradigm, which 
has been so influential in education and social policy. The emphasis is 
on removing barriers to women’s participation in all aspects of public life 
and arguing for women to have a greater share of the rights, privileges 
and opportunities enjoyed by men. This variety of feminism is founded 
on the emancipatory impulse of liberalism, itself a significant aspect of 
Enlightenment thought. Its key elements are a belief in an inherent 
human nature, a commitment to progress and a trust in rationality. 
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Liberal feminism espouses an egalitarian politics, arguing that if men 
and women were to be treated equally in political, social and personal 
terms, then women’s views and activities would be invested with 
the same degree of significance as men’s. What prevents this is female 
subordination and oppression. This can be best understood as a problem 
of sexism, defined as the unwarranted differential treatment of women, 
which can be identified empirically and eradicated through appropriate 
policies and programmes.
By the 1980s, feminists were attempting to integrate their 
approaches into mainstream critical theories such as neo-Marxism.93 
They argued that gender inequality derives from capitalism and that 
men’s domination over women is a byproduct of capital’s domination 
of labour. Class is regarded as the fundamental category of social structure 
and gender difference, and inequality as a secondary feature of the 
economic exploitation practised by the control of one class over another. 
The site of women’s exploitation is sometimes argued to be the family, 
while the focus is on the ideological rather than the material relations 
of capitalism.
A further gendered discourse is united around a position that 
advocates the privileging of traditional ‘feminine’ values.94 Advocates 
for this position accept the view that women’s ‘nature’ is different from 
men’s and that women excel in relational and nurturing practices – 
if rationality is associated with domination and control of the natural 
world with all its destructive implications, women are fortunate not to be 
associated with it. They go on to argue that the characteristics associated 
with femininity such as caring, relatedness and community should 
therefore be valorised over male characteristics. In other words, they all, 
irrespective of emphasis, accept the rational–irrational binary and its 
association with masculine–feminine difference, arguing simply that the 
hierarchy should be reversed with a consequent privileging of all aspects 
of the feminine over the masculine.
From the 1980s onwards, many feminists had become disillusioned 
with the political project of making women equal to men as they found 
mainstream discourses particularly resistant to their challenge, or 
incapable of being broadened to include women. These experiences of 
being rejected and alienated led to a growing awareness of the deep-
rooted patriarchal nature of such discourses. Even if sexism was 
93 For example, hooks (1982).
94 For example, Daly (1992).
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eliminated, with both sexes participating fully, the patriarchal nature of 
structures and value systems would still ensure that men and women 
were positioned unequally in terms of power, with female experience 
still defined as marginal and of lesser significance to male experience. 
Even if women were to be incorporated into patriarchal discourses, it 
would be on the basis of their sameness to men, their specificity as women 
not being acknowledged. In other words, women had to become surrogate 
men. The development of a more radical feminism therefore was a 
response to the perceived limitations of other approaches, which, it was 
argued, were based on irresolvable contradictions from which women 
could not escape an inferior definition and an unequal positioning.
In radical feminism, the focus shifts from equal opportunities to the 
phallocentric nature of all systems of representation;95 that whenever 
the two sexes are represented in a single model, the feminine is always 
collapsed into a universal model represented in masculine terms. 
Theoretically, feminists have analysed how the general concepts, 
assumptions and categories of Western thought have been organised 
around hierarchies, which by association privilege masculinity and 
devalue femininity. Regardless of the academic discipline within which 
radical feminists are working, there is a widespread recognition that 
epistemological issues do not exist in a social vacuum but rather exert a 
powerful influence on concepts, ideals and values. The way we make 
sense of the world is through broad categories and central questions 
relating to the nature of reality, subjectivity, knowledge construction, 
morality and ethics, and political rights and responsibilities. The 
development of feminist theory has stimulated questions about how 
philosophy is implicated in defining masculinity and femininity, the 
values attached to men and women’s skills and capacities, and how 
gender difference is a central analytic category around which every 
society is structured.
Radical feminists have added the insight that when notions such as 
rationality, knowledge and the self are deconstructed, their gendered 
nature is revealed, so that concepts which have been taken as neutral and 
universal are shown in effect to be masculine. The privileging of the 
rational is at the heart of modernist epistemology, yet this is a form of 
rationality that itself privileges the masculine. The claim of empirical/
analytic epistemology that rationality, objectivity and abstraction are the 
only guarantee of truth is actually a specifically masculine claim. 
95 For example, Griffin (2000); and Flax (1990).
DIfferenCe 107
Furthermore, each of the oppositions that structures modernist thought 
are derivative of the most fundamental opposition of all, that of 
masculine–feminine, male–female. In all binaries, the male is associated 
with the first element, the female with the second. In each case the male 
element is privileged over the female and maintains its position by its 
capacity to define itself as a universal norm against which the subjective, 
the emotional, the aesthetic, the natural and, above all, the feminine is 
judged and found wanting. Thus, through the very dualities of modernist 
thought, women’s significance is defined as inferior to the rational, 
objective, abstract qualities of scientific method, which not only 
guarantees truth but positions masculinity and ‘man’ as a legitimate 
knower, capable of discovering truth. Once this kind of analysis is 
accepted, all of the other common-sense stereotypes about gendered 
identities that feminists attempt to counter fall into perspective.
Essentialists try to exalt the virtues of female nature and related 
notions of community, caring and relatedness, as opposed to the male 
virtues of control, mastery, abstraction and rationality. But these 
arguments are unconvincing because they have not challenged the very 
opposition through which the female is defined as inferior in the first 
place and, hence, they cannot succeed in privileging the female over the 
male. Equal but different simply cannot succeed in a world where 
knowledge is constructed hierarchically. What emerges therefore is that 
if particular binaries are not reversed and ultimately dissolved, oppressive 
structures of thought and knowledge will continue to exert their power.
All varieties of feminism try to show how gender relations operate 
in favour of male hegemony, and their aim is to help effect a redistribution 
of power towards women. This may often imply the writing of histories 
or giving expression to voices and views that have been suppressed or 
denied. Models of investigation that assume homogeneity or an economy 
of the same as their starting point fail to acknowledge difference and 
insist that women can be represented as having the same characteristics 
as men. However, there is also the implication that not all women have 
some universal experience that can be a standpoint for the building of 
feminist theory and practice. The category ‘woman’ is not unified, nor is 
the category of ‘female’ as opposed to ‘male’ learning: women’s experience 
is differentiated through such factors as class, ethnicity, race, religion 
and many others. This means that our understanding needs to be sensitive 
to this diversity of female experience and to the power relations that 
are present among women. This also applies to female, male, trans- 




Another category of importance in the lifeworld is sexuality. Sexualised 
identities and identity formations have histories because they are socially 
constructed. The discussion of sexuality that follows is only one example 
of the process of categorisation, and the elements and processes discussed 
here also have affinities with the elements and processes of changing 
manifestations of any social object, such as the changing relations 
between abled and dis-abled, male and female, black and white, 
heterosexual and homosexual, intelligent and unintelligent, and precariat 
and middle-class persons.
Ideas influence human practices, which means that both ideas and 
practices have histories. The contemporary division of heterosexual 
and homosexual as terms made no sense to the ancient Greeks, although 
there were regional variations on understandings of sexuality. Same- 
sex relations, for example, were celebrated in some parts of Greece, 
whereas in parts of Ionia they were prohibited. Physiological differences 
between the sexes were considered to be of less importance than beauty 
in either of the sexes. What was regarded as important was whether the 
person exercised moderation in their sexual dealings. In addition, status 
had a gendered and aged dimension so that a freeman having sex with a 
woman or a boy was considered to be acceptable, but sexual relations 
between freemen were more problematic. The most important distinction 
was not physiological but the taking of active or penetrative roles 
as against passive or penetrated ones. The latter roles were appropriate 
only for social inferiors, such as women, slaves and male youths.
The early period of the ancient Roman Republic had similar 
attitudes towards sexuality. With the formation of the Empire, attitudes 
began to change, even before Christianity became influential. There are 
few criticisms of same-sex relations in the Gospels; however, early 
Christian Church fathers spoke out strongly against such relationships. 
Generally, the expression of sexuality and therefore of same-sex sexuality 
was not considered to be sinful. With a greater emphasis placed on 
marriage (understood to be between two people differentiated by their 
reproductive capabilities) by such renowned scholars as Saint Augustine, 
same-sex relations were prohibited and indeed in some parts of the now 
Christian world attracted horrific punishments. For example, in Emperor 
Justinian’s code of 529 ce, persons who were caught engaging in 
homosexual sex were executed, though different provisions applied to 
those who repented. This rise in intolerance towards certain types of 
sexual behaviour, that is, same sex relations and sex outside of marriage, 
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had important regional variations. As the Roman Empire weakened, to 
be replaced by a number of disparate barbarian kingdoms, a general 
tolerance towards both of these prevailed; and indeed, there were few 
legal prohibitions in Europe against homosexuality right up until the 
middle of the thirteenth century. All of this changed with the onset of 
the Gregorian reform movement in the Catholic Church, which argued 
for licensing natural kinds of sexuality and therefore for prohibiting 
unnatural kinds, such as homosexuality, extramarital sex and non-
procreative sex within marriage.
This appeal to natural law96 became a defining feature of the spread 
of ideas concerning sexuality over the next six hundred years and is 
only now beginning to be played out. However, we should be careful 
about these distinctions in the early and late medieval periods, because, 
for example, a sodomite was understood in a different way from our 
modern conception of the notion of being a homosexual or even in 
some circumstances a heterosexual married person. It was not so much 
being a certain sexual type but engaging in acts of a same-sex nature that 
was of concern. And in addition, if the person repented, then they could 
be excused punishments that were reserved for sodomites. Gender again 
is not significant here.
Despite the risk of severe punishment, homosexual cultures 
flourished in many European cities in the nineteenth century. In addition, 
there were significant reductions in legal penalties for sodomy (not just 
homosexuality), with the Napoleonic Code decriminalising it. However, 
there were moves, supported by new frameworks of ideas, to reinforce 
strong boundaries between the sexes, and this in turn meant that same-
sex relations between people of roughly the same age became or at least 
were becoming the norm. Scientific accounts of sexuality at this time, 
based as they were on notions of mechanical causation, led to views of 
sexuality as biologically given or innate to the person. Medieval views 
that, for example, sodomy was freely chosen by the individual, were 
giving way to ideas of the passive homosexual, and that as a consequence 
it became possible to portray homosexuality as defective or even 
pathological, with all the authority that the medical model could muster. 
In the twentieth century, sexual roles were transformed. Premarital 
intercourse became an acceptable norm, as did the association of sex with 
pleasure, in opposition to some sections of the Catholic Church, which 
96 ‘Natural law’ is a term much favoured by jurists, who argue that human beings have certain 
natural rights and protections.
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still understood sex as exclusively procreational. Gay sex became 
increasingly celebrated. The American Psychiatric Association removed 
homosexuality from its list of deviant sexual acts, and legal equality 
for gays and lesbians became permanent features of European and 
North American life.
In addition, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgendered, queer/
questioning and intersex (LGBTQI+) identities were being recognised 
and accepted. What is distinctive about these moves is, first, the fluid 
nature of gender and sexuality (though resisted by many who would 
position themselves at the extremes of the political spectrum), with 
people moving between different sexual identities over time. Second, and 
perhaps paradoxically, newer forms of sexual identity are being created 
and for some these are becoming well-defined markers of identity 
and lifestyle. Third, it should be noted, because this has consequences 
for public policy, that many of these new forms of sexual identity are 
deliberately crafted as oppositional and transgressive. For example, 
the recent revival and use of the word ‘queer’ denotes an oppositional 
stance in the politics of sexuality. Sexuality is different from other forms 
of difference because it is essentially and fundamentally embodied, 
although learnt in the first place. This has a number of implications: 
first, this means that it may be learnt without any conscious decision 
being made by the person concerned; second, it persists over a long 
period of time; and third, the actual desires are powerful and generally 
resistant to change.
Here is a list of distinct and normalising sexualities, ineluctably 
framed by time and space: heterosexuality, where the sexual attraction is 
between members of the opposite sex; homosexuality, where the sexual 
attraction is between members of the same sex; bisexuality, where the 
sexual attraction is to both the opposite and the same sex; asexuality, 
where there is a lack of sexual interest in others; polysexuality, where 
there is sexual attraction to more than one gender, but this is different 
from bisexuality as the latter implies that there are only two sexes; 
pansexuality, where there is a sexual attraction towards other people 
regardless of gender, and where gender is thought of as insignificant in 
determining whether they are or are not sexually attracted to other 
people; and transsexuality, where a person identifies themselves with a 
gendered position that is different from their own biological one, and this 
has profound implications for their sense of sexuality. A different list 
would include paraphilic desires, such as towards non-human objects, the 
suffering or humiliation of oneself or one’s partner, children and non-
consenting persons. Indeed, one source has listed as many as 549 different 
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paraphilic behaviours.97 What this illustrates is that these different 
lists are valued; that is, they have values embedded within them. In 
this case, these values comprise notions of deviance, difference and 
normalisation.
The key concept that I have focused on in this chapter is difference 
– the type and extent of dissimilarity between different manifestations of 
a category, such as abled and dis-abled, men and women, or heterosexual, 
homosexual and others. Crude versions of these relations are ever-present 
in modern societies. However, difference can be understood in a number 
of ways. There is the common use given to the term, where difference is 
understood as not being or as being opposite to something else. Then 
there is the meaning given to the term by Jacques Derrida. In his essay 
‘Différance’ (Derrida, 1982), he suggested that the term points to a 
number of ways in which textual meaning can be produced. The first of 
these relates to the idea that words and signs have meaning only within 
other arrangements of words and concepts, from which they differ. This 
is the predominant way in which I have used the idea of difference in this 
book so far – a use that has been neglected in most discussions of the 
social world. Meanings are thus forever deferred. The second way in 
which Derrida uses the term is to refer to a notion of espacement or 
spacing, so that what we should be concerned about is the force that 
differentiates social elements from other social elements, and in the 
process engenders binary oppositions and endlessly reiterated hierarchies 
of meaning.98 These processes, then, are essential elements in an object-
epistemology and in an in-depth understanding of the notion of learning. 
Two other binary categories are scientific/practical and educative/
training knowledge, and these are the focus of the next chapter.
97 cf. Aggrawal (2008).
98 Derrida’s (1982) characterisation of difference is derived from an idealist perspective. 
Furthermore, Derrida’s embrace of Heidegger meant that in general terms he equated ontology with 




In this chapter I will be examining two important binary categories: 
scientific/practical and educative/training. These are important because 
they act as cultural conditioning agencies for many of the institutions and 
systems that exist in the field of education and learning. The strength of 
the boundary between two contrasting manifestations of a concept 
influences how learning institutions (buildings, pedagogies, curricula, 
environments and the like) are constructed; for example, if a strong 
boundary between vocational and academic education is in place, this 
can mean that children are assigned to different types of schools, are 
taught in different ways, follow different curricula and learn in different 
environments. For instance, in Germany, at the secondary level, there 
are three types of compulsory educational institutions: Hauptschule, 
Realschule and Gymnasium schools. The Hauptschule (grades 5–9) has 
the same curriculum as the other types of school but teaches that 
curriculum at a slower rate. Students generally enrol in a vocational 
school combined with apprenticeship training at the end of grade 9. The 
Realschule (grades 5–10) in most states provides a technical education, 
although some students are able to switch to a Gymnasium school at the 
end of grade 10. Those students who are assigned to a Gymnasium school 
at the beginning of grade 5 follow an exclusively academic curriculum, 
with in most cases a university as the destination at the end of the twelfth 
grade.99 The point of this example is to suggest or show how in the real 
world difference is constructed. The first of these binary categories is the 
scientific/practical divide.
99 The claim has been repeatedly made that Germany, despite the difficulties of reunification, is a 
better-educated and trained society than many other countries in the world. I am using this set of 
divisions as an example in the real world.
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Scientific/practical
In the first instance, scientific knowledge (broadly knowledge that is 
propositional in form) and practical knowledge (broadly knowledge that 
allows us to go on in life) can be compared, and this involves identifying 
the constituents of each and the relations between them, and then showing 
how they are different or the same. This mirrors the dichotomous relation 
between the sacred and the profane developed by Émile Durkheim (1995), 
which can be expressed in many different ways: nomothetic–idiographic, 
abstractive–concrete, generalisable–particular, objective–subjective, 
factual–valued and universal–disciplinary. These are all specific renditions 
of a distinction that can be made between scientific knowledge and the 
type of knowledge that circulates in the lifeworld.
For example, it has been suggested that scientific knowledge is 
nomological – the knowledge claim can be couched in a language of 
rules and invariant happenings – whereas everyday or practical 
knowledge is idiographic – the focus is on the meaning of contingent, 
unique and perhaps subjective phenomena.100 There are four possible 
approaches that can be taken by a researcher or investigator: inductive, 
deductive, retroductive101 and abductive.102 These four strategies 
are nomological in kind in that they seek to identify laws or make 
propositional rule-bound claims to knowledge, which persist over 
time and/or place; whereas practical knowledge makes no such claims, 
or so the argument goes.
Another way of framing this argument is by contrasting abstract 
knowledge with concrete knowledge (knowledge of particulars); 
an abstraction being understood as a construct in the mind103 in which 
new ideas are formed if a number of these ideas are analysed together 
and those features that are different are then omitted. If we consider 
a range of so-called sharp objects, we can abstract from them their 
different qualia and thereby come to a notion of sharpness. The object 
itself is initially conceptualised in its concrete form. The claim is then 
made that practical forms of knowledge do not engage with these 
processes of abstraction.
100 The word ‘subjective’ is being used here to refer to an internal process and not to the antithesis 
of any notion of objectivity.
101 cf. Bhaskar (2011).
102 cf. Harré (2011).
103 I prefer to use the term ‘in the mind’ rather than ‘mental’ because of the latter’s pejorative 
associations.
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A third way of framing the argument is to invoke a notion of 
generalisation. The defining property of this is that the knowledge claim 
being made can accommodate more than one instance of a concrete 
event. There are two problems here. First, how do we identify, and in the 
process come to understand, the boundaries of an object, a concrete event 
or happening in the world? And second, how do we reconcile this 
identification of the object with it being manifested in a number of ways? 
For example, in order for the object to be manifested quantitatively – so 
that there are a number of instances of it – there has to be some measure 
of generality already present in the object itself; the words, concepts and 
ideas used can then embrace a large number of instances or manifestations. 
The intention, however, may not be to accommodate a number of the 
object’s manifestations, but to give a detailed account of a mechanism104 
and how it might have worked in the world. In both cases, knowledge of 
the object is not isomorphic with the object itself.
Another attempt at distinguishing between the two forms of 
knowledge understands scientific knowledge as knowledge that is not 
tainted by values, interests, preconceptions and so forth, whereas practical 
knowledge is ontologically valued knowledge.105 Generally, knowledge is 
said to be objective when it is not influenced by personal values and 
emotions, whereas subjectivity refers to knowledge that is based on 
personal opinions, feelings and interpretations. However, as I suggested in 
chapter 1, the concept of objectivity (as it is used in the world) contains 
multiple rather than singular meanings. The distinction between value-
free and valued knowledge cannot be directly read into the distinction 
being made here between scientific and practical forms of knowledge.
In a positivist/empiricist philosophy, a distinction between facts and 
values is usually made. This received its first explicit representation in 
1738 in David Hume’s (2000) A Treatise of Human Nature and was 
subsequently taken up by Durkheim (1939) and Weber (1964). Common 
sense would suggest that description and evaluation are separate 
activities, although the idea of common sense is here being stripped of its 
ideological meaning. This distinction has been criticised on the grounds 
that any fact is inevitably a value judgement in some way or another and 
involves a selection process, which in turn can be made only from an 
epistemological perspective or position. Facts are only facts, and thus 
104 The term ‘mechanism’ is frequently used by critical realists. However, they are not using the term 
to denote a mechanical and deterministic ontology.
105 I have already argued that all types of knowledge are valued, despite attempts by many people to 
make a claim for value-free objective knowledge.
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truth-bearers, under some type of epistemic frame or another. This 
distinction therefore cannot serve as a marker of difference between 
scientific and practical forms of knowledge.
A further justification for scientific knowledge is that it is produced 
in specialised places or locations for the production of knowledge 
(in most cases the disciplines or domains).106 A counterargument 
that supports a notion of interdisciplinarity or transdisciplinarity 
is predicated on the idea that a multiplicity of causes and theories is 
always involved in the explanation of any event or happening. However, 
in order to move from a set of disciplines or domains to interdisciplinarity 
and then to transdisciplinarity, an acknowledgement has to be made 
that the knowledge required can no longer be generated by combining 
the knowledge of the various disciplines concerned but requires a 
real integration.107
A number of suggestions have been made above, which would allow 
us to distinguish between scientific and practical knowledge: nomothetic–
idiographic, abstractive–concrete, generalisable–particular, objective–
subjective, factual–valued and universal–disciplinary. Each of these in 
turn, as concepts, has been shown to be problematic, although they do 
point to some differences between the two types of knowledge.
Everyday practical knowledge
I now need to develop a theory of practical knowledge, knowledge that 
allows me to go on in life and is an essential element of the lifeworld. 
Andrew Collier (2003) used an example of repair work – this is a form of 
practical knowledge. If I am riding a bicycle and the bicycle breaks down, 
I stop. In order to repair the bicycle, explanatory knowledge – and not just 
embodied knowledge of how to ride the bicycle – is needed. However, in 
order to make that repair, I do not need to understand the physics of 
stability such as that there is enough forward velocity, or know about the 
two parameters of stability (the lean angle and the steering angle) that 
describe the orientation of a bicycle as it travels in a forward direction, the 
role played by gyroscopic effects, leaning orientations to compensate for 
the effects of centripetal acceleration, and the degree of force that propels 
the bike forward and especially when going up a hill. What I would 
106 The arguments for some form of transcendental knowledge are set out in chapter 2.
107 This is a position that Roy Bhaskar et al. (2010) take.
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normally do is look at the various parts – chain, gears, handlebars, saddle, 
riding capacities and so on – and compare them with a template that 
seemed to operate when the bicycle was functioning properly and then try 
to adjust the one so that it works more like the other. This is a very different 
process from starting from first principles (as scientific knowledge does), 
then working out from these principles that the concrete application of 
them in the form of a damaged bicycle does not conform to them, 
translating these deficiencies in the theoretical model into concrete actions 
of repair, and then effecting the repair. This argument would suggest that 
we do not need first-principle knowledge to diagnose the problem and 
effect the repair. In some cases, it may be positively harmful – as in training 
to be and acting as a teacher, where too much theory may actually impede 
in various ways both learning to be and performing as a teacher.
However, Collier (2003) maintained that theoretical knowledge is 
necessary because it can act as a repair to breakdowns in practical 
knowledge. Theoretical or first-principle knowledge allows us to replenish 
the store of practical knowledge we hold. The issue then becomes that 
practical knowledge is always in this symbiotic relationship with 
theoretical knowledge, so that practical knowledge grows, even tacitly, 
in line with theoretical knowledge. An alternative is to understand it as 
a process, whereby practical knowledge grows and becomes more 
sophisticated in response to experience, practice and learning (the 
pedagogical element). Most practical knowledge, whether tacit or 
otherwise, is learnt in the practice itself, through trial and error, or by 
imitation or through other means, and therefore, always has a pedagogical 
element. What this means is that theoretical knowledge is not just an 
addendum to practical knowledge, appropriate for thinkers, theoreticians 
and academics, but is essential to the development of practical knowledge 
and in turn is partly generated by it.
The central question becomes: do these differences allow us to 
determine that one of these types of knowledge, and specifically scientific 
or theoretical knowledge, can be shown to be of greater worth than the 
other, insofar as acquiring it is better in some specific way than not 
acquiring it? This would require a fuller answer than space allows for 
here, and in part would require an empirical investigation. However, what 
it is possible to suggest is that those differentiating principles, if translated 
into forms of knowledge held by significant numbers of people, can in 
principle contribute to the eudaimonistic society108 (see chapter 5). This 
108 The eudaimonistic society or way of life is a very general idea or concept.
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is both a conceptual and a practical problem, and it has implications for 
how we form and reform teaching and learning practices in educational 
institutions, as does the conceptual division between training and 
education. One of the complications of using this binary divide and 
of identifying how it is used in the world is that at times the two words 
are used as equivalents and at other times as opposites.
Training and education
In order to make sense of the training and education binary and resolve 
the difficulties of operating through this binary, one way of proceeding 
is to suggest that one of these concepts is superior to the other. So, we 
can say for this or that reason or this or that set of reasons that an 
educative model gives a better account of learning than a training model. 
We have to be careful here about how we conceptualise these two terms 
for two reasons. The first is that the account we give may not capture 
the subtleties of the concept at work in the world, and the second is that 
to treat them as oppositional constructs may distort the reasonable 
argument that some aspects of learning are better captured by the term 
‘training’ and other aspects by the term ‘education’.109
The first task is to try to show how these two terms as concepts are 
used in a way of life. In this instance, as we have seen in chapter 1, this 
comprises, for Wittgenstein, a determination of the possibilities of the 
phenomena. This is complicated by the fact that we are dealing here with 
two phenomena that can potentially enter into a number of different 
types of relationships; for example, that one of these concepts is correct 
and the other is false; or that one of these concepts is a more adequate 
account of learning than the other; or that one of these concepts is a 
better descriptor of some aspects of education and the other is a better 
descriptor of all of the other aspects of education that are not covered by 
our first concept. If we want to sustain the first of these suggestions then 
we have to show110 in relation to our criteria for truthful knowledge 
(epistemic adequacy, coherence, rationality and referentiality)111 that our 
understanding of these terms meets the demands of these criteria. And 
109 There are some politicians, policymakers and academics who want to treat all learning activities 
as training activities and abandon altogether those characteristics and attributes that have been 
associated with education. This would seem to be a matter of operative power.
110 This form of words denotes a logical relationship.
111 For a fuller discussion of these criteria for true knowledge, see chapter 1.
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second, we have to provide an argument, which suggests that it is 
possible to say that one is better than the other. In the second case, 
we have to show, in addition to meeting the criteria for truthful 
knowledge, that the issue is not one of true or false judgements about 
the two phenomena being made but of one being a better and more 
useful descriptor than the other. The third is qualitatively different 
insofar as our concern is now with the concept of learning itself, and 
that some activities that can come under this concept can be better 
delivered through a training model, while others can be better delivered 
through an education model. What this requires is an inclusive model 
of learning and a way of showing that training and education models 
can subsume all of those activities that we want to attach to the notion 
of learning.
An example of an attempt at drawing a distinction between the two 
is Basil Bernstein’s characterisation of a particular form of learning 
and being. Pedagogisation is understood as the development of processes 
of social and symbolic control (Bernstein, 2002: 366) and as inter- 
changeable with a notion of training: ‘(t)he concept of trainability places 
the emphasis upon “something” the actor must possess in order for the 
actor to be appropriately formed and reformed according to technological, 
organizational, and market contingencies’. It is also understood as a 
performance activity rather than as a competency. The performance 
model, for Bernstein, clearly emphasises marked subject boundaries, 
traditional forms of knowledge, explicit realisation and recognition rules 
for pedagogic practice, and the designation and establishment of strong 
boundaries between different types of students. Bernstein compared this 
with a competence model, in which the acquirer has some control over 
the selection, pacing and sequencing of her curriculum (and much more 
besides). For Bernstein (2000: 65), performance modes are seen as the 
norm, whereas competence modes are understood as interruptions to this 
normality. Regardless of whether this is so or not, I want to suggest that 
these basic categories (competence, performance, trainability and 
pedagogisation) are not well formulated and thus are unable to perform 
the roles assigned to them.112
Knowledge and knowledge development always have a pedagogic 
form. Knowledge is transformed at the pedagogic site, which could be 
112 Some of these terms, such as ‘competence’ or ‘competences’, are used in different ways now from 
the way Bernstein sought to use them. ‘Performativity’ is another example, although Bernstein was 
more circumspect in this regard.
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a formal classroom in a school, an informal meeting between friends 
or an inadvertent and barely noticed encounter with an object in nature. 
The difference between these pedagogic sites is not that they do or do 
not contain pedagogising influences, but that their characteristics are 
differently realised as conditions for learning. These are: the simulation 
of the learning object; the representational mode of the object; its degree 
and type of amplification; control in the pedagogic relationship; 
progression or its relations with other learning objects; the type of 
pedagogic object; relations with other people in the learning process; 
the organisation of time (temporal relations) and types of feedback 
mechanism; and they are fundamental components of any pedagogic 
transformation113 (see chapter 12 for a fuller explication of these key 
properties). What this means is that in the learning process, the learning 
object takes a new form as a result of changes to its properties, with these 
properties being more or less influential in the pedagogic exchange or 
learning sequence; that is, in all and every pedagogic exchange or 
learning sequence. Bernstein’s notion of a totally pedagogised society 
does not take account of this. The second problem with the notion of a 
totally pedagogised society is its totality. This is an attempt by Bernstein 
to suggest that at certain historical moments, it is the only pedagogic 
form being used. However, trainability is only one manifestation of 
pedagogic relations, and it therefore competes with and operates 
alongside other forms of pedagogy.
Relations
The first set of relations or connections between training and education 
is that the object of learning and the arrangement of its characteristics 
at a particular moment in time are the prime determining factors in 
whether a training or educative model should be used. This argument 
makes sense only if we accept that training and education constitute 
two different forms of learning – they have distinctive approaches to 
learning and how learners experience activities associated with learning. 
In chapter 12, I show how it is possible to distinguish between different 
models of learning: observation, coaching, goal-clarification, peer 
learning, trial and error, hypothesis-testing, reflection, meta-cognitive 
113 This does not refer to Bernstein’s pedagogic device, but to the way in which knowledge is 
transformed in specific pedagogic settings.
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learning and practice. The argument that I am making here is that each 
of these approaches is appropriate only for certain types of learning 
object (either cognitive, skill-based, dispositional or embodied).114
A second set of possible relations between training and education 
suggests that the determining factor in distinguishing between a training 
pedagogy and an educative pedagogy is the function or purpose of the 
learning activity. This requires the identification of a set of differences 
between the two and then the initiation of a process whereby different 
functions or purposes are matched to these different models of training 
and education. So, for example, a teacher is trained to become a teacher 
because what she is required to learn is a set of behaviours and mechanistic 
actions. In this scenario there are no reflective, self-reflective, meta-
cognitive, meditative and imaginative elements that we might want to 
describe as educative.
A third set of possible relations refers to the learning approach 
that is being adopted. In chapter 11, I discuss five possible learning 
philosophies: behaviourism, phenomenology, cognitivism, construc- 
tionism and materialism. Each of these learning philosophies has 
different characteristics. For example, behaviourists focus on how human 
beings behave and not what is in their minds, and thus they argue that if 
these terms are used as descriptors then they should be replaced by 
behavioural terms or, at least, those mind-dependent constructs should 
be translated into behavioural descriptors. This has implications for 
whether one should adopt a training or educative model, although 
a decision such as this also depends on which characteristics are given 
to a notion of training and which characteristics are given to a notion 
of education.
A fourth set of possible relations refers to the values we hold. Such 
values are embedded in a worldview, with the characteristics of a 
worldview being: a person’s dynamic capacities and affordances, and the 
environments within which the person is situated; relations between a 
person and her environments; accounts of understanding, learning and 
change; and inferences from these premises and conclusions about 
representations, media for representations, learning environments and 
practical actions. A training model has a particular view of these 
characteristics and capacities, as does an education model, and they are 
significantly different.
114 Cognitive, skill-based, dispositional and embodied forms of knowledge do not have equal status 
in the pedagogic transformatory process.
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A final set of possible relations between the two models comprises 
their manifestations as power stratagems.115 There are different 
trajectories of power (in history) and consequently different power 
arrangements are now associated with the use of each concept. 
Educative models give greater amounts of agential freedom to the learner, 
and these are sometimes denied to learners in training models. 
Consequently, training models are generally more popular among state 
bureaucrats and policymakers; the reasons for this are clear – a training 
model acts to reinforce the strength of the hierarchical arrangement of 
goods and people, and it provides a greater degree of control over its 
workforce. In addition, each of these concepts has a different history. 
Fundamentally, the various valuations given to each of these concepts 
change over time. Many of the activities that were previously thought of 
as educative are now thought of as training activities. We can see how 
these different arguments play out in different conceptions of teacher 
training or teacher education.
Models of teacher training
I have been concerned, then, with professional learning environments 
and processes of professionalisation and how we can construct these 
within the constraints and enablements of the teacher training system. 
Inevitably we are making judgements about a number of issues, such as 
the pedagogic mode (the type of relationship between the teacher-trainer 
and the student teachers), the learning mode (the type of learning 
approach that underpins the work of the teacher-trainer), the resources 
and technologies needed to allow that learning to take place, formative 
feedback mechanisms by the teacher-trainer (the modes, approaches and 
purposes), where the learning environment is, timings of different 
activities during the teaching sessions, the tasks that the student-teachers 
are expected to complete, and how the learning can be transferred to 
other environments. Learners here are student teachers and teachers 
already in service, and their learning environments are university 
115 Training and educative models have different types of object-relations attached to them. 
To reiterate from chapter 4, these relations are one-to-one or one-to-many, strong or weak, vertical 
or horizontal, corrosive or developmental, endogenous or exogenous, enabling or constraining 
functionally, feed-back or feed-forward, convergent or divergent, framing or reframing, categorising 
or recategorising, and subsumptive or contiguous. 
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and higher education institutions, schools and in-service training 
institutions.116
There are perhaps three dominant models of teaching and 
preparation for teaching: craft worker, executive technician and 
professional learner. The first two of these have greater affinities with 
training models, with the last being more akin to an education model. 
Craft knowledge has the following characteristics: it is rooted in practice 
and in the routines that shape practice, and this rules out certain types 
of learning or pedagogic approaches. This means that imitation 
and scaffolding various attempts to perform the activities are key to the 
development of this type of knowledge. The teacher or facilitator is 
the expert practitioner, and knowledge is derived from exposure to 
the performances of the expert. The expert is therefore not primarily a 
skilled pedagogue but a skilled practitioner. The emphasis is placed on 
observing and imitating the practice. The justification for this is that the 
nature of the practice is better understood in these terms: that the 
learning object, becoming and being a good teacher, is a craft activity.
Craft knowledge values situated understanding and downplays the 
importance of technical know-how and critical reflection. This leaves 
little room for what might be called research-based knowledge, even if 
this is understood in a non-technicist way and as having a non-binding 
quality to it. Though advocates of craft-based knowledge accept that 
there may be a role for systematic propositional knowledge, this is 
confined to what is taught, or subject-based knowledge, rather than to the 
processes of teaching and learning in which the teacher or student teacher 
is engaged. Furthermore, this entails a clear separation between content 
and process knowledge, or between the learning object and the pedagogic 
process. In addition, this focus on practical judgements as the essence of 
the teaching activity fails to account for ethical and epistemological 
elements in the judgements teachers make. These judgements as a 
consequence of their lack of reflective critique and adherence to external 
expert judgement may be inherently conservative and potentially 
unreliable, based as they are on observations of existing practice and 
common popularisations.
The second of our teaching models is the executive technician.117 
This requires the teacher to perform in a particular way; to have, and be 
able to execute, a repertoire of preconceived actions. In this model, 
116 Teacher-training models are framed historically as training activities, and this is not just about 
what they are called. Recent UK government reforms have reinforced this tendency.
117 cf. Winch (2017).
knowleDge DualIt IeS 123
teaching is a rule-based activity and learning is understood as the 
assimilation of these rules and ways of enacting them, without recourse 
to critical reflection or situated understanding. The executive technician 
model recognises the value of research findings, which means that it is 
not thought to be appropriate for teachers to interpret those findings for 
themselves. Educational researchers generate findings that can be 
expressed as protocols for action, and the role of the teacher is to 
implement these protocols in the most efficient way possible given that 
there are always situational constraints. One consequence of this is that 
the knowledge being transferred tends to lack a sense of change, 
emergence, immediacy or relevance. This positions the learning object, 
these rules and protocols, outside space and time and effectively reifies 
the learning object. This also applies to the assimilative and performative 
functions of learning.
These rules are identified by researchers and practical policymakers 
as external to the setting. They are not situation-specific or even sensitive 
to the particularities of the setting in which they are being applied. 
Educational research is understood as the making of nomothetic 
statements about educational activities; educational disputes about how 
teachers should behave in the classroom are settled by atheoretical and 
value-free empirical inquiry; and theoretical knowledge of educational 
matters is thought of as superior to practical knowledge, with the result 
that practice is understood as the efficient application of theoretical 
knowledge constructed by professional experts. Learning at pre-service 
and in-service levels, then, is reduced to the assimilation of these rules 
and to ways of following them in concrete situations such as classrooms. 
A more refined version of the executive technician model is that 
educational propositional knowledge should not be understood as being 
applicable in every possible circumstance and as having a certainty of 
outcome, but that it can act as a guide to practical action. This brings back 
a measure of interpretative activity into the proceedings.
Both the craft and executive technician models can be contrasted 
with a professional learning model. Professional learning emanates and 
is derived from an understanding of the characteristics and functions of 
being a classroom teacher in the context of where that teaching takes 
place. Apart from the content and methodological knowledge that 
teachers need in order to plan and teach a lesson, they also have to take a 
variety of other factors into consideration and integrate them in a 
coherent, efficient and pedagogically effective way. Among these are the 
previous knowledge, schooling biographies and expectations of their 
students, the individual differences between them (such as capabilities, 
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interests and motivations), the objectives of the programme and the 
overall institution, as well as their own pedagogical aims, theoretical 
assumptions and values. Teachers have to make a considerable number of 
instantaneous and ad hoc decisions – they need to react to and take the 
lead in classroom interactions and modify their plans and methodological 
procedures according to the needs of students at specific points in time 
during the lesson. Ideally, they should create an atmosphere that 
encourages learning and communication and make sure that the task 
level is neither too high nor too low. In addition to this, institutions as well 
as classes have their own particular norms and patterns of interaction and 
communication. Teachers play a key role in mediating between this 
institutional culture and their students. They usually determine the 
content of classroom talk, organise the distinct phases of the lesson, 
determine the behaviour that is expected from students, select who is 
permitted to respond to a question or contribute to a discussion, decide 
what kind of answers are regarded as valid, and so forth.
Teachers need to take a multitude of sequential and simultaneous 
decisions that have to take account of personal, interpersonal, interactive, 
disciplinary, pedagogic and institutional factors. Imposing a predefined 
and fixed innovation on teachers (and students) in diverse institutional 
and regional contexts in a coercive, top-down fashion is counter- 
productive and likely to make them revert to safe and routinised practices. 
It seems more promising to encourage practitioners to try out new ideas 
in their classrooms, to make adjustments and then justify their decisions. 
To this end, an awareness of the contexts in which teachers work and 
their own behavioural and communicative patterns can be developed. 
Participants analyse their own classes, strengthen their communicative 
competences and classroom management strategies, and amplify their 
pool of teaching resources. In this discussion of training and educative 
models, a key issue has been that of power and authority and how these 
two important concepts play out in training environments and educative 
settings. In the next chapter I address this issue.
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Institutional/systemic power
In chapter 1, I identified five types of object: discursive objects, material 
objects, relational objects, institutional/systemic objects and people – the 
point is that they have different characteristics and, in particular, 
that they generate different types of object-arrangements. Objects 
and object-arrangements have powers, although these are not always 
realised. They are also sometimes naturalised as objects and object-
configurations. What I mean by this is that they are understood as 
natural, and thus beyond reproach. An example of an institutional/
systemic object is a school system. Comparative educationalists have 
traditionally studied national education systems, with a notion of 
comparison among systems or within individual systems being the 
dominant knowledge-development device. The field was first developed 
in the early nineteenth century in parallel with the rise of national 
education systems, and it took the national system as its main object of 
inquiry.118 Some have argued that this approach is now redundant, since 
nation states are in decline and national systems are consequently 
becoming obsolete.119 Indeed, the very idea of a system is anachronistic 
in a world of global markets, multinational, transnational or even stateless 
corporations and cross-national comparative systems of evaluation and 
control. However, I want to suggest that nation states and national 
systems of education are far from redundant and, furthermore, that even 
in single nation studies, comparison120 still has a role to play.
Education systems change over time and experience transformations 
to both their internal and external structures and relations. Whether 
118 cf. Noah and Eckstein (1969).
119 cf. Reich (2015).
120 Comparison is a key notion in any methodology. I have identified one way in which it is used in 
chapter 4, about which I have significant doubts.
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change occurs or not depends on the capacity within the system as well 
as the condition of the change-catalyst or set of reforms. These in turn are 
structured in particular ways, and this determines their ability to act as 
change-agents. Certain types of catalyst are more likely to induce change 
in a system than others; for example, changes of personnel, new policies, 
events in nature, external interventions, new arrays of resources, new 
arrangements of roles and functions within a system, new financial 
settlements and so on. In short, some of these change-catalysts are more 
powerful than others, or at least have the potential to be more powerful. 
Even here, though, the capacity of the catalyst to effect change within a 
system cannot guarantee or determine whether change actually occurs. 
Even the most comprehensive of reform processes cannot guarantee or 
determine the degree and type of change within the system, how long-
lasting the reform is and any unexpected consequences there may be. 
Furthermore, some types of change-catalyst are more likely to be 
successful in inducing change within the system than others. This is not 
only because some interventions in education systems are more powerful 
than others but also because their capacity to induce change better fits the 
change mechanism within the system being reformed.
What I have been doing here is categorising an education system as 
a set of institutions and relations between its parts, and even perhaps as 
a coordinating body for a number of subsystems, which have a particular 
relation to the central authority and a particular position within it. 
However, this does not mean that the relation between the central 
authority and the schools remains the same over time. These object-
relations may change for a number of reasons; for example, the invention 
of new ideas, natural progressions, structural tensions in open activity 
systems121 and so forth. In addition, it is possible to characterise education 
systems along a series of continua: restrictive control by the central 
authority over its constituent parts as opposed to loose control over these 
parts, or centralised as opposed to decentralised system-relations; 
strongly defined notions of expertise as against weakly defined notions; 
specialisations of functions and roles within the system rather than 
general capacities; and clearly defined external relations with other 
bodies and systems as against weakly defined externalities.
It is fairly easy, then, to understand an education system as a 
coordinating body that directs a number of subunits, so that if the central 
authority demands action of a particular type, then these subsidiary 
121 cf. Engeström (2001).
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bodies will implement its directives. The cohering element in the notion 
of a system being used here is that one body commands a series of other 
bodies, although all are considered to be elements of a system. However, 
it is rare for any actual system to function in this way. Within the system, 
the extent and type of power that the coordinating body can exercise over 
the other elements may be delivered in a different way. Thus, a system’s 
coordinating body may have more or less direct relations with different 
parts of the system. Indeed, it may be that some of these relations become 
so attenuated that it becomes harder to include them in the system. 
Institutional/systemic objects then have powerful characteristics, or 
at least they have these potentialities – power flows operate through 
the identification and use of these objects.
Institutional power
The use of new educational technologies is another example of power-
relations operating in and through education systems.122 For Michel 
Foucault (1975), the introduction of the examination in France in the 
eighteenth century combined the techniques of an observing hierarchy 
with those of a normalising judgement.123 Knowledge of persons was 
created that had the effect of binding individuals to each other, embedding 
those individuals in networks of power and sustaining mechanisms 
of surveillance, which were all the more powerful because they worked 
by allowing individuals to govern themselves. The examination 
introduced a whole new mechanism that both contributed to a new 
type of knowledge formation and constructed a new network of power, 
all the more powerful once it had become established throughout 
society. This is the objectification of the individual as a branch of 
knowledge, so that the individual could now be described, judged, 
measured and compared with others.
For the first time, the individual could be scientifically and 
objectively categorised and characterised through a network of power 
whereby the most important factor is the differences between people and 
objects. Hierarchical normalisation becomes the dominant way of 
organising society. Foucault was suggesting here that the examination 
itself, seemingly a neutral device, in reality acts to position the person 
122 The issue of what a technology might be is taken up in chapter 13.
123 Surveiller et punir (Foucault, 1975) is an extraordinary book. There is only a brief mention of 
education within it, where Foucault refers to the examination.
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being examined in a discourse of normality,124 so that for people to 
understand themselves in any other way is to identify themselves as 
abnormal and even as unnatural.125
Roy Bhaskar (2011) distinguished between three types of power.126 
The first type refers to the capacities of human beings to act in the world, 
that is, to speak a language, teach, reason or communicate. These 
power(s) exist even if they are not theorised, perceived or actualised in 
events. Power can also have negative characteristics, referring as it does 
to relations of subjugation, control, oppression, domination, exploitation 
or specific forms of master–slave relations. Bhaskar identified a third type 
of power, which he developed through his philosophy of metaReality.127 
This type of power is intertwined with the notion of in-the-world 
spirituality, and this should not be confused with religious practice. Power 
is enframed in all individuals as a capacity or potential that can be 
transformed in action. From this standpoint, any form of action, including 
empowerment, liberation and emancipation, pivots on its fundamental 
qualities. Catholic education over a long period of time can serve as an 
illustration of how this happens.
Catholic education
Advocates for Catholic education need to provide answers to two 
potentially damaging objections.128 The first of these is that, as with all 
faith-based programmes of learning, it is indoctrinatory and not 
educative. In order to sustain this argument, those critics of faith-based 
programmes need to be able to show that the educational programmes 
they support (whether explicitly or implicitly) have pedagogic elements 
that are superior to those within faith-based programmes.
124 Normalisation is another example of the atomisation of identity and, in a general sense, of reality.
125 The notion of unnatural desires has a long and sad history.
126 Being powerful is a characteristic or attribute of a discursive object, or a material object, or a 
relational object, or a configurational object, or a human being. Power can be possessed, exercised 
or actualised.
127 MetaReality focuses on the self, human agency and society. Roy Bhaskar (2002) showed how the 
world of alienation and crisis we currently inhabit could be transformed by the ground-state 
qualities of intelligence, creativity, love, a capacity for right-action and a potential for human self-
realisation or fulfilment.
128 Catholic education and Catholic pedagogy are generalisations, which would suggest a disregard 
for the variety of forms inherent in the two concepts. The reason for including this case is to suggest 
that power, power dynamics and powerful practices are ever-present in the construction over time 
of a discourse.
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A second objection focuses on the idea that the framework of 
Catholic values, which underpins the curriculum content of Catholic 
education, is in some sense fallacious or insufficient. And attached to this 
is a belief that as a consequence of this deficiency, Catholic pedagogy 
in schools generates persons who cannot experience a fulfilled life. 
The problem, as critics of faith-based programmes have pointed out, is 
the insistence on a strong coupling between spirituality and ethical 
behaviours and dispositions. Indeed, there may even be a problem with 
identifying distinctive Catholic pedagogical styles and techniques, 
although I argue below that many of these styles and techniques 
of learning were the originators of common and secularised forms 
of pedagogy that are now in common use. In the Gadarene rush to 
secularisation, secularists have simply borrowed or taken over pedagogies 
that could be called Catholic in origin.
The first objection, then, is that Catholic education is not educative 
at all but indoctrinatory. The enlightened person seeks at all times to be 
educated rather than indoctrinated. Catholic pedagogy therefore must on 
this account be a practice that subscribes (in a deontological sense) to 
those features we think of as belonging to an educative practice and in 
addition as engendering, if it is successful, persons who in their lives 
outside the formal education setting are educated and thus live in ways 
that conform to this state of being (and I have to say here, these are not 
lives that conform to an indoctrinated state of being).
There are two meanings that can be given to the idea of the 
indoctrinated person. The first focuses on the arbitrary nature of what is 
being imposed and the second on the effects that it may have, so that the 
indoctrinated person now cannot think, act and behave in an autonomous 
fashion (where autonomy is understood as that human quality a person 
possesses that is most opposed to those qualities associated with an 
indoctrinated person and comprises in part the capacity to will one’s 
own actions). In the first instance, what this requires, as part of the 
argument, is the development of a basic premise that Catholic pedagogy, 
indeed Catholic education, is in some way different from other forms of 
education or from an ideal model of an educational practice. This requires 
the development of some notion of non-arbitrariness, with regards 
to both the content of what is being taught and the end result, so that 
the person has some measure of autonomy in the judgements he makes 
as he lives his life.
If a distinction is to be maintained, then, between indoctrination 
and education, where the latter is understood as involving some measure 
of autonomy, then an argument to justify this distinction has to be 
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provided. Before I do this, a further objection should be noted. This is 
that an argument could be made for the indoctrination of young learners 
on the grounds that it is a necessary imposition because it allows them 
to exercise their autonomy after they have grown up and left school. 
Clearly, there is a sense in which both processes – learning how to be 
autonomous and being autonomous once one has learnt how – involve 
specific actions by the learner. If autonomy, then, is defined as the capacity 
to make sound judgements about the consequences of one’s actions, 
this does not just happen, but results from a series of actions on the 
part of the learner, with the result that the learner is better able to make 
those sound judgements after the learning experiences than before. 
Thus, the learner is provided with experiences, which, if they have 
positive effects, enable the learner to become autonomous, and he 
would not have become autonomous unless he had actually had those 
experiences. In short, for his own good as an educated person, and if it 
is accepted that the optimum state of affairs is that he should exercise 
his autonomy, he should be inducted into this way of life, which some 
might want to call indoctrinatory.
Further to this, it is not at all clear that a notion of education 
involving the imposition of a particular state of mind on a child does in 
fact lead to the development of dispositions that in later life we might 
want to call, in a Catholic sense, conscience-driven and thus autonomous. 
In part, this is an empirical matter, and yet even then we have to be sure 
that a causal relation that we have identified from an examination of what 
has gone on in the past can allow us to predict what will happen in the 
future. We can make a judgement from knowledge of what has happened 
in the past that certain experiences do not in fact allow the individual 
to lead a full, holistic and autonomous life when he grows up because 
those experiences have in some sense damaged him. I am thinking here 
of child abuse in which children have been so badly affected by their 
experiences that they cannot lead fulfilled and happy lives. In addition, it 
is difficult to identify those experiences that might lead to the desired 
state of being after the child has experienced them. It is tempting, 
however, to suggest that experiencing autonomy or being allowed to 
make those choices that constitute an autonomous life as a learner is a 
better way of learning to be autonomous than being told what to do.
The second area of difficulty revolves around the extent to which 
we can make sense of the idea of a non-indoctrinated child. Various 
attempts have been made to identify such a child and these have focused 
on the type of imposition afforded to the child. Hand (2006) defines 
indoctrination as the imparting of beliefs so that they are held 
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non-rationally. Non-rationality is further defined as without regard to 
evidence. We should note here that the definition focuses not on the 
justification for imposing such a state of mind but on the imparting of 
those beliefs to the child. So, a child can have a religious faith, having 
been inducted into such a belief during his time at school, but he has been 
indoctrinated if he holds such beliefs without regard to the evidence. If 
this is put in this way, then a problem with religious belief immediately 
comes to the fore; which is that it is hard to see what might constitute 
good reasons for such a belief, and the belief, if this is accepted, would 
then be categorised as irrational, and the learning of it would be consigned 
to the realm of indoctrination.
Two points need to be made here. The first is that an indoctrinated 
state is being construed as a psychological state in which the person 
is impervious to changing his mind or his belief system. The second is 
that the test for whether the arguments and evidence for changing the 
person’s mind constitutes a public assessment to determine whether 
those arguments or the evidence amount to a sufficient reason for that 
person to change his mind. There may be a less stringent test, which we 
can call the weaker argument, and this is that the public test is discarded 
and replaced with a test involving the strength of the argument. If good 
reasons are provided as to why the person should change his mind, 
and this argument accepts that the capacity to change one’s mind is a 
precondition of an autonomous state of being, then though the person 
may choose not to change his mind, he does so because the reasons 
provided do not constitute sufficient grounds for his doing so. He is 
therefore still acting autonomously. This, however, leaves us with a 
dilemma, which can be expressed in the form of a question: what might 
constitute a good reason for changing one’s mind?
One possible answer is that we are committed to some form of 
coherence of argument about what we should do, and we might want 
to change our mind to produce in our belief system a greater sense of 
coherence. Another reason might be that our present state of being has 
led in the past to certain unhappy consequences, and we are seeking to 
develop a set of beliefs that in our judgement will produce happier 
consequences for us. A third set of reasons might focus on the notion that 
we are simply wrong to hold to the particular set of beliefs that we 
presently have and that we should therefore amend our beliefs so that 
they are more correct. A fourth set of reasons might focus on a desire to 
live our lives free from the dictates of reason; and we are thus committed 
to acting irrationally. In this last case, it should be noted that although we 
choose to act irrationally, all we are in fact doing is the mirror opposite 
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of what the rational person might choose to do. Thus, the criteria for 
determining what we do are in fact based on a system of rational thought 
and action, and we could not go on in life without accepting that there is 
a system of rationality. Finally, we might actually be confused about why 
we do this rather than that, and thus the choices we make are essentially 
arbitrary. To equate autonomy with the making of choices is therefore 
potentially problematic.
What is also problematic is defining the person acting in a non-
autonomous way as someone who is not open to rational persuasion. 
And this is because of the difficulty with identifying what a good reason 
for changing one’s life or making choices might be. The argument made 
by Catholic philosophers is that it is possible to induct a child into 
a religious way of life without at the same time indoctrinating them. 
The counterargument is that inducting a child into a religious faith is per 
se indoctrination because that person is now less open to changing his 
mind about his belief system, and the purpose of a liberal education is to 
open the mind to further possibilities rather than close it. However, in 
effect this is the same for the learning of all types of beliefs, and education 
of whatever type cannot be sustained without some notion of imparting 
a belief system to an initiate. Once again, we need to remind ourselves 
that the person may still be acting autonomously, even if he chooses not 
to exercise this facility. The problem with the dichotomous nature of the 
pair of words, ‘indoctrination–education’, is that any prescription about 
education involves the development of a set of presuppositions about 
how the child and the future adult should behave, and consequently is 
essentially normative. It is to this argument that we now need to turn our 
attention. What I have sought to do here is place in suspension the idea 
that there is an indoctrinated way of life and a non-indoctrinated way of 
life and furthermore that being a Catholic and learning to be a Catholic 
necessarily involves leading an indoctrinated way of life.
And the reason I have chosen to do this is because, if autonomy is to 
provide the underpinning rationale for what should constitute a 
curriculum, then first there is a need to be clear about what an autonomous 
life might be, and second, there is a need to be clear about why leading 
an autonomous life is better than leading a non-autonomous life. If 
education, and certainly formal education, is defined as an intervention 
in the life of the child, then though that intervention may have unexpected 
and unplanned consequences, it is still designed to initiate the child into 
a form of life. This operates at the level of knowledge as well as at the level 
of skill or disposition. We cannot avoid the prescriptive nature of 
education, and this is because by choosing an array of skills, or a particular 
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knowledge agenda, or a set of embodiments, or a set of dispositions, we 
are necessarily putting to one side other knowledge or skills or embodied 
or dispositional agendas. We might have good reasons for doing so, but 
the act of curriculum-making per se comprises the inclusion of some 
activities and the exclusion of others.
We now come to the main part of the argument, which is that those 
experiences that should be incorporated into the curriculum can be 
derived only from a notion of what the good life is (and this of course is 
given a particular definition by the Catholic discourse community), 
insofar as the skills and knowledge children need to acquire as they grow 
up are necessary for living the good life. Is it therefore possible to identify 
what that good life might be? We have already suggested that it is more 
than making choices or living the autonomous life, for two reasons. First, 
there may be moral or ethical reasons for sanctioning some forms of 
behaviour and supporting others. Second, individuals in being 
autonomous may make choices, which do not lead to fulfilment in their 
lives. However, we have established the principle that however hard it is 
to define what the good life is, this end can be the only logical raison 
d’être for determining what is in the curriculum, whether we understand 
this as Catholic or secular.
It may be possible to anchor this prescriptive activity in some notion 
of human nature. In effect, there are three possible scenarios. The first 
of these is that human nature has a plasticity, which does not allow us 
to say that human beings have dispositions that should be fulfilled. 
Human needs and wants are infinitely flexible and, beyond the basics of 
survival, can be construed as irremediably social. They are in a sense 
therefore manufactured, or at least the human need, want or desire 
comes about because of the way society is structured. The second 
scenario suggests the opposite, which is that the natural can be identified 
and this natural state of affairs persists and has persisted through time; 
and though we do not always know what we want – for example, because 
we have misled ourselves or are confused about what we want – we can 
understand these false beliefs only in terms of a pure consciousness that 
seeks fulfilment. The third scenario is a variant on the second, in that 
there is an innate and natural sense of completeness built into human 
beings, which needs to be achieved in order to lead the good life, and 
though in most cases human beings do not achieve this, it does provide 
a criterion for judging the state of affairs that we might want to call the 
good life. If we are to accept either or both of these last two scenarios, 
then further arguments or evidence would need to be provided to 
support such assertions.
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And these assertions always have a backstory, which in the case 
I am focusing on here is Catholic in orientation. This backstory has a 
number of features: a language for understanding the educative process; 
a capacity for analysing this process (identifying and separating out the 
various elements and the relations between them); an ontology and 
an epistemology, and the relations between them; a way of turning all 
of these into a coherent whole that prescribes what is needed for an 
educational setting; and fundamentally a set of Catholic values.
Values
The second objection to Catholic education revolves around the issue of 
what it is that Catholic education wishes to convey, and this is also bound 
up with processes of modernisation and secularisation that are taking 
place. There are two possibilities. The first is what could be called the 
liturgy of the Catholic faith and, in particular, the observances of the 
Eucharist, obedience to Church law and confessional practices. In short, 
the liturgical Catholic education process is one in which the child is, as a 
result of various pedagogical processes, affirmed or reaffirmed in the 
specific activities of the faith, which include those systems of belief and 
those practices that the Catholic Church deems to be suitable expressions 
of that faith. The second possibility can be called Catholic virtues, where 
the trait that is most valued is moral excellence. The child is deemed to 
have achieved moral excellence when he has acquired those virtues, 
which in their application lead to the good life.
A distinction needs to be drawn between two types of Catholic 
virtues, which can be understood as religious values and ethical values. 
This distinction is important because, as the story goes, the latter, 
logically, are not dependent on the former. A person can live the good life 
without in any way subscribing to what I am calling religious values. The 
counterargument is that these secular values are dependent on and can 
be achieved only through immersion in religious values; what is meant by 
this is a full and sincere affirmation of the religious life and, to some 
extent, its embedded behaviours.
The second type of virtue, then, is that of moral excellence, where 
religious virtues (our first type) are neither a prior condition nor a 
necessity. These are virtues associated with acts of kindness, charity and 
care for the poor, and are socialistic and communitarian in kind. Here, the 
story goes, the particular ethos and pedagogy of a Catholic school leads 
to learning (understood in its widest sense) in which the person, who of 
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course might be an unbeliever, behaves in all essential respects as a 
Catholic, even if he does not attend to the rituals of the Catholic Church.
There is an alternative viewpoint. This is the reformist pathway, 
where an attempt is made to secularise Catholicism. Charles Taylor (2011) 
identified three types of secularism. The first of these is what he called 
‘secularity in terms of public spaces’ (educational, political, cultural, 
professional, recreational, and so on), with the understanding that these 
have now been emptied of references specifically to God or even to some 
ultimate reality – in other words, some notion of a metaphysical being. The 
second of these senses of secularity is a falling away of religious belief and 
observances, so that, for example, fewer people go to church on Sundays. 
And the third sense that Taylor gave to this notion of secularity is where 
the idea of God or some ultimate reality is challenged at every moment of 
life and understood as an alternative choice among many others; the 
authority of God (and the Church) has been superseded by other forms of 
authority. Taylor’s point is an empirical one: this is what has happened and 
is happening. However, the problem still remains for Catholic education, 
which is that the educative process may still embrace a set of ethical 
precepts that would be approved of by the Catholic Church, but they do 
not include religious values or taking part in the Catholic liturgy or 
conforming to Catholic rituals. There is a further avenue to explore, and 
our concern here is with the pedagogic transformatory process rather than 
the values (forms of knowledge, skills, embodiments and dispositions) 
that have occupied our attention so far.
Pedagogical approaches
Broadly, seven major Catholic pedagogical styles and techniques can be 
identified. These are events. Each has different emergent pedagogical 
properties. The styles flex and overlap with each other. The first is 
exegetical. This is fundamentally organised around a holy book or books 
and the associated commentary and interpretation. The modal inspiration 
is perhaps the educational parts of the sixth-century Rule of Saint 
Benedict, based as it is on humility and unhesitating obedience. The 
curriculum is holy reading and prayer.
More subtle and non-dogmatic processes of exegesis abound in the 
history of Catholic education.129 For example, in Maximus the Confessor’s 
129 cf. Louth (1996).
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Ambigua ad Joannem and in his Ad Thalassium, two traditions of monastic 
spiritual pedagogy are described: the exegetical aporial tradition, a 
hermeneutic process that seeks to resolve difficulties posed by certain 
biblical passages; and the quaestio-responsio. This last comprises a series 
of steps: asking the question; formulating objections that the teacher 
will eventually have to provide an answer to; the making of the sed 
contra, which consisted of the reading of a passage from the scriptures 
suggesting the position the teacher would have to defend; the responsio, 
or the giving of an interpretation of the passage by the teacher in relation 
to the question originally posed; and finally, there is a resolution of 
the difficulties and objections raised at the beginning of the proceedings 
by the teacher. This suggests that the Ad Thalassium and the responsio 
were in essence a form of spiritual catechism leading the learner to a 
mystical contemplation of the logoi and logos of creation. The Scriptures 
are revealed in this exegetical approach to be windows to higher, spiritual 
realities. The implication here is that the path to the good life requires 
more than the adoption of secular ethical values, however Catholic in 
orientation they are.
Reflection on the world is a third type of pedagogical approach. 
An example would be a pedagogy developed within the tradition of 
Saint Ignatius, the founder of the Jesuits. The thrust of this pedagogy was 
that in performing the spiritual exercises (in order to know the will of 
God), this would transform the individual so that he would make 
appropriate decisions about how he should act in the world. Note the 
order of activity in the pedagogic sequence: understanding the spiritual 
is a prerequisite of acquiring those values, ideals and attitudes that allow 
one to behave in an ethical way in the world. Without this sense of 
spirituality, the subsequent ethical precepts held by the individual 
that compel him to behave in this rather than that way are empty 
and moreover are likely to be misguided and wrong. Reflection, then, in 
this sense also embraces action in the world. The individual behaves in 
a reflective manner.
There are a number of models of reflection based on specific 
philosophical approaches (for example, John Dewey, 1938; Jurgen 
Habermas, 1981; or Saint Ignatius, expounded in Duminuco, 2000) that 
are in common use. To facilitate critical reflection, a range of tools and 
practices have been developed, which include the use and analysis of 
critical incidents and the much-used Kolb learning cycle. The idea of a 
learning cycle, developed by David Kolb (1984), is based on a belief that 
deep learning (learning for real comprehension) comes from a sequence 
of experience, reflection, abstraction and active testing. Reflection is a 
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form of evaluative thinking. It is applied to ideas for which there is no 
obvious solution and is largely based on the further processing of 
knowledge and understanding and possibly emotions that the learner 
already possesses. It is thus a second-order internal activity, which can in 
certain circumstances be transformed into a learning strategy. In addition, 
in Catholic theological terms, the focus of the reflective process should 
always be on the ‘forming and informing of conscience’ (Grace, 2013: 
105). This has some affinities with Michel Foucault’s (2010) notion of 
‘care of the self’. (For Foucault, this is an ethical precept.) For some, 
including Gerald Grace, this requires spiritual work, with the reflective 
process dovetailing between Catholic social teaching and the ‘teaching, 
practice and mission of Jesus Christ and the Saints’ (2013: 105). It should 
be noted here that the education of children is in some sense deficient if 
both elements of Catholic pedagogy – the teaching and learning of those 
knowledge sets, virtues and embodiments that are perhaps Catholic in 
origin but which would now be shared by most liberal educators, and a 
sense of spirituality, which is manifested in one of its forms as 
contemplation of the life of Jesus Christ and the saints – are not included 
in the overall programme of learning.
In using an instructional pedagogy, the teacher needs to: gain 
the attention of the group of learners; inform the learners of the objectives 
of the learning exercise; stimulate recall of prior learning among the 
group of learners, so that the new information is related productively to 
previous and current learning; present content to the learner; implement 
appropriate scaffolding processes; stimulate a performance by the 
learner; provide feedback to the learner that is a comment on their 
performance and allows corrective action to take place; and evaluate 
the corrected performance. Catholic pedagogy in schools has for a long 
time depended on instructional approaches, with compliance as the 
dominant metaphor.
Meanwhile, as an essential part of a Catholic liberal, emancipatory, 
theory of education, a pedagogical approach has been developed 
that could be called individual self-discovery. The goal here is for 
the individual learner to achieve an independent point of view, and 
a personal Catholic voice. For a long time, the key lay in a close personal 
reading of the classics (religious and secular) – of great books in general 
and the Bible in particular. This can perhaps be described as a form 
of spiritual apprenticeship.
A more organised form of external engagement reached its height 
of popularity in the North American enthusiasm for service learning, 
using the resources of the surrounding community for learning scenarios. 
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At one end of the spectrum lies volunteering (whether or not from an 
expert base); at the other lies the educational goal of deep but temporary 
immersion in the dilemmas of particular groups in civil society. Service 
learning in Catholic schools has a long tradition, and also involves the 
learning of some ethical virtues that are Catholic in orientation, although 
originary claims are made for these by secularists. Finally, in Catholic 
education, there has been an emphasis on another long-standing 
approach, much favoured by the philosopher John Dewey (1938): 
learning by doing, which has some affinities with service learning but also 
comprises a notion of phronesis or practical wisdom.
The story goes that Catholic education can uniquely provide human 
beings with a gestalt that can act to frame their subsequent life and 
behaviours. The Catholic child grows as a person as a result of an 
individual and cultural maturation, or Bildung. And, so the argument 
goes, this sense of leading the good life cannot be adequately fulfilled 
without subscribing to doctrinal as well as ethical precepts of Catholicism. 
Despite the efforts to secularise or disenchant the religious life, some 
elements of this enchantment130 and some adherence to Catholic rituals 
are still required to lead the good life. This, of course, is in opposition to 
a view of Catholic education, which simply argues for the inculcation of 
those virtues (and the subsequent capability to instantiate them in the 
world) that are derived from Catholic theology and doctrine. The two are 
not the same and may be in opposition to each other and, in addition, at 
the pedagogical level may be fundamentally in conflict.
I have suggested above that the claim that Catholic education (and 
I suppose any faith-based education) is indoctrinatory cannot be 
satisfactorily made, insofar as the various possible ways of making this 
claim are not up to the task. In general, this involves a repudiation of the 
sharp distinction between prescription and non-prescription with regards 
to both pedagogy and curriculum. The second dilemma that I have 
explored here revolves around the emphasis that the Catholic educator 
places on spirituality as well as on ethical values. I have suggested above 
that a compelling case can be made for both as being part of a Catholic 
pedagogy. However, what this does is establish strong insulations between 
Catholic education and other forms of education.
The final issue that has been addressed here is whether it is possible 
to identify a distinctive Catholic pedagogical form. Given that all and 
130 Charles Taylor (2011) writes about disenchantment and re-enchantment, and makes the point, 
among others, that a strong evaluation of the world is still possible, even if the pictures we now paint 
of the modern world are predominantly scientistic and reductionist.
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every pedagogic form has evolved in some way or another from faith-
based educational practices, with many of them being Catholic in origin, 
this does suggest a historical connection. These practices change over 
time, and processes of secularisation have contributed to their current 
forms. If spirituality is considered to be a significant feature of a Catholic 
educational practice, then this claim is fairly easy to make. Without a 
sense of spirituality as part of the mix, it becomes much harder.
In this part of the book, I have focused on some important ideas in 
the history of thought: what concepts are; the relationship between 
knowledge and learning; the possibility of universal knowledge; 
excellence in a practice; what evidence is; the distinction between 
epistemology and ontology; the role and place of values in our descriptions 
of the world and in the world itself; the notion of difference; different 
epistemic categories; and powerful practices. I also need to relate all of 




In this chapter I will be addressing the issue of personal identity (and 
thus, collective identity), which refers to the way in which a person 
identifies with a particular social object, such as a nation, a collection 
of nations, an ethnic trait, a racial classification, a geographical entity, 
a personal history, a sense of heritage, a sporting club, an abstraction 
such as goodness or love (for example, Philip Larkin’s An Arundel Tomb: 
‘What will survive of us is love’), a social unit such as the family, a religion 
or a sexual orientation. Whatever the social object, this identification 
comprises a preference for that object over other objects of the same type 
– for example, identifying with a nation such as Britain over and above 
a collection of nations such as the European Union, or identifying with a 
particular racial grouping and not with human beings in general. These 
social objects can be nested in some type of identity grouping, so one 
can identify with an area within a country (‘I am a Londoner’), a country 
(‘I am English’), a nation (‘I am British’), a union of countries (‘I am a 
European’) or even the world (‘I am a world citizen’). Belonging to all five 
of these identity groupings is not in itself incoherent or irrational.
What is pivotal here is how a person constructs her personal identity 
– how she gives more importance to one particular social object or even 
to a number of objects and consequently less importance to others. A 
person’s identity refers to certain properties of the social world to which 
a person feels a special sense of attachment or ownership; that is, in all 
her deliberations about the world and with regards to her activities in this 
world, she prioritises some reasons for action over and against others. As 
a result, she sees the world in a particular way, although she may share 
that world with other people who subscribe to the same or similar markers 
of identity. All of these identity markers are imagined conceptualisations 
of the social object, so racial, spatial, historical, ethnic, religious, 
sexualised, embodied or familiar attachments comprise imagined and 
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constructed narratives about race,131 geographies,132 histories,133 
ethnicities,134 religions,135 sexualities,136 bodies137 or social groupings.138 
Frequently, human beings reify the properties of the social object to which 
they are attached, treating them as natural or as common sense and thus 
beyond reproach.
A person’s sense of identity, then, consists of those features of 
the imagined object that define her as a person or even that make her 
the person that she is. They give that person a sense of belonging, and 
they focus that person in a particular way. Fundamentally, personal 
identity is a matter of what human beings care about in the world. Since 
they are what they are, human beings interact with the three orders 
of reality: the natural, the practical and the social.139 If human beings 
are going to flourish, they have to sustain relationships in all three. As 
a result, they cannot afford to be indifferent to the concerns that are 
embedded in each of these three orders.
These are also markers of difference; that is, they refer to the 
type and extent of dissimilarity between different manifestations of the 
social object, for instance, abled and dis-abled, male and female, black 
and white, heterosexual and homosexual, intelligent and unintelligent, 
precariat and middle class, and British and European. Crude versions of 
these relations are ever-present in modern societies. However, difference 
can be understood as not being or as being opposite to something 
else, and in addition, that ideas and concepts are part of a network of 
words and signs, which have meaning only within other arrangements 
of words and concepts, from which they differ. However, difference can 
become pathological if different sets of values, usually in opposition to 
each other, are attached to different manifestations of the social object.
Being a woman, liking poetry and living in London may be 
characteristics of a particular person, but they do not constitute identity 
markers for that person, if that person has not invested enough feeling 
and commitment in them to trigger actions. In addition, it may be possible 
131 An example of which is Hall (1980).
132 An example of which is Jensen and Richardson (2004).
133 An example of which is Foucault (1969).
134 An example of which is Malesevic (2004).
135 An example of which is Taylor (2011).
136 An example of which is Foucault (1978b).
137 An example of which is Shilling (2016).
138 An example of which is Giddens (1986).
139 These three types of relationships are ill-characterised here and may not be of the same logical 
order. However, broadly they are three different types of relationships that are central to the 
concerns of human beings.
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for a property to belong to a person’s identity, in that it is a central defining 
belief that she has (ethnic purity, for example), with at the same time that 
belief being false. A person’s sense of identity may be changeable, fragile, 
focused on different social objects at different times and contingent. 
However, for most people, social attachments that are acquired at an 
early age persist over time and are extremely difficult to reverse – although 
they may take a different form at different moments in that person’s 
life and indeed involve denials and repudiations, such as in ethnic or 
racial identities.
Identities and identity formations operate at different social levels 
and therefore in different ways. These different levels can be categorised 
as: the sub-individual or psychological level; the individual or auto- 
biographical level; the ordinary level of living our lives; the functional 
level at which we are concerned with relational roles such as capitalist 
and worker or shop owner and customer; the structural level as in the 
functioning of whole societies or their parts (such as the economy or the 
political sphere); the mega level of whole traditions and civilisations; and 
finally the planetary or cosmological level where the person’s immediate 
concerns are with the planet (or cosmos) as a whole (cf. Bhaskar, 2011).140 
At these different levels, then, different forms of identity and agency are 
constructed, causing in some cases deep-seated dislocations, anomic 
frames of mind and unhappinesses.
What sort of things then are people or persons? What are their 
fundamental properties? What, for instance, are they made of? Are they 
substances wholly or partly formed and reformed by material, embodied 
and discursive features of society or is each person able to shape her own 
life course? And, fundamentally, how do human beings construct their 
sense of self? These are difficult questions to answer, but the answers that 
are given and the subsequent identities that are assumed have 
consequences – some trivial, some serious.
Identity is being used here to indicate a sense of wholeness and 
thus persistence across time. All discussions of a person over time require 
some understanding of change; that is, a notion of change is built into 
the conception of the human being. If there was no cohering element 
between time moments, so that every moment entailed a change of 
person, we would not have a sense of personhood, which therefore has to 
include a notion of persistence over time and, in addition, has a notion 
of emergence. And this is emergence understood in its two modes: as 
140 These are examples of spatial geometries; see chapter 21.
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a temporal phenomenon, and ontologically as a response to the stratified 
nature of reality. Identity and consciousness are homologous concepts; 
that is, they operate in the same way and have similar properties. In 
saying this, we still need to understand what consciousness is, as it is a 
polysemic concept.
Consciousness
It is possible to identify those elements of consciousness that cannot as 
yet be replicated by artificial intelligence (AI): intentionality, non-
deontological ways of being, reflexivity, meta-reflection and referential 
reflection, identity formation and acting in a virtuous way. The question 
that needs to be asked is: can a machine ever act in intentional, non-
deontological, meta-reflective, identity-forming and virtuous ways? I do 
not think that a machine could ever replicate all of the functions of a 
human being, although I suppose it is just possible to imagine new 
material and substance inventions that replicate (or are superior to) 
human bodies, brains and of course minds, with the proviso that these 
machines would not be able to act intentionally and virtuously.
I am making a comparison between a human being and an artificial 
replication of a human being in an attempt to show that a human being 
has different characteristics from a machine, and that this is directly 
relevant to answering questions such as: do human beings have a 
conscious mind? If they have a conscious mind, do they have free will?141 
If we are asleep or if our minds are working at a subconscious level, can 
we say that we are conscious at these moments? Our brains may be active 
during moments of sleep or inattention, even if this does not point to a 
notion of consciousness generally, and even if subsequently we intuit or 
work out that something has changed (subconscious activity can affect 
conscious activity later on).
Philosophers have proposed a number of theories of consciousness142 
– what it is, how it operates and why we need a theory of conscious- 
ness at all. General theories of consciousness largely divide between 
standard mind–body operations, such as dualist theories, and physicalist 
141 The relationship between consciousness and volition is indeed complicated. Understanding it 
rests on the argument that one cannot be conscious unless one also has some control over the 
operation of one’s mind, and that volition or the exercise of free will requires as a minimum 
condition that a person (though this idea is of course problematic) can influence in some way or 
another the conditions through which individual agency is manifested.
142 cf. Van Gulick (2018).
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theories. Those who believe in dualist theories argue that some 
operations of the mind fall outside the realm of the physical and cause–
effect–cause relations, as they are generally understood. Substance 
theorists, taking their inspiration from René Descartes (1988), suggest 
that there are both physical and non-physical substances, and minds 
are examples of the latter, with these minds embracing a notion of 
consciousness. Property dualists suggest that minds cannot be reduced 
to physical properties, but nonetheless causal relations can be instantiated 
by the same things that trigger the operation of physical processes. 
Fundamental versions of property dualism accept that consciousness 
consists of operative physical processes, but ontologically a claim is being 
made that properties of consciousness do not and cannot be derived from 
physical properties. Emergent property dualists introduce into the 
equation a notion of emergence so that even though they accept that 
consciousness and conscious processes come about through the operation 
of physical processes, the result cannot be understood or expressed in 
physicalist terms (or, it needs to be said, in how language and semantic 
structures currently operate). Monist property dualists understand both 
the properties of the mind and physical properties as being derived from 
a more basic level of reality. This clearly has some affinities with medieval 
conceptions of transcendentals (see chapter 2). Panpsychism would 
suggest that all properties of objects have mindful and thus non-physical 
properties attached to them. This allows a form of consciousness to be 
realised. These dualist theories mark out a clear distinction between the 
properties of the mind and the properties of a physical reality; and it is 
hard to see how any theory of consciousness could be anything other than 
vacuous if a purely physicalist theory was endorsed.
In particular, physicalist theories of consciousness cannot embrace 
a notion of free will, which means that in every aspect of our lives we 
cannot be sure that we are not being radically deceived. Physicalist 
theories vary enormously in their scope and direction.143 For example, 
some type–type identity theories (in which each type of mind-state is a 
type of brain-state) deny the notion of consciousness altogether, whereas 
others argue that since the conscious property and the neural property 
are of the same type, then there is no need to explain how the one can 
cause the other or give rise to it. Most physicalist theories of consciousness 
are not of this type but aim to understand the world in terms of some form 
143 Such as: higher-order theories, reflexive theories, representationalist theories, narrative 
interpretative theories, cognitive theories, information integration theories, neural theories and 
quantum theories.
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of psycho–physicalist relation, in which the two are not identical. All of 
these theories come up against the existence of free will, and all of them 
are essentially deterministic.
A key issue, then, that relates to identity and consciousness is free 
will, that is, volition. John Searle (1984) endorsed a physicalist position 
– all forms of conscious life involve the interaction of molecules – and thus 
implicitly accepted a mechanical causal view of the mind–body 
relationship, and from this he concluded that any idea we may have of 
free will is merely an illusion. This means that for Searle an activity of the 
mind is also physical (and therefore has to abide by the laws of physics), 
and if it is, any notion of intentionality influencing our actions or even 
causing further actions in the mind is simply the operation of prior 
molecular processes, with their commitment to a notion of cause and 
effect. However, again for Searle, we have a strong sense that in life we 
subscribe to a notion of having a state of mind, which in some way causes 
(not in a Humean sense, see chapter 4) other states of mind or physical 
actions. However, this cannot – if we subscribe to the notion of the 
operation of the mind being in no fundamental sense different from the 
operation of physical objects outside the mind – be anything other than 
an illusion. There is no such thing as free will, only a thought in our heads 
that we freely choose some action or some other thought from a range of 
possible thoughts and actions. This is of course not just a criticism of anti-
physicalism but also a sceptical position per se. Unless we can establish 
some certain point outside of the particular case that we are considering, 
by which we can judge our original claim to knowledge, then we are 
forced to withhold assent to it being a valid claim of knowledge. Further 
to this, if we cannot find good grounds for suggesting that the basis for 
having any conscious function in the mind at all is not illusory, then we 
are forced to accept a sceptical position with regards to knowledge of 
anything, if and only if we construe all processes in the mind as conforming 
to the principles of physicalism. What this means is that everything is 
literally physical or at least that everything supervenes on the physical, 
and further to this that these principles of physicalism – all events, 
including events in individual minds, are the product of the play of 
molecules at a lower level – cannot save us in this regard.
Scepticism, further, is necessarily false. For if we support a notion of 
scepticism, then we additionally have to show why it is true. If we do this, 
and we are, I think, committed to doing this, then at least one item of true 
knowledge exists, that is, that we should be sceptical about knowledge, 
and this of course contradicts the original premise. We cannot be sceptical 
about knowledge in its entirety. For any theory of learning there needs to 
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be some reconciliation of the persistent problem of the relationship 
between mind and matter. The reason for this is that one element of the 
learning process may be conceived as a transfer of a material object, an 
entity, to what some think of as a non-material object, a mind.
Thomas Nagel (2012), coming from a dualist position, suggested 
that substances in the mind and processes cannot be directly subsumed 
into physical substances and processes – there are significant differences 
between the two; however, we do not have at present, and possibly never 
will have, a language for describing states of the mind, even if we can 
provide good grounds for suggesting that they are different. What this 
means is that we cannot provide a convincing account of what these states 
are and what the relation between states of the mind and physical states 
might be, although we can deduce that differences exist between them. 
Causal explanations in science are necessary. Given the theory, the 
observed effects must follow. For example, we can deduce from the 
molecular composition of H2O certain properties or features, such as 
solidity or liquidity at a given temperature. However, no necessary 
connection exists between the physical body and the mind. No matter 
how much we know about the brain, we could never deduce from our 
understanding of it a single predicate of the mind.
The problem with a physicalist notion of consciousness is that not 
everything can be explained by this view of the mind–body relationship – 
every action of the mind cannot be explained fully by an identical 
movement in the brain. It is this missing knowledge that constitutes the 
core of consciousness. Consciousness under this conceptualisation is more 
than what we already know about the mind and the brain, and more than 
we can literally ever know. Nagel (1974) in his famous essay on bat 
consciousness asked the question: What is it like to be a bat? Even if we 
knew everything physical there is to know about a bat, it would still leave 
us in a state of ignorance about one key aspect of consciousness: what it is 
like to be a bat. Even if we used our imagination, we would still not 
understand the bat’s subjective or first-person point of view. If this 
is correct, then any physicalist theory (and there are many of them) is 
inherently flawed. Consciousness is thus too complicated to explain 
through the methods of physicalism or neurophysiology.144
144 A friend of mine recently remarked that neurophysiological approaches and methods held out 
the possibility of fully understanding how the brain works and thus for him how the mind works. 
My argument here, and it is long and complicated (it has taken up most of the book so far), would 
suggest that he may have a long time to wait, and even then, any answers that are given to this 
philosophical problem may prove to be unsatisfactory.
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Two issues are relevant here to learning. The first is that there is a 
real sense of intention behind every act of learning, and the second is that 
the missing ingredient in consciousness is this sense that each and every 
learning act is intentional and that this constitutes it as a conscious act. 
This is an essential part of the general theory that I am attempting to 




In this chapter I set out the general theory within which I am positioning 
the concept and practice of learning. Theory or theorising is a concept. 
Thus, in line with the argument that I have set out in this book so 
far, theory should be understood as an acquired disposition, so that as a 
concept it takes the form of theorising. Theory is not just a type 
of propositional knowledge, but an active, engaged and committed 
activity in the world. Again, as Wittgenstein proposed, in the first instance 
we should ‘call to mind the kinds of statement that we make about 
phenomena’ (Wittgenstein, 1953: §90, his italics). Any and every 
methodological approach that I adopt in this book points to the 
possibilities and, as importantly, limitations, of a word, word-set or 
linguistically structured concept, such as theorising(s), with the purpose 
of determining meaning.
There are different meanings that can be attached to and inhere in 
the word-object of theorising, and the list is long and varied.145 For 
example, Theory1 understands the concept of theorising as a set of 
tentative hypotheses about the relations between objects in the world and 
about the types of relations that inhere in a discursive configuration. 
Theory2 suggests that this concept might consist of a set of hypotheses 
about the past, present and future behaviour of a configuration, that is, 
whether this theory comprehensively applies to all of those cases that are 
relevant in the past, in the present and in the future; in other words, it 
refers to all of the possible cases that have been and could be. A third 
possible interpretation (Theory3) is that it is an account of a configuration 
of objects, which is underpinned by meta-theoretical constructs that can 
145 Theory also has a sense of incompleteness. It is used as a way of indicating that what is being 
proposed is tentative, needs to be corrected and is only a first attempt at explaining something. This 
is a common use.
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successfully be used in relation to past, present-past and future cases. 
Another possibility (Theory4) is that it is a set of truth-bearing propositions 
– the theory of truth that is subscribed to here is simpliciter coherentist 
or rationalist or empiricist or logical. And given that, in chapter 1, I argued 
that there needs to be some form of reconciliation between these 
judgemental criteria, a fifth possibility (Theory5) is that a theory is a set 
of abstract truth-bearing propositions that successfully fuses coherentist, 
rationalist, empiricist and logical criteria.146
In distinguishing between different semantic conceptualisations 
of theorising, I am engaging in a theoretical exercise – I am using a theory 
and I am theorising. And thus, I need to continue with my long list of 
possibilities that inhere in the concept. Theory6 is where a general sense 
can be given to a set of relationships between a series of propositions or to 
a logically connected system of general propositions, which allows us to 
say something about an activity, event or discursive object-configuration 
in the world. Theory7 is an explanation of a phenomenon, where this 
phenomenon presents itself in the world as an object, object-relation, 
object-configuration, person or set of persons. An example might be the 
referendum vote in 2016 in the UK and the intention here would be to 
theorise about its cause or causes and what factors might be included 
in the theory that one is trying to develop. Theory8 offers an original 
interpretation or reading of an aspect or aspects of the world and is located 
in and is about the past or the present-past (see chapter 20). Theory9 
has a different focus to Theory6, Theory7 and Theory8, in that it points to 
the making of an interpretation, a reading, an exegesis, a critique, or a 
hermeneutical reconstruction of a text produced by someone else, and this 
text or texts has a sense of being in the past or present-past. Theory10 is a 
Weltanschauung,147 or a unique worldview, held by a community in place 
and time. Heidegger’s (1962) notion of enframing has this meaning, as 
does the injunction that all events, empirical happenings and life workings 
are enframed in some way or another. This type of theory or theorising 
brings it closer to the sense that I have used in this book – that of meta-
theorising or using transcendental notions such as truth and knowledge.
Theory11 invokes the argument that a normative position underpins 
any and every aspect of the lifeworld and the way in which we can 
describe it. For example, history can be written from a Marxist 
146 In this book I have not proposed a means of combining these four criteria, although one method, 
employed by Haack (1993), is to reconfigure the various processes through elimination and 
reformation so that one criterion emerges, foundherentism.
147 From the German word-complex Welt or ‘world’ and Anschauung or ‘view’.
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perspective148 or from a feminist perspective,149 and both of these can be 
designated as theory. Four additional meanings can be given to the 
notion of a theory or what one is doing when one theorises, and these 
are essentially epistemological. The first of these (Theory12) is where 
the construct is abstract, discursive and meta-theoretical as opposed 
to empirical. The second (Theory13) is general as opposed to particular, 
so that the particular is not thought of as theoretical, whereas the 
general is. The third meaning (Theory14) that can be given is to contrast 
the contemplative with the practical – where once again the practical 
is not thought of as theoretical but the contemplative is. Finally, there 
is a functionalist sense (Theory15) where the exegetical is contrasted 
with the heuristic, and the former is designated as theoretical while the 
latter is non-theoretical. And there are many more.
Theory or theorising has a stratificational orientation and 
consequently it can refer to different strata of the lifeworld: the 
psychological level; the autobiographical level; the ordinary level of the 
lifeworld; the functional level at which we are concerned with roles 
such as capitalist and worker or shop owner and customer; the structural 
level; the mega level of whole traditions and civilisations; and finally the 
cosmological level where the person’s immediate concerns are with the 
planet as a whole.150 The question then becomes: which of these uses of 
the concept of theorising makes better sense in relation to the world as it 
is presently constituted? This general theory of objects and object-
relations is an attempt at answering this question. An initial step might be 
to examine two constructs that are generally thought of as theories, 
Maynard Keynes’ General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money and 
Albert Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity.
Keynes’ general theory
Maynard Keynes’ (1936) General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money suggests that in times of economic depression, governments 
should put in place measures to increase consumer demand and this will 
lead to enhanced economic growth.151 In times of economic expansion, 
however, governments should put in place measures to reduce or 
148 For example, Hobsbawm (1988).
149 For example, Pedersen (1993).
150 cf. Bhaskar (2011).
151 cf. Skidelsky (2013).
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stabilise demand and growth. Keynes believed that consumer demand 
and all that it is related to is the driving force of an economy in all 
and every socioeconomic set of circumstances – in the past, in the present-
past and in every circumstance that will occur but has not yet happened. 
This focus on consumer demand manifests itself in supporting an 
expansionary fiscal policy because government spending has an effect on: 
infrastructure (building and creating the means for socioeconomic 
expansion); on rates of unemployment (the fewer people out of work, the 
greater resource there is for other spending projects, and an expanded 
workforce in this set of circumstances contributes to economic growth); 
and on education (a better-educated and skilled workforce contributes 
to the possibility of further economic growth in the future). It may also 
lead to inflationary pressures, although as we can see from the current 
Covid-19 crisis and the UK government’s implementation of fiscal 
expansionary measures, circumstances may mean that inflation does 
not occur (for example, the low cost of oil, the reduced use of energy 
sources and reductions in the cost of raw materials).
What should concern us here is the future behaviour of a number of 
mechanisms (price ratios, consumer demand, imported costs of materials) 
in a particular set of circumstances. If the theory works and can be shown 
to work in every possible circumstance, then it is a general and not special 
theory. Keynes’ theory was developed in the 1930s after governments 
round the world failed to implement economic policies to end the Great 
Depression, and indeed the USA employed Keynesian economics to 
develop its New Deal programme; for example, the President, Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, as a response to the depression, increased the debt by 
$3 million and instituted programmes such as the Works Progress 
Administration to create 8.5 million jobs.
Government spending, even if it came from borrowing rather 
than taxation, was considered to be the most important factor in 
increasing aggregate demand and, in addition, it was an important 
spur to maintaining full employment. In contrast to classical theories of 
economics being propagated at this time, Keynesian economics argued 
for government spending on infrastructure and unemployment benefits, 
because the unemployed could have a role in increasing demand and 
thus contribute to the expansion of the economy, which would lead to 
more jobs. This was opposed to the idea that in times of depression, at the 
bottom of the business cycle, attention should be given to supporting 
business activity in the private sector, and that governments should play 
a limited role in the recovery and focus their efforts on companies rather 
than consumers.
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Classical economic theorists argued that government interference 
in the economy was counterproductive and that markets should be 
allowed to operate through the supply and demand mechanism, even in 
an economic downturn. Eventually the business cycle would revert back 
to conditions of boom and expansion. They argued for a large private 
sector, which should be allowed to own the mechanisms that lead to 
growth: entrepreneurship, capital goods, including capitalisation, natural 
resources and labour. The principle is that successful economic practices 
should be allowed to develop ways of working that maximise profits. 
Classical economics,152 in contrast to Keynesian economics, advocated a 
limited role for governments. Too much government spending restricts 
private investment, especially when the economy is doing well. 
Monetarists claim that monetary policy and not fiscal policy is the real 
expansionary driver of an economy, and that, anyway, trickle-down 
economics will in the end benefit everyone.
One of the components of the general theory is the Keynesian 
multiplier.153 This is a measure of how much demand is created through 
government spending. So, Keynes suggested that £1 of government 
spending creates £1 of increase in gross domestic product (GDP), a 
multiplier of 1, in times of depression. Because government spending is a 
component of GDP, it must have this impact, and perhaps more than this. 
Likewise, a cut in government spending has at least the possibility of 
resulting in a 1-to-1 reduction in GDP. The general theory described here 
then can be called general because it applies in all circumstances, 
including the world economic depression caused by the spread of the 
Covid-19 virus in the 2020s.
Einstein’s theory of relativity
In a similar fashion, Albert Einstein’s theory of relativity comprised both 
a special theory and a general theory, and this mirrors Keynes’ special 
theory of employment, interest and money, and his general theory.154 The 
difference between a general theory and a special theory is that the latter 
152 Adam Smith and David Ricardo are examples of classical economists.
153 At the time when Keynes proposed the multiplier, it was heavily criticised for its false sense of 
precision, and for other reasons.
154 Both Keynes and Einstein were criticised at the time of publication for not making the distinction 
between a special and a general theory clear enough; cf. Howard and Giovanelli (2019).
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can be applied only to a specific set of cases and circumstances, whereas 
a general theory can be applied to all of the possible cases that have 
already occurred, that are in the dimension of time that I am calling the 
present-past, and that, perhaps most significantly, have a bearing on the 
future. Special relativity is a theory or theoretical construct that attempts 
to explain how spacetime works. Einstein first developed it in his paper 
(originally published in 1905, republished in Einstein, 1923), ‘On the 
Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies’. There are two underlying postulates 
of this theory. The first is that the laws of physics, as laid down by Isaac 
Newton, are equivalent for everyone in any inertial frame of reference 
relative to each other; and the second is that the speed of light in the 
particular circumstance of a vacuum is equivalent for everyone, regardless 
of their relative motion or of the motion of the light source. What this 
means is that two events experienced by an observer may not be operating 
in the same timeframe for another observer if they are in different motion 
settings. In addition, objects are shortened in their direction in relation to 
someone who is observing them. Maximum speed is finite, and mass and 
energy are equivalent and transmutable.
Einstein’s general theory of relativity was developed between the 
years 1907 and 1915 and published in 1920 (reprinted in Einstein, 2010). 
An underlying principle is that states of accelerated motion and stasis in 
a gravitational field are in all respects the same. Free fall under this 
conception becomes equivalent to inertial motion, and things do not only 
fall because of gravity, as classical theories of physics and mechanics 
suggested they did. Einstein’s initial response to this and to his postulate 
in the special theory – this was in effect a correction to it – was to suggest 
that spacetime is curved. He developed this further to incorporate a 
relation between the curvature of spacetime and mass, energy and 
internal momentum. Some of the consequences of his general theory are 
gravitational time dilation, orbital precessions, rays of light bending in a 
gravitational field, rotating masses exerting a force on spacetime, and the 
metric expansion of space. Both the special theory and the general theory 
described here operate as epistemological constructs and not ontological 
ones, although there is a sense in which all epistemologies are a subset of 
ontology, because they have substance and are potentially causally 
efficacious. However, they exist outside of the physical universe and are 
attempts to make sense of it. In order to bring the discussion closer to my 
principal concerns in this book, I need to show how theorising is relevant 
to two important issues: causation and learning.
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A general theory of causation
Causality155 can be understood in the same way as employment, interest 
and money or relativity. As I discussed at length in chapter 4, in a 
generative-productive model (Theorya), causality is understood as a 
property of objects, and this has implications for how we should act, and 
whether it is possible and appropriate to use descriptions of current 
learning environments as a basis for predictions about future ones. 
Scientific empiricists and statistical positivists ordinarily subscribe to a 
Humean theory of causality as spatiotemporal contiguity, succession and 
constant conjunction (Theoryb), and this is founded on the idea that 
relations between events are associational and not directly causal, 
although the claim is then made that one can infer a causal relation from 
a persistent association.
Another theory of causality (Theoryc) is that there are only 
apparent regularities, and therefore what is understood as a causal 
relationship – a first event has led to a second event on every occasion 
on which they have interacted – is a product of chance. A more radical 
solution, then, is to argue that there are different types of causes 
(Theoryd) and they are different in kind because they operate in different 
ways; a person with a reason for doing something that also causes him 
to do it, such as painting the walls of the sitting room, is different from 
that person not being able to go outside his house because the door to the 
garden is locked. This type of causal sequence is different from a causal 
sequence (Theorya) in which an object with its potential powers and 
liabilities comes into contact with another object, which both triggers 
a change in these objects and creates a new object with new powers 
and liabilities.
A fifth theory is that the world is not random but is caused (Theorye) 
– the universe is a closed system of objects, and this includes the actions 
of individual human beings. These objects have causal powers that may 
or may not be activated, and, if they are activated, they behave 
mechanically, so that when an object comes into contact with another 
object, then a new object is formed, and this is what constitutes a causal 
sequence. It takes place regardless of whether it can be or is described or 
theorised about, and therefore notions of probability are not relevant at 
this level of explanation. The important point to note about this model is 
that human intentionality is ignored or peripheralised. One substance in 
155 My preferred version of causality works better in the social domain than in the physical domain.
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conjunction with another substance necessarily causes a new substance 
to be formed. This ineluctably implies determinism and necessity.
Theoryf is different, and is predicated on the idea that reasons 
can be and are causes; however, this needs to be qualified by the adoption 
of a further supposition, which is that reasons are not causes in the 
same way that events have antecedent conditions which necessarily have 
to be present for that event to take place. A final theory (Theoryg) is that 
events are caused but can only be known retrospectively. However, we can 
take this theory one stage further and suggest a generative/productive 
view of causation (back to Theorya). We can hypothesise a relationship 
and then try to work out what the mechanism might be – an object 
has causal powers to induce change in another object, these powers may 
or may not be exercised and, even if they are, there is no guarantee that 
change will occur in the object, and this means that we cannot safely 
predict how the dynamic object in the future will behave. This applies 
to learning, as a theory.
A general theory of learning
The concept of learning is potentially polysemic and can be understood 
only in relation to how it is used in the world. A key determination of the 
meaning of this concept is whether and in what way it relates to a meta-
theory, which invokes a relation between mind and world, and which has 
transcendental elements. Earlier I suggested that concepts cannot be fully 
determined with regards to their meaning in definitional and essentialising 
ways, but only in terms of how they are used in a way of life (see chapter 1). 
I then argued that a distinction could be made between knowledge 
of the world and meta-knowledge, which refers directly to knowledge of 
this world and not to the world itself. And further to this, all knowledge, 
including knowledge of learning, is in part constituted by criteria of 
excellence, whether these criteria are implicit or explicit.
As I argued in chapter 1, learning as a process has a set of pedagogic 
relations – it incorporates a relationship between a learner and 
a learning object. A theory of learning pivots on the idea that there is an 
entity called, for the sake of convenience, a human being, and this entity 
has a relationship (both inward and outward) with an environment. 
Knowledge and learning are homologous concepts. Knowledge is 
fundamental to the three types of learning that I have identified: 
cognitive, skill-based and embodied. Prior to each of these is a set of 
dispositions, without which cognitive, skill-based and embodied learning 
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would be unsustainable. Acting in the world requires the use of, and is 
underpinned by, conceptual frameworks of one type or another. 
Propositional knowledge or making a claim that this or that is the case is, 
in common with the other two forms of knowledge, a process of doing 
and thus of knowing how to do something or other. And this results in all 
of these types of knowledge having the same general form, which allows 
them, in this form, to be understood as learning actions or acts of learning.
This learning theory is underpinned by a number of axioms. The 
first of these is that there is a logical connection between the learning 
object and its pedagogic form, and thus its learning mode. Theoretical 
and contextual considerations impact, then, on how elements of teaching 
and learning are realised. Acknowledging this allows the identification of 
a number of learning models; for example, observation, coaching, goal-
clarification, peer-learning, trial and error, hypothesis-testing, reflection, 
meta-cognition and practice (see chapter 12 for a fuller explanation of 
these models). Choosing between these models depends on the nature 
and constitution of the learning object; in other words, the former is 
logically dependent on the latter. A second axiom is that boundaries and 
categories used at the discipline or domain level, temporary as they are, 
cannot be translated, without serious distortion, into organisational 
principles for the development of a learning programme. And a third 
axiom is that this work is enframed in epistemological, ontological and 
relational arrangements.
In this part of the book, I have focused on a number of important 
theoretical elements: what concepts are (see chapter 1), the relationship 
between knowledge and learning (see chapter 1), the possibility 
of universal knowledge (see chapter 2), excellence in a practice (see 
chapter 3), the nature of evidence (see chapter 4), epistemological and 
ontological concerns (see chapter 1), the role and place of values in 
our descriptions of the world and in the world itself (see chapter 5), the 
notion of difference (see chapter 6), different epistemic categories 
(see chapter 7), powerful practices (see chapter 8) and the possibility 
of consciousness (see chapter 9). In the second part of the book, my 
focus is learning as a concept and a practice.156
156 And, in addition, the relationship between concept and practice is an important consideration.
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Part two
Learning as a concept and  
as a practice
The second part of this book focuses on the concept and practice of 
learning. Anything and everything that I say here about the concept and 
practice of learning is ineluctably underpinned by the general theory set 
out in the first part of this book. To reiterate: this general theory is an 
account of discursive objects, material objects, relational objects, structural-
institutional-systemic objects and people (chapter 1), transcendental 
knowledge (chapter 2), judgements and criteria (chapter 3), objects and 
object-relations (chapter 4), ontic and epistemic values (chapter 5), 
difference (chapter 6), knowledge dualities (chapter 7), institutional and 
systemic power relations (chapter 8) and identity and consciousness 
(chapter 9). The book borrows ideas, insights and arguments from two 
seminal books by Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations (1953) 
and On Certainty (1969). His work provides the inspiration for the general 
theory that I set out in the first part of this book and summarise in chapter 
10, and his influence continues through this second part.
In this part I focus exclusively on learning in its two guises: as a 
concept and as a practice. These need to be analysed separately because 
they are different types of object, and what this also requires, then, is an 
explanation of how they are connected or how they can be connected at 
both ontological and epistemological levels. This key relation in the 
lifeworld is between the world itself and our knowledge of it. I start off by 
examining five important philosophies of learning: behaviourism, 
phenomenology, cognitivism, socioculturalism and socio-materialism 
(chapter 11). Theoretical and contextual considerations impact on how 
elements of teaching and learning are realised. Acknowledging this 
allows the construction of a number of learning models: observation, 
coaching, goal-clarification, peer-learning, trial and error, hypothesis-
testing, reflection, meta-cognition and repetition. And each of these in 
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turn is underpinned by a particular theory of learning. What this means 
is that any model of learning that is used in the world is constructed in 
relation to a particular view of how we can know the world and what it is. 
These models or learning sets give different emphases to the various 
elements of a learning process (chapter 12).
In chapters 13 and 14, I examine four important concepts that relate 
to learning: technology, artificial intelligence, literacy and numeracy, 
treating each of them in socially semiotic ways with regards to their 
meanings and their possibilities. A key dispute in the field of learning is 
whether learning is a concept and indeed whether a concept such as this 
is useful and meaningful. I suggest in chapter 15 that this is a false 
argument. In chapters 16 and 17, I examine two concepts that have 
a direct relationship with learning: progression and pedagogy, and 
this discussion allows me to develop the idea of a play-pedagogy. 
In chapter 18, I consider a particular theory of curriculum knowledge (cf. 
Young and Muller, 2007; 2010; Young, 2005). Despite its imperfections, 
it has been enormously influential. I suggest in this chapter that it is 
incorrect or at least imperfect in a philosophical sense. This leads on 
to the development of a history, archaeology and genealogy of learning 
and a discussion of some key episodes in these timeframes: learning 
processes relating to disengaged reasoning, curricularisation, scientism, 
atomisation, innatism, bureaucratisation, naturalism and representa- 
tionalism (chapter 19). I then focus on two of Kant’s157 universal categories 
as they relate to learning: time (chapter 20) and space (chapter 21).
I conclude the book with a brief discussion of doubting and certainty 
in knowledge, and consequently learning, and return to an examination 
of Wittgenstein’s ideas and philosophies (chapter 22). This book is a 
rejoinder to: empiricist and positivist conceptions of knowledge; 
detheorised and reductionist conceptualisations of learning; regressive 
and degenerative notions of curriculum; the propagation of simple 
messages about learning, knowledge, curriculum and assessment; the 
employment of punitive forms of power in the management of people; the 
use of bureaucratic power mechanisms in new public management 
strategies; and the denial that values are central to understanding how 
we live and how we should live, with this valuing going all the way down 
– into our descriptions of the world, into those attempts we make at 
creating better futures and into our relations with other people.
157 Kant (2007).
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Philosophies of learning
Five theories of learning are examined in this chapter: behaviourism, 
phenomenology, cognitivism, socioculturalism and socio-materialism. 
These can be construed as framings or enframings of the concept of 
learning; however, they are not equally coherent, relevant or epistemically 
correct. The representational problem is also present here, since it is the 
dominant metaphor in behaviourist, cognitivist and socio-materialist 
theories of learning. In the last of these cases, representationalism 
is explicitly repudiated – this is the central argument made in its 
development as a theory of learning. However, by denying the possibility 
of both an agent and a referent in the process, this in itself means that the 
type of relation that constitutes the connection between mind and world 
can never be properly examined and given expression to (as an activity in 
the world).
As I suggested in chapter 1, a philosophy of learning has a number 
of elements: an account of a person, including her capacities and 
affordances, and the environments within which she is situated; an 
account of the relationship between a person and her environments; 
knowledge about understanding, learning and change, with regards to 
the person and the environments in which she is located; inferences from 
these premises and conclusions about appropriate object-appearances, 
media for these representations and learning environments; and a set of 
practical actions that emanate from these claims. There are many such 
philosophies.158 I cannot examine all of them for reasons of space and 
158 Here are some more theories of learning: adult learning theory, algo-heuristic theory, anchored 
instruction, andragogy, aptitude-treatment interaction theory, attribution theory, cognitive 
dissonance theory, cognitive flexibility theory, cognitive load theory, component display theory, 
conditions of learning theory, connectionism, constructivist theory, contiguity theory, conversation 
theory, criterion referenced instruction, double loop learning, drive reduction theory, dual coding 
theory, elaboration theory, experiential learning, functional context theory, genetic epistemology, 
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time. So, as a proxy activity, I will provide brief accounts of the five 
most prominent ones: behaviourism, phenomenology, cognitivism, 
socioculturalism and socio-materialism. I need to do this because any 
act of learning, however insignificant and trivial it might seem to be, is 
enframed in various ways, and, in this chapter, I want to consider some of 
these enframings. At this stage in the argument that I am making in this 
book, I am unapologetically reintroducing the notion of correction, or at 
least the possibility of correction. The claim I am making therefore is that 
these five philosophies of learning are flawed (they do not meet the 
criteria I identified for determining truthful knowledge in chapters 1, 2 
and 3), sometimes in a partial sense and sometimes in their entirety. The 
first philosophy that I want to consider is behaviourism.
Behaviourism
Behaviourism is a philosophical theory that has been used within the 
discipline of education to provide an explanation for the play of social and 
educational objects in history. Behaviourists make three interrelated 
claims. The first is that if investigators are trying to understand the 
psychology of a particular human being, they should not be concerned 
with what is in this person’s mind but with how she behaves.159 The 
second claim is that human behaviours can be fully and comprehensively 
explained without recourse to any form of construct or event in the mind. 
The source of these behaviours is the environment and not the mind of 
the individual. And the third claim that behaviourists are likely to make, 
and which follows from the first two claims, is that if mind-specific terms 
are used as descriptors, then they should be replaced by behavioural 
terms, or, at least, those mind-dependent constructs should be translated 
into behavioural descriptors.
gestalt theory, general problem solver theory, information pickup theory, information processing 
theory, lateral thinking, levels of processing theory, mathematical learning theory, mathematical 
problem solving, minimalism, model-centred instruction and design layering, modes of learning, 
multiple intelligences theory, operant conditioning, originality theory, phenomenography, repair 
theory, script theory, sign theory, situated learning theory, social development theory, social 
learning theory, stimulus sampling theory, structural learning theory, structure of intellect theory, 
subsumption theory, symbol systems theory, triarchic theory and transformational learning. 
Some of these theories can be incorporated into the five overarching theories being considered in 
this chapter.
159 John Watson (1930: 11), one of the originators of behaviourism, wrote as follows in relation to 
the purposes of investigating human behaviour: ‘to predict, given the stimulus, what reaction will 
take place; or, given the reaction, state what the situation or stimulus is that has caused the reaction’.
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Behaviourism has its roots in British empiricism and in particular 
in the associational theory of David Hume.160 Observed or experimentally 
induced associations allow the investigator to uncover causal structures 
on the basis of processes of spatiotemporal contiguity, succession and 
constant conjunction. Learning is therefore understood as associational 
without recourse to states of or events in the mind, with an emphasis on 
the reinforcement histories of people. Any reference to experiences 
(especially if couched in the language of states of mind) should be 
replaced by observations of events in the environment; and references to 
thoughts, ideas or schemata should be replaced by references to overt 
observable behaviours and responses to stimuli.
Behaviourism as a theory of learning, then, suffers from a number 
of misconceptions. Because of its strictures against immaterial substances, 
and against agents endowed with the capacity to operate outside of 
embodied, socially derived or genetic causal impulses, it is now rarely 
thought of as a coherent or convincing theory of learning. A number of 
problems with it have been identified – perhaps the most important of 
these is the claim that a theory of human learning is flawed, in part or in 
its entirety, unless reference is made to non-behavioural states of mind. 
In particular, this refers to the way in which an individual represents the 
world, and how this is conditioned by institutional, systemic, embodied 
and discursive structures, stories, narratives, arguments and chronologies, 
and structures of agency.161 A second reason for rejecting behaviourism is 
the existence of internal or inner processing activities. We feel, intuit, 
experience and are aware of our own inner states in the learning process. 
To reduce these phenomenal qualities to behaviours or dispositions to 
behave is to ignore the immediacy and instantaneous nature of those 
processes that condition learning. Finally, it has been suggested that 
reducing learning to individual reinforcement histories162 is to develop an 
impoverished or incomplete theory, and consequently marginalise pre-
existing structures, developed schemata, complex inner lives, prior 
representations, and structural enablements and constraints that allow 
learning to take place.
Behaviourist frameworks have implications for learning. The 
argument is made that positive reinforcement leads to the replication 
160 As I suggested earlier, Hume’s theory of causation is associational and not generative- 
productive.
161 By structures of agency I mean those material, discursive, configurational, relational and human 
constraints and enablements that act to shape the agential possibilities for the individual and 
collectivities of individuals during their life course.
162 The obvious example of a theory such as this is operant conditioning theory (Skinner, 1953).
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of desired behaviours if the person comes to associate them with 
the receipt of rewards, such as merit marks or special privileges. 
Furthermore, knowledge is conceptualised in relation to the principles of 
behaviourism and as a result has a restricted content and form. Again, 
this has implications for the construction of learning programmes, 
curricula and learning environments, and indeed for wider issues such 
as identities, subjectivities and representational modes. Behaviourists 
use feedback – or in their terms, reinforcement – to modify behaviour. 
This is in contrast to cognitivists and sociocultural theorists who 
understand feedback as a guiding, supporting and strengthening 
mechanism to facilitate change within the conscious minds of learners.163 
The second of these educational philosophies that I want to consider 
is phenomenology.
Phenomenology
In contrast to behaviourist perspectives on learning, there are 
phenomenological approaches. Phenomenology is a meta-philosophy 
that focuses on the three key aspects of learning: the relationship of the 
individual to and with the world involving a process of change; the 
subsequent conception and activation of being in the world; and how our 
descriptions, words, schema and theories can provide us with some 
purchase on that world. The focus is on the givens of immediate 
experience, and phenomenology is an attempt to capture that experience 
as it is lived, both by the individual herself and the external observer. This 
knowledge-making activity is directed in the first instance to the things in 
themselves that are the objects of consciousness, and that try to find ‘a 
first opening’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1945) on the world, free of those 
presuppositions brought to any learning setting. This entails a learning 
methodology that foregrounds subjective experiences and understands 
them in their own terms, both linguistically and conceptually, while at the 
same time treating these two modes separately. This presupposes that the 
experience of others is accessible to us, even if with the greatest of 
difficulty. And this points to the break with behaviourism that 
phenomenologists generated. Whereas behaviourists are concerned 
above all with the behaviour of individuals and ignore the inner workings 
163 The issue of consciousness – what it is and how we can know what it is – is discussed in more 
detail in chapter 9.
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of the mind, phenomenologists understand consciousness as essential 
to any theory of learning.
This is consciousness as it is experienced from a particular person’s 
point of view. It is thus intentional or has intentionality – it is directed 
towards something such as an object in the world. It refers to how we 
experience objects in the world and the meanings things have in our 
experience, that is, the value of objects, the values given to objects in 
the world, the flow of time and evolving constructions of the self and 
events in the world; in short, the experiences we have in our lifeworlds. 
When we are conscious, we are conscious of something. For Edmund 
Husserl (1973),164 the concern was with the experiences we have, and 
these include those experiences as they are framed through particular 
concepts, thoughts, ideas, images, and so on. They are mediated. There 
are also enabling conditions of intentionality, such as our embodiment, 
our cultural context, our language and much more.
Being conscious is uniquely about experiencing things in the world, 
living through them and performing them; characterised as the three 
stages of learning, these are: accessing objects in the world, internalising 
those objects and then externalising them. The internalisation process 
includes processes such as evaluation, reflection, familiarisation, 
recategorisation and reformulation. There is a time component in that 
when we are angry or joyful, the intensity of the experience is such that 
the reflective elements are either downplayed or postponed. What this 
means is that these reflective processes can take place at different time 
moments during the learning sequence and in different ways; so, for 
example, a learning action can be performed at the site of sensation or at 
the site of internalisation.
Husserl (1913) drew a sharp distinction between noesis and noema. 
Noesis refers to the intentional element of consciousness; noema refers to 
what the intention is directed towards. Phenomenological analyses of our 
desires, intentional states and actions always involve a consciousness of 
or about something, usually an object in the world, with this being a 
semantic activity. Husserl advocated the method of epoché (bracketing 
out the natural world around us), with the intentional act of consciousness 
being conducted without reference to the object. Consequently, this 
becomes a highly artificial process. Martin Heidegger (1962) disagreed 
164 Edmund Husserl is sometimes cited as the founder of phenomenology. Regardless of whether he 
was or not, much of what he argued for has been criticised by philosophers such as Jean-Paul Sartre 
and Martin Heidegger, although both are sympathetic to some of his basic tenets, such as 
intentionality and volition.
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with this notion of bracketing out the world from our investigations, 
and in particular our investigations into the conceptual framing of that 
world, because being (Dasein) is always in the world and thus requires 
a methodology that takes account of this. He understood our relations 
with the world as being essentially practical, and certainly not enframed 
by a representationalist epistemology. Intentionality is a process of 
meaning-making and a typical act of consciousness is enframed, which 
means that it has a background of meaning – in place and time, political, 
social and epistemological. These various phenomenological perspectives 
have contributed to a distinctive theory of learning.
Phenomenological approaches, then, reconceptualise the pedagogic 
relationship so that learning is now understood as a responsible, 
precarious and uncertain relationship between the teacher and the 
learner, and fundamentally as an unplanned and personal existential 
experience. What this means is that phenomenologists support a different 
conception of pedagogic relations from those embedded in preformed 
curricula, standardised learning programmes and summative forms of 
assessment and control. Feedback mechanisms are understood as those 
mechanisms that are used to support pedagogical relationships and that 
allow the learner to uniquely realise her potential (although there are 
serious philosophical problems with this notion165 – see chapter 16), 
without specifying in advance, or throughout the process, what that 
potential is. Potentiality is a difficult notion to make sense of, and it has 
been used as the prime signifier in eugenic notions of education, 
intelligence and learning. The third philosophy is cognitivism.
Cognitive theories of knowledge
Cognitive theories of knowledge166 focus on structures and processes in 
the mind, and on internal representations of reality by the learner. 
165 Potentiality can be understood as an inbuilt and mind-dependent ceiling for certain human 
attributes. The example I have used in this book is intelligence, where some people have a greater 
capacity for performing in the world than other people, and this is either genetically endowed or 
socially determined. In the latter case, this capacity relates to what the individual has learnt so far 
in her life; in the former case, it relates to an inherited characteristic, which cannot be changed 
during the life course. Geneticists, eugenicists and the like have exploited this idea and, in addition, 
the idea itself is conceptually and empirically flawed.
166 Albert Bandura (1977), in his social cognitive theory of learning, identified three basic models 
of observational learning: i) a live model involving an actual individual demonstrating or acting out 
a behaviour; ii) a verbal instructional model involving descriptions and explanations of particular 
behaviours; iii) a symbolic model involving real or fictional characters displaying particular types of 
behaviours. This learning model has been extensively criticised by sociologists and philosophers 
alike, though it still has some credence among social psychologists.
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Knowledge therefore has both external and internal referents. The 
central issues that interest cognitivists are the internal mechanisms 
of human thought and the processes of knowing. They are concerned 
to find answers to questions such as what and how knowledge is stored, 
and how the integration and retrieval of information operates. Many 
of these ideas and assumptions (perhaps formally expressed, and in 
philosophical terms understood, as representationalist) can be traced 
back to the early decades of the twentieth century – for example, to the 
cognitive learning theory of Edward Tolman (1932)167 or Jean Piaget’s 
(1962) cognitive development theory.168 These theories of learning 
identify the basic mechanisms of learning in terms of stages, and the 
representation and storage of information.
Jean Piaget suggested that there are a number of interactive 
learning mechanisms located between the stimulus and the person. The 
first of these is accumulation; this is where there is little schematic 
formation in the individual (usually due to age) and learning consists 
of recall and applications in situations that are similar to those in which 
the knowledge was originally received. The second is assimilation; this 
is where a new element has to be addressed and made sense of by the 
individual, but this process is still essentially passive. The new elements 
are easily absorbed, indeed assimilated, into the existing schema of the 
individual. The third element is accommodation; this is where the new 
element does not and cannot fit the new schema and thus a process 
of transformation of both takes place, involving the original stimulus 
or object of learning and the schema that is attempting some form of 
accommodation with it. In Piaget’s terms, it has been internalised.
Piaget (1962) proposed that children and young learners progress 
through an invariant sequence of four stages: sensorimotor, pre-
operational, concrete operational and formal operational. Those stages 
reflect differences in children’s cognitive abilities. The learning process is 
therefore iterative, with new information being shaped to fit the learner’s 
existing knowledge, and existing knowledge itself being modified to 
accommodate the new information. Piaget’s theory has a variety of 
implications for learning and instruction, such as that the learning 
environment should support the activities of the learner. Learners 
acquire knowledge through their actions. As a result, a learning 
167 Tolman (1932) used experimental (animal-based) methods to determine understandings of 
human behaviours.
168 cf. Donaldson (1978) for a thorough and convincing critique of Piaget’s theories of child 
development. She provides a plethora of reasons for suggesting that there are errors in his approach 
and in helping children move beyond egocentric thought. 
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environment is created that encourages learners to initiate and complete 
their own activities. This is an active, discovery-oriented environment. 
Feedback is considered to be an essential requirement for the actions of 
the learner, and this relates fundamentally to future learning experiences. 
In addition, learners’ interactions with their peers are an important 
source of cognitive development – peer interactions are essential in 
helping children move beyond egocentric thought.169
Learners need to adopt instructional strategies that make them 
aware of conflicts and inconsistencies in their thinking; they must 
experience disequilibrium, or an imbalance between their current 
cognitive structures and the new information to be assimilated, in order 
to move to a new stage of development or to a state of equilibration. 
Content is not introduced until the learner is cognitively ready to receive 
it. As a result, the instructional design focuses on the development of a 
method to facilitate the process of organising schematic structures, and 
to make meaningful connections between what the learner already knows 
and the learning object. Feedback mechanisms in cognitivist terms are 
understood as corrective, with the expert or teacher engaged in providing 
information to the passive recipient. In contrast, facilitative feedback is 
more closely associated with a socio-constructivist viewpoint, where 
feedback is understood as a dialogic process that takes place within 
a learning environment to help learners gain new understandings, 
without determining what those understandings are. The fourth of these 
philosophies is constructivism.
Constructivist theories of learning
A particular iteration of sociocultural or constructivist theories is 
cultural-historical activity theory. That there is now a three-generation 
model of cultural-historical activity theory is part of its formation as an 
established theory. This and each generation of activity theory can be 
understood in two distinct ways. The first is in terms of its historical 
trajectory, so it is possible to understand Lev Vygotsky’s (1978) theory 
of mediation as a reaction against what it emerged from – it sought 
to replace the stimulus-response model of the behaviourists; or it can 
be understood as an attempt to frame the concept as a universalising 
category. Both of these explanations have meta-theoretical and thus 
universalising elements – insofar as the first requires a theory of history 
169 cf. McLeod (2018). 
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and the second requires a theory of social psychology – but these 
universalising elements are framed in different ways.
Lev Vygotsky (1993) inspired the first iteration of cultural-historical 
activity theory, and as its centrepiece positioned the well-known 
triangular model of subject, object and mediating artefact. When people 
engage in a learning activity (and in a sense this constitutes the principal 
activity of consciousness), they do so by interacting with the material 
world around them (although here the material world is embodied, 
structured and discursive). What they are doing is entering into a social 
practice, which is mediated by artefacts. This needs to be qualified in 
two ways: there cannot be an unmediated practice – so, for example, 
a discursive practice cannot be atheoretic – and as a consequence it is not 
possible to have direct access to the practice itself; indeed, it is difficult 
to understand the idea of a practice that is separate from the way it is 
mediated for us. Vygotsky (1978) therefore suggested that artefacts, such 
as physical tools, technologies or social norms, mediate relations between 
people and the environment. This in turn led him to a preoccupation with 
the notion of meaning and thus to the development of a notion of semiotic 
mediation, and in particular to a rejection of the behaviourist paradigm, 
which posits a passive object-to-subject relationship.
Learning can be seen as adaptive rather than transformative, and 
Vygotsky’s (1978) work has always been associated with the latter rather 
than the former. However, the notions of adaptation and transformation 
are complex. The idea of adaptation would suggest that what is learnt 
conforms to those sets of behaviours, norms and strategies that constitute 
the social world, and which are external to the learner. The learner enters 
into a state of equilibrium, so that what is inside the mind of the learner 
(this changes) is now synchronised with what is outside the mind of the 
learner (which has not undergone any change at all). On the other hand, 
a transformative approach would suggest that both the mind of the 
learner and the object in the environment have changed. What this 
implies is not that one theory is misguided and should be replaced by 
another – a better account of a practice – but that there is a need to build 
into the theory being developed the possibility that some learning is 
adaptive and some is transformative.
Four issues are of concern here. The first relates to whether meaning 
resides in the object itself or is created in conjunction with or through the 
interaction between subject and object. The second relates to the idealist 
tendencies in Vygotsky’s thought and the potential they have for 
misappropriation and misrepresentation. The third issue is that all of 
these mediating devices are expected to work in the same way, even 
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though they have different grammars and constitutions. And what follows 
from this, specifically in relation to learning, is that it is hard to believe 
that every interaction has an equal possibility of influencing and thus 
changing the zeitgeist or at least the learning environment. For Vygotsky 
(1978), the focus of his analysis was tool mediation and the activity 
system where these mediations occurred, rather than focusing on the 
individual per se. However, what is being suggested here is that this 
activity can be transformational both for the system (or learning 
environment) and for the individual, but not in every circumstance.
The second generation of cultural historical activity theory is 
usually, though not necessarily, associated with the development of the 
original theory by Alexei Leontiev (1978) and, in particular, with his 
elaboration of the concept of activity, with a distinction now being drawn 
between an action and an activity. An action is said to be motivated by the 
intention of the person – the person has an object or objective in mind; an 
activity is understood as undertaken by a community and thus has some 
of the characteristics of that community: a division of labour, various 
means of production and so forth. This still leaves many unanswered 
questions about both the mind–world relation and the way in which both 
of these and the relationship between them is transformed.
Five principles underpin the third iteration of cultural-historical 
activity theory (cf. Engeström, 2001). The first principle is that the 
activity system is central to the process of learning: with that activity 
system being collective, artefact-mediated, object-orientated and 
networked with other activity systems. This constitutes the primary focus 
of analysis. The second principle emphasises the way in which the activity 
system is stratified, historicised (traces of other human activity are 
present) and multiply layered. The third principle is that activity systems 
are in a state of constant flux and thus are transformed as they are shaped. 
The fourth principle is that a notion of contradiction is central to the 
transformation of the activity system. These contradictions are both 
internal and external to the activity system under examination. The fifth 
principle suggests that activity systems move through long cycles of 
change, as the internal and external contradictions lead to and indeed 
cause individual and collective changes.170
170 For Engeström, contradiction is at the heart of the transformation of the activity system. These 
contradictions are both internal and external to the activity system being examined, and, as Engeström 
(2001: 137) reminds us, they are ‘not the same as problems or conflicts. Contradictions are historically 
accumulating structural tensions within and between activity systems … Activities are open systems. 
When an activity system adopts a new element from the outside … it often leads to an aggravated 
secondary contradiction where some old element … collides with the new one. Such contradictions 
generate disturbances and conflicts, but also innovative attempts to change the activity.’
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Vygotsky’s central arguments about development and instruction 
have a number of implications. Cognitive development is better 
achieved through the use of dialogic pedagogies, in which the learner 
develops her ideas and understandings in discussion with her teachers 
and peers. This means that learning progresses better when the learning 
objects are scaffolded by a learning expert or at least by someone with 
more experience of the learning object and the learning process than 
the learner. In addition, learners need to be given tasks that are focused 
on what is developing within their minds rather than in relation to 
knowledge already developed, and they need to develop conscious 
mastery of the learning objects rather than reciting facts that may have 
little meaning for them. The development of principled knowledge is not 
subject-specific, but involves general principles of learning, such as that 
it is important not to teach something until the learner is able and ready 
to make sense of it. Programmes for learners should not be limited 
or constrained by the use of diagnostic or summative forms of assessment 
or by learning environments that do not allow help and support from 
teachers, parents and other students. The knowledge framework that 
structures the learning experience is understood as propositional, skill-
based, embodied and dispositional, and is socially conceived both in 
origin and in individual development. As a result, arrangements within 
the learning environment need to be made that allow collaboration, 
collaborative learning, flexible learning and meta-forms of learning. This 
pedagogy involves a rejection of strong insulations between different 
types of students and is in opposition to essentialist notions of intelligence 
and ability. In addition, feedback mechanisms from a socio-constructivist 
viewpoint are understood as facilitative, with feedback seen as a process 
that takes place within a learning context involving a dialogue between 
the teacher and the learner to help the learner gain new understandings. 
We also need to consider post-human, actor-network and complexity 
philosophies of learning.
Post-human, actor-network and complexity  
theories of learning
What distinguishes a complexity theory of learning from conventional 
theories is the different focuses of researchers and investigators, so that 
it is now the flows and relations between objects rather than the 
objects themselves that are the focus of attention. Society is characterised 
by notions of continuous emergence, flux and change, which though 
non-predictive, can be adequately captured in language. Objects in the 
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world cannot be characterised by their essential qualities, but only 
through their interactions with other objects. Complexity resides in all 
of these various interactions that produce new objects (characterised 
as different forms of structure), which results in complicated arrangements 
of material and human objects and object-relations, and, because they 
are difficult to characterise, rarely allow definitive accounts of what is 
going on to be produced. It is the complexity of these object-interactions 
and their subsequent and temporary coalescences that makes it 
difficult to provide complete descriptions of them. The epistemic level is 
unsynchronised with the ontological level because researchers and 
investigators have not sufficiently developed their instruments and 
conceptual schema for capturing something that is both ever-changing 
and has too many elements to it – it is too complex. However, this does 
not categorically rule out the possibility of providing more complete 
descriptions of events, structures, mechanisms and their relations in 
the world, and this suggests a notion of human fallibility that means 
our actions (which correspond to learning episodes) are corrigible. The 
twin elements of complexity and temporal emergence (where systemic 
formations are understood as not incommensurable) do not rule out 
correct descriptions being made of activities in the world, only that these 
elements can create considerable difficulties.
Many of these theorists go further than this and hold to a version 
of emergence in which there is a radical incommensurability between 
different formations over time (whether material, embodied or 
discursive). Furthermore, it is impossible to predict what interconnections, 
new formations and iterations of the object-system will be realised 
because the principles of the new mechanism are not given in the current 
arrangements. In other words, the relations between objects, and the 
objects that make up activity systems, are not patterned in any meaningful 
sense – there is a radical incommensurability between these different 
iterations. What this also suggests is that any attempt to describe even the 
basic outline of the system and the way it works is incompatible with this 
idea of radical incommensurability.
It is possible to focus on the formations, but not on the way they 
were formed. This operates at the ontological level. Although one 
formation, it is acknowledged, has emerged from a concatenation of 
others (prior to it in time), this process cannot be codified or captured 
symbolically (using words, numbers or pictures) except by using words 
such as ‘chance’, ‘non-linearity’ or ‘non-predictability’. However, each of 
these is contested conceptually. Because something is non-predictable 
at the time it operates does not mean that it cannot be described after 
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it has happened – a post-hoc theorisation of the object or arrangement. 
Non-linearity implies that the sequence of events has not followed 
the accepted pattern whether this has been deduced from previous 
occurrences or from logical and normative investigations. Chance, by 
virtue of what it is, precludes a causal explanation of it.
Actor-network theorists171 (Latour, 1991, for example) argue for a 
symmetricality of human and non-human elements, which means that at 
the level of analysis they should be treated in the same way. This has the 
effect of marginalising the hermeneutic dimension of learning and fits 
better with a structuralist or materialist ontology. The intention is to 
understand history not as the outcomes of originary actions by individuals 
or collectivities of individuals, but as sets of material objects (human 
and non-human) coalescing and working together. It is the networks, 
confluences and collective action-sets that produce the conditions of 
action. What follows from this is that the contents of these networks and 
the inevitability of flux and change as essential elements are likely to 
mean that our descriptions of them are incomplete and fragmentary. 
However, what applies to the networks and assemblages themselves 
and to the relations between them also applies to the meta-theory itself. 
Thus notions of symmetry, translation, problematisation, interessement, 
immutable mobility, delegation, multiple-perspectivism and actor-
networking (all terms used by Bruno Latour, 1991; Michael Callon, 1991; 
and John Law and John Hassard, 1999) should be understood as 
incomplete and undeveloped as the theorist tries to plot what is happening 
and what has happened.
Actor-network theorising cannot, then, amount to an argument in 
favour of social patterning or systemic predictability. Actor-network 
theorists have argued against treating those traditional educational 
constructs and forms – such as curriculum, learning, leadership, 
management, and standards – as stable, expressing their opposition to 
the conventional understandings of these terms by pointing to the 
emergent and unstable ontology of material, discursive and human 
171 Fenwick and Edwards (2010: 9) suggest that: ‘Actor Network Theory’s (ANT) unique contribution 
is first, to focus on the individual nodes holding these networks together, examining how these 
connections came about and what sustains them. These include negotiations, forces, resistances and 
exclusions, which are at play in these micro-interactions that eventually forge links. Second … Actor 
Network Theory (ANT) accepts nothing as given, including ‘humanity’, ‘the social’, ‘subjectivity’, 
‘mind’, ‘the local’, ‘structures’ and other categories common in educational analyses. What we 
usually take to be unitary objects with properties are understood as assemblages, built of 
heterogeneous human and non-human things, connected and mobilised to act together through a 
great deal of ongoing work.’
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objects, and the need to move away from prioritising intentionality and 
therefore human agency over other objects in the world. This creates a 
particular aporia in the theory of actor-networking, for which the notion 
of the actant is barely able to compensate. By disprivileging the agential 
and giving it equal status to other objects, actor-network theorists are 
making a point about what happens in the world. They are implicitly if not 
explicitly arguing not just that as theorists they should foreground 
something other than human agency – the relations between different 
networks of human and non-human material objects – but that this allows 
a better purchase on the world than theories that privilege an essentialised 
version of the human being and their relations. What actor-network 
theory essentially does is dissolve the boundary between material and 
human objects; to, in a sense, argue that there are no real differences 
between them, with the effect of discounting ideas of distinctively human 
characteristics, such as intentions and the capacity to operate in the space 
of reasons.
This sense of agency, structured in different spatial and temporal 
ways, allows and conditions the various acts of learning. In characterising 
the field, I have been concerned with epistemic differences between the 
principal theories of learning, and therefore inevitably with the strength, 
probative force and attached value given to those relations and entities. 
This is the way the field is constructed. There are two implications of this. 
The first is that because the field has been constructed in a particular way, 
this does not then preclude choices being made between these different 
theories. And second, these choices are underpinned by a particular 
theory of knowledge, which also has implications for the development of 
a theory of learning in which knowledge plays an important part. My 
attention now shifts to how learners learn, what the role of learning 
environments might be and how what is intended determines how it 
should be learnt. In the next chapter I pursue these strands of the 
argument – the task as it has been throughout is to examine the boundaries 
between different objects and different object-formations in the world.
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Learning theories and models
Theoretical and contextual considerations impact, then, on how elements 
of teaching and learning are realised. Acknowledging this allows the 
realisation of a number of learning models: observation, coaching, goal-
clarification, peer-learning, trial and error, hypothesis-testing, reflection, 
meta-cognition and practice. And each of these in turn is underpinned 
by a particular theory of learning. What this means is that any model 
of learning that is employed is constructed in relation to particular views 
of how we can know the world and what it is. These models or learning 
sets and their properties give different emphases to the various elements 
of a learning process.
A first type is an observational model (cf. Bandura, 1977). There are 
three types of teacher-led stimuli: acting out the behaviours to be learnt; 
describing and explaining a set of behaviours; and offering up a set of 
scenarios and expressive performances. The learning process consists 
of the following: observing a performance by the teacher; comparing 
this performance with an embodied form of that display already held by 
the learner; adjusting what they currently have through modification 
or substitution; practising while being supported within the artificial 
environment; practising without support within the artificial environment; 
transferring the skill to the real environment while being supported; and 
consolidating without support through using it in this real environment. 
This model is underpinned by a cognitivist theory of learning.172
A second type is a coaching model. Here the focus is on a series of 
steps: modelling by the expert, coaching while the learner practices, 
172 Bandura (1977: 43) suggested the following about learning by observation: ‘Most human 
behaviour is learned observationally through modelling: from observing others, one forms an idea 
of how new behaviours are performed, and on later occasions this coded information serves as a 
guide for action.’
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scaffolding where the learner is supported during the initial stages, 
with that support gradually being withdrawn as the learner becomes 
more proficient (coaching here involves the teacher in identifying 
deviations from the model in the performance of the learner, and then 
supporting the learner as he makes attempts to correct his mistakes), 
articulation by the learner of that process, reflecting on those processes 
by comparing them with the expert’s reasons for action, and exploration 
where the learner undertakes the various activities without support. 
Coaching can be understood as a one-to-one activity, or as a collective 
exercise within a community of practice. This model better fits a 
sociocultural theory of learning.173
A third model involves the teacher clarifying and sharing learning 
intentions and criteria for success with the learner over a period of time. 
To this end, teachers provide learners with explicit statements and 
explanations about the instructional objectives in a lesson or series of 
lessons. Goal clarity has three elements: explanations about how learners 
are expected to undertake the tasks assigned to them; opportunities for 
them to grasp what is expected of them; and reflections about their 
capacity as self-directed learners in the completion of the tasks.174
A fourth model of learning is peer-learning. Here an assumption is 
made that the learning relationship is between equals. Examples of this 
type of learning include: being offered emotional support if learning 
proves to be difficult; confrontational exchanges between learners so that 
173 Muijs and Reynolds (2011: 80) suggest that: ‘Coaching is a process of motivating learners, 
analysing their performance, and providing feedback on their performance. Great teachers help the 
pupils while they are solving problems independently or in a group, which will motivate and 
support them. One form of coaching is called cognitive coaching. Cognitive coaching is designed to 
make pupils more aware of their own thinking processes, which will help them to be more reflective 
about their learning. This will build up their problem-solving skills, by giving them tools they can 
use in a variety of situations. This type of coaching helps pupils think about the way they are solving 
problems. It involves them in self-reflection, internalising and generalising.’
174 Again Muijs and Reynolds (2011: 39) explain one of the principles behind goal clarification, 
without seemingly being aware of its technicist orientation: ‘The lesson should have a clear 
structure, so pupils can easily understand the content of the lesson and how it relates to what they 
already know. Many researchers recommend starting the lesson with a review and practice of what 
was learnt during the previous lesson, for example by going over homework, as this will allow the 
teacher to find out to what extent pupils have grasped the content of the previous lessons, and 
therefore to what extent this content will need to be retaught. The objectives of the lesson should 
be made clear to pupils from the outset … During the lesson, the teacher needs to emphasise the 
key points of the lesson, which may otherwise get lost in the whole. A certain amount of repetition 
will certainly do no harm here. At the end of the lesson, the main points should once again be 
summarised, either by the teacher or, preferably, by the pupils themselves, such as through asking 
them what they have learnt during the lesson. Subparts of the lesson can usefully be summarised in 
the same way during the course of the lesson … This emphasis on explaining the goals of the lesson 
– not just what was to be done during the lesson, but how that related to what pupils could learn 
longer term – was found to be typical of effective teachers …’.
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each individual can test his theories, ideas and constructs against 
those held by other learners engaging in the same type of learning; 
cooperation between two learners of roughly equal standing, so that in a 
problem-solving exercise, better solutions are forthcoming because 
there are two problem-solvers rather than one; non-expert tutoring 
between equals, which has the advantage of each person being able 
to make his own evaluation of the advice being offered unencumbered 
by status or hierarchy; and the joint production of a script, artefact, 
performance or text so that alternative and new interpretations/readings 
can be made.175
A fifth model is trial and error. Here, the learner makes repeated 
attempts to solve particular problems, with these solutions being tested 
in real-life situations. If these solutions prove to be deficient, then the 
learner tries out different solutions until he is satisfied that he has found 
the correct one. In adopting a trial-and-error approach, the learner is 
required to engage in a series of interrogative processes with regards to 
texts, people and objects in the environment, and come up with solutions 
to problems.
Hypothesis-testing is a form of learning in which the learner 
develops an idea of how something in the world works and then does 
something in the world with the express intention of confirming, 
disconfirming or partly confirming the original idea. This starts with 
some tentative view about how an aspect of the world works and could 
work in the future. A method is then chosen to verify the truth or 
otherwise of this conjecture. The method is then applied, and some 
conclusions are drawn. The important principle that has to be observed is 
that the method chosen is an appropriate way of testing the actual theory 
being investigated. In many cases, especially in some tests of statistical 
significance, this principle is misapplied.176
Another model of learning is reflection. There are perhaps three 
types of reflective practice: intensive action reflection, which is understood 
as tacit, implicit and occurring on a daily basis, where individuals use 
intuitive tacit knowledge to inform practice (reflection-in-action); 
reactive or reflective learning (knowledge of action) involving immediate 
reactive reflection on events that have already taken place; and 
deliberative reflection (knowledge for action) involving the conscious 
management of thoughts and activity and the deliberate setting aside of 
175 cf. Topping (2001a; 2001b; 2003) and Topping and Ehly (1998).
176 This form of learning is discussed in greater detail in chapter 17.
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time to ensure that judgements are based on a deep understanding of 
a particular issue (see chapter 17).177
Meta-cognitive learning refers to learners’ awareness of their own 
knowledge and their ability to understand, control and manipulate their 
own cognitive processes. Most meta-cognitive processes have three 
elements. The first is meta-memorisation. This refers to the learners’ 
awareness of their own memory systems and their ability to deploy 
strategies for using their memories effectively. The second is meta-
comprehension. This refers to the learners’ ability to monitor the degree 
to which they understand the information being communicated to them, 
to recognise their failures to understand what they are being presented 
with, and to employ repair strategies. And the third is self-regulation. 
This refers to the learners’ ability to make adjustments to their own 
learning processes. The concept of self-regulation overlaps with meta-
memorisation and meta-comprehension – its focus is on the capacity 
of the learners to monitor their learning (without external stimuli or 
persuasion) and to act independently. These regulatory processes may be 
highly automated, making articulation of them difficult for the learners.178
Finally, there is practice and repetition. Practice is the act of 
rehearsing a behaviour over and over again or engaging in an activity 
again and again. This reinforces, enhances and deepens the learning 
associated with the behaviour or activity. Choosing between these models 
depends on the nature and constitution of the learning object – the former 
is logically dependent on the latter. (For a fuller explanation of, and 
justification for, this important claim, see chapter 19.) It also depends 
on the choice of learning theory that is made. These learning models 
have an important role to play (whichever one is chosen) in processes 
of learning and constitute elements of a pedagogic process. We also 
need to examine the relationship between two of the most important 
concepts discussed in this book: knowledge and learning.
Knowledge and learning
Knowledge is transformed at the pedagogic site, so it is possible to 
suggest that properties such as the simulation of the learning object, the 
representational mode of the object, its degree and type of amplification, 
177 David Kolb (1984) extended his theory of reflection to encompass different types of reflectors. 
These were: accommodators, divergers, convergers and assimilators.
178 cf. Butler (2015).
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control in the pedagogic relationship, progression or its relations 
with other learning objects, the type of pedagogic text, relations with 
other people in the learning process, the organisation of time (temporal 
relations) and types of feedback mechanism are fundamental components 
of this pedagogic transformation. What this means is that in the learning 
process the learning object takes a new form as a result of changes 
to its properties. In contrast to some other frameworks – for instance, 
Bernstein’s sociolinguistic code theory (2002) or Maton’s (2014) 
knowledge and knowers thesis – the sheer complexity of the possible 
pedagogic knowledge forms that this allows means that relations 
between pedagogic arrangements and social arrangements, and between 
these pedagogic arrangements and notions of identity-formation and 
social positioning, can be sketched out only tentatively.
The first of these properties is the degree and type of simulation. 
In a simulation, a new medium is chosen that gives the learning object 
a new form, with these media being virtual, graphic, enumerative, 
enactive, symbolic and oral. Indeed, depending on the new form, there is 
a gap between the formation of the original object and the mediated 
object. This does not mean that the object is better or less well represented 
in its new form, only that it takes on a new guise – it is pedagogically 
formed. And this means that its potential impact is likely to be different. 
A simulation might involve, for practical purposes, a virtual representation 
of something in nature that cannot be experienced by the learner. 
Inevitably, the properties of the object and the relations between those 
properties are changed in the simulation; and what this means is that 
any reaction or response to the object by a learner is influenced by its 
new media as well as the shape and form it now assumes. The response is 
always to the mediated object. And the implication of this is that the 
pedagogical relation between the learner and the world is never direct but 
is realised through the mediated object, with the process of knowing the 
unmediated object having a retroductive orientation, although this may 
be understood in a different way by the learner.
A second property is the type of truth criterion that the knowledge 
constructor adopts. As I suggested in chapter 1, there are five conceptions 
of truth: truth as correspondence, truth as coherence, truth as what 
works, truth as consensus and truth as warranted belief. This property 
refers to a determination of the relationship between knowledge and the 
world, although it should never be assumed that this relationship is 
straightforward, linear or easily understood.
A third property, which is subject to transformation during the 
learning process, is amplification. Amplification is a central term in the 
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field of rhetoric, and stands for all the ways in which an argument, 
explanation or description can be expanded and enriched. In addition, 
amplification refers to the capacity of the pedagogic object to increase 
in size, in extent, or in effect, as by the addition of extra material. The 
use of a microscope in a science laboratory, or the use of the internet to 
extend the reach of the learning object, or the taking of a deliberate 
and alternative position from the accepted norm for the sake of debate 
or to further the argument but always to deepen the learning process, are 
typical examples of amplification.
A fourth property is control in the pedagogic relationship. Framing 
refers to the message system of pedagogy. Do teachers and pupils control 
its content, its organisation, how it is sequenced and so on? A syllabus 
with rigid topics, to be completed in a predetermined order, within a 
specified time, is strongly framed. Weak framing occurs when the teacher 
is able to select topics on the basis of a rational principle and organise the 
sequence and pacing of material according to pupil readiness. Two control 
pathways can be identified. The first refers to the relationship between 
the teacher and the learner and the curriculum organisers of knowledge 
(these organising processes may be formal or informal), so that a teacher 
or facilitator of the message system has either a restricted or extended 
control over the way it is received in the pedagogic setting. The second 
refers to the relationship between the teacher and learner, and again this 
refers to the amount of control either one or the other has over the 
constitution of the message that is central to the pedagogic or learning 
process. Clearly, in this last case, the one varies in relation to the other.
A fifth property is curriculum integration or the types of relations 
between learning objects. Progression is one manifestation of these 
relations. Curriculum standards, or learning objects, are written at 
different levels of difficulty. Most forms of progression between levels or 
grades in curricula around the world are based on a notion of extension, 
that is, at level one a student should be able to do this or that, at level 
two the student is expected to be able to do more of this or that, and at 
level three the student is expected to be able to do even more of this or 
that. However, there are other forms of progression between designated 
knowledge sets, skills and dispositions besides extension, such as prior 
condition, maturation, intensification, abstraction and articulation. 
Indeed, some knowledge sets, skills and dispositions cannot be 
appropriately placed at some lower-level or even some higher-level 
grades. For example, many governments around the world have chosen 
not to start formal reading processes until at least seven years of age, and 
consequently reading does not feature in the curriculum standards at 
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pre-primary levels in these countries. (For a more detailed discussion 
of the notion of progression, see chapter 16.)
A sixth property is the constitution of the task given to the learner 
in the pedagogic setting. There are a range of learning tasks or activities 
that take place in classrooms, such as: working with other people, 
individual study, sharing, debating, playing games and so forth. Learning 
tasks have a number of constituent elements, and how they differ in 
kind allows us to determine and identify these different elements: 
media of expression, the logic of this mediated expression, its fit with a 
learning model, its assessment mode and its relation to real-life settings. 
Media of expression include oral, graphic, pictorial and enumerative 
modes. Each of these media has an encompassing logic to it, so that a task 
requiring a written response to a request is of a different order as a 
learning experience from one that requires an oral response. A further 
component of a pedagogic task or activity is the mode of assessment that 
inheres in it, with these modes of assessment being understood broadly 
as formative or summative. Finally, there is the authenticity of the task, 
which refers to whether and how the task relates to real-life settings.
The activity or learning task has a logical relationship with the 
learning model being employed. Frequently there is a mismatch between 
them so that the task or activity (such as an oral response to a question, a 
written analysis of a text, a reading exercise, an argumentative response, 
a feedback loop and so forth) and the type of learning model that is being 
adopted are incompatible. For example, a meta-cognitive exercise that is 
focused on propositional knowledge rather than process knowledge 
would be inappropriate. A dialogic peer-learning exercise that asked each 
participant to grade other participants’ work on a five-point scale again 
would be inconsonant. Feedback that failed to engage the learner in a 
conversation would not work.
Questioning, for example, sets up a choice situation between a 
finite range of possible answers. The type of answer that can be given 
legitimately has to be implicit in the grammar of the question, both in its 
form and content. For example, open-ended questions offer an extensive 
range of answers; that is, the restricting and enabling quality in the 
question is weakly formulated. What this means is that there is a greater 
range of possible answers to the problem. This has to be qualified in 
the sense that some questions, by virtue of their propositional content, 
have a greater facility for generating appropriate answers, whereas other 
questions have fewer possibilities for generating appropriate answers. 
However, this does not nullify the original proposition, which is that the 
form a question takes restricts or enables the type of correct answer that 
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is appropriate. The reason for designating both an enabling and restricting 
function is to indicate that any action performed by an individual is 
located in discursive and material contexts and that these contexts exert 
an influence on the action itself.
A seventh property is the relationship between the learner and 
other people in the pedagogic setting. One way of characterising the 
relationship between the text, object in nature, particular array of 
resources, artefact, allocation of a role or function to a person, or sensory 
object and the learner is by determining its strength along a continuum 
ranging from a diffuse mode to a concentrated mode. What this means is 
that the message being conveyed is embedded in a relationship between 
a stimulus and a recipient, which is either diffuse or concentrated, or 
could be placed on a continuum between them. An example of a diffuse 
strategy is an instructional mode of learning where the stimulus is being 
shared by a number of people. An example of a concentrated strategy is a 
one-to-one coaching relationship. Since the relationship is both from the 
catalyst to the learner or learners and also from the learner or learners 
to the catalyst, this is going to influence the type of message received 
by the learner. We model the world as a sequence of messages passing 
from one to the other. The stimulus is clearly of a certain type. These are 
message conveyance systems or processes of semiotic transmission that 
operate with a particular stimulus.
Learning is always embedded in temporal arrangements of one type 
or another. (For a more detailed discussion of the notion of time and 
learning see chapter 20.) A curriculum is an arrangement of time given 
to different items of knowledge, so any learning episode is going to be 
embedded in these arrangements. For example, pace of learning is 
important; that is, the pace at which a student works in completing a 
learning activity, or the pace at which he is expected to work against 
some norm – in other words, the average or mean of a population. Pace 
can be understood as a performative construct, so it is not meant to 
provide an empirical description of how a person has performed but is 
designed to act as a stimulus to increase the pace of learning for the 
general population – it thus has an explicit normative function. That 
there are eight properties of the learning environment means that 
there is potentially an extensive range of possible environments as there 
is considerable variation within each dimension. In the next chapter, 
I want to examine three key educational concepts: technology, artificial 
intelligence and the concept of learning as it relates to these two ideas.
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Technology, artificial intelligence  
and learning
The first of these concepts is technology. In the last chapter I suggested 
that knowledge, in what could be called its originary state, is transformed 
at the pedagogic site. The simulation of the learning object, the repre- 
sentational mode of the object, its degree and type of amplification, 
control in the pedagogic relationship, its progression or its relations 
with other learning objects, the type of pedagogic text, relations with 
other people in the learning process, temporal relations and types of 
feedback mechanism are all fundamental components of this pedagogic 
transformation. Technology is a part of that learning environment. It 
can be understood in two principal ways: as an object-artefact and as 
a discursive configuration.
It is possible to argue that artificial intelligence in the guise of a 
computer, robot, machine, mechanical algorithmic accessory, electronic 
device set up for the purposes of storing and processing binary data, 
abacus, Turing-like device, electronic brain or sense enhancer, as in sight 
or sound extension, allows certain activities to be performed in more 
efficient or more timely ways than if those activities had been performed 
by human beings without these devices. If we take the game of tennis, for 
example, it is possible for us to have more confidence in a line judgement 
performed by a camera linked to a set of enhancement devices than in a 
judgement made by a human being, however capable she is, sitting in the 
umpire’s chair.179 Again, if we take a large database and our intention is 
to find common patterns within it, then a computerised device can do this 
more quickly than a human being, although this can be done only if all of 
the elements of this complicated operation are reduced to mechanisms 
179 Another example might be the video assistant referee (VAR) system in football.
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that conform to algorithmic procedures.180 A further set of technological 
devices comprises different kinds of artificial intelligence, where this 
is understood as an inanimate object having the capacity to trigger 
a limited number of operations without recourse to human intervention. 
These operations range from the relatively simple (for example, some 
video games, such as electronic chess) to the moderately sophisticated 
(for instance, lane assist or collision avoidance as options for cars on a 
motorway) to the highly sophisticated (as in an iterative learning system 
embedded within a robot, providing medicalised care and monitoring to 
help an older person cope alone at home). These, I would have thought, 
are uncontentious claims: that certain operations can be performed more 
efficiently by machines than by human beings.
Artificial intelligence can currently replicate, and indeed make more 
functionally efficient, a limited range of human capacities and processes. 
These include: supervised learning, analysing and storing large amounts 
of data, hyperlinking to other sources and some forms of self-repair. 
Currently, the impact of artificial intelligence is limited to data being 
inputted at one moment in time and producing a simple response at 
a second moment in time. Examples of this include: human facial 
recognition;181 collecting and using biometric data; tracing individual 
histories of consumer use and targeting this information; transcribing 
spoken to written text; translating from one language to another; and 
the use of sensors in equipment such as hard disks or plane engines 
to determine functionality. These cause-and-effect systems are what we 
mean by supervised learning, and it seems reasonable to suggest that 
human intelligence does far more than this at present. Indeed, these deep 
neural networks are expanding their reach, such as in the creation of 
technology-saturated classrooms. What these supervised learning 
processes require, however, are large amounts of data. For example, a 
photo tagger in a passport control process requires anywhere between 
hundreds and millions of pictures as well as appropriate labels or tags 
attached to them. Building a language translation system requires the use 
of a large vocabulary store and grammatical system in both languages, 
plus recognition software to bridge the gap between them. In addition, 
artificial intelligence can act to enhance human functions and senses; for 
180 As with all knowledge-producing technologies, we should be aware of their propensity for 
changing the type of knowledge being developed and not just their capacity for making a process 
more efficient. In cricket, football and tennis, these technologies are changing the way in which 
these games are and can be played.
181 As with all of these technologies, there are always ethical and social consequences to their use.
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example, with sight as in a telescope, with hearing as in a loud speaker, 
with taste as in taste-enhancer molecules, with touch as in a synaptics 
touchpad driver, with access to data as in a data analysis function on 
a computerised device, and so on. However, there are functions and 
capabilities of human beings that cannot as yet be replicated by artificial 
intelligence, such as higher forms of thinking, many self-repair processes, 
imaginative recreations182 (the claim has been made that computers can 
write poetry, although the quality of this poetry is poor) and the like.
The issue of whether or not a machine or, generically, artificial 
intelligence, can replicate the human brain depends on how the brain, 
and consequently the mind, of an individual is conceived. The relation 
between brain and mind is complicated, with the difference between the 
two resting in the first instance on the difference between determinism 
(following a set of predetermined rules and causes) and volition (not 
being determined by a variety of cause-effect relations). If a physicalist 
position is adopted, with the implication that free will is merely an 
illusion, then it is not hard to imagine that in time artificial intelligence 
will be able to replicate the functions of the human mind. However, if 
we understand the mind as a volitional learning instrument, then it is 
reasonable to suggest that artificial intelligence will never, and indeed 
cannot, have or acquire every capacity of the human mind.183 We also 
need to consider how the concept of technology can be understood in a 
wider sense, for example, as technical-rationality thinking.
Technical-rationality thinking
Herbert Marcuse (1964) argued that the end result of capitalist forms of 
life was the decline of the individual. For him, the metaphysics of the 
human subject had been superseded by technology and by the way the 
human subject always has to face up to a one-dimensional technical 
world. What is dominant is instrumentality and efficacy. Technology is 
not merely the application of techniques or gadgets; it is also a social 
process of production, distribution and exchange, and it constitutes the 
182 I recently gave a talk at the University of Buckingham about technology in educational settings 
and failed to convince one member of the audience that there are limits to the powers of artificial 
intelligence objects because they are essentially rule-bound and cannot be driven by a human-like 
intentionality. I think that the rest of the audience agreed with the arguments I was making.
183 The debate between physicalism and human volition underpins every argument that I make in 
this book.
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totality of how we organise society.184 This can be seen most clearly in, for 
example, those neoliberal institutions central to modern societies, such 
as universities, schools and hospital systems, and how we can give an 
account of them. Human work is disvalued in this technical-rationality 
process; for example, phenomena, such as domestic work, are not 
reported in accounting processes.185
Mariana Mazzucato, in The Value of Everything: Making and taking 
in the global economy (2018), insists, and rightly so, that both the 
economic structures that we have set in place and the means by which 
we give value to objects within those structures are valued in themselves. 
For her, these valuations are skewed in our current social, political 
and discursive arrangements. Mazzucato further argues that this is where 
we should start from when we debate issues that are economic (or, 
of course, educational, social, taxonomic and the like) and the systems 
of measurement and valuation that inhere in them. For example, 
she suggests that over the past 150 years we have been in hock to 
understandings about economic affairs that exclude any economic 
activity that does not have a market value. An example of this is gross 
domestic product (GDP), seemingly an objective indicator, but in reality, 
an ad hoc assemblage of valuations and disvaluations of economic goods 
with no reasonable or rational basis to them. And so, for Mazzucato, these 
calculations reward the wrong types of work (understood in a wide 
sense), discourage those workers whose work is not officially recognised 
and thoroughly mislead naive politicians and policymakers. New modes 
of social control are exercised through technological, consumerist, 
administrative and bureaucratic means.186
Michel Foucault and his anti-humanist perspective
The French philosopher Michel Foucault used the terms ‘technology’ and 
‘technique’ in his various writings, and these were in time transposed to 
‘technologies of power’ and ‘technologies of the self’. Foucault typically 
employed these terms to refer to methods, approaches and procedures for 
184 And how learning is organised and arranged in modern societies.
185 In accounting and accountability systems, the key is to understand how the object being 
measured is framed – what its boundaries are. These accountability systems thus have built into the 
way they work processes of atomisation, reduction and potentially distortion.
186 It sometimes surprises me that educational administrators, while actively advocating notions of 
social justice and fairness, employ methods that produce the opposite effects. Perhaps I should not 
be surprised.
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governing human beings. This raises the issue of Foucault’s use of the 
word ‘technology’, and in particular, the use of terms such as ‘technique’ 
and ‘technologie’. The distinction between technique and technology, 
more pronounced in English than in French, can be said to lie with the 
difference between an abstraction at the level of culture or ideas and a 
set of tools for achieving some limited purpose at the level of practices. 
There is also the sense in which technique applies to practices concerning 
the production and use of objects, with technology obtaining its meaning 
from those theoretical domains that underpin these practices. More 
modern usage has resulted in an elision of these two meanings, with the 
result that reference is now ineluctably made to political and social 
concerns. Foucault at times took the view that these two terms could 
be used interchangeably. In a lecture given in 1978, he explained that 
his ‘research deals with the techniques of power (psychology’s “techniques 
of retraining” or the anatomist’s “technique of the corpse”), with the 
technology of power’ (Foucault, 1978a: 532).
These technologies of power, sometimes referred to as technologies 
of truth (Foucault, 1969), were attempts by Foucault to examine notions 
and practices that related to power. He used them to make four central 
points: i) the same procedures that were being used to control nature, 
production and time were being used to manage human beings in 
institutional settings, an example of which is current UK university 
management practices;187 ii) power should be understood in a productive 
sense as that which shapes, moulds and more importantly enables 
human behaviour, rather than in a purely negative or repressive sense; 
iii) so powerful are these positive forms of power that they can operate to 
override moral ordinances and beliefs about appropriate conduct held 
by powerful people in neoliberal institutions, such as universities; and 
iv) in the field of education it is striking how psychology as a discipline, 
in conjunction with other disciplines that share its epistemology, have 
now assumed an ascendency even with people who do not profess to be 
psychological theorists.188 Technology was seen by some as the solution 
to many of the ills of twentieth-century life – social stratification, 
industrial alienation, environmental despoliation, economic recession, 
nationalistic warfare and so forth.
187 Some academics in universities in their writings use Foucault and endorse his notions of 
normalisation and bureaucratisation, and then behave as traditional bureaucrats always have in 
other parts of their working lives.
188 Psychology as a discipline or domain of knowledge has embraced, but not in its entirety, an 
empiricist epistemology and a naive realist ontology.
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Debates about industrial management, human relations at work 
and the role of artificial intelligence (although this constitutes an extreme 
form of technologisation) indicate an extension of the original meaning 
of the word ‘technology’ to embrace forms of social organisation and 
control. In The Order of Things: An archaeology of the human sciences, 
Foucault (1970) made the point that the human sciences, such as 
psychology, criminology and education, are deeply implicated in modern 
forms of power and, in particular, in the control mechanisms that 
constitute modern subjectivities. In education, for example, dealing as it 
must with the development of these subjectivities, notions of what 
research is, how it can be assessed and how one can make judgements 
about texts and people have been technologised through such devices as 
the Research Excellence Framework (REF), rule-based hierarchies of 
control, and technicist and reified understandings of educational and 
learning practices. Even the soul, and consequently the self, is understood 
by Foucault as being the consequence of powerful punitive structures and 
thus is a concept that can be understood only through the genealogical 
method189 (see chapter 19).
Foucault argued that humanism, and its ethical variants, far from 
being a solution to the ills of technology was in fact the problem: the 
modern conception of human beings had the same epistemological 
antecedents as modern technological applications of power. Examples 
of this are the various iterations of the discourse of school effectiveness 
in the field of education, which provide the conditions for making 
judgements in educational settings, and the technologies of power, 
positive and negative, that are pervasive in the modern academy. This 
cannot conceal the ambiguity in his thinking about technology, which 
is that, despite being fully aware of the way in which technology might 
work in a negative sense, he never proposed, indeed he deliberately 
downplayed, humanist solutions to technological ills or suggested an 
alternative to a technologically saturated world.190
For Foucault, his whole work was a reaction to the then dominant 
phenomenological perspective (for example, Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being 
and Nothingness, 2003). Phenomenologists argue strongly that human 
consciousness comprises the apprehension of phenomena in the world 
and thus focuses on how the world appears to the individual. And further 
189 This is a philosophical technique in which one questions the enframings of various discourses 
attached to different objects over time. An example is tracing the lineages of certain key concepts. 
I have attempted to do this with a number of key concepts that are related to learning.
190 During his lifetime, Michel Foucault advocated prison reform in a traditional liberal way.
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to this, consciousness is never a passive mechanism but is always directed 
in the world in a particular way – for example, in memory, in imagination, 
as objective truth and so forth. Thus, it has intentionality. Phenomenology 
has as its principal focus consciousness and intentionality and through 
these two important processes constitutes itself as volitional. For Foucault, 
this reified notion of self and therefore of subjectivity is one to which he 
was implacably opposed, in particular to the ‘moral claims of humanism’ 
(Foucault, 1970: 34).
An important metaphor for Foucault in his later period was the 
dispositif, which can be translated as apparatus, machinery or deployment; 
or, as Foucault intended it, a totality of means for the exercise of power, 
or procedures for the technical management of human beings. In his 
History of Sexuality, volume 1 (1978b), he used the notion of dispositif to 
explain negative and productive techniques of power; for example, the 
way a number of discrete practices, bodily functions and institutions 
are linked and thus forms of sexuality are created. We are a part of the 
deployment of power in understanding and practicing our sexuality; we 
are not just required to repress our sexual urges: ‘(t)he dispositif de 
sexualité functions by using mobile, polymorphic, and circumstantial 
power techniques’ (Foucault, 1978b: 140). The dispositif is fundamentally 
a technique or technology of power and of truth, and, for Foucault, this 
would also apply to those ideas and sets of ideas related to artificial 
intelligence in education. Martin Heidegger was also concerned with 
these matters.
Martin Heidegger and concernful dealings
In Being and Time (1962), Martin Heidegger argued that the meaning 
of the word, and the concept of, ‘technology’ cannot be confined to the 
means of achieving certain well-defined ends, especially and as in the 
natural sciences, but that it also encompasses implicit understandings 
about human activity. And further to this, he suggested that the detached 
and objective attitude that this encompasses restricts our understanding 
of the world: ‘science flattens the fullness of our concernful dealings’ 
(Heidegger, 1962: 32).
Heidegger’s most important work that explicitly relates to 
technology is his lecture ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, published 
in 1954, which was a revised version of part two of a four-part lecture 
series he delivered in Bremen in 1949. In this lecture he observed that 
technology contributes to ‘all distances in time and space shrinking’, and 
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yet, he went on to suggest, that this ‘hasty setting aside of all distances 
brings no nearness; for nearness does not consist in a small amount of 
distance’ (1977: 34). Here he is focusing on only two dimensions of 
technology, time and space, although other possibilities exist; for 
example, how technology relates to different types of thinking such as 
technical-rationality thinking and theory–practice rationalisations. For 
Heidegger, all things increasingly present themselves to us as 
technological, thus artefacts merge with knowledge constructions. In the 
classic Marxist assertion, the worker becomes nothing more than an 
instrument for production, with the consequence that forms of anomie 
and alienation result. In human resources terminology, we become 
objects to be arranged, disarranged, rearranged and disposed of. In 
workplace education, personalised online learning programmes are 
thought of as appropriate substitutes for face-to-face cohort learning. 
These are three examples of technical-rationality thinking.191
Instrumentalism is at the heart of technical-rationality thinking: 
the desire to treat all means simply as stepping stones to predefined ends. 
For Heidegger, this critique does not ‘show us technology’s essence’, 
and this is because it cannot signify how technology is a way for all human 
entities, not just machines and technical processes, to show themselves 
in the world. He argued that representational epistemologies (including 
correspondence theories of truth) are deficient (cf. Heidegger, 1962). 
This therefore requires the adoption of epistemologies that in essence 
and appearance are not representational or disciplinary-focused, and 
indeed what this means is that the whole concept of epistemology, as 
it is generally understood, becomes redundant. This is the route that 
Heidegger took. He wanted to replace it in the first instance with a notion 
of textual reading that insists on reading as an interpretive activity 
involving processes of fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception. This 
therefore requires a disclosure. The second move that Heidegger made 
is even more crucial and this involves a repudiation of the disengaged 
self and the punctual self (cf. Taylor, 1998). We are beings (Dasein) 
always in the world, agents engaged in realising a particular form of life. 
This is what we are about, as Heidegger put it, first and mostly. The third 
move is to locate all of this within a metaphysical notion of Being (being 
in Being). Heidegger famously identified a form of thinking, calculative 
thinking, that is wholly injurious to the world and in tension with 
191 I have addressed this issue in chapter 4.
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his notion of being in Being. Heidegger argued that it is not through 
science but through an ontological understanding, revealed through 
mood, that the totality of Being is unconcealed.
In the Bremen lectures (2012) and his article, ‘The Question 
Concerning Technology’ (1977), Heidegger set out the four components 
of his critique of technology. First, the essence of technology is not 
artefactual; it is a mode of being or of revealing. Technology, then, is an 
event, which we take part in, and it involves the structuring, ordering, 
reordering and requisitioning of everything around us. The second point 
he made is that technology is everywhere, refers to everything and even 
has metaphysical connotations. The third point is that technology has 
become more pervasive – our lives are technologised. The fourth point, 
and this is perhaps the most important, is that we can understand nature 
scientifically because it has now become a set of calculable, orderable 
forces – a technological dispositif. Science offers us only representations 
of things. It ‘only ever encounters that which its manner of representa- 
tion has previously admitted as a possible object for itself’ (1977: 5). 
Everything becomes technologised. Heidegger’s word for technology 
and its essence is Gestell. This has been rendered as ‘positionality’ 
by the translator of the Bremen lectures (2012), and as ‘enframing’ by 
the translator of ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ (1977). What 
Heidegger is concerned to show is the all-encompassing nature of 
technology, so that in every sphere of life, the natural, the practical and 
the social, we enter into a technologised relationship of enframing 
(Gestell), and this includes the notion of artificial intelligence. We need to 
understand artificial intelligence not as an extension of human powers 
and capabilities or even as a replacement for human activities, but as a 
way of focusing in and on the world: ‘(m)odern technology is not applied 
natural science, far more is modern natural science the application of the 
essence of technology’; nature is therefore ‘the fundamental piece of 
inventory of the technological standing reserve – and nothing else’ (1977: 
5). For Heidegger, the call is to experience a more primal truth192 as we 
try to move beyond and outside a technologised view of the world. 
Hypertextuality is a possible manifestation of this.




New media, in particular the internet, are acting to reconfigure the 
relationship between producers and consumers of content and, in 
particular, between teachers and learners. The role of the learner is, in 
some cases, changing from its traditional passive function to a more active 
and engaged role. The World Wide Web has given us the possibility of 
a more democratic relationship to the power of textual production so 
that it works on us and not through us, as learners.193 This has been 
described as the hypertextual dissolution of centrality (cf. Landow, 
1992); what this means is that new media allow the possibility of 
conversation rather than instruction so that no one ideology, agenda 
or viewpoint dominates any other. The hypertextual author, who is also a 
learner in a fundamental sense, combines the function of both reader and 
writer. They merge with each other and become intertwined. No longer 
does the reader or learner simply absorb the contents of a written text; 
she now has the potential to influence what she reads and, more 
importantly, how she reads it. Hypertext, which allows the possibility of 
having access to an almost infinite number of different texts produced by 
different authors, leads to an active and powerful reader/learner.194
Roland Barthes (1975) coined the terms ‘readerly’ (in French, 
lisible) and ‘writerly’ (in French, scriptable). These distinguish between 
two types of texts, and thus compel readers/learners to make sense of 
them in very different ways. In the first case, the readerly text is read in a 
conventional way, with the authority of the text residing in what is being 
read. The reader has very little scope to interpret the text in ways other 
than those intended by the author. Barthes contrasts this with a writerly 
text and, correspondingly, a writerly way of reading that text, where the 
reader, in her reading of that text, is able to create meanings from that 
text which do not necessarily conform to the intentions of the author 
(see chapter 1).
Prominent among the many hypertextual artificial intelligence 
learning systems that have been developed are: distance learning 
programmes, massive open online courses (MOOCs), hybrid learning 
models and blended pedagogic learning accessories. All aim to deliver 
learning in more efficient ways, with efficiency understood as: 
193 There are many variations of this, some of which are discussed in chapter 5.
194 It also allows any and every type of knowledge to flourish, so that racist, misogynistic, 
homophobic, ill-considered, unfiltered knowledge enters into, and has effects on, the public domain.
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accessibility, flexibility, hypertextuality, better control for learners in 
the pedagogic relationship and over the curriculum, more equal relations 
between teachers and learners, and more accurate identification 
and feedback processes leading to better forms of progression. Many 
of these advantages are exaggerated; however, it is still possible to 
suggest that learning processes are not just enhanced by technologies 
but fundamentally changed by them, so that new types of knowledge 
are being created, with subsequent wash-back effects195 on identity 
formations and positionalities taken by these learners.
Instead of the pedagogic process acting merely to facilitate learning, 
it also acts in a variety of ways to transform the curriculum it is seeking 
to bring into being. Wash-back effects work on a range of objects and 
in different ways. So, for example, there are wash-back effects on the 
curriculum, on how we think we can evaluate the acquisition and 
retention of this knowledge that affects the curriculum, on the capacity of 
the individual and, more fundamentally, on the structures of knowledge, 
although these mechanisms are frequently conflated in the minds of 
educational stakeholders. Micro wash-back effects work directly on the 
person, whereas macro wash-back effects work directly on institutions 
and systems, which then subsequently have an impact on individuals 
within those institutions and learning systems. However, these systems 
are designed in particular ways that are in essence algorithmic and 
reductionist. This has consequences.
Claims and consequences
At the beginning of this chapter, I suggested that certain operations 
could be performed more efficiently by machines than by human beings. 
However, determining which operations these are and how they can be 
constituted has both epistemological and ethical dimensions. Technology, 
technique, technical-rationality thinking, artificial intelligence, 
technologies of power, technologies of truth, and technologisation have 
ethical dimensions and consequences. Deploying these terms in discursive 
configurations and in educational practices signifies an enframing of 
these actions. What I have suggested, and indeed argued for, is a view that 
195 By wash-back effects I mean that measuring, describing and evaluating human activities in the 
world also has the potentiality to change those behaviours and beliefs. Accounting and evaluation 
activities are never neutral, although strong advocates for them deny that is the effect or the 
intention. This is a manifestation of a power mechanism in action.
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ethics always supervenes on epistemology (see chapter 5). Learning, the 
key concept in the field of education and in this book, likewise supervenes 
on epistemology and should be understood and, perhaps more 
importantly, practised as such.
I have been careful to suggest that the way in which technology is 
used in modern societies and in generative learning environments is as it 
is currently being used and not how it could be used. I also have some 
doubts about the much-heralded benefits of e-learning: for instance, 
flexibility, hypertextuality, better control for learners in the pedagogic 
relationship and over the curriculum, more equal relations between 
teachers and learners, and more accurate identification and feedback 
processes leading to better forms of progression. Our descriptions of 
reality and our means for accessing the world contribute to changing 
what we are accessing. In short, new ways of learning, through the 
internet and other technological means, cannot be neutral technologies, 
but are always content-rich. Knowledge, and consequently the way we 
access it, is subject to change. What I have been doing here is positioning 
knowledge acquisition and retention as pre-eminent dispositions of 
human beings and thus giving a privileged position to epistemology in the 
scheme of things. And what this means is that other human attributes and 
activities such as learning, ethics, or ways of behaving supervene on 
knowledge: the form that learning can assume depends on the 
epistemology that is adopted. The one determines the other, with this 
being both a logical and an empirical claim.
The essential question is: does this mean that technology, and 
in particular artificial intelligence, can ever transcend, or is capable 
of transcending, the boundaries or limits imposed on it by how it is 
constituted? At the moment, it can replicate certain types of learning 
only, and thus certain types of content in the world. And what this means 
is that it can produce particular types of knowledge and, subsequently, 
induce only certain types of behaviours, attributes and dispositions in 
the learner.
What, then, are these elements of consciousness that cannot as yet 
be replicated by artificial intelligence? Here are some suggestions: 
intentionality, non-deontological ways of being (after all a machine 
simply follows a set of complicated rules), reflexivity, meta-reflection and 
referential reflection, identity formation and, of course, acting in a 
virtuous way. Can a machine ever act in intentional, non-deontological, 
meta-reflective, identity-forming and virtuous ways? I think not, although 
I suppose one could imagine (just possibly) new material and substance 
inventions (made from chemicals and attached to artificial bodies) that 
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replicate (or are superior to) human bodies, brains and of course minds, 
with the proviso that these machines would not be able to act intentionally 
and virtuously. After this discussion of the role of technology in learning, 
I now want to move on and examine a key part of the argument that I am 
making in this book – the need to understand the significance of the 
dispositional in learning – and to do this through a discussion of two key 




In this chapter I argue (provide compelling reasons) for accepting and 
endorsing a notion of dispositional realism. In A Realist Theory of Science 
(2008a: 212), Roy Bhaskar endorsed the anti-Humean argument that 
things have causal properties and thus causal powers:
(a) thing acts, or at least tends to act, the way it is. It should be 
stressed that the difference between a thing which has the power or 
tends to behave in a certain way and the one which does not is not 
a difference between what they will do, since it is contingent upon 
the flux of conditions whether the power is ever manifested or 
tendency exercised. Rather, it is a difference in what they themselves 
are; i.e. in their intrinsic natures.
This refers to an important element of the claim or series of claims that 
I am making about learning in this book, which is that any coherent 
theory of learning needs to embrace a dispositional essentialism196 
(but not an identity essentialism),197 and consequently an object, 
whether discursive, material, relational, configurational or person-
oriented, has causal properties and thus dispositional powers. In 
accepting this, I am committing myself to an approach which suggests 
that objects have real powers by virtue of what they are, although, as we 
have seen, those powers are not always realised.198 With regards to 
196 In using the term ‘dispositional essentialism’, I am referring to the capacity of objects to have 
properties, including causal powers. In starting this chapter with a long quotation from Bhaskar, I am 
using this textual device to provide evidence to support an argument that I am making in this chapter; 
however, I am framing the notion of evidence in its widest sense to mean, in addition to its conventional 
sense, reasons for making judgements about matters to do with learning – see chapter 3.
197 I am not transposing the idea of dispositional essentialism to any form or type of human identity.
198 I am drawing a distinction here between the potential powers of objects and their actual 
realisations, in that they have causal effects.
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human beings, our fifth object-type, there are still a number of issues 
that need to be resolved before we can have confidence in this argument. 
The first is the claim that these dispositions are acquired (and not 
inherited) in the lifeworld. (How they are acquired is an issue that I will 
take up in the next chapter.) The second issue refers to the dynamic 
nature of objects, especially with regards to human beings: the changing 
object may be incompatible with a notion of a fixed disposition. In this 
and subsequent chapters I sketch out solutions to these problems, real 
or imagined.
Dispositions are the building blocks of a person, and indeed of any 
object in the world. For example, literacy and numeracy are properties 
of a person;199 fragility and number are properties of, respectively, an 
artefact such as a glass vase and an abstraction such as a mathematical 
set. Dispositions, as inner states of objects, precede, condition and have 
some influence over actions, activities and events. A disposition is a 
habituation, a state of preparation or readiness and a tendency to act in a 
specific way. For Pierre Bourdieu (1986), the dispositions of a person 
have the power to allow him to take a specific position in a field. 
The habitus is the choice of the individual in taking up a position in 
that field according to his dispositions; but it cannot determine in any 
absolute sense what the person does. Dispositions of a person, artefact 
or abstraction then have this persistent quality; however, because they 
are time limited, they can be modified, that is, a person at the age of one 
may not have acquired the disposition of kindness but develops it at 
some point during his life, and all matter is subject to natural change.200 
Further to this, objects may relinquish their dispositions. An example 
of this is the glass vase referred to above being dropped. What remains 
no longer has the property of being fragile, since we can say that the 
object has exercised its fragility.
There are two types of conditions for the application of a disposition. 
The first of these refers to those conditions that enable or prevent the 
realisation of the intended disposition. An example of this is a match 
having a flammable disposition. A lack of oxygen in the environment 
prevents that match from lighting if struck; however, the match still 
retains its disposition of flammability. Another example is the human or 
at least male disposition of breeding. If there are no female human beings 
199 The issue of what a person might be is complicated, but it must include some notion of acquired 
properties that persist over time.
200 Natural change is perhaps best expressed, in the fragments of writing that Heraclitus left us, as 
universal flux (cf. Bollack and Wismann, 1972).
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to breed with then his breeding disposition cannot be realised, although 
he still retains his disposition of fertility.
The second type of condition for the application of a disposition 
comprises those enablements or constraints that respectively allow an 
object to be dispositionally active or prevent an object from exercising 
a dispositional capacity. For example, if a match is wet then it cannot be 
flammable; it does not have the disposition of flammability. If a man 
has a zero sperm count this stops that man from being fertile. In the 
absence of literary texts there can be no disposition of being literate. This 
distinction is of fundamental importance in that any theory of change, 
whether institutional, systemic or person-oriented, needs to take account 
of the nature of the relationship between an object and its properties, and 
whether these properties are intrinsic or attached. If an object changes its 
properties and consequently its powers to effect change in other objects 
and in the arrangement of objects in the world, it becomes a new object. 
However, if one or more but not all of its properties change, then we can 
say that we do not have a new object but only a modified one.201
A disposition, I am suggesting, is a functional property of an object. 
A property of a person is that he is, for example, literate or numerate; if 
he is, then that person can perform certain literate or numerate acts, 
although, first, those actions may not be as they were intended by the 
person, and second, they may not result in what the intention suggested 
would happen if the action had been performed. Dispositions have 
functional essences, and these are at the core of any social, discursive and 
physical object-ontology; indeed, the only way that dispositions can be 
construed is in their functional form. Being numerate or literate, then, 
involves the acquisition and expression of a complicated set of abilities 
understood as functions of an object-person. Furthermore, these abilities 
may be fully realised, partly realised or not realised at all.
I am referring here to the powers that objects have and their 
interactions with other objects. If I take the example of the glass vase with 
its property of fragility, then I can say that this property is realised only in 
relation to a set of conditions in the world, as I observed above. If that 
vase fell from a sufficient height onto a metal floor, which did not have 
flexibility as one of its properties, then it would break. I can confidently 
assert this. And conversely, if those conditions were not present 
and indeed other conditions were in place such as the length of the drop 
being insufficient to allow it to break on a feather-bedded floor, then the 
201 The distinction between a modified and new object is not definitive.
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property of fragility would not be realised, although the object would 
still retain this property. Dispositions of human beings work in the same 
way. Human beings have powers to change personal, institutional and 
systemic arrangements, but they may not be realised because they operate 
in open systems.
Closed systems are characterised by two conditions: objects operate 
in consistent ways, and they do not change their essential nature. Neither 
of these conditions pertains to open systems. A closed system operates 
through deterministic rules, which govern its change processes. While 
this form of historical change leads to continually evolving systems and 
institutions, especially with regards to learning, the change that is 
produced is self-contained within the system itself. Feedback is thus 
generated within the system and has as its purpose the maintenance of 
equilibrium within that system. Closed and open systems can also be 
distinguished by the degree and type of determinism that each has, which 
is conditioned by the evolving network of other concepts of which it is 
a part.202
So, for example, in using concepts such as literacy and literacy 
acquisition, a network of other concepts is made available to the user. 
This framework of concepts might include: innateness, genetics, 
phenotypicality, reading, writing, listening, talking, the semantics of a 
text, constructivist whole language approaches, meaning construction, 
literary epistemic frameworks, naturalism, phonological awareness, 
word-identification skills and strategies, spelling–sound relationships, 
print-rich environments, visual and grapho-phonic cues and many more, 
and if we are to use this concept, then we have to give due consideration 
to this network of other concepts.
In addition, these networks have histories203 and this is important 
for understanding key educational concepts such as literacy and 
numeracy. The point is that literacy and numeracy and a host of other 
concepts have different semantic contents at different moments in 
their histories. Thus, concepts are enframed in time; for example, 
hypertextual literacy has implications for how we read texts and is a 
very different activity from pre-digital literacy and those dispositions 
that are a part of it.
202 Roy Bhaskar (2011) makes much of the distinction between open and closed systems and then 
gives this distinction a methodological twist.
203 Concepts and conceptual arrangements have histories, and this is why Michel Foucault (1969) 
advocated a genealogical method of investigation.
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Literacy
A distinction can be drawn between talking and writing, and not just 
the relatively trivial one that they have different physical forms. The 
transition from a non-literate society to a literate one was more than an 
extension of the available tools to access the world at the disposal of 
human beings, but in addition allowed a qualitative change as to how we 
live and how we are able to develop accounts of our lives. This change 
process had four elements. The first is that when we moved from a pre-
literate to a literate society, we were able to internalise spoken language 
and bring it into consciousness so that it could become an object of 
reflection. Second, writing something down in however crude a form 
allows a record to be kept of what has been said. This means that in a 
written exchange, one or the other of the two parties can refer back to 
what he said, and this changes the nature of the exchange. In addition, 
writing provides a permanent record of our thoughts. Speech acts 
are immediately reversible. Third, written language tends to be more 
complex than speech and this allows it the possibility of entering into 
a more complex relationship with the world. Spoken language tends to 
be repetitious, incomplete, corrigible and full of interruptions. Writers 
receive no immediate feedback from their readers. Speech is a dynamic 
interaction between two or more people. And finally, written and 
spoken language use different modes to suggest timing, tone, volume, 
significance, emphasis and colour. Written material can be repeatedly 
analysed and revised, whereas spoken texts cannot be so amended, unless 
turned into written texts.
What is literacy? There are at least five different dispositional 
abilities or sets of organising principles that inhere in the concept. These 
can be broadly characterised as technical,204 semantic,205 referential,206 
ethical207 and ideological.208 A technical reading ability (of texts) entails 
the decoding and deciphering of words and relations between them. This 
ability has a limited semantic, referential and ideological content. 
A semantic ability, with an ability understood as a dispositional and 
204 Technical literary approaches have dominated policies for reading in countries around the world. 
This has meant that, for example, whole-book reading approaches have been neglected.
205 Semantic approaches to literacy and reading prioritise meaning above all else.
206 Concepts and conceptual arrangements have histories, and this is why Michel Foucault (1969) 
advocated a genealogical method of investigation.
207 An ethical approach foregrounds the valued dimensions of literacy ontologically.
208 The issues of ideology and ideological conceptions of literacy are complex. They relate to notions 
of truth and the real.
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acquired capacity, refers to meaning construction whether intentionally, 
historically or conceptually framed. A referential capacity is an ability 
to understand the medium of the semantic content of the literary text; 
an example of this would be to distinguish between descriptive, narrative, 
expository and argumentative texts. An ethical approach to literacy 
would frame this ability as a set of normative behaviours, whether 
deontological, consequentialist or virtue-based. There are a number of 
different ways of reading a text. The first of these is monosemic. In using 
an intransitive historical method, the text gives up its meaning, and this 
is an unequivocal reading. A second approach is also monosemic, but here 
the intentions of the author are foregrounded. A third approach focuses 
on enframing the reading of the text, a position that I discussed at some 
length in chapter 1.
For Michel Foucault (1997), a literacy discourse consists of: 
discursive objects, for example, an illiterate person or an unintelligent 
subject; positionings within an array of orders and dispositions, such as a 
teacher of reading; conceptual relations between different fields, so, 
for example, literacy and economic productivity; and strategies that 
regulate and consolidate literary practices (both discursive and non-
discursive) such as punitive inspection services and tests/examinations 
that structure (delimit what can be thought, practiced and reflected 
on) reading or literary practices. Discursive practices are the means by 
which, in Foucault’s terms, regimes of truth come into being. Furthermore, 
a discursive configuration, such as the one I have briefly sketched out 
above, can never be a simple determinant of identity, behaviour or action. 
Everything I say here also applies to becoming a subject in the first place; 
and this has implications for being, thinking and acting. Foucault hinted 
at this when he coined a notion of desubjugation. Processes of desub- 
jugation entail, first, the person resisting becoming a subject, in the 
sense that subjugation implies becoming something for someone else; 
and second, they entail active processes of criticising the limits of the 
discourse itself (and in the process, expanding the opportunity to think 
for, and conduct, oneself in the world, which is in opposition to what the 
discursive formation allows one to do).
A discursive arrangement,209 then, may be seen as operating on 
three planes: a set of practices that delimit (and perhaps allow) certain 
types of thought, action and ethical conduct; a series of statements, which 
209 In using the term ‘discursive arrangement’, I am referring to the fourth part of my object-
ontology: a discursive configuration.
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act as carriers for the content of the discursive formation; and formations 
and arrangements that define categories, identify objects and relations 
between objects in the world, and delimit disciplines and fields of activity. 
Foucault in his later work (for example, History of Sexuality, volume 1, 
1978b) extended this notion of discourse to show how over time 
governments use power strategies to effect the transformation of social, 
political, ecological and human relations with regards to the management 
of populations. For example, Foucault identified four forms of power 
implicit in a notion of governmentality:210 sovereign power,211 pastoral 
power,212 disciplinary power213 and biopower.214
Literacy discourses can therefore be analysed in relation to: their 
history – the changing nature of the concept over time; their cultural 
geography – the different ways in which the concept is used in different 
locations; the internal relations of the concept itself and those objects that 
are included or not chosen to be a part of the concept at any one moment 
or in any one location; the external relations in which the concept is 
embedded (concept-to-concept relations); valuations given to discursive 
and material objects in the world; and relations and connections 
with transcendental notions, such as truth, objectivity and the like (see 
chapter 2). The concept of literacy, then, has a number of forms, although 
we should be careful about giving these forms a specific time and place 
location. Numeracy is another important concept in the space of learning.
Numeracy
The concept of numeracy supervenes on mathematics – what mathematics 
and its relationship to the world is provides in the first instance the 
semantic content of the concept of numeracy.215 Three important non-
Platonic accounts of mathematics have been formulated: logicism, 
210 The Foucauldian concept of governmentality (1969) can be understood as the way in which 
governments produce citizens who are best suited to government beliefs and policies, and as those 
organised practices (thoughts, rationalities and techniques) through which subjects are governed.
211 Sovereign power refers to power mechanisms that are supported by the state.
212 Pastoral power is a form of power that guarantees the redemption of a person, accompanies him 
throughout his life, and invades that person’s inner world.
213 Disciplinary power has two meanings: the first is the exercise of power over another by virtue of 
his position or status, such as in master–slave relations. The second is the power that is exercised 
through disciplinary or domain regimes of knowledge.
214 Biopower, for Foucault, is a practice of the modern state and its regulation of its subjects through 
‘an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the 
control of populations’ (Foucault, 1978b: 140).
215 cf. Horsten (2019).
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formalism and intuitionism. These were in effect responses to dominant 
(for long periods of time) Platonic views of mathematics. Within the 
Platonic conception, the subject matter of mathematics is abstractive 
qualities. Kurt Gödel (2003), a neo-Platonist, for example, argued that 
mathematical objects are objective insofar as their existence as entities 
does not depend on the actions and activities of human beings, including 
current members of the human population and past ones. They have 
timeless properties. One of the implications of this is that we enter into 
a relationship with these objective entities, which is analogous to the 
relationship between any other physical object and our minds; that is, we 
develop mathematical concepts. We do this, according to Gödel, through 
a form of mathematical intuition. Our mathematical intuition provides 
evidence for determining what these mathematical principles might be. 
Numeracy, then, would be the generalised capacity, operating at the level 
of the mind, to use these mathematical principles either in self-reflective 
ways or in actions or activities in the world.
Platonic views of mathematics were challenged in the twentieth 
century by logistic, intuitionist and formalist accounts. The first of these, 
logicism, is an attempt to reduce mathematics to logic.216 The reason 
for attempting to do this is because it was thought that logical rules 
would be the objectifying bridge between mind and world, as they could 
then be understood as having both ontologically real properties and 
properties that allowed them to be construed as properties of the 
mind. This attempt at reducing mathematics to logical principles proved 
to be unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, it proved impossible to 
find equivalences between mathematical and logical operations in 
every single case, and logical principles failed to account for even basic 
mathematical operations. (There were other attempts, such as Frege’s, 
1980, but in the end these proved susceptible to logical inconsistencies.) 
Second, the move to express logical operations in mathematical 
form, and thus give them a role in conceptualising the important but 
difficult mind–world relationship, did not solve any of the epistemological 
problems associated with Platonic attempts at describing and explaining 
the world.
The second non-Platonist account of mathematics became known 
as intuitionism and, following a Kantian perspective, suggested that 
mathematics is in virtually every instance a construction or at least an 
activity of construction. For Kant, universal truths that play a part in the 
216 cf. Russell with Whitehead (1925–7).
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concept of numeracy can be derived from particular representations, 
where these particular representations are construed as predicates in 
the mind. This raises issues with regards to the object that is being 
represented; what that representation is; how relations between objects 
in the world can be construed; and fundamentally what this intuitionist 
project actually entailed. It also places at risk the idea of forming and 
using a concept such as numeracy because the constructed nature of the 
activity seems to preclude mathematical knowledge being construed as 
an ontological and real universal of coherent thought217 (see chapter 1).
The third non-Platonist account of mathematics is what became 
known as formalism. In this revision of Platonic ideas, it was suggested 
that natural numbers are foundational in mathematics. However, these 
are not constructions in the mind as the intuitionists understood them. 
Natural numbers are construed at the level of the mind as symbols, which 
are not thought of as abstract objects because they are simply embodiments 
of concrete objects. One of the problems with this conceptualisation of 
mathematics is that higher forms of the activity do not and cannot fit this 
pattern since they cannot be interpreted in a concrete manner or even 
transposed to an object level. On this account, the concept of numeracy 
comprises an ability to manipulate symbols both in providing authentic 
descriptions of the world and being able to use those symbols in concrete 
action settings.
Numeracy, then, which is the focus of this discussion, has to be218 a 
disposition that is informed by a particular viewpoint about mathematics, 
about mathematical forms – whether Platonic, logistic, intuitionist or 
formalist – and how these forms relate to the world. Second, we can say 
that the semantic contents of the concept of numeracy are contested. 
Third, we might even want to say that the concept is polysemic, although 
this may be as a result of ignorance and misidentification rather than 
anything that is inherent in the concept itself.
Finally, the concept of numeracy can be understood as having 
six dimensions: technical, semantic, referential, normative, ideological 
and interpretive. A technical numeric ability would be a competence 
in completing a mathematical operation, without at the same time 
understanding in a satisfactory way the semantic content of this 
operation. A semantic numeric ability would be a competence in 
completing a mathematical operation and at the same time understanding 
217 cf. Strawson (1959).
218 This is a logical necessity.
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the purposes and functions of the various symbols being used. 
A referential numeric ability would be a competence, in addition to 
the technical and semantic functions of a mathematical activity, in 
understanding the medium of communication being used – for example, 
being able to distinguish between two common types of mathematical 
operations: unary and binary, where unary operations are understood 
as having only one value, and binary operations are understood as 
having two values. A normative dimension of numeracy would frame 
this ability as a set of behaviours, whether deontological, consequentialist 
or virtue-based, and would focus on the relations between mathematics 
and a person’s ethical actions in the world. An ideological numeric 
ability would focus on the relations between the different dimensions 
of the disposition: technical, semantic, epistemic, normative and 
interpretive functions of mathematics. Finally, there is an interpretive 
dimension to this ability, and this refers to whether the mathematical 
text is monosemic or polysemic, and how it can be understood and 
used. These dimensions are not mutually exclusive. These two concepts 
(literacy and numeracy) also have pedagogic dimensions and it is to this 
matter that we now turn.
Conceptual learning
Conceptual learning or, as I have transposed it, dispositional learning, 
then, has a place in the language of learning. What this means is 
that concepts are understood as the properties of a person, as elements 
of knowledge and as having dispositional powers. Knowledge is 
transformed at the pedagogic site, through processes such as: simulation, 
representation, amplification, pedagogic control, progression, textual 
construction, temporality and feedback. What this means is that in the 
learning process, the learning object takes a new form as a result of 
changes to its properties.
The elements or dimensions of conceptual learning are seven-fold: 
technical, semantic, referential, normative, ideological, historical and 
interpretive. Theoretical and contextual considerations impact, then, on 
how elements of teaching and learning are realised. Acknowledging this 
allows the identification of a number of learning models: observation, 
coaching, goal-clarification, peer learning, trial and error, hypothesis-
testing, reflection, meta-cognition and practice (see chapter 12). And 
each of these in turn is underpinned by a particular theory of learning 
(see chapter 11). What this means is that any model of learning employed 
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is constructed in relation to a particular view of how we can know the 
world and what it is. Choosing between these models depends on the 
nature and constitution of the learning object; in other words, the former 
is logically dependent on the latter. In the next chapter I will attempt to 
apply this learning theory to the acquisition of concepts and, consequently, 
as I have argued above, to dispositions.
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Dispositions – innateness  
and essentialism
In the last chapter, I examined two important educational dispositions: 
literacy (the concept) or being literate (the disposition), and numeracy 
(the concept) or being numerate (the disposition). As dispositions they 
have causal powers, even if these powers are not always realised. They 
are also concepts. This means that a concept is being understood in 
a particular way, and in a way of which Ludwig Wittgenstein would 
have approved, given his aversion to the idea of concepts as being 
representational images in the mind. In the Philosophical Investigations 
(1953), he suggested that concepts are not representations or images in 
the mind, but rather abilities or capabilities. According to the abilities 
view, it is wrong to maintain that concepts are particulars in the mind; 
rather, concepts are abilities that are distinctive to intelligible human 
beings. Concepts such as redness or being literate or being numerate 
or being careful in the world about our five types of object – discursive 
objects, material objects, relational objects, configurational objects and 
human beings – are abilities or dispositions of particular objects. This has 
implications for how we learn concepts, with some philosophers (such 
as Jerry Fodor, 1975) maintaining that we do not learn concepts, we 
reconstruct these concepts from previously held concepts that are in some 
sense innate.219 Here is a reconstruction of Fodor’s argument – perhaps 
best expressed in his Concepts: Where cognitive science went wrong (1998): 
concepts of both types (primitive and complex)220 cannot be learnt by 
219 Innate theories of learning suffer from confused ideas about genetic determinacy and different 
potentialities.
220 Fodor drew a distinction between primitive concepts, which are in some sense foundational, and 
complex concepts, which are made up of a number of primitive concepts.
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testing hypotheses; there are no other ways by which a concept can 
be learnt; and therefore concepts cannot be learnt.
In this chapter I will attempt the difficult task of critically addressing, 
indeed refuting the possibility of, Fodor’s (1975) paradox of learning. 
The reason for doing this is that if the paradox he has identified turns 
out to be truly constitutive of learning, then the only way out is to embrace 
a belief in innateness, with all of the problems that this creates. Indeed, 
on some accounts this would mean that there is no such thing as learning 
– an almost impossible idea to hold on to. The solution to Fodor’s 
paradox of learning and thus to the reinstatement of learning as a 
coherent concept and viable practice is to show how the various ideas and 
connections between these ideas are misconceived; for example, that 
hypothesis-testing221 is not the only way that concepts can be learnt 
or that concepts are not exclusively abstract entities in the mind. This 
would mean that there is indeed no paradox of learning.
My first task then is to give a faithful account of Fodor’s paradox 
of learning. I want to consider an example of what on the surface seems 
to be a typical learnt behaviour: moral development. A child progresses 
from following rules that are defined for them by authoritative others to 
behaviours that are determined by social approval. The child is now 
motivated by a desire to win the approval or affection of these others. The 
child subscribes to wider concerns than close, usually familiar, ties and 
now operates through a belief in the worthwhileness of rules and laws to 
maintain social order.222 This progression or movement from one state of 
being to another is an example of what we would normally think of as 
learning. The child having previously focused on seeking personal 
satisfaction and individual preferences now begins to realise that, first, 
this is not the only way of behaving and, second, externally devised rules 
in order to secure the social order as she understands it have some worth. 
This is a difference between egocentric desire satisfaction and social rule-
following and both are underpinned by different sets of values.
In short, the child has acquired a new concept, or so it would seem. 
For Fodor (1975), it is this idea of conceptual growth that seems to be 
impossible. There are two possible ways of explaining this conceptual 
growth. The first is that the child has gained a new concept from the 
environment and from her efforts at working in and on the environment, 
221 Hypothesis-testing is a form of learning in which the learner develops an idea of how something 
in the world works and then proceeds to do something in the world with the express intention of 
confirming, disconfirming or partly confirming the original idea.
222 cf. Kohlberg (1976).
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and this then becomes an addition to or even a consolidation or extension 
of what was previously there, with this being understood as a form of 
conceptual development. The second explanation for this form 
of conceptual development is to suggest, as we will see from Fodor’s 
account, that in fact this can be understood as the unfolding or realisation 
of something that was already there – or to put it in more general terms, 
all concept development is in fact dependent on previous concept 
acquisition and development.
The most plausible way to understand this conceptual development 
is to suggest that a child progresses in her learning by adding a new 
concept to an already existing concept. So, for example, the child having 
previously focused on seeking personal satisfaction and fulfilling 
individual desires now begins to realise that this is not the only way of 
behaving and that externally devised rules in order to secure the social 
order as she understands it have some worth. The new concept overrides 
the old one, which is that following an externally oriented set of rules 
is worthwhile. Two processes have taken place: first, there is now 
a recognition that there is another conceptual framework that could 
be followed; and second, there is a bestowal on this framework of a new 
sense of worthwhileness.
For Fodor, this cannot happen, both in the sense that any process 
being referred to here has not taken, and could not take, place, and in the 
sense that any conceptual framing of this process would be misguided. 
In order to acquire a new concept, the person must be able to identify 
for herself instances of this new state of affairs. However, the problem is 
that in order to be able to distinguish between cases of this new state of 
affairs and cases that are not exemplifications of this state of affairs, she 
must already have acquired the concept and thus the concept is not new. 
Any acquisition of a new concept requires the holder of that concept to be 
able to discriminate between instances of that concept in use, and this 
is not possible without some prior knowledge of, and capacity to use, 
that concept. Thus, all concept acquisition and use can be traced back 
to previous concept acquisition and use, and ultimately to the idea of 
concepts being innate. What this also implies is that human beings cannot 
learn new concepts; they can only allow, through social immersion, those 
concepts to come to some form of fruition or realisation. Learning 
presupposes the very concept or conceptual framework that is explained 
by the action of learning this new concept.223
223 This theory assigns a limited role to learning, but it does not and cannot deny that some learning 
takes place. For Fodor, it is not a totally empty concept.
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A way out of this dilemma is to suggest that concepts are acquired 
by people having experiences in the world. However, this cannot solve the 
problem, since any experiences that we may have are filtered through an 
organisational framework of one type or another, and this in turn requires 
the person to already have access to those meanings and conceptual 
framings that this organisational schema possesses; once again this 
requires a pre-developmental understanding of the concept, which is 
prior to the act of learning. We are forced back to Fodor’s conclusion that 
concepts are innate.
An alternative way of thinking about this is to understand the idea 
of concept acquisition as driven by rules or principles, rather than by the 
person acquiring the new conceptual elements. This means that the 
person acquiring a new concept works out for herself the logical outcomes 
of applying these rules in the world. This requires a capacity to already 
know and be able to use rule-bound and logical processes (which may or 
may not be innate, but certainly pre-exist what we are calling acts of 
learning). However, it focuses on the logical processes rather than the 
substantive conceptual development under consideration. This cannot 
dissolve Fodor’s paradox, since it could be argued that the substantive 
concept under consideration is implicit within the rules that are being 
followed to acquire the new concept. The problem is the same with each 
of these arguments: that in order to acquire a new concept, a person has 
to be able to identify instances of that new concept, and this requires 
some prior understanding of that concept (its history, its genealogy, its 
use, its relationship with other concepts) to do this. Thus, the weak case 
is that conceptual development is always prior to the act of learning a 
new concept and the stronger case is that this acquisition is innate. I want 
to suggest in the rest of this chapter that this is a mistaken viewpoint 
(certainly for the strong case and quite possibly for the weak case), 
and that it is mistaken because concepts and concept acquisition are 
dispositional in character and should be understood as abilities or 
capabilities, and thus do not conform to Jerry Fodor’s conceptualisation 
of what a concept is. However, before I do this, I want to set out some 
examples of nativist theories of learning.
Nativist theories of learning
There are many examples of nativist theories of learning. Roy Bhaskar’s 
theory of learning has the following elements. In foundational critical 
realism, what is said about learning relates to the development of beliefs. 
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With dialectical critical realism, learning is understood as involving all 
of the components of action, so there is learning at the level of values, 
learning at the level of wants, and learning at the level of being. In his 
Philosophy of Meta-Reality (2002), Bhaskar provided a model of learning, 
which he called ‘the unfolding of the enfolded’.224 This model of the 
unfolding of the enfolded understands learning not so much as learning 
something outside oneself, but as the unfolding of an implicit potential 
that each human being has. What happens in life is that human beings 
realise or fail to realise their potentials.
However, if not enough attention is paid to the external elements, 
then it is a one-sided model. The model of the unfolding of the enfolded 
has five elements: the cycle of creativity, the cycle of courting, the phase 
of formation, the phase of making and, finally, the cycle of reflection. This 
is not to deny the importance of the teacher, and it is not to deny the role 
of the catalyst. Knowledge is something the learner is trying to develop. 
Knowledge always pre-exists the learner, and knowledge and learning are 
central to any theory of being.
Another example of an innate theory of learning is Noam Chomsky’s 
(1968) argument for language acquisition.225 Underpinning his theory 
are three presuppositions. The first of these is that the way we as human 
beings acquire language is by realising (and in the process developing) 
a biologically determined programme for learning a language. This 
process is like the physical growth of the human being in normal human 
development. What this also means is that human beings start to speak at 
the same age and their progress follows a clear linear path, although 
there is likely to be some variation in how this is realised. The second of 
these is that this language programme comprises a set of rules, which we 
might want to call the grammar of the programme (although not in a 
Wittgensteinian sense – see chapter 1), and human beings have access to 
this set of rules and a special ability to decode this grammar, which is 
nativist or innate. What this means is that in most circumstances the child 
is able to learn the complexities of a language system in a short period 
of time. There may in some cases be environmental or physical factors 
that actively prevent its realisation, such as food deprivation or brain 
damage. The third underlying presupposition is that because children 
have different experiences during childhood and therefore there are 
environmental differences between children, there is bound to be some 
224 Roy Bhaskar’s theory of learning is further discussed in the next chapter.
225 Noam Chomsky’s (1968) argument for innate language acquisition has certain regressive (in a 
political sense) tendencies.
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variation in the speed and depth of language acquisition. This 
acknowledges the role of environmental factors in language acquisition, 
even if the knowledge that is being acquired is already there in the brain 
of the individual (although it has yet to be put to work and thus is 
non-functional).
The argument for this innate theory of knowledge acquisition is that 
first and foremost children in most circumstances are able to grasp their 
native language – a language, we should note, in which the child is fully 
immersed. Children learn to use complex language structures and even 
invent words that we do not use as adults but follow the grammar of the 
language we use. Chomsky argued that language is rule-bound and thus 
all human beings are equipped with a language acquisition device, 
which in all essential respects allows them to speak the language. In short, 
this is a mechanism that is in the brain (genetic) at birth. This language 
acquisition device comprises a universal grammar, which provides 
all human beings, regardless of the language they speak, with fixed 
grammatical elements that are common to all languages. For Chomsky, 
there are two elements. The first is substantive universals, which are 
features of the language such as phonemes or syntactic forms (for example, 
nouns or verbs). The second is general principles of grammar, although 
Chomsky was careful to point out that different languages have different 
types of grammar. This is what he called a language’s core grammatical 
syntax. In addition, each language has peripheral elements, and it is these 
that allow one to argue that different languages have different grammatical 
structures. Without these formal universals, no child can learn a language 
and here at its starkest is an iteration of Fodor’s learning paradox. Whether 
it is a concept or a language, there is a prior structure implanted in the 
human brain that facilitates the process of concept learning and use in the 
first instance and language learning and use in the second. Chomsky’s 
work is highly controversial, in that it posits the idea that language 
structures exist in the mind before experience.226 Another example of 
nativist thinking is how we use the concept of intelligence.
Intelligence
Learners are constructed pedagogically within a practice. An example of 
this process is the application of the notion of intelligence and, in 
226 Chomsky’s theories of language acquisition should not be confused with his progressive 
arguments against the United States of America’s neocolonial policies.
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particular, the use of the idea of a fixed innate quality in human beings 
that can be measured and remains relatively stable throughout an 
individual’s life.227 This has come to be known as an intelligence quotient 
(IQ) and is measured by various forms of testing, for example, the 11+ 
test. The 11+ had a significant influence on the formation of the tripartite 
system of formal education in the UK in 1944 as it was used to classify 
children as appropriate for grammar schools (those who passed the 11+), 
technical schools (those who passed the 11+ but were considered to be 
better suited to receive a technical education) and secondary moderns 
(the vast majority who failed the 11+ and in the early days of the tripartite 
system left school without any formal qualifications). This system of 
education was largely replaced by a comprehensive system of schooling.
This illustrates one of the problems with an approach to the 
relationship between mind and reality that is technicist, scientistic and 
reductionist. What was considered to be a natural kind – innate qualities 
of intelligence in human beings – has been shown to have undeniably 
social or constructed dimensions to it. Powerful people had constructed 
a tool or apparatus for organising educational provision and given it 
credibility by suggesting that it was natural and thus had legitimacy. One 
manifestation of this discourse is the gifted and talented programmes 
that have been introduced into schools in the United Kingdom over the 
past 20 years. ‘Gifted and talented’ is a term used to describe children 
who have the potential to develop significantly beyond what is expected 
for their age. The suggestion is that some children have this potential and 
others do not. It is also closely allied to processes of individualisation 
and personalisation that are becoming commonplace in UK educational 
settings and has contributed to a sterility and impoverishment of learning 
approaches and outcomes in schools.
Central to the concept of the intelligence quotient is the tension 
between the relative emphasis given to genetically inherited characteristics 
and the influence of the environment. Many contemporary educationalists 
believe that children’s early and continuing experiences at home and at 
school constitute the most significant influences on their intellectual 
achievements. However, early exponents of the argument that genetic 
inheritance determines intellectual potential saw intelligence, measured 
by tests, as the factor that could be isolated to produce a ‘quotient’ by 
which individuals could be classified.
227 The belief in differentiated intelligences between people and groups of people has had profoundly 
deleterious effects on the body politic.
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Regardless of environmental factors such as teaching and learning 
programmes or socioeconomic variables, it was argued, some people 
were born with low levels of intelligence. Schooling could bring them to 
a certain level of achievement, but there would always be a genetically 
imposed ceiling on their capabilities. An extreme version of this belief was 
that intelligence, like certain physical characteristics, followed a normal 
curve of distribution, so that within any given population there were a set 
number of intelligent people and a set number of less intelligent people. 
It was further argued that those individuals who were most generously 
endowed were obviously more fitted to govern and take decisions on 
behalf of those who were less fortunate.228
Rousseau’s romantic expressivism
A fourth expression of innateness in learning is Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
educational philosophy.229 His notion of freedom or being free comprises 
an idea of innateness or natural capacity, where this is understood in 
essentialist terms, and as relating in a fundamental sense to the individual 
concerned, and as being subject to, in its full realisation, the contingencies 
of history and experience. His mature work, which focused on education, 
is called Emile, or Treatise on Education (in the original French: Émile, ou 
de l’éducation) (1979), and this has led, whether rightfully or not, to a 
notion of progressive education. Émile’s underlying principles seem to 
support a notion of child-centred education, which accords with a view of 
what progressive education is and what traditional education is not. A 
child’s natural or innate capacities need to be allowed to come to fruition 
and this can be achieved through a process of self-discovery, as well as the 
avoidance of that child being dominated by others, especially teachers. 
So, both process and innate capacities are protected from the harmful 
effects of formal educational structures and life more generally. The 
young child is allowed to play by herself and with others, but only in and 
through learning environments that refrain from domination and 
subordination. At about the age of 12 or thereabouts, the child acquires 
abstract ideas. The third stage is early adolescence, which involved for 
Rousseau the regulation of a child’s amour-propre (loving oneself), thus 
casting doubt on his notion that it is only through non-coercion that the 
228 These are eugenicist beliefs.
229 Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s writings on education have influenced some people’s notion of what the 
idea of a progressive education might be (cf. Bertram, 2020).
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child can successfully realise her potential. The teacher’s task is to ensure 
that the child learns about pitié or compassion and that her amour-propre 
is developed along non-competitive lines. In this last phase, it is clear that 
certain values are inculcated into the child through particular pedagogic 
processes and that these have little to do with the fulfilment of certain 
innate tendencies or natural capacities in the child.
Rousseau reacted against the enlightenment notion of progress, 
since he argued that civilisation and even learning (certainly of a formal 
type) corrupt human nature, which he understood in a fixed and 
essentialist way. What in Émile he seemed to suggest was that we should 
celebrate the original, natural man (sic.), the noble savage who had never 
learnt to read or write, had no sense of private property and was free 
from the powerful institutions of the state. Rousseau implicitly or 
explicitly created a binary and debilitating opposition between nature 
and culture. Nature, the natural, the innate, is good and virtuous. Culture 
inevitably corrupts this, although the better social arrangements implied 
by Rousseau’s political and social reforms are less corrupting than the 
status quo. Indeed, the problem is two-fold. The first of these is: how 
do we define the natural? Human beings have experiences in the world, 
some good, some bad, and the question then becomes: which of these 
are natural and which are unnatural? The second is that this sense of 
negative freedom that Rousseau encapsulates seems to suggest that it 
is only the absence of certain things that can guarantee the ideal state of 
upbringing for the child.
For Rousseau, there was a moral universe separate from human 
beings, a natural order of growing and learning, which for a variety of 
reasons could become distorted – leave a child to herself and this natural 
potential or being could be fulfilled. There is thus a natural ethic of being 
(for other enlightenment figures this was reason), so that a child had only 
to listen to her inner being and voice, filter out those siren voices that 
would ultimately lead to distortions and disfigurations of the natural and 
live the good life. Inner reflexivity then involves both the cultivation 
of these natural instincts and the resisting (with the help of others) of any 
distorting tendencies. This romantic expressivism, found in Rousseau but 
also in other European enlightenment figures, is an expression of 
innateness, and in different ways can be seen in Chomsky’s language-
acquisition device, Bhaskar’s unfolding of the enfolded and Fodor’s 
learning paradox. The implications for learning are profound: learning is 
understood as the expression and fulfilment of something that is already 
there, by virtue of being human.
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Refutations
At this point in the argument I am making, I need to show how these 
arguments for nativism or innateness can be refuted. In chapter 1, 
I suggested that a number of concepts are used in the field of learning, 
such as: literacy, numeracy, meta-cognition, emotional intelligence, 
self-regulation, growth, progression, learning, intelligence and many 
more. I also suggested that it is possible to identify different types of 
concepts if we understand a concept-type in relation to how it can be 
used in a way of life. Some of these are: generalisations, abstractions, 
symbols in the mind, acquired dispositions, object categorisations, valued 
configurations, algorithmic formations and semantic conditionals.230 
This class of objects can be understood, as Wittgenstein (1953) did, as 
having family resemblances and not just logical or rationally formed 
relations or connections. There are three principal uses of the term 
‘concept’: concepts as representations in the mind, concepts as abstract 
objects and concepts as abilities.
The first of these maintains that concepts are psychological entities; 
this view is underpinned by a representationalist theory of mind, with 
such a view of the mind–world relationship able to accommodate a notion 
of correspondence, reflection, sameness or manifestation. There is 
something in the world, outside of the structures of a mind, that can 
lead to an equivalent operation in that mind, and these operations can 
be thought of as beliefs, desires, concepts and the like. These are 
psychological states, which are sometimes divided into primitive or 
basic concepts and concepts that are dependent on them. Under this 
conceptualisation, concepts are taken to be foundational or basic, with 
thought – now understood as irremediably conceptual – grounded in 
these images in the mind. Fodor (1975) called this the language of thought 
hypothesis. This representational view of concepts is the default position 
in cognitive science. This is Fodor’s view of what a concept is, and this has 
implications for how it can be learnt or acquired, if at all.
Here again is the argument Fodor made: concepts of both types 
(primitive and complex) cannot be learnt by testing hypotheses; there are 
no other ways by which a concept can be learnt, and therefore concepts 
cannot be learnt. The first problem with this apparently safe conclusion is 
that hypothesis-testing is not the only way we learn concepts. We also 
230 These different views about what a concept is can be encapsulated in the three principal views of 
concepts and conceptual developments discussed here.
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learn concepts through processes such as observation, coaching, 
reflection, meta-cognition, problem-solving and practising. Many of these 
learning modes do not allow us to fall into the trap set by Fodor and, 
consequently, if we adopt a different view of what a concept is, such as 
that concepts are abilities, then other forms of learning can be deemed to 
be legitimate.
Hypothesis-testing implies that at every occasion in which 
hypotheses are formulated by the learner, they always contain elements 
of preformulated concepts. Concepts as dispositional acquisitions, I am 
suggesting in contrast, can be learnt ab initio, although subsequent forms 
of propositional, process and embodied forms of learning may require 
prior acquisition of specific dispositions. The second problem is that 
reflection and reflective processes would under Fodor’s cognitivist 
account (see chapter 5) lose any sense of an inner process of serious 
thought about, or consideration of, a concept. Now, this perhaps is not a 
necessary element of a theory of learning,231 but it creates a considerable 
problem if learning is understood as a conversation between the inner 
and the outer, as involving a capacity to operate outside of embodied, 
socially derived or genetic causal impulses, as accepting that reasons can 
be conceived as causes of human behaviour and as incorporating some or 
other notion of intentionality as a central element in any theory of the 
relationship between mind and world.
The second view of a concept is that concepts are abstract objects. 
Concepts, under this conceptualisation, are the meanings of words and 
word-complexes as opposed to objects and states of mind. Concepts as 
meanings mediate between thought and language and their referents. 
Gottlob Frege (1980) argued for a sense–reference distinction, although 
he did not use the term ‘concept’, but rather referred to the referents of 
a predicate. Again, he used the notion of thought as an equivalence 
of a proposition – thoughts are not psychological states but rather they 
are the meanings of states of mind. However, as Wittgenstein (1953) 
suggested (see chapter 1), there cannot logically be a private language of 
thought, only that for a statement to be meaningful (that is, for it to make 
sense and thus have a use-value), it must in principle and in reality be 
subjected to public criteria of justification to allow a judgement to be 
made about its truth-value. For Wittgenstein, the signs in language can 
work only where there is the possibility of public (comprising other 
people in specific time and place locales) affirmation or disaffirmation. 
231 A learning theory such as behaviourism deliberately eschews such processes, see chapter 11.
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A difficulty with the idea of concepts as abstract objects is that they 
stand or seem to stand outside the causal process; that is, they cannot 
be accessed in the normal way in which we access objects in the world. 
As far as Frege was concerned, we grasp the sense of an expression, 
but this metaphor remains at the level of expression and has little 
ontological substance. And furthermore, it is unclear here how concepts 
can be learnt.
The third principal view of learning is that concepts are abilities, 
and this is the predominant way in which concepts have been understood 
in this book. This does not mean that some concepts cannot be understood 
and conceptualised as abstract objects; however, what this suggests is 
that primitive or basic concepts, such as learning, are neither repre- 
sentative images in the mind nor words and word-complexes in a language 
of thought. And this in effect renders Fodor’s paradox of learning as 
inadequately conceptualised on two counts: first, that concepts are 
understood in too narrow a way so that learning inevitably becomes a 
peripheral activity; and second, that there is a variety of learning types 
that allow learning of concepts as abilities. In the next chapter I will 
address the issue of the connection or relation between different learning 
objectives, or, to put it in another way, progression in learning.
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Progression and learning
Underpinning the notion of progression is a rationale for teaching 
some aspects of the knowledge domain before others and a belief that 
a curriculum can in fact be arranged in a reliable hierarchy. Examples 
of these frameworks are Jean Piaget’s (1962)232 schema comprising 
progression from concrete operational to formal operational thinking, 
and Lawrence Kohlberg’s (1976)233 stages of moral thought, where the 
individual progresses from pre-moral and conventional rule conformity 
levels to the acceptance of general rights and standards, and even to 
adopting individual principles of conduct. These hierarchies, it is claimed, 
are based on empirical investigation – this is how human beings actually 
progress. The other way of establishing knowledge hierarchies is through 
some form of logical ordering, where complexity comprises both a 
progressive development of more items of knowledge and the making of 
more complicated connections between these items of knowledge. Many 
school-based curricula around the world employ progression modes that 
are extensional in design, where this is understood as an increase in the 
amount, or range, of an activity, whether knowledge-based, skill-oriented 
or embodied.234 This has the effect of limiting, and distorting, the notion 
of progression, both between items in a curriculum and in terms of the 
progress a learner makes within that curriculum.
232 Jean Piaget’s theory of cognitive development has been the subject of much criticism, principally 
that child development does not always follow a smooth and predictable path, for example, 
Donaldson (1978).
233 Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory of moral development has been the subject of much criticism, 
principally that a child’s moral development does not always progress in the way suggested by the 
theory. For example, Gilligan (1990) offers a gendered perspective on moral development and a 
disputation of the stepped and developmental nature of such learning.
234 If the only language you permit yourself to use is numbers, then the mode of progression you are 
likely to use will be extensional.
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There are a number of other forms of progression that might 
allow us to give meaning to the concept. The first of these is prior 
condition. In the acquisition of particular knowledge, skill and 
dispositional elements, there are prerequisites in the learning process. 
Progression refers to the relations between operations within a domain. 
The learner in this case is not able to understand a particular operation 
unless he has also acquired knowledge of the previous one and is fully 
conversant with it – he can use it. What this means is that embedded 
logically in the second and higher concept is the operation referred to in 
the first and lower-level concept. This has to be in this conceptualisation 
of progression an integral part of the ability of the learner to grasp the 
concept. For example, counting and cardinality in mathematical thinking 
are prerequisites of operations, algebraic thinking and number and 
operations in base ten. Knowledge of counting and cardinality is a prior 
condition for learning to take place. These are logical relations, which are 
determined by the subject matter or domain content of the particular 
operation under consideration. This does not mean that they are natural 
or ahistorical, since they can be determined only by the current state of 
the domain, and domains ineluctably change their form and structure.235
A second type is intensification. Whereas extension refers to the 
amount or range of progression, intensification or complexity refers to the 
extent to which a sophisticated understanding has replaced a superficial 
understanding of a concept. In relation to the knowledge constructs, 
skills and embodiments implicit within a curriculum, there are four 
possible forms of complexity. These are behavioural complexity, symbolic 
complexity, affective complexity and perceptual complexity.236 There 
is also a type of progression, abstracting, which involves moving from 
a concrete understanding of a phenomenon to a more abstract one. A 
pedagogic response to this type of progression is to revisit and reconstruct 
a set of ideas or operations at different levels of complexity at different 
stages in the learning programme (cf. Bruner, 1996).237
Another type of progression and thus learning is where the end 
result is already present at a first moment in time and is openly revealed 
235 The arguments for the inevitability of change are rehearsed in chapter 4.
236 Behavioural complexity, symbolic complexity, affective complexity and perceptual complexity are 
different types of complexity because they refer to different human capacities and objects: 
behaviours, symbols, emotions and perceptions. As a result, they have different possible forms and 
trajectories.
237 Jerome Bruner argued that there is a need to incorporate a spiral element into the curriculum, 
that is, a set of ideas or operations, once introduced, is revisited and reconstructed in a more formal 
or operational way, at different stages in the learning programme.
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at a second moment in time. As we have already seen, in his Philosophy 
of Meta-Reality (2002), Roy Bhaskar provided a model of learning, which 
he called ‘the unfolding of the enfolded’.238 This model of the unfolding of 
the enfolded understands learning not so much as learning something 
that is external to the learner, but as the realisation of an implicit potential 
that human beings have.
A further type of progression is an increased capacity to articulate, 
explain or amplify an idea or construct; that is, the learner retains 
the ability to deploy the skill and, in addition, he can now articulate, 
explain or amplify what he is able to do and what he has done. In order to 
articulate an experience, there are a number of conditions: knowledge of 
the object, knowledge of the process and knowledge of how the object 
and the process can work.
And finally, progression can be understood as part of a process, and 
this refers to the way in which the learner interacts with the learning 
object. Progression and thus learning are understood as movements from 
a dispositional state to a progressively higher or better dispositional state. 
An example of this would be moving from a dependent state, as in another 
person or institution, to an independent state, where the person does not 
now rely upon any other person or institution. He has achieved some 
independence in his learning.
This suggests that curricula as they are presently conceived around 
the world are deficient if they employ extensional forms of progression 
exclusively at the expense of a range of other types. These forms of 
progression are not of the same order because they refer to different 
aspects of the process of learning. They are linked by their capacity to 
affect different parts of the learning process and, in particular, where a 
person moves from one state of being to another. For example, extensional 
forms of progression focus on the objects of learning, whereas procedural 
forms of progression focus on the learner and the way in which he can 
and does respond to these objects. I need to provide some examples of 
progressive schema.
Scribbling
A first example of a progressive schema is scribbling. With young children, 
scribbling can be categorised in fixed developmental phases, milestones 
or stages:
238 Roy Bhaskar’s model of learning is explained in more detail in chapter 15. It is seriously deficient.
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Stage 1: (broadly 1–2 years old) random or uncontrolled scribbling, 
featuring large movements from the shoulder, fist-held tools, a 
whole body scrubbing motion and an emphasis on sensory 
experience. There is little or no concern for what marks are made.
Stage 2: (2–3 years old) controlled scribbling; attributed to better 
muscle control and pencil grip. Children make repeated marks on 
the page – open circles, diagonal, curved, horizontal or vertical 
lines.
Stage 3: (3+ years) moving towards controlled lines and patterns 
that are viewed as emerging or early signs of developmental writing, 
the naming of scribbling, or what has been called ‘fortuitous 
realism’. (Lowenfeld, 1949)
A child progresses through these stages of learning.239
Moral development
Another example of progression is Lawrence Kohlberg’s schema of 
moral development,240 which I referred to in the last chapter. This is based 
on thinking processes inferred from particular types of behaviours: how 
a person decided to respond to a particular moral dilemma. Kohlberg 
argued that these decisions could be arranged sequentially into six 
stages. Level one, which he called the pre-conventional level, comprises 
two stages. At this level morality is externally sourced. Individuals 
follow rules that are defined for them by others. The individual operates 
through ethical precepts that encourage the idea that they can get away 
with certain things or that they should always seek personal satisfaction. 
There are two stages at level one. The first of these is where punishment 
and the avoidance of it is the dominant motivational behaviour. 
The second is where the individual focuses on receiving rewards or 
satisfying personal needs.
Level two is the conventional level. Following social rules is still 
considered to be important; but the concerns of the individual are now 
239 Viktor Lowenfeld’s influential model of scribbling could have been constructed in a different way, 
given the available evidence then. It has now become the accepted way to understand scribbling and 
thus has become normalised and accepted practice.
240 Regardless of the correctness of his theory, then, it is now true, or at least aspires to be true.
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focused on relationships with other people and even social relations 
in general. Again, at this second level there are two asynchronic stages. 
In the first of these, behaviour is determined by social approval. The 
individual is motivated by a desire to win the approval or affection of 
others. The second of these manifestations is where the individual 
subscribes to wider concerns than close, usually familiar ties, and now 
operates through a belief in the worthwhileness of rules and laws to 
maintain social order.
For Kohlberg there is a third level, the post-conventional or 
principled level. At this level, the individual starts to act from a set of 
principles that he has developed. Morality is defined as a set of abstract 
principles that apply to all human beings in all times and in all places, 
and thus has a universal quality about it. Again, there are two stages. The 
first is a social contractual orientation, where laws and rules are not 
considered to be absolutely right but the best we have and are sanctioned 
by contracts freely entered into by individuals. The second stage is for 
Kohlberg the highest state of being (and this is a requirement of any 
stratified system). Here the individual operates through freely chosen 
ethical principles of conscience, which may override principles relating 
to laws or socially defined rules. Frequent empirical investigations have 
shown that in relation to progression this is how human beings develop. 
In other words, they move from lower levels to higher levels in accord 
with this theoretical schema of progression. And further to this, some 
understanding of and practice at the lower levels is a prerequisite of 
moving satisfactorily to the higher levels. However, these are not just 
logical or empirical accounts of what happens; they are also preferential 
statements by Kohlberg, writing as he did more than 50 years ago, 
although they may have become actual normative progressions since.241
Formal assessment
Another example of progression is the 2014 Research Excellence 
Framework (REF). A similar exercise is being conducted in 2021. These 
are the most recent iterations in a series of national assessments (formerly 
known as Research Assessment Exercises [RAEs]) of the quality of 
research in British universities going back to 1986. The Higher Education 
241 cf. McLeod (2013) – it is the linear nature of the progression mode that has bothered a great 
many people. 
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Funding Council for England (HEFCE) and its equivalent bodies in 
Wales (Higher Education Funding Council for Wales [HEFCW]), Scotland 
(Scottish Funding Council [SFC]) and Northern Ireland (Department of 
Education [DoE]) are responsible for organising the REF and accountable 
to the government for doing so. As a result, HEFCE and the other three 
bodies allocate research monies to UK universities using a formula that is 
decided after the exercise has been completed (in some of these exercises, 
2* outputs were funded generously, whereas in others they received 
only a cursory reward). In 2014, universities were required to submit 
four outputs per member of staff (with some exceptions) (65% of the 
aggregated score), a series of impact case studies (20% of the aggregated 
score) and an account of their institutional research environment (15% 
of the aggregated score) to 36 discipline-based subpanels.
In 2014, 155 institutions submitted the research outputs of 52,077 
research staff members for scrutiny and assessment. In total, the 36 
subpanels were required to read 191,232 individual research outputs 
and grade them on a scale that ranged through 4* (quality that is world-
leading in terms of originality, significance and rigour), 3* (quality that 
is internationally excellent in terms of originality, significance and 
rigour, but which falls short of the highest standards of excellence), 
2* (quality that is recognised internationally in terms of originality, 
significance and rigour), 1* (quality that is recognised nationally in terms 
of originality, significance and rigour) to unclassified (quality that 
falls below the standard of nationally recognised work). Some panel 
members have admitted they were advised to spend roughly 20 minutes 
on each piece, which might be a 250-page book, a 10,000-word article 
in a learned journal or a 15,000-word chapter in a book. Time constraints 
meant that only a superficial reading of the pieces could be made, and it 
is therefore possible to conclude from this that the longer and more 
substantial the piece of work, the less reliable was the judgement being 
made of it. One consequence of this was the mistaken assumption made 
by research directors in universities that researchers should submit 
refereed articles rather than books or book chapters, an output model 
that members of natural science bodies felt more comfortable with than 
those working in the humanities or in some parts of the social science 
community. The judgements made by panel members were meant to be 
criteria-referenced, although subsequent accounts of the deliberations 
that were made after the initial assessments were completed have 
confirmed that adjustments were made to these initial assessments 
to bring the 36 subpanels into line with each other, thus providing 
contradictory evidence to the claims made by university research directors 
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that their internal assessment exercises were in line with, or accurate 
predictions of, actual results.
At this point it is enough to suggest some problems with this 
model. First, excellence was being defined in terms of geographical 
scope and thus a neat and largely meaningless hierarchy was being set up 
that did not reflect the depth and meaning-in-use of the concept of 
excellence. (Self-evidently, meanings-in-use definitions of words or 
concepts change in relation to different conditions and consequently have 
histories.) Bizarrely, the guidance for the 2014 REF denied that this form 
of words is about geographical scope, although the explanation for the 
use of these words does not add much to how they could and should 
be interpreted. The second point is that the three subcategories used 
(originality, significance and rigour) were understood differently 
by different disciplines or even (and this is more important given the 
nature of the divisions used by HEFCE, that is, the 36 subpanels) within 
those disciplines themselves. Evidence that allows a judgement to be 
made about a piece of work is domain-specific, and this includes those 
criteria that an exercise such as the REF uses to make these judgements 
(whether they are actually used is a different issue, but this is certainly 
the intention). The third point is that in effect the readers or assessors 
were being asked to grade each piece of work on a five-point scale without 
paying much attention to any criteria relating to excellence and, 
consequently, their judgements were based on the idea that this piece of 
work is better than this piece, which is better than this other piece, and 
so on. The reasons then for making these judgements were implicit and 
therefore, presumably, a variety of notions (some of which are directly 
in contradiction with each other) of what makes one piece better than 
another was being used.242 At a meta-level, history can be understood 
in progressivist terms.
An idealist sense of history
Georg Hegel is the philosopher who was most concerned to articulate 
a notion of progression. Here, in an idealist sense, history is said to 
encompass a view that one set of arrangements in the history of a people 
242 This was the subject of a British Educational Research Association (BERA) blog (Scott, 2017b). 
Despite the many criticisms made of the REF, it still persists. The reason for this is that it is not meant 
to be helpful or formative, but it is meant to corral and control academics and restrict the types of 
knowledge that can be developed.
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is better or an improvement on a previous set of arrangements, and this 
may even result in a perfectly rational set of arrangements coming to 
fruition, in which we can say that nothing could be improved on. The 
objects and relations between objects in the world are now so conceived 
and actualised that any different set of arrangements would constitute a 
diminished (in terms of some notion of ideational completeness) set 
of arrangements. What this amounts to is the identification of a hierarchy 
of goods or a stratified arrangement of human affairs, which can be shown 
to be better at higher levels than at lower levels.
The philosophical problems are four-fold: first, there are problems 
with identifying what these progressive stages might be; second, there 
are problems with identifying the relations between these different 
stages; third, there is a problem with identifying an end point (for 
example, the end of history as Francis Fukuyama suggested),243 and 
fourth, and perhaps most importantly, there are problems with conflating 
current ways of understanding historical events and happenings with 
ahistorical and universal ways of understanding these matters. With 
regards to the shape and trajectory of human history and the way it 
progresses, the only definitive clues that we have are that an object has 
changed (or will inevitably change) and that this something has become 
better (or has the potentiality to change in a better way). What this 
amounts to is making a claim that there is a large organising theme (for 
example, Hegel’s theory of events as the unfolding of human history), 
meaning (monosemic inevitability) or direction (cyclical, teleological or 
progressive) in history; and that this is not just a retrospective judgement 
but one that has implications for the future or will determine what 
happens in the future. This, then, is different from a goal that a human 
being or set of human beings has, which may or may not be fulfilled 
depending on the circumstances that prevail at the time and the work that 
is put in. It thus treats history as non-arbitrary but as having some 
underlying purpose.
These underlying purposes were more easily expressed in terms of 
some notion of a metaphysical being and becoming one with it. For 
example, Saint Augustine constructed a theology of the self in the 
Confessions (Confessiones in Latin) (2017) and a theology of history in the 
City of God against the Pagans (De civitate Dei contra paganos) (2003). 
Progression in history begins with the Creation, moves through this to the 
243 This neo-Hegelian theory about the end of history and the triumph of liberal democracies and 
capitalist modes of ownership and distribution looks at the present time to be fallacious.
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dysfunctionality of person-made states – with the implication that 
generically humankind is as yet incomplete in some way or another – to 
the realisation of perfection (understood in rational terms) in the 
Kingdom of God. Likewise, the self as part of this project can progress 
towards fulfilment or completion only in God. This is a belief in the 
universality of divine revelation. This does not mean that it is inevitable, 
only that this is the sole way in which real and authentic notions of 
progression can be sustained. There is a divinely ordered plan for 
the universe, and history is understood as theodicy or as eschatology.
Enlightenment thinkers moved away from eschatological inter- 
pretations of history and introduced a new idea to the concept of progress: 
a better or more perfectly organised arrangement for civilisation 
(examples of this form of writing can be found in Condorcet, 2012; and 
in Montesquieu, 1892). This required some assumptions or claims to be 
made about human beings, such as, that human nature is constant over 
time and place, and thus it is possible to identify the different stages that 
all human civilisations go through. It finds perhaps its most important 
expression in Hegel’s philosophy of history, which was in turn inverted 
in Marx’s materialistic theory of the development of economic modes 
of production (cf. Marx, 2009). Other macro-theories of progression 
such as Spengler (2013) understood human history as passing through 
specific stages of youth, maturity and senescence, and that, given what 
human nature is, this is inevitable.
An important criticism of all of these theories of progression is that 
they assume the existence of an ineluctable process whereas in reality 
none exists or can exist. Notions of stages or levels or improvements or 
progressions are simply fanciful notions of what human beings aspire to, 
but there is no inevitability about them happening or nothing in previous 
arrangements or conceptions of human life that lead inevitably to certain 
states of being. There is no super-agent lying behind historical events.
Hegel’s philosophy of history is another super-agential theory, but 
in this case the super-agent is the realisation of human freedom: ‘(t)he 
question at issue is therefore the ultimate end of mankind, the end which 
the spirit sets itself in the world’ (1977: 63). Hegel understood human 
history as a narrative of progressive manifestations of human freedom,244 
from the limited freedoms enshrined in the Ancient Greek polis to the 
individualisation of the Protestant Reformation, to Napoleon in the first 
244 Freedom is a much more complicated concept than most people who use it, especially politicians, 
realise.
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establishment of a rational bureaucratic state, and then to our rights 
enshrined in modern expressions of the nation state, such as the Bill of 
Rights in the United States of America. These are expressions of progress 
in history, with the latter events being better or more rational than the 
former ones.
Hegel’s method is dialectical, although he hardly ever used the term 
in his writings. What this method consisted of was a way of relating 
specific events, happenings and objects in nature to an absolute idea, in 
which a claim (thesis) is necessarily or contingently opposed by its 
apparent opposite (antithesis), which in turn can only be reconciled at a 
higher level of truth (and thus this incorporates a notion of progression) 
by a third claim (a synthesis). Roy Bhaskar understood the dialectic in 
a different way. He provided a formal description of the dialectic as a 
‘process of conceptual or social ... conflict, interconnection and change’ 
(2008b: 32). The dialectic results in a real process of human flourishing 
because it allows the removal of obstacles that can change the conditions 
of existence. Such obstacles are conceived of as absences that must in turn 
be absented in a real, contingent dialectical process of emancipatory 
critique: ‘(o)ntological dialectics is concerned with reality, epistemological 
dialectics is concerned with what is known about reality, and relational 
dialectics metacritically situates our knowledge in relation to what is 
known’ (2008b: 3). Bhaskar understood humanity as having a core 
human nature (which fundamentally is subject to change), and this 
manifests itself in different ways under different conditions.
Learning has to incorporate a notion of progression; that is, 
movement from one state of being to another, with the latter being 
understood as better in some way or another. This introduces an ethical 
dimension to the concept of progression, and thus ineluctably an 
epistemological dimension. We can rise to or reach higher kinds of 
knowledge only through a supersession of what we perceive to be a lower 
kind. Another important learning concept is reflection and I discuss this 
idea in the next chapter.
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17
Pedagogy as reflection  
and imagination
A concept, such as pedagogy, is both a material and discursive object 
and consequently has all the characteristics that we have come to 
associate with these types of object. In the real world, boundaries are 
drawn between objects. As a discursive object, the concept of pedagogy 
has certain properties, such as being polysemic, semantically contested, 
networked, interactive, powerful and dynamic. In addition, as an object 
it has causal powers, both as a conceptual object and also because it is 
in the world, or at least in a world.245 It is also central to any theory of 
learning for which we might want to argue – as the argument I am making 
throughout is that both formal and informal learning environments are 
pedagogically formed.
There are many different views of what pedagogy might be and 
how broad it is as a concept, with three principal theories in existence.246 
The first is a model of pedagogy that can be built up around the idea that 
knowledge is transposed from and to many different locations, and that it 
emanates from outside the learner. The second is a model of pedagogy 
that understands pedagogy as a carrier of something such as identity, 
social positioning, concept acquisition and much more. Basil Bernstein 
(2002) argued that pedagogy was the means by which the accumulated 
knowledge of a society could be produced, distributed and allocated, then 
transposed into an institutional form, and finally changed into a set of 
criterial standards. (Wittgenstein would have argued that these were 
already there, although implicit.) In Bernstein’s terms, this pedagogisation 
245 Pedagogy, then, can be understood as a concept in the traditional propositional sense, and in 
addition as a practice.
246 Alternative views of what pedagogy is invariably technicise the notion.
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comprised three fields of activity: an area of production and distribution, 
a field of recontextualisation and a field of reproduction.247 A third 
approach, then, is the one argued for in this book, which is that pedagogy 
is a mechanism (using this word without its mechanical and deterministic 
elements) and has properties, including causal powers, that operate in 
the churn of other objects (discursive, material, relational and perhaps 
more importantly human).
A concept such as pedagogy has a history. In ancient Greek society, 
a distinction was made between the activities of teachers or pedagogues 
(paidagögus) and subject teachers (didáskalos). In order to understand a 
concept, in this case pedagogy, it is necessary to examine in the first 
instance the history of differences and distinctions that have been made 
to and within it.248 Here is one iteration: a pedagogue is a moral guide and 
custodian of a child-learner (this is complicated by the fact that many of 
these pedagogues were trusted slaves, who assumed an authority role in 
relation to their charges), and in addition a pedagogue is not a subject 
teacher. This revision and modification of the master–slave role is 
captured in remarks attributed to Socrates by Plato (1997: 692). In a 
conversation between Socrates and a young boy called Lysis, Socrates 
asked Lysis whether there is anyone who controls him. Lysis replied, ‘Yes, 
he is my tutor here.’ Socrates then asked whether he is a slave. Lysis 
responded, ‘Why certainly, he belongs to us.’ Socrates concluded the 
exchange by saying, ‘What a strange thing … a free person controlled by 
a slave.’249 The subject teacher, who was not a pedagogue, was known as 
a schoolmaster. A pedagogue, and consequently a pedagogic activity, thus 
became divorced from the idea of a subject teacher and from a notion of 
didactics or learning a subject or subjects.
Immanuel Kant, writing in the latter part of the eighteenth century 
and early part of the nineteenth century, in his work On Pedagogy 
distinguished between the nurturing of the child and formal instruction, 
the point being that pedagogy was at this time understood as more than 
just instruction. Kant made a further distinction between the two insofar 
as he suggested that instruction is a training for school, and guidance is a 
training for life. The distinction between education and training had not 
yet taken on its modern meaning. The instructional element in pedagogy 
247 Without a full understanding of what knowledge is, Bernstein trivialises the conception of the 
transformative process. In addition, he treats culture and cultural formations as rationally coherent 
and logically consistent.
248 See chapter 6, ‘Difference’.
249 Lysis is one of Plato’s dialogues. It discusses the nature of philia, or friendship, even though the 
word originally referred to a more intimate bond.
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had earlier been introduced, at least in an unformed way, with the 
publication of John Comenius’ book, The Great Didactic (Didactica Magna) 
(2012).250 This development of didactics suggested that the point of life 
was to develop as a rational, self-regulated and devout human being. The 
book concludes with some trivial, although this is not intentional, remarks 
about: the need to respect a learner’s stage of development, what 
knowledge is, the idea that teaching should be at the level of specifics 
and that generalisations should be built from these, the injunction that 
teaching should not cover too many themes or issues at the same time,251 
and the further injunction that teaching should proceed in a slow and 
methodical fashion. Its triviality provides of course no evidence of its 
importance or influence, and Comenius’ book is now thought of as the 
foundation document for a notion of didactics. One of Kant’s successors, 
Johann Friedrich Herbart, introduced into the concept of pedagogy a 
further distinction between education (educatio in the original Latin) 
and teaching (instructio in the original Latin).252 To some extent this 
mirrored or at least reinforced the distinction that I referred to earlier 
between pedagogic activity (paidagögus) and didactics (didáskalos) 
common in Ancient Greek society; however, the effect was to bring into 
the clustered concept of pedagogy the notion of didactics, to interiorise 
what was for some an external activity. For Herbart, education was about 
the shaping of character, teaching was about the acquiring of knowledge. 
Herbart in addition wanted to subordinate the concept of teaching to 
education.
Another way of framing the concept is through determining what 
counts as a pedagogic activity. This sense of inclusion and exclusion is an 
ever-present concern, with the stress on instrumentality and examinability 
as criteria for certain types of knowledge being included in a curriculum 
and others being excluded. Indeed, the concept of pedagogy is now 
understood as exclusively didactic, with this borrowed idea more in line 
with how pedagogy is used as a concept in Europe. Didactics now has a 
more instrumental function.
An alternative notion of pedagogy is what has become known as 
social pedagogy,253 which has its roots in Continental Europe and 
Scandinavia; and it also takes us back to Ancient Greek notions of 
250 The Great Didactic (Didactica Magna) was first published in Czech in 1648, Latin in 1657 and 
English in 1896.
251 This mimics Andreas Schleicher’s (2015) unsuccessful attempt at determining protocols for 
learning from a comparative survey.
252 cf. Blyth (1981).
253 Some of the features of social pedagogy are discussed in Smith (2009).
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pedagogy, expressed through the figure of the pedagogue. The principle 
behind this new or revived form of pedagogy is the flourishing child, or 
at least a focus not on the narrow instrumentalism of learning but 
learning as an integral part of being and becoming a human being. So, 
the emphasis is not just on a child learning a particular aspect of living – 
for instance, how to read a particular type of text – but on the consequences 
of being able to do this in and for the child’s own life and the lives of other 
peoples. The scope of pedagogic activity has been widened to include 
notions of reflection, meta-cognition and self-awareness. The first of 
these elements is reflection.
Reflection
Reflective learning as a concept has been understood in a variety of ways. 
However, in order to make any sense of these notions, I want to make a 
number of claims about learning. The first is that in accessing the world, 
which is a precondition for saying anything at all about learning, there 
has to be an acknowledgement that we are dealing with: i) a person with 
the capacity to access the environment, who is distinct in some form or 
another from another person; ii) a learning object, that is, something that 
is to be learnt, that is in all respects at a certain moment in time distinct 
from the person with the capacity to learn; iii) a means whereby the 
learning object can be accessed by the person, in short, a learning strategy 
(an interiorisation process); and iv) a subsequent, and thus after-the-
event, process where the person reconnects with the environment by 
using powers that have resulted from this initial learning event (an 
exteriorisation process). The focus of a reflective activity relates to the 
third of these claims.
What seems here to be a straightforward process of interiorisation 
and then exteriorisation is replete with difficulties. The first difficulty is 
being able to conceptualise the idea of a person or self-conscious being, 
material object or living thing as a central motivating force. One of the 
characteristics attached to a person is a sense of identity; however, put in 
this way, this presupposes that there is something else besides this sense 
of identity to which the latter attaches itself. Another difficulty is the 
notion of personhood, so we can say that a person or self has some 
characteristics, without which she would not qualify to be a person. For 
example, does a foetus qualify as a person? Does a person in a vegetative 
state qualify as a person? Does this mean that for a person to qualify as a 
person she has to have certain properties of the mind? (I am taking for 
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granted that she has to have certain bodily properties; that is, she has 
to be physically conscious in some sense of that word-complex.) Then 
there is a sense of personal identity over time. What this precludes is the 
person being only a piece of furniture in the mind, a receptacle for 
thoughts, sensations, reflexes and the like. And the reason for this is that 
what persists through time is literally the changing object of the mind, 
which may be given a form and a substance in different ways at different 
time moments. It is not empty, and it is temporally situated.
A number of answers to the question of what a person is have been 
proposed. For example, human beings are biological organisms, with the 
consequence that any notion of free will that we may entertain is merely 
an illusion. This dissolves the binary divide between the brain and the 
mind and suggests that physicalism – the idea that all of our activities in 
the mind are subject to molecular causative processes – is correct. Human 
beings are material objects. They progress or move between different time 
moments in specific ways.254
In contrast, human beings throughout the ages have been 
understood as immaterial substances or as having souls in a religious 
sense, which are distinct from material bodies, although our language 
structures are not yet developed enough to give a complete account of 
these immaterial substances. Human beings have also been described by 
David Hume (2000), among others, as being ‘bundles of perceptions’ – 
there is no organising vessel, only sets of internalities, externalities and 
relations between them. This characterisation of the learning-self is 
derived from Hume’s associationism rather than any material causality 
that is implied by the way the world might work.
Margaret Archer’s (2007) notion of a mind has as its centrepiece a 
model of individual reflexivity that includes a notion of inner speech, 
where parts of the mind talk to or communicate with other parts of 
the mind. This internal conversation has three conditioning structures. 
The first is that it is a genuinely interior phenomenon, which implies that 
a human being has a private life – this is not to be confused with a private 
language because, first, speech or language may not be the medium used 
and, second, if it is, then it is a public language. The second conditioning 
structure is that this sense of subjectivity has a first-person ontology – it 
relates directly to a particular person. And third, it possesses causal 
powers, in that material and discursive consequences could follow 
directly from the particular internal conversation.
254 I discussed these notions of physicalism in chapter 9.
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This is a notion of reflection, or even reflexivity, which is a way 
of saying that a human object can be disposed to reflect back on itself. 
Archer (2007) identified four types of reflexive action. The first of these 
is what she called communicative reflexivity. Here the life of the mind is 
characterised by an internal conversation that is a part of the whole 
process of learning. The second type of reflexive action is what she called 
autonomous reflexivity, and here the processes of the internal conversation 
are foreshortened and may be automatic and involuntary, insofar as they 
lead to actions. The self-referential conversations have taken place in 
the past; the externalisation process is given emphasis. Then there are 
meta-reflexive processes, in which the principal focus is the internal 
conversation; interiorisation and exteriorisation processes are neglected. 
The purpose is for one part of the mind to interrogate other parts or 
contents of the mind – to be, in other words, critically reflexive. This is an 
internal process, although there may be consequences in relation to 
future actions. Finally, Archer suggested that there may also be fractured 
reflexive processes, in which the interrogation by one part of the mind of 
another part does not proceed smoothly and coherently, leading to 
distress and disorientation.
Reflection is a seminal form of learning. It has been variously 
described as critical reflection, reflective practice, reflective thinking 
and reflexivity. Whereas some see these terms as interchangeable and as 
having similar meanings, others have sought to differentiate between 
different types and levels of reflective activity. Critical reflection is seen as 
a precursor to transformative learning255 by supporting the development 
of meta-cognition through the use of critical reflective practices. It is 
widely recognised as a key component in the learning processes of 
individuals and organisations. There is a wide variation in the techniques 
and approaches used in the practice of critical reflection. There is, 
however, general agreement that the process of critical reflection needs 
to be facilitated, with approaches ranging from informal discussions to 
highly structured interventions. The second element is meta-cognition.
Meta-cognitive learning
Meta-cognitive learning256 refers to learners’ awareness of their own 
knowledge and their ability to understand, control and manipulate their 
255 Transformative learning fails to give any real semantic content to the notion.
256 cf. Butler (2015).
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own cognitive processes. There are three types of meta-cognitive processes 
that have been identified. The first is meta-memorisation. This refers to the 
learner’s awareness of her own memory systems and her ability to deploy 
strategies for using her memories effectively. The second is meta-
comprehension. This refers to the learner’s ability to monitor the degree 
to which she understands the information being communicated to her, to 
recognise her failures to comprehend, and to employ repair strategies.
The third of these is self-regulation. This refers to the learner’s 
ability to make adjustments to her own learning processes. The concept 
of self-regulation overlaps with meta-memorisation and meta-
comprehension; its focus is on the capacity of the learners themselves 
to monitor their own learning (without external stimuli or persuasion) 
and to act independently. These regulatory processes may be highly 
automated, making it difficult for the learner to articulate them. Self-
regulated learning approaches stress the importance of three regulatory 
processes: regulation of the self; regulation of the learning process; 
and regulation of information processing mechanisms. The efficacy of 
the self-regulation process depends on the aggregated effect of cognitive, 
meta-cognitive and motivational elements. The third element is self- 
awareness.
Self-awareness
Self-awareness demands some form of reflection. Being conscious 
makes sense only in relation to the presence of a relevant meta-state of 
mind and it is this that constitutes a reflective ability. Reflection in this 
sense, then, is both a relationship between different activities in the mind 
and a determinant of the capacity of the self to engage in these activities. 
Phenomenologists explicitly deny that self-consciousness, indeed the 
reflective process, is to be understood in terms of a judgement being 
made about its conformity to a higher-order evaluative marker. Rather, 
it is to be understood as an intrinsic feature of the experience itself. The 
phenomenologist insists on the existence of some form of pre-reflective 
self-consciousness. What this implies is that any account of learning, 
and in particular learning that involves an examination of internal 
activities in the mind, does not and cannot predicate a self that acts 
separately and in a controlling manner over the stream of consciousness. 
This self-awareness or reflective capacity is not an added extra, a different 
part of the experience. It is implicit in the experience itself and excludes 
other types of reflection on existing thoughts.
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Temporality, or our temporal existence, allows us to return to and 
investigate our past experiences, but only at the expense of intruding 
on the process of living or having those experiences. Our knowledge 
of our experiences is therefore literally out of step with the ontological 
reality of our lived experiences. Any knowledge we have about learning 
and learning processes never fits in an absolute sense with what is actually 
happening. However, we should and do still engage in self-referential 
and self-critical acts. We do this by reflectively directing our thoughts 
back on themselves, and by practical acts of self-determination, self-
willing and self-formation, in the process modifying those capacities and 
what they are about. In addition, what is being reflected on is transformed 
by the act of reflection. The object of learning is neither perfectly mirrored 
as a result of the reflective activity nor is it constitutively the same as it 
was before.
Furthermore, the act of reflective self-awareness is an embodied 
act, which acts to position the individual in relation to the world. This 
suggests a sense of embodied agency in learning and in other actions 
in the world. Judgements that I make about myself, criteria that I 
appropriate in the making of these judgements, ethical positions that 
I take up and adopt in the course of my life, are all constrained and 
enabled by social expectations, language structures, conceptual framings 
and cultural values. These three notions of reflection, meta-cognition and 
self-awareness are essential elements of a pedagogy of imaginative 
possibility.
Imaginative possibilities
Some examples of learning objects are: learning how to behave in 
a classroom; learning that two plus two equals four; learning what a 
concept such as succession might mean; learning how one should behave 
in settings outside school; learning how to read; learning about the 
spatiality of objects in the world; learning what grammar is; learning to 
be kind; learning how to take part in a conversation; learning a language; 
learning a new language; learning how to catch a ball; learning how to 
trap a football; learning what trapping a football might mean; learning 
how to build a house; learning how to be literate and numerate and 
becoming literate and numerate; learning how to express a wish; learning 
what a father is and what love is; learning what being a part of a form 
of life might be like and many more. All of these learning objects have 
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dispositional elements – so, for example, you do not just learn how to 
count up to six, you understand the activity of counting upwards as 
enframed in a complicated network of concepts and what things are.
Stanley Cavell (1979: 177) described this enframing in the following 
way:
In learning language, you do not merely learn the pronunciation of 
sounds, and their grammatical orders, but the ‘forms of life’ which 
make those sounds the words they are, do what they do – e.g. name, 
call, point, express a wish or affection, indicate a choice or an 
aversion, etc. And Wittgenstein sees the relationships among these 
forms as ‘grammatical’ also.
For Wittgenstein, grammar is a semantic idea; in trying to understand the 
grammar of a collection of pedagogic processes and learning objects, we 
are always looking at what is meant by them and their arrangements. 
Grammar is not understood in terms of its linguistic reference, but rather 
in terms of how it can show meaning – what concerned Wittgenstein 
was the semantic possibilities of the grammar of a pedagogic process or 
learning object.
A child learns by using her imagination and being allowed to use 
her imagination. The reason for this is to develop and extend a child’s 
ability to determine the possibilities of objects (Wittgenstein’s phenomenal 
possibilities).257 Throughout this book I have been constructing an 
argument that concept learning is about developing the imaginative 
possibilities of how a concept can be used in a way of life. This mirrors 
Wittgenstein’s notion of learning as being about dispositional concepts 
and acquiring these dispositional concepts as they are used in the world 
and as they fit within a framework or network of other dispositional 
concepts in the world, through determining the possibilities of use 
and being that inhere in that object (concept or otherwise), even if only 
temporally. A pedagogy of imaginative possibility can be construed as a 
play-pedagogy.
257 To reiterate: ‘(w)e feel as if we had to see right into phenomena: yet our investigation is directed 
not towards phenomena, but rather as one might say, towards the “possibilities” of phenomena. What 
this means is that we call to mind the kinds of statement that we make about phenomena’ 
(Wittgenstein, 1953: §90, his italics).
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A play-pedagogy
The principles that ground a notion of play-pedagogy have been set 
out in the various chapters of the book that you have read so far, if 
your reading proceeded chapter by chapter in a sequential order. These 
principles are: i) a play-pedagogy is a compound word-object that gets its 
semantic content from meanings that are given to both words and then 
used in combination; ii) word-objects (compound or otherwise) can be 
understood only in relation to how they are used in the world or a world; 
iii) using criteria, or acknowledging that there are always criteria being 
used in judgements that are made, points to the purpose or function of 
these criteria – the use of any criteria signifies a set of enablements and 
constraints as to how a word-compound or a concept such as play-
pedagogy can be used; iv) a play-pedagogy is a compound concept that 
in its use allows us to say something about two human activities or 
practices: playing and learning; v) a concept such as play-pedagogy is 
better understood as an active, engaged and committed activity in the 
world, rather than as a proposition, skill or embodiment; vi) play-
pedagogy as a concept has a binding relationship to knowledge and this 
can be expressed as a means for learning particular objects that are in the 
world, but that can be learnt only in a particular way; vii) the activity 
or learning task has a logical relationship with the learning model being 
employed; viii) ethical and taxonomic valuations that inhere in the 
concept and in the practice of play-pedagogy are central to the meanings 
we give to this compound concept; ix) knowledge of the concept and 
how it is used in the world is transformed at the pedagogic site, so it is 
possible to suggest that properties such as: the simulation of the learning 
object, the representational mode of the object, its degree and type of 
amplification, control in the pedagogic relationship, progression or its 
relations with other learning objects, the type of pedagogic text, relations 
with other people in the learning process, the organisation of time 
(temporal relations) and types of feedback mechanism are fundamental 
components of this pedagogic transformation (see chapter 12); x) what 
this means is that in the learning process, the learning object, in this case 
play-pedagogy, takes a new form as a result of changes to its properties; 
and xi) the concept of play-pedagogy has attached to it properties 
that relate to the grammar of the pedagogic process within which the 
learner is embedded.
The concept and practice of play is grounded in the proposition that 
looking at things as if they could be otherwise is a worthwhile activity. 
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Play is about transformational possibilities; that is, it both creates the 
conditions for being imaginative, and it allows the practice of imagination 
to function. This transformational process refers to ideas, materials, 
media and actions, creating in the process novel ways of thinking about 
these activities. Maxine Greene258 suggested that play allows the shifting 
of perspectives and different ways of seeing. There are three possibilities 
here: introducing into the learning setting alternative ways of seeing and 
thinking of which the learner was not aware; reworking the meanings 
that the learner has given to objects, object-relations and object-
configurations in the mind; and filling in the gaps by making something 
more coherent than it is at present.
Lev Vygotsky’s (1978) emphasis on play as a pedagogy has been one 
of the most significant omissions in discussions of his work. Play allows 
the child – although it could be any learner exercising her imagination – 
to create her own rules of behaviour and to become the central organiser 
of those rules. Play allows the child to attach meanings to objects, both in 
relation to those semantic networks that any play activity operates within 
and in relation to her sense of self. Play, for Vygotsky, allows the child 
to fulfil desires that otherwise are denied to her by adults and teachers: 
‘(p)lay is such that the explanation for it must always be that it is 
imaginary, illusory realisation of unrealizable desires’ (Vygotsky, 1978: 
6). As a consequence, play allows children to initiate and act out desires 
that are outside of their normal daily routines and experiences. Play is the 
externalisation of acts of imagination into actions in the world. When 
children play with toys, for example, what they are being allowed to do is 
violate the rules and especially the norms in their lifeworld, albeit a 
limited lifeworld, and thus this leads in a learning sense to the expansion 
of the possibilities of use of an object: play is ‘a novel form of behaviour in 
which the child is liberated from situational constraints through his (sic) 
activity in an imaginary situation’ (Vygotsky, 1978: 11).
Understanding the relationship between imagination and memory 
is salient here. A standard account of memory is that it has three elements: 
non-declarative memory, where the person cannot access the content of 
the activity under consideration, such as learning to walk, but can still 
perform the activity; semantic declarative memory, which consists of 
propositions about the world and does not include references to the 
contents of that person’s mind; and episodic declarative memory, which 
258 Maxine Greene (2000: 5) wrote as follows: ‘(s)ocial imagination is the capacity to invent visions 
of what should be in our deficit society, in the streets where we live and in our schools. Social 
imagination not only suggests but also requires that one take action to repair or renew.’
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makes direct reference to the person and can be divided into past, present-
past and future happenings. There are some significant differences 
between the concepts of imagination and memory. David Hume (2000: 
13), in A Treatise of Human Nature, distinguished between them in terms 
of strength of impression: ‘the ideas of the memory are much more lively 
and strong than those of the imagination’. Aristotle, in De Anima (On the 
Soul; 1987),259 suggested that a causal connection between memories and 
what happened in the past was present in memory but not present in 
imaginings. Memory can also be understood in a different way from how 
it is understood by many cognitive scientists, as a process of constructing 
and reconstructing the contents of the mind in response to changing 
circumstances, both in the mind and in the world generally. Imaginings 
do not and cannot have this function. A distinction can also be drawn 
between supposition and imagination. Supposition involves only those 
functions that we associate with cognition, whereas imagination involves 
a range of functions and activities, including cognition.260
There is also the sense that can be given to imagination of under- 
standing and connecting with other people’s minds and circumstances. 
This argument has been made by Maxine Greene (2000) in its strongest 
form: in order to behave well towards other people and to empathise with 
them and their circumstances, we must have a strong sense of imagination 
because in imagining we step outside of our own beliefs, understandings, 
reflections and memories in a transgressive sense, and thus implicitly 
accept that there is another person or persons not like us. This both 
affirms to us the existence of other people and other minds and allows us 
to behave in ways that are not purely solipsistic.
Another sense that can be given to the term imagination is that it 
allows one to develop alternative meanings of a concept or word-complex. 
This is after all what I have been doing throughout this book: following 
Wittgenstein’s injunction that in trying to understand a phenomenon, one 
has to work out the possibilities of use that inhere in that phenomenon. 
We, of course, have to do more than this, such as also trying to understand 
259 De Anima can be translated as ‘On the Soul’.
260 Pretending and imagining are sometimes thought of as homologous concepts. An obvious 
distinction between the two is that one is a state of the mind and the other is a behaviour in the 
world. Some psychopathologies such as autism and delusionary disorder have been described as 
disorders of the imagination; what is meant by this is that the autistic person or the delusional 
person is lacking an imaginative capacity. They cannot imagine what it is like to be another person 
or a different person, and thus their beliefs, self-reflections and actions are wholly self-oriented. 
There is a great deal of controversy attached to these notional states and thus also to their association 
with a lack of imagination.
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how it fits into a network of other concepts, propositions, embodiments 
and processes. Imaginative processes are not inductive, deductive, 
retroductive or abductive; they operate in the space of possibility.
The key for us here is to work out what the connection might 
be between an act of imagination and a specific act of learning. In 
learning, we are engaging in a number of processes, such as responding 
to a learning stimulus, internalising something from an environment, 
reflecting in different types of ways on that learning object, assimilating 
that learning object into the array of other objects in the mind, and then 
externalising and establishing a new relationship with the environment, 
even though this might have changed as a result of the actions of other 
human beings. At the reflective level, there may be room for imagining 
what the learning object is not – an imaginative recreation of the 
possibilities that inhere in the object. For example, counterfactuals in 
history are an imaginative way of determining the possible explanations 
of an object-configuration in time. Modal arguments work on the 
assumption that some functions of an object may be fallible, including 
knowledge in general, and it is this fallibility and corrigibility that can act 
as a guide to what is really possible in a broad sense. Thought experiments, 
such as Galileo’s injunction to contrast the falling of a composite of a 
heavy and a light object against the falling of a heavy object on its own, 
is another example.261
Following the principle that a pedagogy or learning process is 
logically dependent on the meanings that inhere in the learning object, 
play as a practice would seem to fit this best. And this is because play has 
characteristics that better align with the exercise and development of 
an imaginative capacity in the learner. Playing then, is not a rest from 
learning – a way of renewing the energies and capacities of the learner 
before she embarks on harder and more demanding tasks – but an 
essential pedagogic process for learning certain types of object in the 
world and, perhaps more significantly, for learning, and laying the 
foundations for learning, other types of object as well. What I have been 
arguing for here also applies to two other important knowledge concepts 
– curriculum and assessment – and I focus on these in the next chapter.




I have already pointed to and therefore implicitly endorsed a notion of 
error (see chapter 1), or at least the possibility of operating with and 
through a flawed theoretical perspective. In this chapter I examine a 
particular theory of curriculum knowledge (cf. Young and Muller, 2007; 
2010; Young, 2005). Despite its imperfections, it has been enormously 
influential. I want to suggest that it is incorrect, or at least imperfect, and 
can be doubted – that is, doubted in a philosophical sense.262 The question, 
then, that immediately comes to mind is: what are the grounds for saying 
this, both in relation to this theory and generally? If one wants to critically 
examine a theory in the world (let us call this theory T1), then one has 
to do two things: first, set out a more complete or adequate theory (let us 
call this T2) and provide compelling reasons as to why T2 is complete or 
fundamentally sound; and second, show that the original theory that is 
being critically analysed (T1) fails to satisfy the standards or criteria 
implicit in T2. Two inferences can be made from this: the first is that all 
knowledge is flawed or incomplete or inadequate to some degree, and for 
good reasons, and thus the judgement being made here is one of the 
relative inadequacy of T1 in relation to a set of criteria in which there is an 
acknowledgement that it can never be perfectly adequate or sufficient. 
And the second type of inference that can be made is that it operates 
against criteria that have some universal and transcendental properties 
(see chapter 2). These two arguments are not compatible.
The first type of judgement needs to be enframed within a notion of 
epistemic263 fallibility. Fundamentally, a judgement about knowledge has 
262 Doubt is a concept and should be understood, in line with the argument that I am making in this 
book, as doubting in an active and dispositional sense.
263 I am using the word ‘epistemic’ in two ways: as relating to knowledge or epistemology and as 
relating to one of the justifications for knowledge: what is outside the mind but has an influence on 
its contents.
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a background to it, and in part this reflects the degree to which that 
knowledge is considered to be fallible. A number of different types of 
fallibilism have been suggested. The first sense that can be given to this 
notion is where the person believes that because he is positioned in 
relation to the external world, then his perspective is limited and thus the 
knowledge he produces is compromised and incorrigible. A second type 
of fallibilism comprises the possibility of making mistakes that in theory 
could be corrected and this is therefore a corrigible version of fallibilism. 
A third type is a form of epistemic scepticism, in that the individual holds 
that no true knowledge is possible because there are no convincing 
arguments to refute the possibility of being radically deceived. Again, this 
type is incorrigible because, if it is accepted, there could be no possibility 
of correction. A fourth type reflects Karl Popper’s (2002) hypothesis that 
knowledge is produced through processes of conjecture and refutation, 
but this can never attain to a perfect form of knowledge, since the 
changing and emergent nature of reality means that knowledge always 
lags behind its referent. Again, this is an incorrigible version of fallibilism 
because there is no possibility of ever keeping abreast with the way the 
world is currently structured. Epistemological fallibilism may also cast 
doubt as to whether the various forms of logical relations between items 
are sufficiently robust to allow the production of knowledge. The 
application of epistemic criteria in judgement is therefore determined 
by the degree and type of fallibility underpinning the epistemology used 
by the investigator in making his knowledge claim.
In relation to the second type of judgement, it may be possible to 
develop criteria for making judgements that allow us to say that T2 is a 
better description or gives a better account of the world, or a specific part 
of it, than T1. As I noted in chapter 2, a minimum set of conditions for a 
belief to be thought of as rational or intelligible is as follows: there are 
reasons for supporting a belief and these reasons can be construed in 
evidential form; these reasons are relevant to this belief insofar as they 
are necessary and sufficient for holding it and using it in the world; there 
are no contrary reasons publicly available or imagined for not holding 
that belief; this set of reasons is internally coherent; and there are a series 
of logical connectives, conditionals and inferential methods available 
for use, so that there is a reliable method that can be used for connecting 
evidence, reasons and beliefs. On these grounds, then, we can be 
confident in our judgement that T2 is preferable to T1.
There are other grounds as well, which consist of our four tests for 
making a judgement about a theory (see chapter 3). The first is epistemic, 
where one theory is better than another because the relationship between 
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knowledge of the world and how the world is structured is better 
aligned. The second element or process is where a theory or description 
of the world is superior to another because within it there are fewer 
contradictions and logical anomalies. A third approach focuses on the 
capacity of the theory or model to be more rational and intelligible than 
its rivals; and a fourth approach suggests that a theory is to be preferred 
to another because it is more practically adequate or has stronger links to 
extant frameworks of meaning. These four processes, once they have 
been reconciled, allow us to make judgements about theories, models and 
descriptions of the world.
In one of his later works, On Certainty, Wittgenstein (1969: §58) 
suggested that knowledge of anything implies the logical possibility of 
doubt:
If ‘I know etc.’ is conceived as a grammatical proposition, of course 
the ‘I’ cannot be important. And it properly means ‘There is no such 
thing as a doubt in this case’ or ‘The expression “I do not know” 
makes no sense in this case’. And of course, it follows from this that 
‘I know’ makes no sense either.
Wittgenstein in both the Investigations (1953) and in On Certainty rejected 
the Cartesian idea that true knowledge consists of the absence of doubt. 
The example he gave in the Investigations is about pain, where he argued 
that because he could not seriously doubt that he was in pain, it made no 
sense to say that he knew he was in pain. For him, making a judgement is 
a cognitive achievement, and this includes the possibility of failure. This 
notion of cognitive achievement is central to the particular idea of a 
concept – what a concept is – that is being used in this book.264
Non-arbitrary knowledge
The more complete or adequate theory (T2) in turn needs to be justified, 
or at least a compelling set of reasons needs to be provided to show that 
it is superior in some way or another to an alternative theory (a T1). An 
expression of this superiority is to call the more complete or adequate 
theory non-arbitrary knowledge and to call the inferior versions arbitrary, 
264 A notion of cognitive achievement is central to how we can understand what a concept is and how 
it can be acquired.
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insofar as these versions of knowledge do not and cannot be justified in 
any reasonable way. There are thus a number of features of knowledge 
that might qualify the knowledge set to be non-arbitrary; for example, 
its ontogenesis, its disciplinarity, its sociality, its testability, its purposive 
or intentional nature, and its capacity to transcend the uniqueness of 
particular standpoints. There are other features, such as its rationality, its 
representative capacity and its integrity, but these have been addressed 
in previous chapters (see chapters 1, 2 and 3). The question that needs 
to be answered is: do any of these characteristics allow us to argue that 
knowledge can be non-arbitrary?
The first of these is ontogenesis. Knowledge emerges from previous 
knowledge, and therefore has historical roots. The non-arbitrary element 
is its heritage, and this suggests that ideas develop; it is this genesis that 
constitutes non-arbitrariness. However, if an assumption is made that 
knowledge – whether within the disciplines or outside of them – comes 
about because a person or a group of people produce a new version of 
knowledge, and this is rooted in previous iterations of that knowledge 
domain, then ontogenesis is a weak rationale for knowledge. The reason 
for this is that both arbitrary and non-arbitrary knowledge could have this 
characteristic. However, if we extend this argument so that knowledge 
becomes, as a result of its genesis, better at explaining the real world 
(the epistemic construal), or providing a greater degree of epistemic 
integration (the coherentist argument), or offering an improved resource 
for society (the pragmatic justification), then the ontogenetic argument 
is strengthened.
A second feature of knowledge, which might provide us with a 
reason or set of reasons for identifying a non-arbitrary dimension, is 
disciplinarity. I have already referred to various disciplinary knowledge 
classifications; for example, Bernstein’s (2000) typology comprising 
a distinction between vertical and horizontal knowledges. There may 
be external reasons for the development of these disciplinary forms 
of knowledge as well as internal reasons. For example, the development 
of computer technology produced a new discipline devoted to the 
production of a specialised language, protocol for behaving, set of 
evaluative criteria and a division of labour within the discipline, including 
a differentiated knowledge base for that division of labour. Changes 
in disciplinary knowledge therefore may be derived from internal and 
external sources; and external factors may act to strengthen the non-
arbitrary dimension of the knowledge domain under consideration, 
insofar as this contributes to the epistemic construal becoming more 
adequate.
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As a consequence of these internal and external changes, evolving 
disciplinary forms of knowledge change their mode of operation. This 
refers to their spatial components, their applications, their relations to 
the practicum and their emanations. For example, Gibbons et al. (1994) 
distinguished between Mode 1 and Mode 2 knowledge. Mode 1 knowledge 
is linear, causal and cumulative, originates in the university, is applied 
to the practice setting, is disciplinary-sourced, and reductionist. Mode 2 
knowledge, in contrast, is trans-disciplinary, practicum-sourced, hete- 
rarchical, transient and produced in situ. Mode 2 knowledge is developed 
and used outside of the disciplinary setting. Furthermore, it has been 
suggested that Mode 2 knowledge has replaced Mode 1 knowledge as 
the dominant form of knowledge in society.265
Even if social relations of power have featured in the genesis of 
a discipline, it may still be possible to distinguish between moments in 
the development of the discipline initiated by historically situated 
social relations of power, and moments initiated by drivers that are 
independent of these social relations of power. This would allow one to 
suggest that these moments are non-arbitrary. This does not mean that 
the production and development of this knowledge domain was 
independent of those working in the discipline, but only that their work 
contributed to a knowledge domain that could in principle be judged to 
be superior to another domain on grounds other than social relations 
of power. However, what this argument then requires is a justification 
for knowledge that does not refer to these social relations of power.
A third feature is its sociality. Even if a distinction is made between 
internal and external relations with regards to the genesis of knowledge, 
this cannot mean that the former operates outside of the social and the 
latter incorporates all that we mean by the social, which includes any 
references to relative or arbitrary knowledge. The point is that even if one 
accepts that the production of knowledge is not tied inexorably to the 
development of particular vested interests, including cognitive interests, 
this does not mean that we can rule out cognitive values that are 
independent of local power struggles. These are universal values. It might 
also mean that there are no cognitive values that are relative to particular 
places and times or specific discourse communities (in other words, these 
values are local or relative); or that there are no means for determining 
that one theory is better than another theory (that is, these means are 
265 Mode 1 and Mode 2 types of knowledge, and the distinctions between them, have been 
enormously influential; however, it is hard to see how they can be sustained as forms of true 
knowledge.
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universally justified); or even that there is no infrastructure for the 
production of knowledge that transcends time and place (this would 
provide a universal means of legitimation). Each of these four alternatives 
needs to be justified in turn, and then compared in order to determine 
which is the strongest argument. And that argument needs to embrace the 
idea of the social production of knowledge, and not rule out transcendental 
and therefore universal criteria for determining that one theory is better 
than another theory, which is the basis for any knowledge claim.
Michael Young (2005) took the view that disciplinary knowledge is 
not arbitrary, is social, but cannot be equated with the results of power 
struggles between people engaged in arguments about what is or is not 
true knowledge – arguments that engage academics throughout their 
working lives. This refers to the idea that there are power struggles about 
knowledge, which one of the protagonists wins in the end, and that this 
results in the legitimation of one version and the delegitimation of the 
other. However, this does not mean that ineluctably the stronger or the 
more coherent or the more correct version is the one that is adopted. If 
this were so, then this would render those struggles about knowledge 
irrelevant, because there would then be an inevitability to the adoption 
of the more correct idea, and as I have suggested previously, incorrect 
ideas may be accepted in society, even if they have the potential over time 
to become more truthful, because of the looping nature of the relationship 
between description and object.
A fourth feature is its testability or its capacity to be tested for 
its truth-value in a variety of settings, such as practical, laboratory, 
research and workshop environments. This is a variant on a disciplinary 
justification: if knowledge is tested in various ways, this therefore reduces 
its arbitrariness, and consequently knowledge can be thought of as non-
arbitrary because it conforms to the rules developed in the disciplines or 
domains for knowledge development, which means that knowledge is 
tested against a set of discipline- or domain-specific criteria. If we want to 
argue that the only rationale for knowledge development is that it 
conforms to a set of rules developed in this way, then we are reverting to 
an internal justification for knowledge development.266 What this position 
emphatically rejects is any reference point to an external reality outside 
our internal beliefs. This takes us further from an initial rejection of a 
correspondence or mirroring relationship between language and reality 
266 This is Richard Rorty’s (1979: 185) position, since he argues that ‘nothing counts as justification 
unless by reference to what we already accept, and that there is no way to get outside our beliefs and 
our language so as to find some test other than coherence’.
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to a position where reference can be internal only, and an external world 
cannot even be contemplated.
A fifth feature is its intentionality, and an argument is constructed 
to the effect that knowledge is arbitrary if it does not have a convincing 
purpose. This feature is consequentialist, because it is concerned with the 
consequences or effects of using this knowledge in the world. There may 
be a number of reasons why intentions are not translated into practices. 
For example, there may be unintended consequences involved. The 
problem with this viewpoint is that knowledge may be produced for 
reasons other than utility, such as explanation or intrinsic worth. Insofar 
as each of these meets a human need (such as the satisfaction of curiosity, 
or providing order in the world), a purpose is fulfilled or at least there is 
an intention behind the activity. However, a distinction can be made 
between these essentially intrinsic and extrinsic processes, which 
emphasise external purposes such as revaluations and rearrangements of 
allocative and authoritative resources in society. Intrinsic purposes may 
result in extrinsic gains; however, this is not their intention.
A sixth feature of knowledge is its capacity to transcend the 
uniqueness of particular standpoints, with a standpoint or position 
understood in an epistemological, ethical or geo-historical sense. There 
are two arguments being articulated here. The first of these is that non-
arbitrary or universal knowledge has generalisable properties so that it 
applies to objects with family characteristics and therefore transcends or 
goes beyond the particular. The second argument focuses on the notion 
of transferability insofar as an object has properties, which allows it to be 
relevant to a number of similar settings. The object is plural. The problem 
with this is that it assumes a particular ontology, which is that the world 
consists of individual and family items that are in a definite relationship 
to each other and, further to this, arbitrariness is equated with uniqueness. 
This is a difficult argument to sustain. However, the second argument 
suggests that if the world is constructed in this and not in another way, 
then it makes sense to say that knowledge is not arbitrary because it is 
a truthful representation of the world.
Two types of arguments are being used above. The first is that 
knowledge claims are legitimated on the basis of external relations of 
power, and the second is that knowledge claims are legitimated by 
principles intrinsic to knowledge itself. These intrinsic principles are: a 
greater rationality, that is, the giving of more or better reasons for actions; 
fewer deficiencies leading to a greater comprehensiveness or adequacy; 
an enhanced ability to bridge the divide between the epistemic and ontic 
realms; and higher levels of abstraction or theorisation. Knowledge, then, 
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it is argued, is non-arbitrary because it conforms to one, or more than 
one, of these internal principles. And knowledge is arbitrary if it does not 
conform to one or more of these principles. I suggested in chapter 12 
that knowledge and learning are homologous concepts and that this 
has implications for an understanding of the curriculum. This is the next 
part of the general argument that I need to make.
A curriculum perspective
Michael Young and Johan Muller’s (2007; 2010; 2015) curriculum 
argument is underpinned by two precepts; the first is that a curriculum 
should comprise objective knowledge and that a notion of objectivity is a 
precondition for any inquiry or practical application of knowledge in a 
curriculum. The second precept is that this knowledge emerges from and 
cannot be reduced to the contexts of its production and acquisition – 
it thus has some transcendental characteristics. This means that real 
knowledge and consequently powerful knowledge is emergent, non-
reducible and socially differentiated. The claims, then, that Young and 
Muller (2010) made are as follows: i) there is and should be a clear 
demarcation between curriculum and pedagogy; ii) the boundaries 
between knowledge domains and between school knowledge and 
everyday knowledge are not arbitrary and need to be maintained; iii) the 
guardians of these distinctions are teachers and other experts, especially 
those concerned with learning; iv) pedagogy has an ineluctably 
hierarchical nature; v) there are epistemological constraints on the scope 
of policies for widening participation and promoting social inclusion; 
vi) generic skills are deemed to be of less importance than subject-specific 
knowledge; vii) a distinction should be made and maintained between this 
subject knowledge, derived as it is from the disciplines, and information; 
and viii) boundaries in general have to be strengthened and maintained. 
Among the expressions of this boundary weakening are: the integration of 
school subjects; the stipulation of curricular content in generic, usually 
skill or outcome terms; the promotion of formative over summative 
assessment; the introduction of unified national qualification frameworks; 
and the promotion of facilitative rather than directive teaching. As we 
have already seen, these stipulations are derived from a fallacious 
Durkheimian epistemological perspective (1939)267 (see chapter 2).
267 Durkheim’s (1939) epistemological perspective is positivist and empiricist (see chapter 2).
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Young and Muller’s curriculum argument, then, is flawed on a 
number of grounds, principally that their conception of learning is 
erroneous. At the beginning of this chapter, I suggested that if one wants 
to critically examine a theory in the world (let us call this theory T1), then 
one has to do two things: first, set out a more complete or adequate theory 
(let us call this T2) and provide compelling reasons as to why T2 is complete 
or fundamentally sound; and second, show that the original theory that 
is being critically assessed (T1) fails to meet the standards or criteria 
implicit in T2. Young and Muller’s curriculum argument can serve in this 
instance as a T1, and thus can be compared with the curriculum theory 
that I have argued for in this book, T2. This theory (T2) begins with an 
explication of learning as a concept.
The concept of learning is potentially polysemic and can be 
understood only in relation to how it is used in the world. A key 
determination of the meaning of this concept is whether and in what way 
it relates to a meta-theory, which invokes a relation between mind and 
world, and which has transcendental elements. In line with Wittgenstein 
(1953), I suggested that concepts cannot be fully determined with regards 
to their meaning in definitional and essentialising ways, but only in 
terms of how they are used in a way of life. I then suggested that a 
distinction could be made between knowledge of the world and meta-
knowledge, which directly refers to knowledge of this world and not to 
the world itself. And further to this, that all knowledge, including 
knowledge of learning, uses or is enframed in criteria, whether these 
criteria are implicit or explicit.
Learning as a process has a set of pedagogic relations; that is, it 
incorporates a relationship between a learner and a learning object. 
A theory of learning pivots on the idea that there is an entity called, for 
the sake of convenience, a human being, and this entity has a relationship 
(both inward and outward) with an environment. As a concept, learning 
is fundamentally related to knowledge, and therefore if we are thinking 
about learning and the practices of learning, we also need to make 
reference to what is to be, and how it is, learnt. Typically, what we are 
aiming at in such considerations is some form of knowledge. Knowledge 
is fundamental to the three types of learning that I have identified: 
cognitive (relating to propositions), skill-based (relating to processes) 
and embodied (relating to bodily accomplishments). Prior to each of 
these is a set of dispositions, without which cognitive, skill-based and 
embodied learning would be unsustainable. Acting in the world requires 
the use of, and is underpinned by, conceptual frameworks of one type or 
another. Propositional knowledge or making a claim that this or that is 
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the case is, in common with the other two forms of knowledge, a process 
of doing and thus of knowing how to do something or other. And this 
results in all of these types of knowledge having the same general form, 
which allows them, in this form, to be understood as learning actions 
or acts of learning. In order to make a claim of knowing, we are not, as 
is commonly thought, providing a description of an experience (that is, 
constructing propositional knowledge), but making a claim about it 
in what has been described as ‘a space of reasons’; what follows from this 
is that we can and should understand and use concepts specifically 
in relation to current and future-oriented networks of meanings.
There are five types of object in the world, each of which has 
different characteristics: discursive objects, material objects, relational 
objects, structural-institutional-systemic objects – this type includes both 
discursive configurations and material configurations – and people, 
including the self, which is always experienced differently from the way 
other people are experienced.268 Each has different characteristics and, 
because objects have a dynamic structure, in rare circumstances they may 
change their status as objects; indeed, what constitutes an object-type is 
also dynamic. In an object-ontology, objects, including human beings, 
have acquired dispositions. This theory of learning needs to be positioned 
within a concept of curriculum. A curriculum indicates what is intended 
to happen in a programme of learning and the circumstances in which 
these activities can take place. The activities referred to here are learning 
activities; a curriculum is a collection of exercises and tasks that 
culminates in learning of one type or another.
This is underpinned by a number of axioms. The first is that there is 
a logical connection between the learning object and its pedagogic form 
and thus its learning mode. Theoretical and contextual considerations 
impact, then, on how elements of teaching and learning are realised. 
Acknowledging this allows the identification of a number of learning 
models: observation, coaching, goal-clarification, peer-learning, trial and 
error, hypothesis-testing, reflection, meta-cognition and practice (see 
chapter 12). Choosing between these models depends on the nature and 
constitution of the learning object; in other words, the former is logically 
dependent on the latter. A second axiom is that boundaries and categories 
used at the discipline or domain level, temporary as they are, cannot be 
translated, without serious distortion, into organisational principles for 
268 These five types of object, and the distinctions between them, are fundamental aspects of 
knowledge and being.
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the development of a school curriculum. And a third axiom is that 
curriculum work is enframed in epistemological, ontological and 
relational arrangements. Young and Muller’s theory of curriculum is 
replete with difficulties, aporias and unresolved dilemmas. This does not 
of course mean that it has not been enormously influential, since the 
power of simple messages (for example, their idea of powerful knowledge) 
is undeniable. This has implications for any theory of curriculum and 
assessment that we might want to develop.
The curriculum and assessment field
Classifying and categorising the field schematically is fraught with 
difficulty, and this is because a history, exposition, delineation or 
explanation of an idea is essentially a contested activity. Whether a person 
adopts a conventional view of narration or chronicling with its trans-
historical subject and immersion in originary knowledge modes, or seeks 
to genealogise such a narrative or chronicle by subverting the naturalness 
of the categories and delineations in common sense discourses, it is still 
important that he confronts his own position as historian, genealogist, 
expositor, academic or critic. In other words, the person still has to take 
account of the originary status of his viewpoint about knowledge, his 
epistemic position.
A curriculum points to what is intended to happen in a programme 
of learning and the circumstances in which these activities can take 
place. There are five possible curriculum frameworks (there may be more, 
but they have not yet been codified or much used in the world): the 
systemic-technological, the critical-reconceptualist, the cognitive-
constructionist, the interpretive and the instrumentalist. To these should 
be added neoliberal curriculum frameworks, focusing on competences, 
and extra-national single-surface comparative and assessment-driven 
implementation mechanisms.
Neoliberal curriculum frameworks are in the ascendancy. 
Governments around the world and coordinators and curriculum 
developers of systems of education such as Young and Muller (2007; 
2010; 2015), with a few notable exceptions, have reached an agreement 
about the nature of the school curriculum, learning approaches and 
assessment practices. This consensus now operates at all levels of 
education systems, and can be expressed in terms of a number of 
propositions: traditional knowledge forms and strong insulations 
between them need to be preserved; each of these knowledge forms can 
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be expressed in terms of lower- and higher-level domains, and the 
latter have to be taught before the former and sequenced correctly; 
knowledge can be understood in behaviourist and objectivist terms 
(see chapter 11); certain groups of children are better able to access 
the curriculum than other children, and, as a result, a differentiated 
curriculum is required to meet the needs of all school learners; the 
teacher’s role is to impart this body of knowledge in the most effective 
way, and thus his brief cannot concern itself with the ends to which 
education is directed, but only the means for its efficient delivery; and the 
school’s role is to deliver a public service that meets the targets set for 
it by governments and education systems.
The key to understanding these various curriculum models and 
frameworks is how each of them conceptualises the notion of assessment. 
Particular assessment practices reflect decisions that have been made 
and will be made in the future about who and what is assessed, for what 
reason and in what way. Assessment serves a wide variety of purposes, 
ranging from the most commonplace of exchanges in a restaurant, for 
example, to school reports and high-stakes examinations, from individual 
job interviews to national monitoring. What unites all of these is the sense 
in which assessment first and foremost is a proxy for determining the 
quality of something or someone. It therefore operates as a mechanism 
for placing that person or object in a particular hierarchy of values: this 
person is better than this other person with regards to a particular range 
of skills and this school is better than this other school because its students 
have graduated with better examination results. This spectrum of 
communication ranges from the most informal of exchanges to the 
extremely formal, the common factor being the use of assessment data of 
one kind or another as a publicly acceptable code for quality. Closely 
associated with this is the issue of legitimacy. The results of any particular 
assessment device have to be trusted by the public if the consequences are 
to be acceptable. Sadly, assessment issues are generally treated as 
technical matters, as focusing on improving the methodologies used to 
assess people rather than on the purposes or consequences of using such 
approaches, or as essential elements of a specific pedagogic approach.
What this means in effect is that on occasions clear contradictions 
and tensions between common assessment practices emerge. An example 
of this is the incompatibility between an increasingly test-driven 
educational and curricular culture and an explicit commitment to lifelong 
learning processes. Another example might be the tension between 
summative and formative purposes in an assessment. This learning 
agenda, exemplified in the notion of formative assessment, is at odds 
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with the use of punitive high-stakes testing, which has as its principal 
purpose raising standards, although the notion of a standard is in itself 
a contentious issue.
An extremely important aspect of assessment is its increasing 
internationalisation, exemplified by large-scale cross-national assessment 
studies, such as the Programme for International Student Assessment 
(PISA). It is possible to argue that there is now a world trade in educational 
policies, especially in relation to assessment issues. This ‘policy 
borrowing’, the take-up of apparently good ideas developed in one 
country by another, has further strengthened the grip of conventional 
assessment assumptions. Despite the significant evidence concerning 
flaws in international comparisons of student achievement (see 
chapter 4), the power of the simple messages that can be and are derived 
from them about relative national success in a world of increasing 
global competition has acted to reinforce the prevailing domination of 
established forms of educational assessment. The collection of data has 
become in itself a major instrument of social control, whether this is at the 
level of the individual, the institution or indeed whole operational 
systems such as that of education. And thus, we need to understand 
learning (making a knowledge claim in relation to a network of concepts 
and making the subsequent commitments that this entails) in historical, 
archaeological and genealogical ways.
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A history, archaeology and  
genealogy of learning
In this chapter I want to focus on learning, as a concept and as a practice, 
and its historical, archaeological and genealogical connections and 
relations. In the first instance, I need to consider how these three types of 
event-methodologies, which refer to events in the past and in the present-
past, can be distinguished from each other. Historical, archaeological and 
genealogical methodologies are framed by time, although this core 
category is construed differently in each of them. A further shared 
element is that they produce configurations of discursive objects, such 
as learning discourses relating to, for example, disengaged reasoning, 
curricularisation, scientism, atomisation, innatism, bureaucratisation, 
naturalism and representationalism. These discursive object-
configurations are understood in different ways historically, archaeo- 
logically and genealogically. The key, then, to understanding what they 
are lies with the types of relations that exist between objects in their 
formation and reformation.
Archaeology is the term used by Michel Foucault in his earlier 
writings (1970, for example) to describe his approach to history and 
writing history.269 This approach focuses on the discursive trace-objects 
and object-arrangements (the order of things) left from the past, which 
enable us to write a history in the present-past. He contrasted this with 
a genealogical approach.270 Although there is some confusion in his 
269 Michel Foucault focused above all else on writing a history of the present. In his later writings, 
this became a critical history of the present, or, as I am calling it, the present-past. He described his 
archaeological method as a history of thought, and not a history of ideas, and he did this because 
he wanted to uncover the discursive traces of distinct historical periods, each with its own types of 
truthful statements and orders of discourse (internal and external).
270 Michel Foucault understood the genealogical method as being qualitatively different from the 
archaeological method, although there are traces of each in the other. The archaeological method 
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later work about the differences between the two modes of historical 
theorising, this approach is designed to critically interrogate belief 
formations by attempting to explain the scope, extent, breadth and 
totality of discourses that are in existence. Both of these approaches are 
historical in a conventional sense, in that an event, a discursive or material 
happening, or a configuration relating to either of these, has occurred 
prior to other object-events, objects and configurations of objects. There 
is a temporal order between these objects.
Foucault revived the notion of genealogy as it had been used in 
the past, and in particular developed the idea from the one used by 
Friedrich Nietzsche in his On the Genealogy of Morality (1998).271 
Foucault’s principal concern in his The Order of Things (1970) is to 
offer an account of how knowledge through the ages has changed, and 
the implications this has for practices such as psychiatry and clinical 
medicine, and for disciplines such as economics, biology and philology. 
Throughout this book, I have pointed to historical, archaeological 
and genealogical ways of thinking, which operate at particular time 
moments in history. We might want to call them Weltanschauungen,272 or 
universal-views, held by a community in place and time – discursive 
configurations that are in history. Having said that, it is important not 
to overvalue and thus exaggerate the efficacy of the properties of 
these historical configurations, and especially the property of absolute 
reach or ambit.
Representationalism
An example of Foucault’s use of the archaeological method in The Order 
of Things (1970) is his explanation of the notion of representation, 
although this account also has genealogical elements. This is an 
focused on structural order, difference and discontinuities between the past and the present- 
past. The genealogical method tried to show descent and emergence, and the continuities 
between the past and the present-past. The differences between the two are not clear-cut. The 
point about a genealogy of knowledge as opposed to an archaeology of knowledge is to include 
within it elements of power and its many variations in the construction of knowledge and 
understanding.
271 Michel Foucault acknowledged his debt to Nietzsche and especially to Nietzsche’s On the 
Genealogy of Morality (1998). The commonality in their works lies in the subject matter of their 
concerns: the disunity of the subject, powerful practices, continuities and discontinuities in history, 
and experimentation.
272 The need to use a German word, Weltanschauung, here is because there is nothing in English that 
fully covers all of the various meanings that attach themselves to it.
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archaeological account of an object in the world – in this case, a discursive 
object and a discursive object-configuration. There is a historical element 
in his description of the discursive object, and this therefore implies that 
the one gives way to the other. However, the process of transformation 
from one discursive configuration to another cannot be characterised as 
occurring at a particular time point, as it is sometimes portrayed in 
popular histories.
The transformative process of a discursive object such as 
representation has three distinct stages or levels. In the pre-classical 
age,273 the concept of representation was understood as the employment 
of ideas to represent the object to which it referred. Knowledge was 
thought of as resemblance – the idea in the mind resembled the object it 
was seeking to represent. This pre-classical age gave way in time to what 
has been described as the classical age,274 a body of thought and thinking 
that was qualitatively different from what there was before. Again, we 
must be careful not to subscribe to a belief that this was how everyone in 
the world understood the relationship between mind and world. This 
Weltanschauung is a discursive object-configuration, which had its being 
in the mind, and had implications for how people lived.
In time, a new discursive formation developed, but not as a part of 
a preset pattern or ineluctable process. Whereas the pre-classical age 
understood the relationship as one of resemblance between things or 
objects, now representation was understood as a bridging mechanism 
between mind and world, and as an abstract structure that underpinned 
our knowledge of what was in the world and to which it made reference. 
René Descartes (1988), for example, suggested that we can have direct 
access to the abstract qualities of our thoughts, and we can also alter 
those thoughts in order to produce different representations of these 
objects. The classical view had to confront the difficulty of determining 
what an adequate representation of an object might be. This cannot be 
achieved by arguing that we can know the object by separating it out from 
its representation in the mind because this would preconfigure what we 
are attempting to describe. The only way to answer the question of what 
an adequate representation might be is through an external notion, such 
273 The pre-classical age is ill-defined in the work of Foucault, but certainly embraces the European 
Renaissance and much more besides. This problem of historical definition points to the need to 
reaffirm the idea that archaeological and genealogical time points are not and cannot be definitively 
set.
274 Again, the classical age can be only loosely identified. It would, however, include the European 
Enlightenment and more than this.
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as, in Descartes’ case, that it gives a ‘clear and distinct perception’,275 or 
in Hume’s case, that it is a simple impression.276 The classical theory of 
representation, then, is that of abstract qualities in the mind, with these 
being representations of what is out there in the world. Furthermore, 
because these abstract qualities were not thought of as being causally 
efficacious, they were not able to influence what was there in the world, 
and thus language and languaging could not have a fundamental role in 
the development of the mind and the development of the world.
The classical era, in its turn, gave way to what Foucault described as 
modern philosophy,277 and the story takes us up to and beyond Kant’s 
rejection of classical representation, although we should be careful not to 
position his critique as a specific historical event. Kant wanted to reject 
altogether the idea of representation as an appropriate descriptor of the 
mind–world relationship and replace it with something other than 
representation. He suggested that some thoughts or abstractions were 
themselves the product of processes that belonged to a specific epistemic 
order of the mind, which he called transcendental subjectivity.278 This is 
an example of the idealistic tendencies for which he has been and 
continues to be criticised.279 Kant opened up the possibility that all 
knowledge was essentially historical, and consequently could be applied 
only to particular and specific communities of knowers. This thought and 
injunction thus paved the way for the emergence of Nietzschean and 
indeed Foucauldian postmodernist and post-structuralist idealistic views 
of the world and especially those that referred to the key relationship that 
concerns us here: the relationship between mind and world.
In The Order of Things (1970), Foucault understood this post-
classical or modernist notion of representation through two important 
processes: the reinstatement at a conceptual level of the importance of 
language and the rebirth of man (sic) (and its swift repudiation). In the 
classical age, human beings were thought of as the site of knowledge 
275 Clear and distinct perceptions for Descartes (1988) are such because they are perceptions that 
prove to be self-evident. In other words, they cannot be doubted, although here doubting is being 
understood in a Cartesian (this is to be expected) and not in a Wittgensteinian sense.
276 Hume’s (2000) notion of simple impressions has a very similar meaning.
277 Foucault argued that the fundamental turning point in history for the modern period occurred 
with the publication of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason in 1781, although this seems to be somewhat 
early in the history of thought.
278 Kant’s notion of transcendental subjectivity (2007) has two dimensions. In the first case, there is 
what Kant referred to as the empirical self, and in the second case there is the transcendental self. 
This is an attempt by Kant to suggest a theory of subjectivity that is not impersonal, scientistic and 
atomistic. It is rooted in his idealist perspective, with subjectivity being another idea of the absolute.
279 cf. Strawson (1959).
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because they have in their minds those ideas that represent what is in 
and of the world. Foucault (1978b, for example), writing as a modernist, 
went on to disabuse us of this notion of a transcendental human 
being. This was because of, what he called, the ‘finitude of man’ (sic), and 
the ‘analytic of finitude’280 (1978b) that is attached to it. In the modernist 
era, some philosophers tried to compensate for this by grounding human 
beings in natural processes, substances or viewpoints. In its Romantic 
iteration, which Charles Taylor (1998) talks about so compellingly,281 we 
have an attempt at naturalising human beings, to in effect explain and 
justify knowledge in terms of natural processes and as being in conformity 
with what already existed in nature.
What Foucault was doing here was archaeology and not genealogy, 
although his discussion of representation and the various forms that it 
takes certainly has genealogical elements. This preferred methodology is 
now understood as the identification of epistemological and ontological 
elements in political, social, economic, ethical and taxonomic orders of 
reality. The key principle behind the archaeological method as he used it 
in the History of Madness (first published in France in 1961 as Folie 
et déraison: Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique) and the Birth of the Clinic 
(first published in France in 1963 as Naissance de la clinique: Une 
archéologie du regard médical) is that systems of thought and knowledge 
in general are rule-governed and define the boundaries of thought within 
a specific domain or period: what can be said and thought so that one can 
280 Foucault’s notion of the finitude of man is very like Heidegger’s (1962) version. Here is Foucault 
in his own words: ‘In one sense, man is governed by labour, life, and language: his concrete existence 
finds its determinations in them; it is possible to have access to him only through his words, his 
organism, the objects he makes – as though it is they who possess the truth in the first place (and 
they alone perhaps); and he, as soon as he thinks, merely unveils himself to his own eyes in the form 
of a being who is already, in a necessarily subjacent density, in an irreducible anteriority, a living 
being, an instrument of production, a vehicle for words which exist before him. All these contents 
that his knowledge reveals to him as exterior to himself, and older than his own birth, anticipate 
him, overhang him with all their solidity, and traverse him as though he were merely an object of 
nature, a face doomed to be erased in the course of history. Man’s finitude is heralded – and 
imperiously so – in the positivity of knowledge; we know that man is finite, as we know the anatomy 
of the brain, the mechanics of production costs, or the system of Indo-European conjugation; or 
rather, like a watermark running through all these solid, positive, and full forms, we perceive the 
finitude and limits they impose, we sense, as though on their blank reverse sides, all that they make 
impossible.’ (Foucault, 1970: 341–2).
281 In my copy of the book Sources of the Self: The making of the modern identity by Charles Taylor, 
there is on the flyleaf a handwritten note from my daughter: ‘Dearest Dad, Happy 50th Birthday, 
Lots of Love, Sarah’. Since I was 68 at the time of writing this book, I can identify the year my 
daughter gave me Taylor’s book – 2002. I have to say that since then I have read and reread it many 
times and gleaned from it a great deal of what little I know about philosophy. This book seems to me 
to be one of the most profound and enlightening works of philosophy that has been written. It has 
proved over and over again to be a source of inspiration.
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engage in an intelligible conversation. He used the genealogical method 
for the first time in Surveiller et punir (1975). Whether we call it 
archaeological or genealogical, the use of the method has implications 
for the history of a discursive configuration such as learning and, in 
particular, the idea of representation.
Symbol-processing accounts of learning
One of the consequences of understanding the mind as a vehicle for 
representing the world is that the learning process becomes a means of 
making a correct and given representation of it. A distinction can be 
drawn between symbol-processing views of learning and sociocultural or 
constructivist views of learning (see chapter 11).282 The first of these 
theories, the computational or symbol-processing view, conceptualises 
learning as a three-fold process of sorting, storing and retrieving coded 
information that has been received from an external source, which 
mirrors the way a computer processes data (see chapter 13). The mind is 
a tabula rasa, and learning comes from experience and perception. 
Information or data is inputted into the mind, and this consists of 
predigested facts about the world, which represent in a clear and 
unambiguous way how the world works. The theory of mind that this 
represents conceptualises each act of learning in input and output terms, 
and this assimilative process means that, as a result of the learning 
process, adjustments are made to the store of facts and theories that the 
person already holds, in the light of new information that the learner 
receives. This is a mechanistic, indeed technologised (see chapter 13), 
event-process, and the notion of interpretation is subsequently reduced 
to the assimilation of new information and the reformulation of the 
mindset of the learner. Learning is understood as a passive reflection of 
the world, with particular learning episodes being understood as more or 
less efficiently realised.
Symbol processing approaches have their origins in the philosophical 
theory of empiricism, proponents of which understood the world as given 
and then received by individual minds. Adopting this theoretical 
framework means that language is separated out from reality and the 
individual is separated out from society.283 The first of these, the language-
reality split, suggests that facts can be collected about the world, which 
282 cf. Bruner (1996).
283 cf. Bredo (1999).
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are atheoretic and separate from the belief systems of the collector. These 
facts are understood as true statements about the world. Furthermore, 
the theory of learning that emanates from it points to the need to discover 
what they are, and then develop appropriate models to explain them. 
The claim being made here is that language is a transparent medium and 
has the capacity to faithfully represent what is external to it. There is, 
however, a more appropriate solution to the problem of the relationship 
between mind and reality, which is that representations of reality are not 
given in a prior sense because of the nature of reality, or because the mind 
is constructed in a certain way, but as a result of individual human beings 
actively constructing and reconstructing that reality in conjunction with 
other human beings – some contemporary, some long since dead.
There is a second dualism that critics of symbol-processing 
approaches have suggested is problematic. This is the separation of the 
individual from society. If a learner is given a task to complete, she has to 
figure out for herself what the problem is and how it can be solved. The 
task is framed by a set of social assumptions made by the teacher. The 
problem with the symbol-processing view is that an assumption is made 
that both learner and teacher understand the task, and the way it can be 
solved, in the same way. However, this is an assumption that should not 
be made, and one of the consequences of making it is that the learner who 
then fails to solve the problem is considered to be inadequate in a specific 
way, rather than someone who has reconfigured or interpreted the 
problem in a way that is incongruent with that of the teacher or observer. 
(Here we have the birth or at least the rebirth of one of the most important 
concepts in the learning network, that of innatism.284) The individual/
civic distinction, which is central to a symbol-processing view of cognition, 
separates out individual operations in the mind from the construction of 
knowledge by communities of people, and this leaves it incomplete as 
a theory of learning. Even then, it still has archaeological elements.
Bureaucratisation
A different account of learning has bureaucratic elements. Max Weber’s 
(1964) notion of rational activity has three constituents: increasing 
knowledge, enhanced impersonality and improved control. Rational 
284 Innatism is one of the most powerful concepts in the history of ideas and it is used as a device for 
creating divisions between people, categories, concepts, societies, objects, object-configurations and 
much more.
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action presupposes knowledge insofar as it requires an understanding 
of those economic, political and social circumstances that form the 
backdrop of our actions, because to act rationally is in part to be able to 
reflect on them in relation to the probable consequences of any actions 
that might be contemplated. Rationalisation is here understood by Weber 
not as the post-hoc reinterpreting of a previous historical event but as the 
way in which we develop our ability to provide an accurate account of the 
world, which for Weber meant a rational account of the world. The second 
element in his thinking was impersonality, where modern societies 
demand a sense of objectification, such as in reducing the complicated 
lives of individuals to sets of numbers and placing them within suitable 
categories.285 For Weber, one of the seeds of this impersonality was the 
protestant vocational ethic, which was predicated on a monotheistic 
theology that reduced human beings to elements of God’s goodness. 
The third element is control. Rationalisation involved increasing control 
of human beings in the lifeworld, prompted in part by scientific and 
technological mechanisms, both material and discursive (see chapter 13). 
This meant that human beings were increasingly subject to legal, 
technical, political and social enablements and constraints, and, perhaps 
more importantly, forms of discipline and control that were reflections 
of the puritan ethic that so pervaded the society in which Weber 
lived. Weber called this an ‘inner-worldly asceticism’ and it has many 
of the meanings that Foucault found to be attached to the control of 
the body in his work on sexuality (cf. Foucault’s History of Sexuality, 
volume 1, 1978b).
A particular manifestation of the bureaucratic ethic lies with the 
discursive learning formation, new public management, and this has had 
significant effects on the governance of UK higher education institutions 
and, no doubt, elsewhere. The major goals of this discourse are to improve 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the public sector, enhance the 
responsiveness of public agencies to their clients and customers, reduce 
public expenditure and improve managerial accountability. In addition, 
it has resulted in the creation of a new cadre of managers. These new 
managers consume resources that could have been spent elsewhere, 
although the argument is made that they produce efficiencies. Such 
285 cf. Kim, ‘Max Weber’ (2019). Even simple mathematical computations such as a mean average, 
or a median average, or a model average, have reductionist tendencies. The mean is defined as 
adding up all the numbers you have collected and then dividing this by the number of numbers that 
you have. The median is the middle value in a list of numbers. The mode is the value that occurs 
most often. In all three computations, some meaning that is there in a list of cases is lost.
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efficiencies are achieved in a number of ways: by making staff (academic 
and administrative, although this distinction has archaeological 
dimensions) work harder and in more productive ways; by constructing 
and using a particular type of knowledge, broadly conceived as technicist 
and bureaucratic; and by injecting into the system as much competition 
as possible (this involves a reconstitution of the notion of academic 
identity, so that loyalty is towards the institution rather than to the 
discipline). New hierarchies are established so that old hierarchies 
constructed around a notion of academic capacities (expertise in the core 
activities of academic life, such as researching, writing and teaching) are 
replaced with hierarchies that are underpinned by bureaucratic forms of 
knowledge. The way signs are interpreted, and judgements made, is 
reconstituted by the bureaucratic model of organisation – this is the 
bureaucratic discourse acting in a causally efficacious way. Furthermore, 
these acts of interpretation and judgement are reduced to binary choices, 
and this affects how we can understand the object and how we can 
interact with it. Professional loyalties are marginalised, and rewards and 
sanctions are tailored to fit this model, so that knowledge construction 
within the academy assumes a new form, which relates to both the 
behaviour of the academic within the institution and her academic work.
Max Weber (1964: 219) argued that bureaucracies are ‘the most 
rational known means of carrying out imperative control over human 
beings’ and that a bureaucratic administration achieves its purpose by 
‘domination through knowledge’. He suggested that a bureaucracy has six 
features. The first is that the area of life which forms the bureaucracy 
should be delimited and governed exclusively by rules. This entails a clear 
division of labour (a hierarchical division of labour prevents duplication 
of roles, allows people to specialise and enables them to develop expertise 
in that area) and standard operating procedures. Second, a hierarchy of 
roles has to be set up with clear responsibilities and statuses, designations 
of power and authority, and chains of command. Power flows in a 
downward direction. Third, any actions performed by members of the 
bureaucracy need to be written down and preserved so that a permanent 
record can be kept, to allow accountability mechanisms to operate in the 
most effective way. Fourth, expert training for its members is a prerequisite 
so that the knowledge the bureaucrats possess is formed and reformed in 
accord with technological, organisational and market imperatives. The 
final two precepts are that members of the bureaucracy should devote 
their full attention to their work, and, more importantly, that they should 
become accustomed to learning, following and enforcing rules, which can 
be unequivocally interpreted. The overall effect is to increase efficiency 
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and predictability. Finally, these rules and regulations and the admi- 
nistrative procedures that accompany them are designed to limit personal 
favouritism and promote fairness and equity for the benefit of the 
organisation as a whole. The bureaucratic discourse is extremely powerful 
and has had powerful effects.
A theory of bureaucratic learning suggests that knowledge can 
be broken down into its smallest parts, with only those elements of it 
that can be incorporated into a bureaucratic view retained. The rest 
are discarded. This process therefore values, through elimination, 
those dispositional, propositional, skill-based and embodied forms of 
knowledge, learning and being that fit into a bureaucratic ethic and ethos. 
This mode of learning is rule-based insofar as the detheorised objects 
of learning, the pedagogic methods employed and, fundamentally, the 
assessment and evaluation practices that accompany bureaucratic 
learning, are given prior to, and priority in, any acts of learning that might 
take place, and reflect a particular arrangement of knowledge and learning 
practices that are hierarchical, identity-forming and reductionist.286 
Naturalism is another discursive configuration.
Naturalism
There was a family of views in the late eighteenth century that understood 
the natural as an inner source of motivation and action. It is possible to 
place these under the collective term of expressive romanticism – 
although we should be careful about placing all of its many iterations 
under one single banner or label. Each of these iterations has some 
elements in common; they have, in Wittgensteinian terms, family 
relations.287 In contrast to the classical emphasis on form, tradition and 
harmony, some romanticists argued for the expression of feeling and 
imagination in the construction of knowledge. There are two consequences 
of this. The first is expressive in a fundamental sense, so that we can talk 
about the nurturing of an inner voice; this echoes the development of the 
inner Catholic voice, which I suggested in chapter 8 might be regarded as 
an important Catholic pedagogy. The second is entering into a particular 
relation to nature, one of conservation, respect and care for it. In this 
sense, nature means more than just the environment but also extends its 
286 Bureaucratic modes of management have some very unpleasant consequences.
287 Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblances comes from the two books that, I think, best 
encapsulate his mature thinking: Philosophical Investigations (1953) and On Certainty (1969).
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meaning into what is considered natural. Thus, some sexual practices 
were considered to be abhorrent because they did not conform to what is 
natural or given (see chapter 6). We can then talk about a naturalistic 
ethic in which our behaviours, intentions and thoughts are aligned with 
a natural norm. This is also a form of legitimation in that human beings 
now had a clear way of distinguishing between those activities that are 
natural and those that are abnormal, and consequently those activities 
that they should own and those activities that they should disown.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau,288 as we saw in chapter 15, subscribed to a 
form of naturalism with regards to learning, with the natural process of 
the development of the child being commended and the unnatural or 
cultural view of education being an imposition, an unjustified and almost 
certainly injurious intervention, with damaging consequences for the life 
of the child. For Rousseau, our access to the natural is first and foremost 
inward and internal. It is also the harbinger of a notion of fulfilling our 
potential, an idea that was transposed in various forms into a harsh and 
unyielding expression of innate differences between people. This process 
reached its apotheosis in the revival of eugenics in the last part of the 
nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century,289 and also 
of course in the Holocaust in Europe in the middle of the last century. 
These racist theories persist to this day.
Another example refers to the boundaries we develop between 
concepts. There are many ways of describing and redescribing the world 
and thus of dividing it up into objects, object-relations and object-
configurations. And what this implies is that there are no criteria in and 
of the world that would allow us to say that one of these is superior to 
the rest. Natural differences between kinds constitute the boundaries 
between real entities; here I am referring to relations between different 
manifestations of an object, object-relation or object-configuration over 
time. Instead of talking about similarities and differences, perhaps 
we should be talking about the genesis and development of these 
differences and similarities. This implies that the similarities and 
288 In chapter 15, I suggest that there are some fundamental difficulties with the educational 
philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
289 Eugenics was a perfectly respectable doctrine in late Victorian and early Edwardian society, with 
Francis Galton from the university where I work (University College London) one of its most 
prominent advocates. James Watson, one of the discoverers of the DNA sequence, more recently 
argued along eugenicist lines. Another eugenicist working from University College London was Karl 
Pearson, whose claim to fame was the development of a number of statistical methods, such as the 
chi-squared test. There are some important and complicated connections and relations between the 
development of eugenicist beliefs and these analytical methods.
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differences that we formulate at the epistemological level are not only 
descriptions of kinds, but in addition are a part of a causal sequence and 
thus potentially have causal effects.
And what this means is that, first, all of these kinds are constructed 
human activities in history; second, these kinds of object are brought into 
being by human beings living with each other in physical, social, 
discursive or epistemic communities; and third, if those kinds can be 
formed, then they can also be reformed. Processes of classifying and 
reclassifying change the nature of objects, object-relations and object-
configurations. All references to the world involve the identification, 
manipulation, transformation and reconstruction of the categories, and 
we cannot avoid this. The scientific method, with its claims for the 
possibility of positional objectivity, that concepts can be reduced to 
measurable constructs, and that we should adopt a representational 
ontology, is negligent of these.
Romantic expressivism has a number of variations. What could be 
considered to be a learning object in formal educational settings was 
given an authority previously denied to it, in that some learning objects 
were considered to be natural and some were not. Because the romantic 
era essentially embraced an inwardness, a sense of inner reflection, a 
view of the person as a natural source of being, that needed to be opened, 
discovered and explored as a learning medium, this became the norm. 
This learning process assumed a relationship with nature that was 
wholly essential and good, and this view of learning marginalised the 
idea of learning as engaging in a reshaping of those objects in a life 
project. In order to live properly, human beings are enjoined to enter into 
productive relationships with nature, if only they can find the right way 
of doing this. To adopt a correct moral and practical stance towards 
nature is to develop an inner voice, and this becomes the essential tenet 
of learning.
A fourth learning element is that this directs us away from cognitive 
forms of learning and towards the cultivation of dispositions and 
sentiments. Even if sentiments are understood as a particular type of 
disposition, or even that all dispositions have sentiments at their heart, 
this still allows us to separate the two – to in effect divorce the one from 
the other in later time moments and in different Weltanschauungs or 
communities of practice. A fifth consequence is that the learner during 
the process of reconnecting with the environment, which was the source 
of the original learning act, is also enjoined to express (or articulate as 
with propositional forms of knowledge) that inner process of learning in 
the world. In the expressive act there is a sense of self-formation, both 
a hIStory,  arChaeology anD genealogy of learnIng 265
with regards to this inner being, which Christians refer to as the soul, but 
also to a shaping of the life project, and a capacity to be able to do this.
Curriculum and learning
I now want to focus on an important archaeological process – the 
curricularisation of knowledge for learning – and suggest that this should 
not be understood as an event occurring at a particular time point, but as 
an event-process in time. In the first instance, I want to give brief accounts 
of two important historical events: the curriculum in the early grammar 
schools; and the medieval university curriculum in England.
The grammar schools were different in function from the song 
schools, with the latter being almost exclusively concerned with 
performances of Christian rituals in the cathedrals290 and the former 
more concerned to provide a general education for the professions, as 
well as members of the clergy. Saint Augustine’s idea of a curriculum, 
being derived as it was from the Roman and Hellenistic schools of rhetoric 
(this word having a distinctive classical meaning and being different from 
its contemporary common usage), comprised the study of grammar, 
rhetoric, logic, arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy, with these 
considered to be a preparation for the professions of theology, law and 
medicine. In practice, these early grammar schools focused on Latin 
grammar and literature, as they saw their primary function as being to 
prepare initiates for the priesthood.
A second example of a curriculum event is the medieval university 
curriculum. In medieval England, the university curriculum comprised 
a six-year Master of Arts programme of study, which consisted of a 
combined Bachelor and Master’s degree. The curriculum, such as it was, 
comprised arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, music theory, grammar, 
logic and rhetoric. The trivium consisted of the latter three subjects 
and the quadrivium of the former four subjects. At a later period, the 
curriculum came to include three Aristotelian philosophies: physics, 
metaphysics and moral philosophy. The language of delivery was Latin, 
and the preferred pedagogy or method of learning was scholasticism, 
with its strong emphasis on dialectical reasoning, inferential analysis 
and the resolution of contradictions, usually in common texts. Having 
successfully completed a Master of Arts degree, some students went on 
290 This is a history and not a genealogy.
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to complete studies in law, medicine or theology, leading to a doctorate. 
These accounts of the development of the school curriculum and the 
medieval university curriculum are histories, with little reference being 
made to archaeological and genealogical elements.
A number of features of these curricula stand out. The first is the 
limited range of subjects covered, if we understand limited as referring 
to all of the possible human activities and all of the possible ways of 
understanding those human activities. The second is the reference to 
previous subject categorisations, in this case, Aristotelian categories. 
The third is that there was for a long period of time a common means 
of delivery and a common language to deliver it. This had the effect of 
developing a stronger boundary between scientific or first-principle 
knowledge and everyday knowledge (see chapter 8). It conferred a special 
status on the knowledge produced and used in schools and universities. 
The fourth insight that we can glean from these two curriculum accounts 
is that the divisions between the different knowledge silos are understood 
in highly abstract terms and not by reference to particular ways of living; 
so, for example, grammar is understood as the connections and relations 
between word-objects, word-complexes, sentence constructions and so 
on, as the written text (in Latin) decreed, and within this process and 
others can be seen the origins of absolutism or correctness in language, 
in this instance. In the twentieth and twentieth-first centuries, we can see 
the beginnings of a new notion of curriculum, which is underpinned by 
a new epistemological settlement. Its characteristics are: a much more 
clearly defined set of subject areas; an atomisation of knowledge in 
which each knowledge area is broken down into its most basic elements; 
justifications for knowledge practices that are discipline-specific (see 
Young, 2005; Bernstein, 2000); the choosing of knowledge items for the 
formal curriculum on the grounds that they can be tested or evaluated in 
formal procedures such as examinations; clear boundaries established 
between curricula and pedagogy; the development of learning practices 
that pivot on notions of fixed capacity and potentiality; and the acceptance 
of linear progressions and pathways through the knowledge canon. 
This form of curricularisation rapidly became the norm, and it was 
underpinned by a form of disengaged reasoning.291
291 Forms of disengaged reason are now dominant in meanings and practices that operate in the field 
of learning. They are hegemonic, with the most obvious example being the Research Excellence 
Framework (REF), which is laying waste to excellent research, writing and philosophy, driven on by 
management zealots who feel that this is the way we have to go and there is no alternative. There is 
an alternative, which involves refining our sensibilities and deepening our understandings of our 
relations with the world.
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Disengaged reasoning and curricularisation
It is possible to sketch out an archaeology of these two important 
processes as having three staging posts: an original theistic grounding 
of the notion of reason; a naturalism of disengaged reasoning, which 
took the form of scientism;292 and, as we have seen, a family of views that 
take their inspiration from a romantic expressivism, or even, and at a 
later point in time, one of the many modernist viewpoints, some of which 
are still with us. One form that this sense of disengaged reasoning took 
was a particular view of epistemology. When in the nineteenth century 
the social sciences were beginning to be developed, they did so under the 
shadow of the physical sciences. Therefore, as immature sciences, they 
sought to mirror the epistemic and methodological approaches adopted 
by the natural sciences (see chapter 2). And what this meant was that a 
rational and correct behaviour or judgement was construed as free of any 
form of valuation. This is a type of disengaged reasoning, and it was 
complicit in a new notion of curricularisation.
This new notion of curricularisation in the form of behavioural 
objectives comprised an atomisation of knowledge. This was an argument 
for precision, objectivity, prediction and the use of the scientific method 
to establish once and for all what should be taught in schools and 
indeed how educational knowledge should be ordered. Arguments for 
behavioural objectives were repeatedly made, and these comprised a 
notion of objective analysis whereby designated skills were broken down 
into their constituent elements. These skills were derived from the 
activities of experts in a variety of fields essential to the wellbeing of 
society, and curricular aims and objectives were derived from an 
objective examination of such activities. Furthermore, these skills and 
their component subskills were expressed as specific teaching objectives, 
which were so arranged that the curriculum was designed around 
them. This work is behaviourist in that learning is understood as the 
acquiring of these skills and the evaluation of sets of behaviours in order 
to determine whether these skills had been successfully acquired by 
the learner (see chapter 11). This is the origin of the behavioural 
objectives movement that influenced curriculum-making in the 1970s 
and 1980s, and which continues to shape global, national and local 
curricula round the world.
292 ‘Scientism’ is a term used by Jurgen Habermas (1981) and others to denote a mode of thinking 
that equates science with truth.
ON LEARNING268
What is noteworthy is the underpinning belief in science as the 
model for the essential practical activity of determining what should 
be included in a curriculum and how it should be delivered. Atomism, 
pre-specification and control are therefore foregrounded, with the 
curriculum conceptualised in terms of behavioural objectives and an 
input–output model of schooling. A behavioural objectives model has to 
be operationalised and, since the process involves the specification of 
observable performances and not inner states of being of the learner, 
behavioural indicators can serve only as approximations of these inner 
states. Words that refer to those inner states are acceptable as general 
statements of intent, but then have to be broken down into behaviours. 
The logic of this argument is that if words and phrases used in constructing 
objectives are clarified properly, they can be translated into actions for the 
learner, so that the verification of those behaviours is not open to 
misinterpretation. While it may seem that this follows directly from the 
need to clarify these objectives, in reality this introduces a new idea. The 
learner’s behaviour that is being evaluated can qualify as a proper 
objective only if it is capable of being evaluated in an unequivocal way. 
This would seem to preclude the evaluation of a number of behaviours 
and therefore a number of inner states of the individual because any 
use of them is always open to interpretation as logically they can be 
framed only in this way. Some worthwhile educational activities are 
designed to be open to a number of interpretations, and thus, within the 
strict boundaries of a behavioural objectives model, these would have to 
be excluded. It is clear here that the model fits certain types of activities 
better than others and, consequently, to include all worthwhile activities 
necessarily involves a distortion or packaging of some of them to fit the 
model. Examples of these might include the more expressive objectives 
of the curriculum.
There is a further problem with the atomised model of knowledge 
and learning that is being proposed. A subject or discipline is broken 
down into its constituent parts, which are then expressed in terms of 
behavioural objectives. In such a specification of the knowledge process, 
no account is taken of any unintended effects. Since the purpose is 
effectively achieved if the learner can perform the clearly and explicitly 
stated action, the means to achieve this become irrelevant. Consequently, 
there is both an issue about unintended effects and an issue about the 
ethical consequences of arguing that any means are appropriate if the 
desired end is to be achieved. Means, furthermore in this scenario, are 
treated as ethically neutral, because they are thought of as actions for 
reaching a particular endpoint. Means are judged by criteria such as 
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efficiency and effectiveness. With this clear separation of means and 
ends, governments around the world have developed curricula within a 
behavioural objectives model, and at the same time have intervened in 
the specification of the means as well. Thus, the logic of behavioural 
objectives has been commandeered to produce a performative model in 
which teachers are held accountable both for the production of good ends 
and the efficient following of means (teaching approaches) specified by 
outside bodies.293
In this chapter I have artificially separated out a number of 
key processes from a narrative about learning. These key processes 
are disengaged reasoning, curricularisation, scientism, atomisation, 
innatism, bureaucratisation, naturalism and representationalism. There 
are other processes and discursive configurations that there is not the 
time and space to discuss here, many of them given pride of place in 
Charles Taylor’s monumental archaeology of identity formations, Sources 
of the Self: The making of the modern identity (Taylor, 1998). It is also 
worth noting that Taylor sets out his work in a fairly straightforward 
historical manner, although of course his subject matter is not strictly 
historical events but important discursive and material formations in the 
history of the world. I have been referring throughout this chapter to 
the issue of time. In the next chapter I want to suggest that time and 
temporality are essential building blocks in the theory of objects and 
object-relations that I have developed in this book.




It is said that the Hopi people do not have a concept of time or have never 
developed an ability to conceptualise and use time (see Whorf, 1956).294 
This is hard to believe since they plant crops that mature at later periods 
of time than when they planted them – intention and purpose are time-
oriented. Despite there being no trace of a concept relating to past, 
present and future events in the language they use (Hopilavayi, a Uto-
Aztecan variety), this does not mean that they do not have a sense of time 
passing, since there might be a disjuncture between the language in use 
and the thought processes, beliefs and networks of meaning that are a 
part of how they go on in life. However, without some notion of time, the 
concept of memory – that is, remembering an event that happened in the 
past and is no longer happening – becomes a problem. This also reminds 
us that time is a concept and thus should be understood as a conceptual 
activity in the world.
Learning itself, if it is understood as an activity, has a temporal 
element to it. If we understand it as a process – event A produces or leads 
to event B, which in turn leads to event C – then we are identifying three 
time points, where each of these time points is arranged sequentially. The 
philosopher Henri Bergson (1999) suggested that the present is not 
in time but should be understood as presencing, where what this means 
is that any talk of the present and indeed any presencing activity is an 
intrusive act in the ceaseless flow of time.295 In addition, self-reflection or 
294 Malotki (1983) refuted Whorf’s claim that the Hopi did not have in their language any sense of 
time. He identified many examples of Hopi words and more importantly grammatical forms that 
refer to temporal relations. Malotki also argued that the Hopi language has tense constructions that 
distinguish between future and non-future tenses. This debate, and indeed dispute, shows how 
arguments can be conducted at one level, in this case the language level, and ignore other levels, 
such as the semantic one.
295 Heidegger (1962) borrowed from Bergson the notion of presencing, though his claim was that 
he used it in an entirely original way.
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taking part in an internal conversation or in an examination of the 
self (especially in a religious sense) all refer to past occurrences – they 
are never acts of reflection about present occurrences. The whole present 
is never available for self-examination. This notion of reflection and 
examination has important consequences for learning, pedagogic 
relations and going on in life (as we have seen in chapter 9).
For Martin Heidegger (1962), human beings are future-oriented296 
at every time point. He was concerned to repudiate a conventional notion 
of time, in which time is understood as a uniform, linear and given series 
of what he called ‘now points’ – the future is not yet in the present or not 
yet now, the past is no longer now, and the present is thought of as the 
confluence of past to future events at each and every time moment. For 
Heidegger, this is a weak sense of time and it implies that the present is 
always foregrounded. He was also concerned to avoid metaphysical 
notions of time. Heidegger wanted to enframe time within a notion of 
human beings ineluctably moving towards their end, which he called 
being-towards-death. The human being does not and cannot live in the 
present but always projects themselves towards their end.297 This 
projection into the future entails a carrying forward of the person’s 
having-been-ness;298 however, this does not mean that the person is 
inexorably a prisoner of his past. He can liberate or free himself from his 
past by choosing what he does. The present then can be captured in what 
Heidegger described as a moment of vision,299 leading to an authentic 
sense of being (or Dasein). Time can be grasped only as a unity of its three 
dimensions: past, present and future. However, time is finite; it ends in 
death. Time also has a use-function.
Categorisations of time and the temporal order
There are perhaps three categorisations of time in use. The first of these is 
fixed time, and this is best exemplified by scientific measurements such as 
atomic time. There are two different measures of this. The first is what is 
296 Zukünftig in the original German. The reason for providing the original German word is because 
translation (in this case from German to English) is never straightforward.
297 Zukommen in the original German. The reason for providing the original German word is because 
translation (in this case from German to English) is never straightforward.
298 Gewesenheit in the original German. The reason for providing the original German word is 
because translation (in this case from German to English) is never straightforward.
299 Augenblick in the original German. The reason for providing the original German word is because 
translation (in this case from German to English) is never straightforward.
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called international atomic time, which is a timescale based on 400 very 
precisely calibrated atomic clocks and comprises divisions between time 
such as 60 seconds constituting one minute or 60 minutes constituting one 
hour. These divisions are essentially arbitrary in that there is nothing in 
nature that corresponds to a second, but what a second is corresponds to 
agreements reached in history and retained in some form or another. The 
second measure of fixed time is what is known as universal or astronomical 
time, and here the standard used to differentiate one day from the next is 
the rotation of the earth and the actual length of a day on earth. A day 
represents a 24-hour rotation of the earth on its axis and a year represents 
365.25 days, or the equivalent of one rotation of the earth round the sun. 
Again, we should note that within this broad metric, the subdivisions of 
time, such as minutes and seconds, are arbitrarily chosen. It allows the 
timetabling and structuring of learning, especially in formal settings.
The second categorisation of time is what has been called biological 
time. In this mode, chronological age – and not it should be noted 
experiential or familiar time – is given precedence. An example in a 
formal learning setting such as a school is where children of the same age 
cohort are taught together and expectations of what they can do are 
framed in terms of being ahead, or perhaps more significantly (for them) 
being behind, those levels of knowledge, skill, dispositional or embodied 
acquisitions designated for this age group. The organising principle is 
time, and much flows from it, such as the comparative principle, which 
allows children to be compared to each other.
The third category of time is social time. Many of our temporal 
classifications are the results of decisions made in the past and the present 
about how we should organise learning, and each of these decisions, 
when formally ratified, builds on other decisions made in the past. 
Furthermore, the contexts, including the historical contexts of these 
collective decisions, may include different notions of relations between 
human activity and time. Particular attitudes towards time may have 
pedagogic implications, so that schools may choose to privilege what 
Anthony Giddens (1986: 35) has called ‘durable co-present interactions’, 
as in classes of children in different schools being taught about the same 
topic at the same time; this can be compared with fragmented temporal 
interactions, such as various forms of internet-based learning. These two 
examples of the influence of time on pedagogic arrangements point to the 
way in which different conceptualisations of time influence, and to some 
extent determine, the conduct of learning, and therefore how or what is 
acquired by learners. These conceptualisations of time can be construed 
as philosophies.
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Philosophies of time
A particular philosophical perspective on time is fatalism.300 This can 
be understood as an assertion that regardless of whether there is a 
human intervention or not, any event or happening in the future is 
unavoidable. It will happen. A number of objections have been made to 
this idea. There is no evidence (and this includes reasons) for the 
proposition since it is wholly future-oriented; that is, there are no signs in 
the present or the present-past to indicate or allow one to speculate that 
the future is already mapped out and consequently that there is nothing 
one can do about this. There is a way of determining whether fatalism is 
true or not, but this investigation would have to be conducted over a 
period of time and suffers from the flaw that there is no way of determining 
that the fatalist assumption at a first time point is an accurate prediction 
and does not in any way contribute to the state of affairs observed at a 
second time point. When we talk about an event happening in the future, 
the truth-value of this proposition is also future-oriented. We can tell only 
whether it is true or false by observing and being present at that future 
event. Propositions have truth-values at particular times rather than 
truth-values simpliciter or atemporal truth-values.
I have suggested how and in what way the present works in relation 
to the past (and this is why I am calling it the present-past) and equally 
how and in what way the present works in relation to the future. Every 
material or discursive event has a history, and this may be concealed. 
Further to this, when we make a decision in the present, we are inevitably 
thinking about what the consequences are of this decision being enacted 
in the future. This is different from understanding the past and the future 
as necessarily embedded in the present.
A dimension of time is necessarily attached to any change process 
– could there be a timeless process of change or a period of time when 
nothing changes? If the latter is possible, then it is also possible that a 
million years have passed (in what has been called objective time) since 
you started reading this sentence. This does not make a lot of sense as it 
assumes that objective time can pass without there being any change at 
all, and this assertion separates out time and change, so that they operate 
independently. We have moved here from a linguistic or conceptual 
argument or description of what is happening in the world to a belief that 
this is how the world actually works. What the opposing argument implies 
300 cf. Markosian (2016), ‘Time’.
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is that since we cannot separate out time from internal change in objects 
in the world and from changes to objects caused by interactions between 
objects in the world, we therefore have to understand time as a necessary 
element or property of all objects in the world and of all relations and 
interactions between these objects.
This argument has implications for the topology of the timeline 
since if we subscribe to the notion that time is a property of an object in 
the world or a dimension of object-relations, then the shape that 
the topological line can assume is dependent on the nature of these 
objects and object-relations. If, on the other hand, there is no necessary 
relation in a Platonic sense between time and objects in the world, time 
exists independently from the motion of these objects and relations. 
And this means that we can never know what the shape of the topological 
line is: is it linear and singular, or multi-streamed, or beginningless or 
endless, or branching, or a closed loop, or discontinuous? I have been 
focusing in this book on learning objects and their relations, and thus the 
topography of time has direct implications for curriculum progression, 
school timetables, examination syllabuses, disciplinary knowledge and 
learning trajectories.
There are multiplicities of time: lived, experienced, generated, 
allocated or used as an exchange. Time allows repetitive cycles of activities 
in formal institutions of learning and is usually expressed quantitatively. 
As a result, it can be separated into slots or blocks or sections and allocated 
for subject learning. This means that comparison, a key educational 
concept, is frequently construed in quantitative terms – this is not 
inevitable and has implications for how learning environments, formal or 
informal, are constructed in the present.
Our own obsessions with ordering time can in part be traced back 
to the ascetic daily rounds of Benedictine monastic life. It was in the 
monasteries of the West that the desire for order and power first 
manifested itself after the breakdown of the Roman Empire. Within the 
walls of the monastery there was sanctuary; under the rule of the 
Benedictine Order, surprise, doubt and irregularity were put to one side. 
Time, then, can also have this tendency to regularise the activities and 
actions of human beings, especially in their learning form.
A restricted temporality comprises the simultaneous coexistence of 
future, present and past events. This implies that since they coexist, 
human activity cannot alter the future-present. The universe is closed and 
not open and not susceptible to directional change. An example of this is 
where science postulates time laws governing the present, so that 
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future-present-past events are preordained before they are caused.301 A 
restricted form of temporality is not compatible with embodied agency 
because this involves the potentiality for transformative change. The 
universe is not yet made, which means that some form of separation 
between past, present and future events is necessary. This entails a 
modification and refinement of the idea that all present events and 
happenings have been formed in the past and in the future. When we say 
that a present event or happening is past-orientated, what we mean is 
that the conditions for decision-making and the instantiation of those 
decisions are antecedently formed, and when we say that future acts or 
happenings are always future-orientated, we are suggesting, and no more 
than this, that our limited understanding of what might happen in the 
future constitutes a dimension, albeit an important one, of our decision-
making and being in the present.
Temporal framings
Time is also influential in social theorising and thus in all of our relations 
with the world. We can contrast a naive realist position with a belief 
in radical relativism. Here, observations that we make about the world 
are never conceived of as theory-neutral, but are always mediated 
through temporal structures, time-paradigms and chronological 
worldviews. Furthermore, these are not just epistemological frameworks 
but normative beliefs about how researchers would like the world to be. 
The implication of this is that no one framework is superior to another 
and that we simply have to live with such value disagreements. The way 
in which we settle disputes is practical, by the exercise of power, whereby 
those with greater control of allocative (material features of the 
environment and the means of material production and reproduction) 
and authoritative (the organisation of time-space, the body and life 
chances in society) resources (Giddens, 1986) impose their view on the 
world. This results in various forms of idealism that imply a radical 
conjoining of thought and reality. Indeed, it challenges the distinction 
between statements and referents, and implies that statements refer only 
to other statements and not to any underlying reality. This can be 
301 This is why it is difficult to apply evolutionary theories to the full gamut of human activity in 
history, although evolutionary psychologists suggest that human behaviour in most of its 
manifestations is the result of psychological adaptations that evolved to solve problems encountered 
in past events and happenings.
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contrasted with the doctrine of naive objectivism referred to above, which 
signifies another conflation of thought and reality, but this time of a 
different order. Whereas naive objectivism collapses a description of the 
world into its referent, radical relativism does the same but in reverse 
order, collapsing reality into text.
For social and learning theorists, there is always a problem with the 
relationship between the agency of the individual and those relatively 
enduring structures within which they are positioned. Agency is a self-
constructed form of action; the person constructs and reconstructs himself 
in the course of his life and through other people’s accounts of him. It is 
forever in a state of flux. In addition, it is possible to suggest that those 
structural relations within which we are embedded are in history and 
therefore also subject to change. However, the most fundamental insight 
of the hermeneuticist302 is that these structural relations can be known in 
the first instance only through their reconstruction by a person or persons.
A naive realist position would suggest that structural influences 
can be understood without reference to the way in which they are 
conceptualised by individuals. An alternative position suggests that those 
structures and mechanisms that underpin social life are competently 
reflected in actors’ descriptions of the world and their worlds. In other 
words, social actors can give adequate accounts of their skilled 
performances under the right conditions, and these reflect how society 
works. A third position seeks to reconcile the first two positions. Agency 
and structure operate as a duality. Actors continually draw upon sets of 
rules and resources, which, once substantiated, allow social life to 
continue as they become normalised. Human beings make the world in 
the context of previous attempts by them and other people (this creates 
structural properties), and at the same time transform those structures 
and change those conditions that influence subsequent reconstructions of 
the world. Furthermore, while agency is responsible for structural 
transformation, it is also being simultaneously transformed itself. 
Structures therefore have only substance, and then only fleetingly, in the 
skilled performances of actors within society and over time.
Giddens’ (1986) ‘tendential voluntarism’ has been criticised by 
Margaret Archer (2007), among others, because it suggests too close a 
relationship between agency and structure. For Archer, social structures 
and systems have a relative independence from the activities and beliefs 
of social agents. Archer offered a solution to this dilemma, which she 
302 Anthony Giddens is an example.
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called analytical dualism. Even as she recognised the interdependence of 
structure and agency, she strongly argued for them operating on different 
timescales. At any particular time moment, antecedently operating 
structures constrain and as importantly enable agents; the interactions 
between them have consequences, both intended and unintended, which 
lead to structural elaboration, where much changes, or to stasis, where 
nothing changes. All of this is conducted over time. Social processes are 
an endless array of sequences of morphogenesis or morphostasis – their 
elements are temporally ordered. Some of these are brief, some take a 
long time. This allows accounts of how structural and agential phenomena 
interlink over time to be developed.
John Stuart Mill’s four principles of difference that I referred to in 
chapter 4 – agreement, difference, residue and concomitant variation 
(the third one that I referred to earlier is a combined method involving 
the first two principles) – formed the basis for three types of investigative 
models, which established the foundations of a temporal theory of 
causation. The first of these is the deductive-nomological model, also 
known as Hempel’s (1965) model, or the Hempel-Oppenheim model 
(1948), and this is an extension of the original logical positivist model. 
Here, premises, general law statements and statements of antecedent 
conditions (the explanans) allow a conclusion to be drawn, which is a 
statement describing the event (the explanandum). Temporality is thus 
built into this model. The second is the inductive-statistical model in 
which probabilistic or statistical generalisations are made, rather than 
general law-like statements resulting in probabilistic statements of 
antecedent conditions. This is the dominant model in the field of 
education around the world. Hempel’s model was reworked by Karl 
Popper (2002), so that instead of confirming a conjecture or theory, its 
truth-value depends on whether or not it can be potentially falsified. 
These three models attempt to both explain what is happening in the 
world and predict what might happen in the future. It is the element of 
prediction that locates these theories in the temporal dimension. The 
emphasis on constant event patterns that allow the possibility of 
predicting future events – this pattern is not just present-orientated but 
extends into the future – is a consequence of understanding causation in 
this Humean303 way and of understanding cause-and-effect relations as 
constant conjunctions rather than the interplay of deep-lying mechanisms 
in open systems (see chapter 4).
303 cf. David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature (2000).
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A further point about time is relevant to the architecture of objects 
and object-divisions that I have argued for in this book. I have asserted 
previously, and perhaps in a somewhat unreflective manner, that there 
are five types of object in the world: discursive, material, relational, 
configurational and persons. It might be argued that there is no clear 
distinction between, or no good reason for separating out, discursive/
material objects and configurations of objects because even discursive/
material objects are dynamic and configurational – they have a variety of 
characteristics at particular moments of time. What distinguishes the two, 
however, is their temporality – a configurational object (as an object-type) 
endures over a longer period of time – and their generality – an object is 
singular, a configuration is plural.
Learning temporalities
I have suggested in this chapter that time and temporal relations can 
be understood in a variety of ways, which has implications for how 
we conceptualise learning. This means that those many linguistic and 
conceptual manifestations of time – order, organisation, synchronisation, 
change between fixed points, rates of change, repetition, regulation, 
duration, sequencing, irreversible direction, passage, the rate at which 
events occur, timing, parameter and measure – can be and frequently 
are enframed in different ways. For example, the temporal dimension of 
order can be understood as a Foucauldian technology of power and truth 
or as a rational way of arranging human affairs. In the former case, power 
through time is understood as diffuse, embodied, enacted, discursive and 
constitutive of agency.
An important dimension of learning is time and temporal relations. 
This works through activities such as: progressions and trajectories of the 
learner; knowledge formations; progression and emergence of learning 
objects and relations between them; logical prerequisites of learning 
objects and relations; institutional temporal relations such as timetables, 
lesson durations, school days and learning holidays; examination and test 
progressions; age-related competences and more. Indeed, it could be said 
that time and temporal flows are essential to understanding the concept, 
process, institutionalising and practice of learning. In addition, it is 
possible to argue that the way we conceptualise learning is deeply 
embedded in temporal enframings. Our investigations of learning are 
structured, paced, timed and sequenced. Time becomes an ever-present 
idea in any thinking we might want to do about what learning is and could 




Many philosophers have argued that time and space are not ultimately 
real; they only appear to be so. What is real, and this is of course a 
contentious issue, is not subject to temporal and spatial conditions. For 
example, Plato (1997) suggested that ultimate reality resides in the 
forms, which are neither time-bound nor spatially dimensioned.304 
Christian philosophers such as Saint Augustine of Hippo sought to affirm 
the existence of an everlasting and ever-present God.305 This God was the 
source of all space and time relations. Immanuel Kant (2007) argued that 
human beings experience the world as located in space and situated in 
time, but that this was in the mind and not outside it. For him, these 
experiences were intuitions and inferences concerning space and time. 
Thus, it is only in a weak sense that he asserted the objective reality of 
these two important categories. Space and time are bound up with their 
particular manifestations and for him only the particular could be real.306
Classrooms, learning environments and educational institutions 
have different spatial geometries, which support certain types of 
interaction and communication. Prominent among the many spatially 
oriented learning systems that have been developed are: distance learning 
programmes; massive open online courses (MOOCs); hybrid learning 
models; and blended pedagogic learning accessories. As I suggested in 
304 In the Timaeus, Plato (1997) understood time and space as eternal forms. Time, he identified as 
the period of motion of the heavenly bodies, and space as that in which things come to be.
305 In his Confessions (2017: 201), Augustine of Hippo suggested that: ‘(y)ou are not the mind itself. 
For you are the Lord God of the mind. All these things are liable to change, but you remain 
immutable above all things.’
306 Immanuel Kant (2007: 39) wrote as follows: ‘(s)pace is a necessary a priori representation that 
underlies all outer intuitions. One can never forge a representation of the absence of space, though 
one can quite well think that no things are to be met within it. It must therefore be regarded as the 
condition of the possibility of appearances, and not as a determination dependent upon them, and 
it is an a priori representation that necessarily underlies outer appearances.’
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chapter 13, all of them aim to deliver learning in more efficient ways, 
with efficiency understood as: accessibility; flexibility; hypertextuality; 
better control for learners in the pedagogic relationship and over the 
curriculum; more equal relations between teachers and learners; 
and more accurate identification and feedback processes leading to 
better forms of progression. Many of these advantages are exaggerated; 
however, it is still possible to suggest that learning processes are not 
just enhanced by technologies, but fundamentally changed by them, 
so that new types of knowledge are being created, with subsequent 
wash-back effects on identity formations and learning positions taken 
by these learners.
With regards to learning environments, spatial orientations include 
notions of: open; distance; distributed and flexible learning; student-
centredness; border-crossings; communities of practice; the spatial 
ordering of people; a spiral curriculum; spatial identity positionings; and 
comparative learning methodologies. Michel Foucault (1986) referred to 
the current world as the era of space in the sense that we are now in and 
formed by simultaneous, juxtapositioned, near and far, side-by-side and 
dispersed sets of relations.307 Such relations have significant consequences 
for the formation of learning environments, and we need to understand 
their spatiality.
Spatiality
In this book I have argued throughout for the existence of five types of 
object: discursive objects, material objects, relational objects, confi- 
gurational objects and persons. Objects have emergent properties that 
interact with each other and, as a result, new properties are created or 
emerge from old combinations of objects. This means that the relation 
between the structure of objects and the agency (agencies) of the person 
(or people) is the key framing device at the ontological level. Spatial 
relations, then, are one dimension of how we organise objects in the world.
On 23 June 2016, Britain voted to leave the European Union and 
thus establish a new political geography.308 Brexit has been characterised 
as an issue of sovereignty, although this is better understood as a 
displacement rationale. This is because Brexit, in whatever form, will 
307 cf. Foucault (1997).
308 At the time of writing, the United Kingdom had not yet left the European Union.
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not be a reclamation of sovereignty. Rather, it is about new arrangements 
of power in the world and specifically about how that power can be 
distributed and thus exercised. Being inside or outside the European 
Union, then, may not be the most significant issue; rather, it is about the 
UK’s capacity to resist globalising pressures, in relation to their intensity, 
the velocity of these global flows and the impact they are likely to have – 
all of which have spatial elements. However, it would be a mistake to 
think that globalisation, a spatial phenomenon, acts as the sole driver 
of policy and practice within an individual country, and therefore it 
would be a further mistake to understand the process of globalisation 
as deterministic, linear, inevitable and all-embracing, and to argue that 
global influences are always more powerful than national interests 
and agendas.
Globalising processes, insofar as they have real effects, work in two 
ways: first, national governments operate within global markets and 
therefore fashion their policies to fit this agenda or to exploit it; and 
second, national governments are subject to pressure from forces outside 
their jurisdiction, which influence their policies and practices. Further to 
this, the success of any intervention (by another body operating outside 
the boundaries of the State), or at least the path it takes, is not just 
determined by the system into which it is being introduced but also by the 
type of intervention that is being made. Interventions are time sequenced, 
so they are likely to have different effects at different moments in the 
history of a nation.
This takes place against a background of an apparently growing 
commitment to improving and, in part, standardising social institutions 
and practices, seen as important in the light of dominant market-based 
theories, and against a backdrop of neoliberal ideas. The most widely 
predicted response to the global financial crisis of 2008 was a return to a 
more measured Keynesian approach, and yet capitalism, markets and 
neoliberal economics still seem to be in the ascendancy, and this has 
direct consequences for nations around the world.
Globalisation works in a number of ways; for example, it can be 
understood as a cultural phenomenon. So instead of distinct national 
forms and identities, there is a cross-fertilisation of ideas, a creation of 
hybrid cultural forms, a homogenisation of culture, and a standardisation 
of cultural products. This may lead to a sense of cultural sameness or 
conformism. Globalisation also points to the establishment of globalised 
markets and global consumer identities.
Globalisation can refer to the nation state and the ways in which its 
powers have declined; an example of this is the way in which global 
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capital has now broken free from national boundaries. This means that 
local legal codes, currencies, habits and customs now serve as constraints 
on the free movement of capital across national boundaries. Another 
manifestation of globalisation is the expanding nature of capitalisation.309 
This can take a number of forms. For example, it is spatial as capital seeks 
to fill the potential social, geographical and physical spaces available to it. 
Capitalisation may also expand through the invention of new types of 
commodity, and it may act to intensify or deepen and develop its influence 
in the world.
Globalisation may also refer to the way in which the labour process 
is constituted and reconstituted, and, in particular, to how all of the 
activities involved in work are commodified; and as a result are given a 
value so that a profit can be made in relation to any surplus that can be 
created. Traditional modes of working, notions of public service, and 
sets of professional ethics give way to the need to make a profit, as 
systems, institutions and people reconfigure themselves and in turn 
are reconfigured by global forces.
These new forms of globalisation coalesce around notions of 
the commercialisation, privatisation and capitalisation of social goods. 
Commercialisation describes the ways in which institutions, their 
products, their protocols and their epistemologies become marketable 
properties. Privatisation involves the takeover (either directly or 
indirectly) of schools, hospitals, universities and the like for the purposes 
of generating profits. Capitalisation entails labour taking on a new form, 
so that profits can be made from any surplus value. It also involves 
the erosion of public service values. It changes the nature of labour (its 
motivation, its purposes, and its organisation and management) in 
social institutions.
What globalisation implies is that the world now comprises multiple 
and developing spatial relations: a complex system of finance, production 
and trade; a positioning of corporations around the world; and these 
flows of capital and goods. These may lead to certain pathologies, or at 
least potential pathologies, such as excessive financialisation, debt-
dependence, exploitations of people and, perhaps more fundamentally, 
environments, and distortions of the three orders of reality: the natural, 
the practical and the social, and our spatial relationships within them.310 
309 Capitalisation – what it is, how it works and how it could work – is the key issue in world politics 
at the moment.
310 Margaret Archer writes as follows: ‘(c)onstituted as we are, and the world being the way it is, 
human beings interact with three different orders of reality: the natural, the practical and the social. 
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These pathologies are better counteracted at the supranational 
rather than the national level, and, with regards, for example, to 
issues concerning environmental sustainability, at the global level. 
Conceptualising a notion of globalisation also has implications for how we 
should understand policy learning models and their spatial dimensions.
Policy learning models
Change within a system can have spatial dimensions. An education 
system is an example of our fourth type of object – a spatial configuration. 
Knowledge-transfer between nations identifies a set of successful 
practices, which are then transferred to another national setting, in 
which a problem or need has been identified. Previously, such models 
were thought of exclusively as processes of borrowing policy from 
other countries or jurisdictions, and then turning these policies into 
practices, which were subsequently implemented. However, this is a 
flawed model if we are to understand change as inherent in a system and 
learning as a necessary part of the process. It would be wrong for us to 
see this kind of activity exclusively as borrowing rather than as a deeper 
form of learning, just because of the origin of the policy under 
consideration. Bearing that in mind, it is helpful to explore a number of 
different models to see how far they represent examples of this kind of 
deeper learning through engagement with alternative external models.
The first of these alternative models focuses on reconciling the 
external policy model, borrowed from countries or jurisdictions where 
it seemed to be operating in a successful or effective way, with local 
conditions in which these policies are to be implemented.311 This consists 
of providing a working model of the practice to be transferred, 
understanding how context impacted on that model – both contextual 
elements of the donor country or jurisdiction as well as contextual 
elements from the recipient country or jurisdiction – stripping out these 
contextual elements from the model being implemented and then 
replacing them with those contextual elements that were found to be of 
significance in the recipient country. This model suffers from a common 
fault in knowledge transfer processes, which is that it is assumed context 
We have to sustain organic relationships, work relationships and social relationships, if we are to 
survive and thrive. Therefore, we cannot afford to be indifferent about the concerns that are 
embedded in each of these three orders.’ (Archer, 2002: 132).
311 An example is Phillips and Schweisfurth (2008).
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can be stripped out of these theoretical models without in some 
way distorting or impoverishing the models themselves, and that in 
like fashion recontextualising these models so that they are fit for the 
new environment does not consequently lead to a distortion of the 
original models. In short, it would be better to start from scratch 
and develop a model of a productive practice that is wholly appropriate 
to the recipient setting.
However, this model can be usefully amended. It still retains a 
notion of transfer and replacement of one context with another. And it 
still retains the element of transformation prior to implementation. It is 
more precise about the activities at the different stages of the process. The 
first step is where the investigator provides a description of the focus of 
the investigation. She then identifies a mechanism within the country 
from which the policy is being borrowed. A third step is understanding 
how this mechanism works – epistemologically, socially, politically 
and geo-historically – in the original country; in other words, identifying 
those features in this country that allow the mechanism to work as it was 
intended or at least as it has been adapted to a new set of circumstances 
(over time but still within this same country). A fourth step is identifying 
another country that seems to be a suitable recipient for this mechanism 
because it seems to have some similarities to the donor’s context. A fifth 
step is identifying those similarities and differences that exist between 
the two countries. A sixth step is making a judgement about the degree of 
similarity and difference between the two settings and subsequently 
about the amount and type of change required for the mechanism to work 
in the country for which the policy transfer is intended; this also requires 
a judgement to be made about whether the mechanism is working or not. 
This involves predicting how one mechanism, which seems to work in 
one particular setting, should work in another that is characterised by a 
different set of structures. And finally, having identified the consequences 
of transferring the mechanism to the new country, the policy transfer is 
allowed to take place.
A third model is a policy-learning model, and it therefore has built 
into it the characteristics of a learning process. An accepted, but not 
uncontested, view of learning is to theorise it as a process, with a range of 
characteristics. It has a set of pedagogic relations; that is, it incorporates 
a relationship between a learner and a catalyst. A change process is 
required, either internal to the learner or external to the community of 
which this learner is a member. In any learning episode, there are 
temporal and spatial arrangements, and these can be understood in two 
ways: that learning is internally structured, and that learning episodes 
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are externally located in time and space. This has the advantage of 
resembling more organic forms of learning and is likely to be more 
durable over time.
Globalisation and policy transfers, then, operate at a macro-level. 
Micro-level properties and processes also have spatial elements, such as: 
the shape, positioning and function of school buildings; classroom 
arrangements such as the positioning of the teacher’s desk, the 
arrangement of children within the classroom, the storage of books and 
other resources; the spatial dimensions of reading a text such as the 
proximity, direction, layout and organisation of objects in the text; the 
spatiality of a timetable; the element of the curriculum that focuses on 
space, such as geography; the way in which knowledge is spatially 
formed, both in discursive communities and around the world, with 
direct implications for the curriculum; and the embodied nature of 
learning. All of these and more point to the importance of space in 
learning discourses and in the construction of knowledge. In the last 
chapter, I want to return to two important epistemological issues: what 
knowledge is and how we can know anything at all.
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A conclusion – learning as  
a disposition
I have used a variety of textual devices in this book (referentiality, 
linearity, fragility, corrigibility, enframing and coherentism) and I want 
to draw attention to some of them here. The first of these is the insertion 
of a large number of references – an unusually large number – to other 
chapters in the book. This is designed to show that every concept being 
used here has a referential structure, in that every conceptual (and 
thus semantic) activity is framed and then reframed in relation to the 
possibilities that inhere in the concept and in a network of other concepts. 
This demands a complicated reading of this text, although no more 
difficult than reading an encyclopaedia, dictionary or work of reference. 
The point of this is to suggest or show that one important part of the 
argument I am making is that meaning, or the semantic dimension, is 
both dynamic and embedded within a network of other concepts, with 
their own semantic possibilities.
A second device that I have used here is more traditional. This refers 
to the linear structure of the text, in which a series of premises are 
introduced and justified, connections and relations are established 
between them, and conclusions are then drawn. In contrast, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein organised his material in the two books with which I have 
been principally concerned – the Philosophical Investigations and On 
Certainty – in units of remarks. In the first paragraph of the Preface to the 
Investigations, he suggested that: ‘I have written down all these thoughts 
as remarks, short paragraphs, sometimes in longer chains about the same 
subject, sometimes jumping, in a sudden change, from one area to 
another’ (1953: Preface). He qualified this in the second paragraph, after 
first suggesting that he had tried to write philosophy in a conventional 
manner, in the following way:
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… my thoughts soon grew feeble if I tried to force them along a 
single track against their natural inclination. – And this was, of 
course, connected with the very nature of the investigation. For it 
compels us to travel criss-cross in every direction over a wide field 
of thought. – The philosophical remarks in this book are, as it were, 
a number of sketches of landscapes, which were made in the course 
of these long and meandering journeys. (Wittgenstein, 1953: 
Preface)
This hypertextual mode has a non-linear structure. The textuality that it 
implies mirrors the structure of the substantive argument that is being 
made and is not solely the result of Wittgenstein’s natural modesty. My 
textuality in this book, then, is of a more conventional type. I have set out 
an argument, and the elements that make up this argument, and nothing 
more; that is, I have been making a case for a particular viewpoint about 
knowledge and learning, and what they refer to.
A third device concerns the fragility of the writing, and what I mean 
by this is the sense in which I as the author have had to struggle throughout 
with finding the right words, set of words, sentence constructions, 
paragraph arrangements and so forth, which can approximately bridge 
the gap (an ever-present and always-changing gap) between the text that 
I have produced and what it refers to outside of the confines of the text 
itself. If we abandon the idea of categorical and timeless definitions of 
words that represent in some magical way what is out there in the world, 
then the attempt at writing the world into being is always a struggle and 
always insufficient. The point I am making is that this is not a confession 
of inadequacy, but an acknowledgement that our words, word-sets, 
sentences and paragraphs are never adequate or sufficient and cannot 
be so given the task that is being attempted – although most writers 
addressing issues to do with learning are unaware of this.
A fourth device that I have used here is to discuss at all times and in 
as many ways as I can the issue of corrigibility. Am I correct in what I say? 
Am I producing truthful knowledge? Is this the best I can do? If one wants 
to criticise a position taken by someone else, or if one wants to make a 
claim that this other position is insufficiently evidenced or superficially 
formulated or conceptually inadequate or logically deficient, then one 
can do this only by comparing it with a position that is evidenced or in 
depth or conceptually adequate or logically sufficient. In short, one needs 
criteria about truthful knowledge in order to make a judgement about a 
position or approach. If one wants to correct an idea, then one has to have 
some foundation from which to do it.
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A fifth textual and methodological device is that in every word, 
word-complex, sentence, paragraph and chapter in this book, I have 
made a series of assumptions about the world and my knowledge of it, 
some of which are explicit, some of which are not. These preconceptions 
can be broadly summarised as: a realist theory of ontology and thus of 
epistemology (what this cannot imply is that everyone is a realist); an 
ontic and epistemic theory of valuations; that we can know the world but 
only with the greatest of difficulty; and that these key ontological objects 
– knowledge and the world – should be analysed as separate entities. This 
textual device is one I use throughout the book and is of some significance.
A final textual and methodological device that I have used 
extensively in this book is to set a series of general arguments against 
other arguments developed by other people. I referred to this in the 
preface to the book. The point is that this is what most philosophers 
and thinkers actually do, even if they do not always make it explicit. 
This leaves open the possibility that one could write an archaeology of 
learning without such referencing and, indeed, there must have been 
a time in which every thought was new or at least not related to what 
other people said.
What you have just been reading is a text and a particular type of 
text. As a text, I have argued throughout that it is a signifying practice, 
and as a signifying practice it has to question its own textuality and indeed 
the discursive contents to which it is committing. This argument also 
places in suspension the notion of certainty that Wittgenstein in his later 
period of writing was so concerned about. Before I discuss this, I want to 
set out two key learning discourses that have been influential in the field 
or space of learning.
Learning discourses
The theory of learning that I have outlined in this book has to be 
set against current and other discourses – discursive configurations – of 
learning. A discourse is a set of propositions about the world joined 
together by a set of connectives and relations that offer an account of an 
object or objects in the world. This formulation of discourse (as concepts-
in-use) will become clearer in the accounts of discursive formations that 
I offer below. It refers to a person, although this does not signify an 
essentialist or fundamentalist form that the human being takes or can 
take, and is in part focused on the nature, role and position that the 
individual can assume (but is not necessarily assumed for him) in relation 
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to a discursive construction. Below I critically analyse two influential 
discursive constructions in the field of learning: school effectiveness and 
field construction.
One of the most influential framings of learning over the past 30 
years in the United Kingdom is the school effectiveness/school 
improvement discourse. School effectiveness research has its origins in 
a general dissatisfaction with the deterministic and pessimistic view of 
schooling which suggested that schools, teachers and education generally 
have little effect on the different ways in which students perform in 
schools and subsequently. Other background factors are more influential, 
and there is little that schools can do to counteract their effects. The 
discourse is deliberately designed in opposition to this. Thus, the 
suggestion is that schools and other educational institutions can make 
a difference to the life chances and lifeworlds of individuals, and that 
these educational factors can be measured.312
Indeed, the claim is now made that it is possible to plot the different 
ways in which those background causal factors can impact on the 
learning experiences of children. However, despite advances in statistical 
techniques, mathematical modelling is able to deal only with those 
background influences by processing them in particular ways. The 
problem lies with how the variable, as a conceptual framing device, is 
understood and used. We have here a process of knowledge reduction, 
insofar as the variable works as a representational device and this 
leads to an illegitimate conclusion that this in fact is how reality is 
constituted (see chapter 4). An example of this is the effects of one-family 
parenthood on children’s development, which is assumed to be the same 
for all children of one-parent families. Although it is now possible to plot 
changes in family status over time, what it is not possible to do is model 
312 This discourse has also influenced research into higher education. Here are the first three of ten 
principles of effective pedagogy that emanated from the work of the Teaching, Learning and 
Research Programme in the United Kingdom (TLRP, 2010): ‘PRINCIPLE 1: Effective pedagogy 
equips learners for life in its broadest sense. Learning should aim to help individuals and groups to 
develop the intellectual, personal and social resources that will enable them to participate as active 
citizens, contribute to economic development and flourish as individuals in a diverse and changing 
society. This means adopting a broad conception of worthwhile learning outcomes and taking 
seriously issues of equity and social justice for all. PRINCIPLE 2: Effective pedagogy engages with 
valued forms of knowledge. Pedagogy should engage learners with the big ideas, key processes, 
modes of discourse, ways of thinking and practising, attitudes and relationships, which are the most 
valued learning processes and outcomes in particular contexts. They need to understand what 
constitutes quality, standards and expertise in different settings. PRINCIPLE 3: Effective pedagogy 
recognises the importance of prior experience and learning. Pedagogy should take account of what 
the learner knows already in order for them, and those who support their learning, to plan their next 
steps. This includes building on prior learning but also taking account of the personal and cultural 
experiences of different groups of learners. 
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mathematically the different ways in which family status impacts on 
individual children at different points in their lives, because there are 
conceptual elements involved in these relationships. The relationship has 
to be expressed in a linear fashion to meet the methodological demands 
of such modelling. Furthermore, the methodology being employed 
suggests that values are not an important dimension of understanding 
what happens in schools and other educational institutions. Ideas such as 
gender, social class, teaching style and management are all value-rich 
concepts; that is, they do not function purely as descriptive terms, but 
operate to impose a particular way of ordering on the world. They are 
ideological constructions, even if they do not compel the recipient, and 
need to be understood as such.
School effectiveness/school improvement researchers disregard the 
contextual, the historical and the social; the preoccupation with what 
works ignores the question of whose interests shape the nature and 
process of the work. There is no recognition of the problematic nature of 
curriculum or of the possibility that schooling may be organised in the 
interests of, for example, dominant ethnic groups, males or the ruling 
classes. Indeed, the socially situated nature of the discourse, which at 
the same time seeks to conceal its sociality, is deficient with regards to 
how knowledge of self and others is constructed by society and through 
educational processes. Discourses can be fractured, full of contradictions 
and internally incoherent, but still hold together. This is because their 
internal relations are not only logical, but also refer inferentially and 
retroductively to other social, political and epistemological discourses 
and practices in the world.
Discourses can frame political agendas. Norman Fairclough (2000), 
for example, suggested that the new UK Labour Government between 
1997 and 2010 developed an educational agenda that was underpinned 
by a combination of a social integrationist discourse, with the focus on 
shifting people from welfare to work, and a moral underclass discourse. 
He argued that there are three possible ways of framing notions of 
equality as a political discourse. The first is a redistributionist discourse, 
which focuses on reducing poverty by redistributing wealth. A second 
discourse is socially integrationist in form, and here exclusion is primarily 
caused by unemployment and other social problems, with the solution 
being to reduce these high levels of unemployment and get people into 
work. And the third discourse, a moral underclass discourse, is perhaps 
more significant, insofar as deficiencies are identified as existing in the 
culture and experiences of those who are excluded, with the solution to 
this being cultural change and the imposition of education programmes 
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to facilitate inclusion. This last is therefore very much a deficit model, 
which focuses on the right ways of behaving in society, rather than on 
specific outcomes from particular socioeconomic arrangements. The new 
Labour governments of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries 
were also attracted by communitarian thinking, which attempted to link 
three themes: economic efficiency, social cohesion and morality.
UK Conservative and Coalition Government policy after 2010 was 
more concerned with issues surrounding the erosion of responsibility 
in society, caused, as their political representatives repeatedly stressed, 
by an overwhelming paternalistic state. The prime ministers during 
this time, David Cameron and Theresa May, argued for a collective culture 
of responsibility and an ethos of self-betterment. The state in this vision 
has two principal roles – the efficient delivery of public services and early 
life interventions – achieved through paternalistic nudges to the populace, 
described by others as guided choice strategies. If this does not work, then 
the state is forced to mobilise its repressive resources to ensure the good 
order of society, and these punitive measures can take the form of either 
the withdrawal of goods usually provided by the state or restrictions 
on people’s freedom.
Another discursive construction is the field. Field formation in the 
first place is a discursive activity. Values are central to the activity of 
research; that is, both the values of the researcher and the values of those 
being researched. These values, or conceptual frameworks, are located 
within historical contexts or traditions of knowledge (see chapter 5). The 
production of knowledge, therefore, has a close relationship with the 
way in which society is organised. However, to conceptualise knowledge 
and power as inseparable is to erect too rigid a straitjacket on the 
relationship between social arrangements and knowledge (both about 
them and other matters). This argument can be extended to the realm of 
curricula or to the way in which knowledge is produced and reproduced 
in educational institutions by examining one element of the process: the 
way knowledge is organised (its boundary definitions). The argument 
that I am making here is that how we divide up knowledge has an effect 
on the way we can and do understand the world.
Each discursive field has a history, is composed of individuals with 
different projects who form and re-form them at different moments 
and in different ways. (I am using this term to describe a specific 
demarcation or boundary point between domains of knowledge.) There 
are, therefore, micro-political struggles within the history of each field. 
But, more importantly, at the level of the academy, those struggles involve 
the establishment of various organs of dissemination and of criteria by 
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which the knowledge-producing activity is judged. In the first place, a 
new field needs to produce: books and articles in academic journals; new 
journals that reflect the epistemological assumptions of the field; 
positions of office in universities; access to the popular media; the 
development of a cadre of taught and research students; research funding 
for projects; and the establishment of a coterie of loyal referees for 
journals and research projects. The paraphernalia of field formation is 
often hard-won, frequently involves excursions down blind alleys, and 
is a risk-taking business.313
An example in the field of education is the development and 
maintenance of its professional association, the British Educational 
Research Association (BERA) and its principal organ of dissemination, 
the British Educational Research Journal (BERJ).314 It understands its 
primary function as supporting a particular view of education and 
ultimately its practices, although these do not emanate in a straight- 
forward manner from the discursive construction. That is, it is possible 
to support all of the different epistemologies currently and in the future 
that swirl around in the allocated discursive space; that the issue of the 
differences between them can be resolved by focusing on perceived 
commonalities at the strategic and method levels, rather than at the levels 
of ontology and epistemology (the issue of truth is attended to, but 
only in a decontextualised and reductionist form; for example, cf. Moss, 
2015); that it is possible to collect evidence that allows one to make 
unequivocal claims about how educational systems and people actually 
work and that these claims are in some sense transcendental; and that the 
collection of people who make up the particular community can come 
together and agree about educational judgements of institutions, texts 
and persons, and how they can be made. Indeed, the recent emphasis on 
awarding prizes for the best of this or that is evidence, first, of a particular 
approach to knowledge development and, second, of a commitment to 
current social practices rather than to critical evaluations of them.
But, more importantly, the field needs to establish three sets of 
criteria before it can be considered to be fully formed: first, it has to have 
created a set of criteria by which its knowledge can be evaluated; second, 
it needs to have formalised a set of definitional criteria that includes 
and excludes what is considered proper knowledge; and third, it needs to 
313 It is remarkable how many people in higher education have succumbed to the blandishments of 
such a discourse, even though they are also and at the same time committed to notions of social 
justice, equality and fairness.
314 The bulk of these remarks were published as a BERA blog in 2018.
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be able to offer a set of methodological criteria through which an initiate 
may operate – a set of procedures that delineates a practitioner from a 
non-practitioner. While some of these moves are more successful than 
others, they are always subject to decay, argument, dispute and change. 
The field itself always has to operate with and between other discursive 
fields, for example, the wider field of policy. Macro-political influences, 
therefore, have an influence on the way the field comes into being, and 
indeed practitioners (especially in the field of education) may deliberately 
shape their thinking to chime with policy moves, either actually in 
existence or projected.
These two discourses, and there are more, act as the background to 
what can be said about learning. More importantly perhaps, in most 
instances they take the place of criteria for determining truthful 
knowledge. Bearing this in mind, I now want to address the issue of 
knowledge and doubting.315
Knowledge and doubting
Here are some meta-level propositions that I have argued for in this book: 
i) we should read and try to understand the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
a philosopher who died nearly 70 years ago; ii) there are five types of 
object in the world – discursive objects, material objects, relational 
objects, configurational objects and persons; iii) human beings have 
dispositional features; iv) learning and knowing are homologous 
concepts; v) there are four types of learning: cognitive, skill-based, 
dispositional and embodied; vi) doubting a proposition does not mean 
that one cannot know what it is about; vii) human beings can reflect on 
knowledge that they have already acquired; viii) a school effectiveness 
discourse is seriously deficient; ix) there are five conceptions of truth 
(there may be more, but they have not yet been invented, or codified): 
truth as correspondence, truth as coherence, truth as what works, truth 
as consensus and truth as warranted belief; and x) I am the author of 
this book. The question that should concern us, and does not concern 
enough people, is whether these are true propositions about the world. 
Wittgenstein’s fundamental concern was to rework the notion of certainty, 
to include within it an idea of doubt, and to repudiate the full range of 
sceptical arguments.
315 This was my initial starting point in this book.
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Wittgenstein was interested in trying to answer the question of what 
it means to doubt something.316 In On Certainty he suggested that 
ordinarily the sceptic doubts individual propositions and not meta-
propositions, such as the enframings of individual propositions. In 
response to this, Wittgenstein (1969: §247) asked the question: ‘What 
would it be like to doubt now whether I have two hands? Why can’t 
I imagine it at all? What would I believe if I didn’t believe that? So far 
I have no system at all within which this doubt might exist.’ And further 
on in the book (1969: §274), he suggested that it is easy to doubt 
individual propositions in isolation, but much harder to do so if we place 
these propositions in a network of other propositions: ‘(e)xperience can 
be said to teach us these propositions. However, it does not teach us 
them in isolation; rather, it teaches us a host of interdependent 
propositions. If they were isolated I might perhaps doubt them, for I have 
no experience relating to them.’ What this means is not that there are 
objects in the world that enter into relationships with other objects in the 
world, but that the meaning of these objects resides in the network of 
objects of which they are a part. Wittgenstein is here making a semantic 
point, and at the same time reaffirming the idea that doubting a 
proposition about a state of affairs in the world is not an invitation to 
adopt a sceptical position towards knowledge as such but an entirely 
legitimate part of knowing the world or acquiring knowledge of this 
world.
René Descartes (1988) developed the idea that radical doubt leads 
to foundational certainty. Wittgenstein was much more circumspect 
about the possibility of knowing something, even though he included 
as a prerequisite of this process of knowing that we should doubt the 
proposition if we are to know it (1969: §115): ‘(t)he game of doubting 
itself presupposes certainty’. However, Wittgenstein did not believe that 
every proposition is open to doubt or should be doubted as a necessary 
part of determining its truth-value, because some propositions are basic, 
and therefore we should call these propositions foundational or primitive 
(1969: §341): ‘(o)ur doubts depend on the fact that some propositions 
are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn’. 
316 In On Certainty (1969), Wittgenstein addressed many more arguments against scepticism than I 
have referred to here. In line with the general argument of the book, I have sought to show that 
concepts should be understood as dispositional attributes of human beings, that they are acquired 
and that this renders much educational research redundant. One of these concepts is doubt or being 
doubtful. This is in line with the remarks made by Wittgenstein in On Certainty.
a ConCluSIon – learnIng aS a DISPoSIt Ion 295
Furthermore, one can doubt something, that is, exercise a doubting 
disposition, only if the way of life that one has chosen to belong to has 
an attitude of trust and doubting already established within it.
For Wittgenstein, certainty rests on the possibility of doubt, despite 
his assertion that there are some primitive propositions that cannot be 
doubted. This last seems to me to be an unnecessary concession to those 
who argue that radically doubting everything can lead to foundational 
certainty. Doubt implies the possibility of epistemic, logical, rational and 
practically adequate corrections to any proposition that we might want to 
make, or that we are having to deal with, and, as Wittgenstein explained 
at some length, it is manifested in particular types of action. As with 
learning, doubting is an acquired disposition.
It is almost a truism to say that the self-aware sceptic is actually 
committed to what he denies, even if this is an exception to the general 
claim. In On Certainty, Wittgenstein repeatedly claimed that the sceptic 
does not understand the meaning of the words he is using (1969: §456): 
‘If, therefore, I doubt or am uncertain about this being my hand (in 
whatever sense), why not in that case about the meaning of these words 
as well?’ On Certainty can be understood as a refutation of transcendental 
knowledge, or meta-knowledge as I described it in chapter 2, and this 
can be contrasted with an ordinary, everyday certainty of knowledge, 
to which he subscribed (1969: §7): ‘Why do I not satisfy myself that 
I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on. 
– I tell a friend, e.g. “Take that chair over there”, “Shut the door”, etc. etc.’ 
It is also a continuation of the fundamental argument he proposed in the 
Investigations, that understanding the world is a semantic activity. Any 
investigation of the truth-value of propositional statements, then, such 
as those with which I began this section of the chapter, have to examine 
in the first instance the possibilities and, as importantly, limitations, of 
the words, word-sets or linguistically structured concepts that are being 
used with the purpose of determining meaning. The aim, first and 
foremost, is a semantic one.
This can hardly be called a completely satisfactory solution to the 
problems of knowledge and learning, although it might be a start. That 
these notions are complicated is a given, and that these solutions are 
incomplete is accepted; but what I hope the book does is provide some 
purchase on the most important issue of our times: the impoverishment 
of learning. It hardly needs saying, but I will say it anyway. This book has 
been a rejoinder to: empiricist and positivist conceptions of knowledge; 
detheorised and reductionist conceptualisations of learning; regressive 
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and degenerative notions of curriculum; the propagation of simple 
messages about learning, knowledge, curriculum and assessment; the 
employment of punitive forms of power; the use of bureaucratic power 
mechanisms in new public management strategies; and the denial that 
values are central to understanding how we live and how we should live, 
with this valuing going all the way down, into our descriptions of the 
world, into those attempts we make at creating better futures and into our 
relations with other people. And then there is Brexit … The barbarians 
are at the gate.317
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A general theory of objects  
and object-relations
This is a philosophical work that develops a general theory of ontological objects and 
object-relations. It does this by examining concepts as acquired dispositions, and then 
focuses on perhaps the most important of these: the concept of learning. This concept is 
important because everything that we know and do in the world is predicated on a prior 
act of learning.
A concept can have many meanings and can be used in a number of different 
ways, and this creates difficulty when considering the nature of objects and the 
relationships between them. To enable this, David Scott answers a series of questions 
about concepts in general and the concept of learning in particular. Some of these 
questions are: What is learning? What different meanings can be given to the notion of 
learning? How does the concept of learning relate to other concepts, such as innatism, 
development and progression?
The book offers a counter-argument to empiricist conceptions of learning, to the 
propagation of simple messages about learning, knowledge, curriculum and assessment, 
and to the denial that values are central to understanding how we live. It argues that 
values permeate everything: our descriptions of the world, the attempts we make at 
creating better futures and our relations with other people.
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